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ABSTRACT 
In confining this Commentary to the first 62 sections of the Lucullun 
my intention has been to make a special study of Antiochus' case against the 
Academic sceptics. Although this is the only full-length counter-argument 
against Academic scepticism which we possess (despite the many works written 
by both aides in a controversy spanning more than two centurios), duo attention 
has not been paid to it. Scholars have ton'led to use Cicero's work as a 
source-book for Antiochus' general philosophical views or to corfino their 
attention to the sceptic case. Even if consideration has been given to the 
dogmatic case As well (as by Stough, Crr k Skanticinn), there has teen a 
certain bias in favour of the Academic sceptics. This is possibly due to the 
fact that the scepticism of the Academy has in itself a strong appeal and 
that it has the final word in Cicero's work. But I do not think that Lucullus' 
argua: onts, whatever their shortcomings, are woakor by conpwrioon. 
The Luaullus is, not only an extremely important philosophical text, 
it is also one of the most difficult. Reid's Commentary is very valuable 
but his interest was more literary and goneral than strictly philosophical. 
Diy own Commentary is concerned solely with the philoscphical content of the 
dialogue and takes account of relevant work on Hellenistic philosophy since 
Reid's edition appeared at the end of the last century, I have tried to 
place the ar, umonts and philosophical issue: in their ancient context, either, 
by moans of plausible inferences whore direct evidence is lacking or by 
reference to c? issical texts. I am aware that the problem of knowledga is 
still an issue to-day and I have made use of soma modern works on the subject, 
in elucidating particular arguments, but, in genoral, I have limited roferances 
to modern philosophy to a minimum in ordsr not to impede understanding of 
Cicero's text rid not to widen excossively the scope c. the Commentary. The 
text used is that of Planborg (Teubner, Leipzig, 1922). 
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AßTRF; V? ATIONS' 
I have in general used the standard abbreviations for classical 
texts, source books and journals. When referring to works of, Cicero, 
I have not given the name of the author, except to avoid ambiguity. In 
referring to the Acade 1oa Priori, I have given the section numbers only. 
For the Academica Poeteriora, I have used either Ao. I or I. 
Other abbreviations regularly used include the following: 
Bailey, Greek Atomasts C. Bailey, ThR Creek Atomists and Epicurus 
Brochard ' V. Brochard, Lon Scepticue4p*recß 
Dillon J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists 
Hirzel, Untorsuch. R, Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros 
rhilonophicclien Schriften 
Long, I1. Ph. A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy 
Plasberg 0. Plasberg, Teubner text of the Academica 
Problems A. A. Long (editor), Problems in Stoicism 
Raid J. S. Reid'u edition of the Arademica 
Robin L. Robin, P-rrhon et In scepticicne pree 
Stough C. Stough, Greo'r. Sknnti. ciom 
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INTPODUCTION 
A. Clot-role Lucul]u8 
The Lucullu3, otherwise called Acadcmica Prior. II by some editors, 
is the sequel to another dialogue, the Catulus, now lost. Both constituted 
a single work -rd were intended to be an exposition in dialogue form of the 
controversy 'etween Anz; demic scepticism and Greek philosophical dogmatism, 
tte cs:: ief exponent of which in Cicero's time was Antiochus of Ascalon. One 
of Cicero's aims was to champion and popularise the New Academic case, so 
that although the work included the case of Antiochus ('Antiochia', At±. XIII, 
12,3; 19,5), Cicero was more inclined to see it as a treatise which as a 
whole concerned the Academic philosophy ('haeo Academical, Att. XIIr, 19,5)"1 
There-is perhaps nothing surprising in this since Antiochus also claimed to 
be an Academic, but Cicero refuses to see him as such, at least in the 
dialogue. 2 It is clear that he considered his work as a whole to be a 
defence of the Academic sceptical philosophy (cf. Ac. II, 7), and both the 
later title of the work and'his description of it in his letters and elsewhere 
already shcw his bias for the New Academic case and against Antiochus. 
3 
We do not, of course, know whether Cicero would have actually entitled 
the first version of his work the Academica, or Academici libri., as he later 
4 
called his revised and official version. Most of his references are to the 
later version, but since he himself uses the titles 'Catulus' and 'Lucullus' 
Cf. 'Axab-qµLxý a6vicaý, cc, Att. XIII, 12,3; 16,1. 
2F.. 
g. 12 'Antiochum contra Academicos (disserentem)'; 137 'plane Stoicrs'; 
143 'a Chrysippo pedem nusquam'. 
3r. 
g. Tusc. II, 4 'pro Academia autcm quad iiicenda essent satic accurate in 
Academicis quattuor libris explicata arbitraznur. ' 
4Hence the commonly accepted titles, Academicd Priera and Posteriora. The 
phrase 'in Academicis' (Tim. l; Off. II, ß; cf. 'de Academicis', Att. XIII, 13,1) 
suggests the use of the neuter plural as a title (Reid p. 37). I'lasbcrg, on 
the other hand, understands 'in Academicic' as a masculine with 'libris' 
omitted, and takes the neuter plural 'Academical to refer to subject-matter 
only Praef. X). Ile moreover confines the title 'Academici libri' to t}'a 
second version. 
9. 
in his earliest explicit reference to the first vorcion (Att. XIII, 32,3, written 
on the 29th May 45 B. C. from his villa at Tuseulum), 
lit is possible that 
these would have been his official titles for that early version. If so, 
Cicero may have been plenning a sort of trilogy with the three dialogues 
(Hortensius, Catulus, I. ucullus), having the same characters (Hortensius, 
Catulus, Lucullus and Cicero) and taking place at the villas of Lucullus, 
Catulus and Hortensius respectively. 
2 Although Cicc: o himself clearly 
regarded the second as the, authentic version, the first was also published; 
Quintilian (111,6,64) refers to it as the Catulus and Lucullus. Plutarch... 
(Luc-4293) refers by name to the Lucullus. 
We also know that, before starting on his second, versiong Cicero, had 
been dissatisfied with the 'prohoimia' of his early version and had added 
new ones (Att. XIII, 32,3).. The present proem of the Lucullus is most likely 
the amended version. But despite this modification Cicero was still not 
satisfied. From his letter to Atticus of the 28th June written from Arpinum 
(Att. XIII, 16,1)we learn that, prior to his decision to recast the work and, 
at Atticus' suggestion, make Varro the mouthpiece of Antiochus, he had 
already transferred the discussion of the first version to Cato and Brutus. 
This, it seems, he did on reaching Arpinum around the 21st June. 
3 Despite,,, 
some hesitation as to whether he had, made the right decision about Varro, 
the new version was completed befo. "e the end of Juna (Att. XIII, 14,1; 18,1;. 
In Att. XII, 44,4, written on 13th May from Asturs, where he had retreated 
after the death of Tuliia, he mentions the completion of 'duo magna 
OL VT&'tuatia I* This has been taken to refer to tht two volumes of the 
first version of , the Academlca, or, less probably, to these with either. - the ITartensiuc or the 1)0 F'inibuc (Reid, p. 30-31: Plasberg. Fraef. VII-VIII). 
11. Ruch, 1,2 pv mhu]o inns lN_oeuvrer. rh1i rýnhiý1 gfl de CicÄron, has a 
whole chapter on the circumstances surrounding the r. ompoaition of the 
Aceflemtca. it is uncertain when Cicero started work on the first version. _ 
2AC. II, 9. For the scene of the Hortensius, hSchol., Cic. Verr. II, l, 54. 
3The 
date is from Att. XIII, 10,3Awhen he was planning to leave Tuaculux. 
10 
19,3). Cicero continued to have doubts and still hesitated to 'send the book: 
to Varro (Att. XIII, 22,1,4th Julys XIII, 23,3,8th July). We find him even 
contemplating giving tha part of Varro to Brutus (Att. XIIx, 25,3). But there 
was to be no third version and by the 20th or 21st of July the work had 
already been cent to Varro (Att. RIII, 44,2). 
Cicero's main reason for being dissatisfied with the first version was 
that the subject-matter did not fit the characters. He had come to feel that 
to represent Catulus, Lucullus and IIortensius taking part in a philosophical 
discussion of this nature would be moot implausible and it, proper because of 
their &'rpL4rta in such subjects Att. XIII, 16,1; cf. XIII, 12,3). The subtlety 
of the arguments was such that they could not even have dreamed about them 
(XIII, 19,5). A-ticus' suggestion of Varro was seized on as a 'godsend' (Att. 
XIII, 19,5), since voicing Antiochuc' case could suit no one better (XIII, 16,1). 
The other literary faults of the first version can also be guessed from the 
fact that Cicero considered his second version to be 'splendidiora, breuiora, 
meliora'(XIII, 13,1). He"obviously was much more pleased with it and boasted 
that the Greeks themselves had nothing like it in this particular field of 
literature. The two volumes of the first version were divided into four 
(of which part of the fi-_-at and come fragments remain), and though the amount 
of material. wao cut down, Cicero considered the four books to be 'grandiores' 
(Att. XIII, 13,1). l 
On the other hand, the author's doubts about choccing Varro as a 
character and dedicatir the work to him are fully ui. dorstandable. It meant 
abandoning his earlier principle of avoiding envy by portraying no living 
person other than himself in his-dialogucs (4tt. XIII, 19,3-4). As a scholar, 
not a man of affairs, ZVerro could not typify Cicero's ideal of a.. philosopher- 
1'Grandiorea' has nothing to do with length hero (contra Reid, p. 35). 
11 
ctatesman. 
1 There were other reacons of a more personal nature. Varro had 
not yet. honoured his promise to dedicate to Cicero a work of his own (Att. xiii, 
12,3), and Cicero was not entirely convinced that he wished to receive the 
dedication(XIII, 14,1). Moreover, both Moro and Atticus seem to have been 
nervous of possible criticism from Varro(XIII, 25,3; cf. Roid p. 34-5). "In spite 
of. his confidence in the merits of his work, Cicero could visutline Varro 
complaining 'moss paruis in its libric copiosius defensas eeoc quarr cuan' 
(ibid. ). 'Though Cicero strongly denica that this in so, 
2 i, reins true 
that the can for the sceptical Academy has the last word in the dialogue, 
and that Varro might thorofore havo had grounds for fueling displeased with 
tho way the caso of Aptiochus had been presentod" 
D. Philonorhical B: ickr*roirnd 
1. The eceptica1 Ac demy before Mile 
Academic scopticism started with Arccsilas (316/5 - 241/0 S. C. ). 
3 
There was later a controversy as to whether scepticism was somothinc new in 
the Academy or not (cf. -13 ff. ). But though the issue was discussed with' 
much partiality, it is virtually certain that it was due to Arcosilas that 
the Academic philosophy became charreteristieally one of , 
doubt,. propounding 
the basic sceptical thesis that nothing can to kno'? n. 
Arcesilas directed his sceptical attacks chiefly against the Stoic 
theory of the cataloptio impression and their theory of ascent. An impression 
((Pav%acta ) is, according to the Stoics, an image that arides in the leading 
part (rYc µoVtxbv) of the soul, and must necessarily arice if a porceptual 
1Soo 
p. 67 of this thesis. 
2Cf. Att. XIII, 19,5'eaeque partes ut non aim consecutus ut`auperior mea causa 
uideatur' et seq. 
3110 became head of the Academy some time boforo Zero's doath c. 260 B. C. (Zeller, Stolen. Fricurpnns and Sceptics p. 37 n. 1), 
12 
act is to take place. 
' It is said to be 'cataleptic' (xatiaa-n%-rtxfj )2 
When it is an exact copy of the external object and is u mistakably taken to 
have come from that object. The Stoics therefore claimed that a3cont 
( cvY c o, e cot C) to a cataleptic imprecs. '. ln results in xatiäa1*L c 
perception or grasp of tho image and its source. This perceptual event is 
itself said to be intermediate between knowledge (definod as 'eccure and rirm 
grasp that cannot be .. ltered by argument') and opinion 
(defined as 'wca: c and 
false assent'). 
3 Both the wise man and the fool can oxperi: acc ". caTVtijrc; 
but the grasp is opinion if the percipient is a fool and knowledge if he is 
a wise man. 
4 Arcesilas argued that in this case the -existence of XC;, rrWn*tCas 
an intermediate or common experience is purely verbal. 
5 He also argued that 
assent is given to a judgomont and not to an impression, so that if xaTUr4LC 
is defined as assent to a cataleptic impression it is non-sxistent. 
6 
Further, 
it-is non-oxiotent because the cataleptic improssion iu no'-existent. There 
are no. perceptual experiences which enable us to have an indubitably truo 
grasp of facts or of the external world. If the wise man were to assent, he 
would be assenting to more opinion; ho will thoreforo, in all cacec, withhold 
assent. ? 
1Sextus A. '1. VII, 236/SVF I, 58; 288 ff. /sYF II, 56. 
2For the meaning of the term soe Sandbach in Pro býmg, p. 10 and The Stoics 
p. 89. For the dofinition, Ae. II, 18, Sextus A. H. VII, 248. '_ 
3Sextus A. M. VII. 151 (Stiff 11#90). 
4n. M. VII, 153. 
5Sextus, ibid. Rist, Stoic Philosorhy p. 140, giver the mistaken impression 
that Arcesilas argued that, if vc., cVT)*yco; can occur in the wice man and tho 
fool, then the difference between knowledge and opinion is merely : "arbal. 
6Sandbach, 
Problems p. 12-13, has attempted a defence of the Stoic position 
by arguing that the Impression carries with it certain information about its source and that it in to this information that assent is given. The Stoics would probably not have denied that the act of assent is made to 
a judgement about the impression. Arcesilas' objection could be rc c rimed as 
purely contentious in this respect. 
7Scxtus A. M. VIi, 157s =S. II, 59,66 ft., 77 ft. 
13 
We are told that Arcesilas refused to grant the one epistenic claim 
of Socrates, that he knew that nothing can be known. 
I It is probably 
because he aimed at consistency as a sceptic and argued against the views 
of others without putting forward any of his own (Fin. II, 2) that what we 
know of his philosophy is very scanty and consists almost exclusively of 
sceptical polemic against Stoicism. In face of the argument that scepticism 
renders action impossible, he proposed, as a substitute for truth and 
knowledge, the 'reasonable' ( e0OyOV ) as a standard for action (Sextus 
A. M. VII, 158). lie agreed with the Stoics that the end for man is harpiness 
and that this is attained by wisdom (gP6vr)cLC), which consists in the 
performance of right actions (xaTopewµaTa). But he dealt a blow to Stoic 
ethics by contending that a right action is one that admits of a reasonable 
defence (öitep pax&Ev ctiaoyov e"xet "ri v aioloytmv), a description a 
Stoic would give not of a perfectly moral action but of a befitting action 
( xa8ijxov ), 
2 
which is within the capacity even of the fool. By no doing 
he undermines the Stoic distinction betucen. the wise man and the fool and 
strips the wise man of his characteristic perfection based on absolute 
knowledge. 
The next head of the sceptical Academy +-ho is of interest to us is 
Carneades, 3 fourth in line fron Arcesilas (16,. ;. o new develcrmcnt seems 
to have occurred in the interval, but academic scerticism may at that time 
have had a wide appeal, to judge by the number of names cited. 
4 It was 
IAc. I, 45. Socrates, however, did not say that nothing can be Imo, -M, but 
that he knew nothing. 
2D. L. VII, 107: Stob. 7c1. II, 85,13 (SVP III, 494-5). Cf. ^. Devan, Stoics and 
Sc=tics, p. 143. 
3214/3 
or 219/8 - 129/8 (see p. 100 of this thesis). Ile muct have been 
head of the Academy before 156/5 when he accompanied the Stoic Diogenes 
of Babylonia and the reripatetic Critolaus on the famous embassy to Rome 
(137; Plut. Cat. Yai. 22% 
4Zeller, Stoics, ^ icureans and Sceptics p. 535 n. 3; 3rochard, pp. 121-122. 
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with Carneades that Academic ucopticism reached its zenith. He widened its 
scope and ärought it to complotion (16)ß particularly by hia doctrine of 
probability. But a word of caution must be introduced. hero. Part of the 
evidence abtat Carnoados (notably that of Sextuo) )is been influenced by 
the biassed interpretations of Motrodorus and Philo. 
' It would be wrong 
to assume that his thoory of probability . ncorporat: s a du. strine of aosent, 
for whethor Ca: ncados in fact hold that tiro wise an will sometimes assent 
4 
was still a controversial issuo in Cicero's day. 
2 Moroovor, thoro is no 
ground for thinking that a concept of 'qualified' an opposed to 'absolute' 
assent existed at all in the sceptical philosophy of the Academy. 
3 
We are told that Carneades directed hie attacks against all previous 
ilosophers, though again tho Stoics were his principal opponents. Like ph 
4 
Arcesilas, he refused to grant the existence of the cataleptic impression 
because our perceptual oxpor±. nces do not necessarily correspond to the 
external world and any improß8ion that aypearo true might always be (alto. 
1Motrodorus 
and Thilo maintained that Carneades actually hold that the 
wiso 
man might form an opinion (i. e. assent to what is false or not indubitably 
known), whereas Clitomachus maintained that Carneades had merely advanced 
the view in argument (78 cf. 59,67,104,112,148). Cicero says that he 
believes Clitomachus. (78), but the other view may have been put forward in 
the Catulus (of. 143). Sortus' account of Carneades' theory of probability 
implies that assent ib given to a probable impression 
(It. M. VII, 172,108; cf. 
PJI. I, 228). Isumenius, fr. 26,107-9 (Des Places) a` . +o states that Carneades, 
differed from Arcesilas on the question of 
btoxf1, maintaining Us t it was 
impossible for a man to withhold assent about everything. Modern scholars 
have been inclined to ace the doctrine of probability as a modification of 
Carneades' position on-assent (Brochard, p. 135; Robin, p. 99; Stough, pp. 58, 
63 and 65). For further diseuaFion, Gee p. 310 ff. of this thesis. 
2Seo 
previous note. 
3Tho 
concept seems to ba the invention of Reidl cee his notes on 104, pp. 299- 
300; cf. p. 209 n. 19, p. 254 n. 6, p"348 n. 2. Ho is followed by Stough, pp-58 
and 67, and other recent writers. Nono of the ancient sources quoted by 
Stough lends any support to the distinction. Cf. pp. 197-198 below. 
4Sextus A. M. VII, 159; Cie. 'Punc. V, 83f N. D. II, 162. 
15 
But he may have adduced more arg unents and examples to illustrate perceptual 
seems 
error, 
l 
and/to 1iavu made a more scientific attack on the Stoic criterion. Ilia 
approach eras both more methodical2 and more positive than that of Arcesilas. 
Rejecting the cataleptic impression or our own perceptual faculties as criteria 
of truth, Carnoades analysed the percipient-impression-object relation and 
discarded the possibility of determining the precise relation of the impression 
with the object in any act of perception. When we : xperience an impression, 
ua cc= never be certain of its truth; but an impression, he pointed out, can 
appear to us as true or as falte, so that our acceptance or rejection of it 
is based on a probable juddomont, not on absolute certainty. 
3 As opposed to 
the Stoic criterion, the probable impression is said to have 'sufficient 
breadth', 4 meaning that different degrees of probability can be accepted 
according to circwnot. ncos. Hence Sextus regards Carneades as having 
abandoned the true sceptical position, in no far as he assigns more weight 
to some impressions than to others. 
5 Further, in contrast to the etloyov 
of Arceoilas, Carneados' ii. ß av6v was by Cicero's time taken to be not 
only a rule for action but also applicable to theoretical and intellectual 
activities 
6 
179 ff.; Soxtus A. b1. VII, 401 ff. 
to 240 ff., where the ro: eronco may boXCarneades in particular. Sextus A. M. M. 
159 ff., cf. Ftn. V, 16 ff. 
3Sextus A J1. VII, 166 : f. 
4' &roc txav6v A. M. VII, 173. 
SThis Sextus regards as inconsistent with &7toXfi A. 11. I, 230,232). 
Brothard p. 100, following Hirzel, argues that Arcesilas may have rejected 
the concapt of the lLe av6V because, according to the Stoic definition, it 
leads tu assent (D. L. VII, 75/M II, 201). Numenius fr. 25,70-71 (Des Places) 
states tha: he did away with the true, the false and the probable (Ru8 av6 v ). It is in any case clear that the e üao yov of Arcesilas is concerned with 
the justification of action, not with the credibility of impressions. 
6'uolunt 
onim ... probabile aliquid esse of quasi ueri simile, eaque uti 
regula of iii agenda uita of in quaererdo ae disserondo' (32). 
16 
Carneadec carried his attacks into other areas of Stoic thought, 
truing against the existence of gods, 
1 divine providence2 and divination, 
3 
as we11 as their strict system of causality and determiniom. 
4 In many cases 
he turned their own premisses against them. Cicero implies that it was in 
5 
the same polemical spirit that he put forward his view of tho mum bonvm 
as the enjoyment of the primary advantagenn of naturi,. 1' would often 
6 
debate on both sides of a quc.. io-, his most fauou3 tour de force of this 
nature being the occasion when (in Rome In 156/5) he discoursed on two 
successive clays for and against justice (Lacta, nt. Inst. 5,14r3-5/. =-III, 9)" 
We can infer from C1itomachus' use of his work in a 'consolatio' that he 
discumed the quection of the wise man's 'apathy' (Tusc. III`, ý4), and he is 
said to have d. isngroed with the Stoics and moot other people in maintaining 
that'sorrow is merely deepened not'alleviated by the reflection that 
suffering is the common lot cf hurienity (ibid. 59). 
Although Carneades brought Academic scepticism to its highest level, 
hin philosophical position was not unassailable. Otherwise the controversy 
would not have continued and Lucullus would not be voicing the objections 
that are raised in the first part of Cicero's dialogue. But whatever 
criticisms might bo brought against him, there is one that would not , 
2rimmaa 
facie be justified, namely that he was en inconsis+cnt sceptic because 
certain Fonitive assertions are attributea to him. 
7 Those are-puc forward 
1N. 
_D. 
III, 29; Sexta J',. T%1X, 140 cf.; 102 ft.; cf. N. D. III, 44. 
111,65 ff.; 79 ff. 
3niý. 1I, 9. 
41at. 31-2. 
5E. 
C. N. 1). 111,22 ; 66 ff.; Sextun A. M. IX, 140 ft. 
6 
131; of. Fin. II, 42; V, 20; Long, 11-No P. 99-100; of. Also his. 'Carneades 
and the Stoic Tolon' In 1hronenin 12 (1967), PP. 59-90. 
7E. 
p. 'them is something in our powei r' (-11.31). This Uras in fact a Stoic 
tenet, thouc: 1 Carneadea uses it r<<fute their determinism (Long, pp. 103-4). 
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in r. context of debate and need not represent his own opinion. 
1 But it 
should not be forgotten that assertions can legitimately be made within 
the framework of a probability theory, which do not at all clash with the 
rejection of' dogmatism. 
The headship of Clitomachua2 is relevuist for us because of the 
question whether the Academy immediately z. fter Carrnadee tsgan a gradual 
move towards dogmatism, and whether the'i:, mediate disciples of Carneades 
had anything to do with the developments under Philo that vore to lead to 
the collapse of the sceptical Academy. Clitcmachus wau the literary 
exponent of Carneades, as Lacydes had been of Arcesilas; he was noted for 
his industry and the volume of his uritingo (93; D. L. IV, 67). Philo is 
said to have studied under him for many years (17), and Cicero frequently 
refors to his opinion (78,108 ff., 108,139). There is nothing to suggest 
that he was less of a sceptic than Carneados. 
3 
It seems to have been characteristic of the school at this time to 
attack rhetoric and the professional teachers of the subject. In this 
connection Sextun A. M. II, 20) specifically mentions Clitomachus and 
Charmadas= the latter is said by Cicero to have maintained that true 
eloquence is impossible without philosophy (D, Or-1,84). Charmadast who 
was noted for his remarkable memory, 
4 
was also associated with the Academy 
1In 139 Cicero says that Carneades used to defend Calliphon's view of the 
summum bon um as a combination of virtue and pleasure so vehemently that 
he was thought to hold it himself. It is in this context, he tells us, that 
Clitomachus used to say that he never knew what Carnoades' own views were. 
2For his dates see Brochard, p. 186 n. 5. According to the Index Fore. cola. 
24 and 30, Clitomachus was third in succession to Carnoades, who was 
succeeded during his lifetime by another Carneadec, followed by Crates of 
Tarsus, who presided for two years. 
3Diogenes' 
statement (IV, 67) that he also studied in the Peripatetic and 
Stoic schools need not indicate any leaning towards doicatism. Drochard, 
p. 186-7, assumes that this refers to his early years; Zeller, 22. c. p. 564, 
that he studied the doctrines of other schools in order to refute them. 
4DO Or. II, 360i `liuSe. I, 59; Pliny, 11. ii. VII, 89. 
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of Philo (Sextun P.. }1 , 220), pocsibly bocauno of a common intoroct in 
rhetorical teaching (1, Or. III, 110 with Wilkine' note). Thic intorost 
certainly does not imply, as Ritter. sugosts, 
1 the oral of Carncades' 
doctrine of probability. Cicero's statement (D O. I, 84) that Charuad: Mi 
followed the 'moo patrius' of the Academy in arguing against the opinions 
of others without revealing hie own, is sufficient proof that he did not 
abandon the sceptical standpoint of Carneades. 
Mothcr disciple of Carneadea, Motrodorus of Stratonicý, is of 
especial interest owing to. tho statement ascribod to him by the Index, 
iierculMnensj , that everyone had misinterpreted Carneadea, who had not in 
fact believed that nothing could be known. 
2 Wo cnu3. presumably add, 'but 
only in the Stoic sense'. 
' This was the position of Philo, which ho also 
attributed to the Academy before him. Philo may havo boon influenced by 
. 'otrodorus, but the evidence hero is not entirely consistent, since 
according to Cicero the elder Catulus had accused Philo of plain lying, 
and Antiochus, when he read Philo's book in Alexandria, had indignantly 
asked his friend Horaelitus whether such views had over been put forward 
either by Fhilo or any other Academic, and received a negative answer (11, 
18). Elsewhere the view ascribed to Metrodorus and Philo (67, '78) is that 
Carneados hold that, though nothing can be known, the wise man can assent 
and therefore hold opinions{ thin interpretation of Carneades was also 
accepted by the elder Catulus (140). 
4 
'Zollort Stnicc. EpicurcAn: a nrd ScFntlcs p. 564 n-4- 
2 Indnx Ill re. col. 26: 84 Ehr Kapvc66ov napamIxotvat r. vTaC, ov Yb. p d, xaTWA)7Ta vcVOµixIvaL 1äv'ta. 
3St. Augustine (Ac. III, 18,41) roprosonts I"otrodorus an the first to admit that 
the Academics did not sincorely believe that nothing can be known, but had 
found it nocoseary to use thi. o as a weapon against the Stoics ('qui primus 
dicitur esse confessus non decreto placuisce Academicis nihil posse comprohondi 
red necoscario contra Stoicos huius modi eon arme sumpoisso'). In 16 Lucullus 
says that ?o trodorus wan thought to be well acquainted with the doctrines of Carnoades, and in 1 Or. I, 45 he is mentioned as a diligent pupil. 
4Soe, howover, PP. 57-0 of this Introduction. 
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We may conclude that, even if Thilo'c philosophical standpoint owed 
something to I"; otrodorus, the latter's views were excepticnal"and that under 
Clitornachus the Academy in general remained, as sceptical as it had been 
under Carneades. I shall argue lower down1 that Fhilo himself did not 
make any concession to dogmatism and that his position has been greatly 
misunderstood. It was in Fhilo'a interest to emphasise the positive and 
constructive side of Carneades' teaching and to claim continuity in-the 
Academic tradition. But if the New Academy had all along been gradually 
moving in the direction of do maticm, as Brochard thinks,? there would have 
been less rather than more justification for Antiochus' dofection-and 
'revival' of the Old. The move to dogmatism, when it ccmo, 'was not gradual 
but sudden. 
2. Cppozition to the sceptical Ac2demy 
One of the most puzzling thing about the origin of ocepticißm in 
the Academy is the fact that there does not seem to have been any opposition 
to it in the Academy itself. It took nearly two centuries for a member of 
the Academy (i. e. Antiochus) to object to it. If, as is generally thought, 
the Academy of Arcecilas marked a break in the philosophical tradition-of 
the school, it would not be surprising if he had propounded his scepticism 
only after becoming head (i. e. after, Crates' death, 268/264 ß. C. ). Yet, 
according to Plutarch(Adv. Col. 1121E), Epicurus was jealous of Arcesil'a' 
reputation, and Epicurus died in 270 B. C. Are we then to think that 
Arcesilas' rhilosophical position was approved by tolemo and Crates, his 
immediate predecessors, or even by Crantor, from whom his admiration for 
1Seo 
p. 35 of this thesis. 
2Brochard 
p. 189: 'L'hiatoiro do la nouvollo Academio mcntre d'aillours vno 
marche plus ou moin3 lentc, mail ininterrompuc, vors le dot atisme. ' 
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Plato's works was perhaps derived? 
i Varro, reporting the views of Antiochus, 
speaks of these philooophcrs as wrong those who 'carefully guarded what they 
had received from their predecessors' Ac. I, 3. i), and there is nothing to 
indicate that they haC any leanings towards scepti: 4sm. Nevertheless. Mio 
opposition to : ecesilas from within the Academy itself is recorded= on the 
contrary, wr, even hear of a : ertain Socratides resigning in his favour 
(D. L. IV, 32). It was only in Antiochus' time that a controversy arose ca 
to whether Arcoailas had led the school away from the original tradition 
or not, 
There was, on the other hand, much oxtorral opposition to the scbptical 
Acadcmy, coming not only from the doCmatic. 3choole 'gut also from contsmporary 
sceptics. Aroesilas no lese than the dogmatists came under attack from 
Timon, 2 the disciple o+. Pyrrho (o. 365-275 B. C. ), who had boon the first to 
bring scepticism in its most extreme, but perhaps moat consistent, form on 
to the Cree% philosophical scene. Areosilas and the later Academics were 
unwilling to admit the influence of Pyrrhonicm and preferred to trace their 
lineage to earlier and more notable philosophors. Cicero himself never 
mentions the scepticism of Pyrrho, and it was this policy of silence ti. at 
may have whetted the curiosity of later generations as to the conaeotion 
between the two schoolu. 
3 It would have been virtually impossible for 
Arcesilas, an an Academic, to voice openly any association with Pyrrhonism. 
But unlike the early Pyrrhonist, Arcosilas was a brilliant dialeetician, 
4 
ID. L. IV, 32. Crantör vac the author of the fir3t commentary on Plato's 
Tim eus (Proclus in Ti. m. 24A= Zeller, Plato and tho Older Acadomy p. 590 n. 24). 
Like 1olemo, he appearu to have been more interested in ethics than in 
dialectic or opiotomology (Zoller, p. 617 ff. ). 
2Fr. 31. and 32 (Diols); D. L. IV, 33" 
3Co11iul, r. A. x1,5, G: 'uetuw autem quaestio ot'a multis acriptoribu3 Craeois tractata, an quid of quantum Pyrronio3 et Acadomicos philosophos intersit'. Plutarch wroto, a work on this subject, now lost (Catalogue of Lamprias, 64). 
4lience tho Stoic Aristo refers to Arcocilac in a parody, of a line of Ilooor (I1.6,1ß1) an 'Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle' (i. e. the Ylegarian Dodorus Cronos, D. L. lV, 33)" 
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a fact which may explain why Academic scepticism appears to have been more 
popular than iyrrrhonism and at that time to have dominated the philosorhical 
scene. It was perhaps through envy at this turn of events that Timon and 
others accused Arcesilas of being a friend of the mob. 
l Timon may also have 
thoucht that, because of its contentious nature, Academic scepticism still 
retained some affinity with doematism. 
2 
According to Cicero (70), all the other philosophical schools were 
united in their opposition to Academic scepticism. Yet there is no record 
of any objection raised by contemporary Foripatetics agairst the scepticism 
of the Academy as such. 
3 One reason may be that the Academics themselves 
wore not particularly concerned with the Foripatetics in their attacks on 
p3rcoption. 
4 The novelty of Stoicism, on the other rand, made that philosophy 
a more conspicuous targot. Furthermore, the contemporary Poripatetics may 
not have been very much interested in epistemology. Cato accuses them of 
'ignoratio dialecticao' in Fin. III, 4l. 5 On two occasions (Ac. II, 112-13 
and Fin. V, 76) Cicero claims that he has no quarrel with the Feripatetics 
and contrasts their moderation with the extremism of the Stoics. He argues 
(112) that a Peripatetic would grant him that no percept is incorrigible 
gEIoXIoC , D. L. IV, 41-2. 
21^. 
li& thought lay underlie the remark which, according to D. L. IX, 114, he 
addressed to Arcocila3 as the latter was paaaina through the Knaves-market: 
'thy do you "me here, where wo free men come? ' On the association of 
scepticisri w th freedom, nee seen. 0-9. 
30ne 
of the severest c.: itica of Arcesilas aua the Foripatctic Hieronymr^ (D. L. IV, 41). But what he was condemning was the apparently imxncrRl lif: 
of 1ºrcesilas and his pursuit of pleasure. 
4Arco3ilao 
had, after all, been a pupil of Theophrastus (r. L. IV, 29-3o). 
, hat the Feripatos had a formative influence on his scepticism (a view nut forward by A. ldeiaeho, 'Cicero und (lie reue , kadenie, pp. 71,78) is very 
unlikely. Long (H. Ph. p. 88 n. 3 finds the arjunent of Weische 'not 
compelling'. 
5. 
lntiochus himself reverted to the doetrit, c of the older . ^eripatetics 
in 
ethical matters (F`ln. V, 14). 
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and consequently that it Is possible for the wise ruin to opine. 
' 
-Since the 
l'cri; atotica believed in the indubitability of`knowledge no less than the 
Stoics, Ciccro'c assumption is to a groat extent unjustified. But he could 
safely use 'rs argument, not only because the Peripc, tetic position war-much 
less explicit than the Stoic on these two icsues, 
2 but also perhaps because 
of a general lack of interest on the part of contemporary peripatetics in 
the controversy with ccopticism. 
In the cane of the Fpicureans, there is some evidence of objections 
raised against scepticism, although it in not always made explicit tha;; the 
attacks are 6)cir. C directed at the Academics. The Epicurean Colotes included 
Arooailas in his poler.. io against various philosophers whose doctrines he 
considered inconsistent with ordinary life (Plut. Adv. Col1120C). Lucrotius' 
refutation of ccepticiam in IV 469 ff. is taken by 0: 3ener to echo Epicurus' 
attach on Arcesilac. 
3 Torquatus, argument in Fin. 1,64 against those who 
spy that nothing can be perceived no doubt refers to the Academia sceptics. 
Ihit Epicurean opposition was. only very superficial, and they in their tu---n 
were not attacked as extensively and in the same critical and analytical 
way as`-were the Stoics. Epicurus' claim that all impressions are true 
inspir. d contempt rather than an elaborated response. It is disminsod 
off-lind by Cicero (80) and oven by Lucullus (19), who, besides, does not 
think that the Epicurean attempt to overcý, mo the problem of perce;. tual 
error made the case eerier for do(aatism (45). 
lihio 
argument probably comes from Ih!. lo, who had every reason to seek 
support for 'zis modified theory of perception and knowledge from other 
quarters and to Fee a close link between hin Academy and the Peripatos. 
Reid, p. 307 n. 24, wrongly attributes the arCument to Carneades. 
2Cicero 
notes in 113 that Zeno was the first to insist that perception must 
be incorrigible and that the wino man never opincs. 
3Us. 
p"348,14; cf. Ylut. Adv. rol. 1121E-F. Bailey in his commentary on the 
r . oca"e 
(: ii 1-1237 fl-) : u, octo that Lucretius Ja rcproducinC; Epicurus' 
argument ar; ainat the iollowcrs of Pemocritus, particularly i'otrodcrus of 
Chios. But it the beginni. n,, -; T of the passage Lucretius virtually repeats the 
arCumcnt of ,: etrodorus (_1c. II, 73) that we do not know whethcr we know or not. 
23 
The ; toica were bitterly opposed to the Academics (cf. Plut. Corim. Not. 
1059A), natt:: ally, since they were the chief targets of attack. Numenius 
paints a vivid picture of the clach between Arcesilac and Zeno in which the 
latter, being worsted in the encounter, attempted to divert his opponent by 
starting a polemic against Plato. 
1 Another stoic whose opposition to 
Arccailcas ii explicitly attested is dristo of Chios (D. I.. IV, 33; VII, 162-3)" 
Uumeniuu' statement that-after Arcesilas there was a long truce until 
Carneadea renewed the fight cannot ee entirely trua. 
2 In particular, it does 
not tape account of Chrysippus, the third head of the school (died c. 2C5) 
and the moot rcmarkoblo of the opponents of the Academy. Plutarch states 
that it was claimed that he was sent by divine providence in the interval 
between Arcesilas and Carneades, so that by his writing against the former 
he built a barricade against the cleverness of the iattcr and bequeathed to 
sense-perception many aids, au it were, against siege (Comm. Eot. 1059B-C/ 
SVF II, 33). He was praised by a disciple as 'a cutter of Academic knots' 
(Flut. Sto. Res. 1033E /ME IT 3b). Whether through sympathy at first with 
the ccepticiom of the dcadcrny3 or because he thought that he could thus 
fight accpticiem moro offoctivoly, 
4 he dioplayod a profound-interest in 
perceptual orror and raised sceptical issues to such an extent that hic 
IFr. 25110 ff., esp. 83 Lt.,. Dee Places (reproduced in part in SVF It 12). 
Cf. Ae. II, 16. 
2Fr. 27,4-5, (Dos Plauc, s). This seems to be an inference from the fact 
that it was Carncades who really brow ; ht the controvercy to a head. 1.1.14. 
Patrick's clain (The Greek Scq JJ_e , p. 139) that 'the strife with the Stoa 
seared until it was rcnowod by Cci. rneadcs' and that there was 'a Gradually 
devolopinC f icndship with the Stoa' is without foundation. 
3According to Sotion (D. L. VlI, 103-4), Chrysippuc was associated with 
Lrcesilas and Lacydea in the Academy and thin was why he arGued at one time 
aCainst and at another in support of expericnco. Drehicr, Ch rysirpe, p. 11, 
rcjecto this story. 
4J. ß. Gould, The Thilocorhy of ghr4ap1)s, p. 8-9.. 
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supporters boasted that the arguments of all the Academics put together were 
not worth comparing with those Chrycippv:, wrote against the senses (Flut. 
Sto. Rer. 1036C/:, VF II, 109), and that Carneades was merely repeating his 
arguments Q1036ß/SVF I1,32). Cicero, on the other hand, claims that he was 
unable to solve the problems he raised and that the Stoics themselves 
complained that he had provided Carneades with the necessary weapons to 
tight dogmaticm. I But there is little doubt that he considerably stren3th- 
ened the Stoic pocititn, and his argument that assent is necessarily iuplied 
in action aa9 impulse continued to plague tho Academy to the end. 
2 After 
Chrysippus the only Stoic opponent about . hom wo. havo'direct evidence is 
Antipater, who, however, did not prove himself a match for Carneadee. 
3 There 
is no mention that Panaetius or Posidonius opposed the Academic sceptics, 
and in fact Cicero seems to be under the impression that Panaetius had 
approved of Academic doubt, at leant in the matter of dreamu and oracles. 
4 
To meet Academic criticisms the Stoice were undoubtedly compelled to 
bring forward new arguments and even to modify their position from time 
to time. According to Sextus (A. M. VII, 253-60; cf. 424-5), later Stoics 
(ot vc ze poL ) posited that the cataleptic impression is the criterion 
not unconditionally but only when there is no obstacle, and that in such a 
case it virtually forces assent. 
5 Scholars have found 
'it difficult to 
175 
and 87. Cf. D. L ýIV,? 2 
(Carneadcc)s t ýiý1 ýhp 
ýjv Xpüý1«t7cor., ovx äv jv cyW 
(a variant of &L 1AY.. A, ýv ): pv`O i. 1i oC, ovx dv 
1jv ZTO6. I). L. VII, 183). 
2P1ut. Sto. Rep. 1057A/SNT I11,177; see pp. 207 of this thesis. 
3See Commentary on 1?, p. 103 of this thesis. 
4107; 
cf. N. I). II, 118; niv. I. C-7; I1,88. 
5Long, il. Fh. p. 128; iiamlyn, Sknßc. tion and Ferceotion, p. 38. The obstacle in 
quceticn is cithor a factor in the extcrnai circumstances, such as Admetus' 
bolicf that Alcestin was dead, or in the perceptual conditione (Aý1"!. VII, 25ß; 
of. 425). 
25 
determine who these 'younger' Stoics were. 
I Tho whole pasrtgo in Sextus has, 
however, so many echoes in the Lucullus2 that it seems certain that Intiochus 
shared their view. I shall argue later3 that the interprctation of the 
theory in terms of strictly irresistible impreunions is not necessarily 
correct, particularly since Antiochus himself upheld the freedom of the will 
and of the act ui assent (37-39), and that despite the proviso about obstacles 
the catalopt:. s impress-. n remained the criterion of truth. For the presents 
I 'hoiitd like to record my disagreement with Riot's view (Stoic Fhilosorhy, 
p. 144) that the theory goer as far back as Sphacrus, but that the orthodox 
Zenonian view persisted alongside it. In A. 1I. VII, 424 Sextun does say that 
'come' (TLvc r. ) have held such a view, but the contrast in 253 is between 
the 'older' and the 'younger' Stoics, which suggests that once the theory 
had been put forward it became accepted doctrine in the Stoa as a whole. 
There is a striking parallel between this modified Stoic theory and the 
Carneadean stipulation about absence of obstacles and the need of proper 
perceptual ccndition3 in the determination of probability. 
4 It is Most 
likely, therefore, that this Stoic theory was put forward only after 
Carncades had propounded his doctrine of probability. 
5 
1Polhenz 
at first (in his Zeno und Chr ipy) Identified Chrynippus as one of 
them, but later (in DSR Stoa} modified his view and thought that they were 
later than Chrysippua. Sandbach (Problem p. 14-15) suggests Antipater or 
his contemporaries. A similar view was held by Schiekel, who also included 
Fanaetiuo (Die Fhiloroohie der mittl.: r(-, n Stoa, p. 352 ). Long, in his 
review of Stough's Graelc S__rpticicm Z1ý}iilo^ö 1970), puts them 'probably 
after Carneades' time'. 
2As 
noted by Hirzel (Unternuch. III, pp. 514-17). Ac. II, 19,31,32,37,33,46. 
3See 
p. 201 of thia'thocia. 
4Sextus A. M. VII, 176-189. The concept of 'concurrence' (ovvopo µf) in import- 
ant in both theories (cf. A. T4. VII, 424 with 179 and 182), and so is that of 
%CoTIC(of. A. M. VII 254,256,258 with 178,180,181,185). For the absence of 
obstacles, compare 19 and 46 with 59,104, and 108. 
5Seo F. Couosin, 'Lo ntoicicme do la nouvelle Academic', Bov d'hintotre de 
la tthilosorhte 3 (1929), pp. 270-71. 
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j. 1"%Ilo and Antlochust crißic in the Aendergy 
When r"nilo took over the Academy at the death of Clitouachus,, 
1 the 
general-philosophical atmosphere was still greatly opposed to scepticiim, 
while the Arf. denica on their cido did not desist from the fight with other 
schools, particularly on the issue of perception and knowledge. Two events 
later occurred which completely changed t'e course of the history of the 
Acadcrny. Antiochuu, who had oti: died undo' Fhilo for a long time and 
zealously supported his doctrines, both orally and in writing, turned 
dogmatist and proclaimed the possibility of knowledge in the very se: o 
which ho hoc: as a ec©ptic denied (69-71), while Milo himself advanced 
certain no« inter, rctatione of the sceptical Academic philcsophy, which 
werd considered (particularly by A. ntiochua himself, 11-12), to be quite 
revolutionary. According to Cicero, Antiochue was furiously angry on 
hearing of these irnovations, and this has led some scholars to think that 
hie defection was the direct result of tr: m. 
2 111y view is that the sequence 
of eventn wao the reverse and that it was to a tare extent Antiochua' 
defection that provoked Thilo into advancing his new dcctrines. 
3 
(i) Ant-tochui' new ronition 
Jntiochus gave up soopticism for a dognatic eclecticism. According 
to him the pcadcmy bci'oro Axceuilac said the roripatcra belonged to the same 
Flatonio tradition and syutem of philocophy, 
4 
while Stoicism was rnly a 
verbal modification o: ' it. 
5 ]To therefore gathered together a medley of 
1 Vie exact date is urknokn. ro Cr. 1.45 implies that Clito: rachus Was still 
alive in 11C B. C. If tho dates given by Erochard (n. l89-91) are wcirked out 
correctly, Thilo could have cucceedod any time between 110 and 104 B. C. 
2E. 
g. Zoller. Cutlinep of the Hintorý' of Greek Fhilocophv`, p. 253; Dillon, 
P-53 ff.; R. E. Witt, flbnu3, p. 22. 
3Also 
maintained by A. Schmekel, Tie Yhiloeoph'ie der mittleren Stoa, F"3135. 
41+c. I, 17-10,22,33; F3n. IV 3 ff.; V, 7 ff.; Lef-. 1,30; Te Wir. 111,67. 
51; 
c. 1,37,43, Fln. III, 5; IV, 72-3; Jcy. I, y5; 1T. T3. I, 16. 
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doctrines bo1onc; ina to the other nchoois into a syotem of hic own which, 
he claimed, represented the true Old Academic cyctcm abandoned by Arceeila3. 
hie opponents accused him of being nothing but a Stoic and an Academic only 
in name, 
l 
w". le the Stoics theiaselven resented his . failure to recodniao the 
uniqueness of their doctrines. 
2 Antiochus was not unaware of the difforonces, 
for example, botweon the Stoa and the : er! patos. 
3 Rut fei. him both schools 
were part of a common dogriatio tradition 'erived from Plato 
,` 
and by 
highlighting the agreements he perhaps hoped to counter the sceptical thesis 
that disagreements among philosophers establish the impossibility of 
knowledge. LIis eclectic position thus enabled hilt to oppoco sceptioicm 
on a wider front, and at the samo time to avoid moving practically into the 
Stoic camp. 
The fundamental difference between the occptleal Academy and the Old 
Acadeiy of Antiochus is that, like the Stoics, tntiochus hold that the wine 
man can infallibly distinguish tho true from the fulse. 
5 His concern with 
knowledgo'influerced not only his view of philosophy but also perhaps his 
ethics. The problem of lnowledge became for him one of the two most 
important isoueo in philosophy (29), while physics retained a very 
insignificant place in his system. 
6 Ilia entirely empirical theory of 
perception was necessary to his view of the ethical end as a life in 
complete agreement with nature (Fin. V, 16 : f. ) and as consisting in the 
169; 132; Plut. Cic. 4,1; Sextun t. i1. I, 235t Au,. Aa. III, 41; 9. D. 19,3. 
2Pi. n. I, 16; Fin. III, 41; Ac. II, 119. 
3Ac. I039-41; Fin. 1V, 3 ff. 
4Thia 
claim is considered to be historically unreliable; nee Long, IT. 'h. 
p. 224 ff.; Dillon, p. 55. The amal;; amation of philosophical systems can 
only have been prompted by his desiro to oppose ecepticicm, though this is 
a point which is cncrally overlooked. 
? 67; AuC. Ac. II, l5. 
6Ilia 
views on physics are to be found primipally in n. 1,24 ff. Fbr a more 
detailed acraunt of his eneral philosophical views, see Dillon, pp. 62-1(16. 
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development of man's whole boing and the realisation of his entire potential 
(ibid. 26 ff. ). The beat guides to the moral life are our earliest impulses 
and these continue: to be significant ritt up to and after moral maturity 
(ibi. c',. 41 ff. ). 1lere Ant . ochus diverged fror: the Stoics who, after bating the 
development of moral awareness on the primary impulcee of nature, discard 
these at a later stage and postulate that bodily and external advantage: no 
loner matter, as comx^red with virtue. In so doing, Antior'ius argues, they 
take into account only one aspect of man, as thouiji he were a disembodhd 
mind. 
l Sinop natural advartc. gea mittarg however insignificantly, and form 
part of the sumnum bonm, he regarded the enjoyment of healthy perceptual 
faculties and their proper functioning and use as part of man's moral 
activity (Fin. V, 36 ff. ). It is natural for man to strive after knowledge, 
since he has been endowed not only with a profound and instinctive desire 
to know, but also with the necessary faculties to attain sut: h knowledge 
(arid. 48-9). 
In defending dogmatism; Antiochus relied principally on the Stoic 
theory of perception and knowledge. He ro-emphasised the doctrine of the 
cataleptic impressicn (17. ff. ) and stressed that such an impression could 
be differentiated from others owing to a characteristic mark (33 ff. ) and 
clearness (45,51). This prorpta"Cicero to ask ironically 'quis enim iste- 
diee i:. luxerit quaero qui iili ostonderit ein quarr multos annos ecee 
negitauisset üeri et : Mai notem' (69), and Plutarch to suggest that he 
abandoned the standpoint of Carneadcs because he was influencrd by v vCLp yc m 
and the senses (? lut. Cic. 4, l). 
1rin. 
7V is a criticism of the Stoic T'osition from ;. ntiochus e point of vie; -t. H. A. K. Thuit, The Th, r;., Lni rm of Ci cr-ro, examines in detail . `, ntiochus' objections to Stoic ethics on the ground that it was inconsistent with their empiricism. 
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(ii) Fhilo's innovations 
Fhilo's main inrovaLion unrloubted. y consisted oC the statement that 
the Academy had all alone been denying tho poscibility of lalow. "leOZ only in 
the Stoic . 3ense and c^-isocuently that the Academic could i ake know]. edgo 
claims. 
1 In addition he supported the view that Carncades had given up the 
doctrino of LitoXfj (ß.. e. that CarneadEC held that the wiso mbn docc e)rurciae 
his assent and thorefnre opines),? which means that he him3--lf rave it up 
(as stated by 2lumo7iuQ, fr. 28,6-7, Des Places). Both views, 'it will be 
noticed, were also attributed to llotrodorus (see above, p. 18), who is 
explicitly associated with Thilo in sec. '10 with regard to the second claim. 
These two thocec, (1) that knowledge in imposoible only in the Stoic 
sense, and (2) that the wise man assents and therefore cpincs, arc, I believe, 
complementary to one another and part of the same philosophical position. 
To understand the connection it must be borne in mind that. for an Academic, 
it follows that 'if the wise man assents, he opines' only because Y. nowledgo 
in the strict sense is hold to be impossible. Thus the wise man in assenting 
to a highly probable experience can claim knowledge in the Philonian sense, 
but at' the came time, since it is recognised that such knowlcdge is not 
based on incorrigible perceptions, it has to be allowed that, in assenting, 
he would be opining. In accepting the Carneadean thesis, Thilo was equating 
}nowleri3Ze (in his sense) with opinion (in the Stoic senso), and so erasing 
the usual Greek dichote5ny between knowledge and opinion. whether he would 
have retained the distinction outside the context of the cont: overEy with the 
Stoics and within his oim epistemological cchome, and if so, where he would 
have drawn the line betwoen them, is debatable. 
Sextus P. N. I, 23ý; Ao, II, lß; 146; of. 112; xin,. V, 76. 
278; 
also 59,67,112 and 148. 
30 
There is no sue: gestion in the Ace. dc'mica that the necond of these two 
theses (i. e, that the wi3o man assents and opines) was considered innovatory. 
We may, however, deduce fron 59 that Antiochus was not too aura of the 
historical p"int that Caineades really did take this view; fron this in turn 
Xe may deduce that it was not the official vi, w of tho Academy prior to his 
defection and that Philo Cave up the doctrine of 1 7-oXfj only later (a fact 
confirmed by Numeniuz, fr. 28,6-7; Des, P1c es). 
The elder Catulu3 is said to have rebuked Mila for mininterproting 
the tradition of the sceptical Academy (12,10). Yet he appears to havc. 
maintained that the doctrine that the wise an accents and opines was 
genuinely Carneadean (1.16). There is a discrepancy hero fox which Cicero 
" himself may be responsible while putting together thin whole story about the 
elder Catulus (see below, p. 57 NO, At could not bo denied, however, that 
Carneades had actually maintained this in argument; what was doubtful was 
whether he really mcant it (78). On the ether haiid, the claim that the 
sceptical Academy had not rejected the possibility of knowledge was a much 
more dubious one. It cannot, of course, be true that Antiochus and 
fteracijtus (ii) had never previously heard of such a claim, for Xetrodorus 
had been making it. This is another discrepancy probably deriving from 
Cicero himself. But apart from Cicero's evidence, the only sense in which 
Philo's move could have been considered revolutionary is that he : ras raisin;; 
some moot points in ta Academy to the level of official doctrine. 
Lastly Thilo maintained, both in his books and in his lcdturea at 
Rome, which Cicero heard (Ac. I, 13; Rrut. 306), that the Academy had all along 
followed the same tradition and that those who distinguished between two 
Academies were wrong. The books referrel to are probably those in which 
Thilo made known his innovations (11-12). The. impression we receive is that 
this contention formed part of Philo's new position and that it was meant to 
settle the n_uestio: & whether the Academy hed remained faithful to the teaching 
of Plato. 
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(iii) The relation between Antiochun' defection and I"hi]o'R Innovations 
If Antioch-us' defection was in fact. brouCht about by the innovations 
of Thilo, we would expect Cicero to have exploited the dramatic significance 
of. the even; by stating or at least hinting that this was the case, either 
in 11-12, where Lucullus narrates how Antiochus first cam3 to know of Fhilo'c 
new doctrines at Alexandria, or in 69-71, where Cictro slenulates on the 
motive of Artioclius' defection. Yet in the first passage he represents 
Antiochus as already arguing against the Academic position even before the 
two books of ililo ca. "ne into his hands, while in the second (particulsrly 69) 
he seems to imply that the break occurred before the two men left Athens at 
the beginning of the First 11ithridatio War (88 B. C. ). Again in Ao. I, 13, when 
Varro questions Cicero about his supposed desertion of the Old Academj for 
the New and Cicero refers to Fhilo's contention that those who think that 
there are two Academies are ristaken, Varro replies, 'b t ut dicis, sed 
ignorare to non E, sbitror quas contra ea Fhiloni3 Antioohus scripeorit'. 
It is quite. possible, as Dillon argues 
(p. 51), that Antiochus first made 
his position clear on this point in his Soss. But Thilo was obviously 
arguing against a view hold previously to his own 
('orroremquo eorum qui 
ita putarunt'coarguit'), and there is nothing to prevent the plural 'eorum' 
from including a refdrence to Antiochue. 
Dillon argues that Antiochus desertel the rcoptical Academy because he 
was dissatisfied with t"hilo's innovations and thought that they made the 
sceptical position less consistent (r"53)" it is true that Antiochus did 
consider Philo's new standpoint to be inccnsistert 
(lß), but this was not 
because he believed that Mile's earlier position was a more'tenablo one. 
If the dispute wore about the conuistency of the sceptical position, we 
would have expected him to defend either Thilc's original doctrine or a 
different modification of it. As it was, 1lntiochus passed on into the 
do matio carp by repudiating every aspect cf the Academic sceptical 
philosophy rund adopting, the doLnnatic epictetnology of the Stoics, co that, 
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judged from., his own original standpoint, he went considerably further than 
Philo had dared to go. It is furthermore unlikely that he would, as a 
sceptic, have found Philo's emphasis on the unity of the Academic tradition 
particularly objectionable or that this was one of the factors that ca:. iod 
him to break aviy from Philo. On the other hand, Fhilo's insistence on 
unity is wholly understandable as an answer to Antiochus. Dillon's 
conjecture that Philo was replying to 'inquiries m:. ta by the Roman hearers of 
his lectures as to how far his teaching in fact acc^rded with the doctrine 
of Plato' (p. 55) is most implausible. P1, tlo's corn ern on this score. suggosta 
a prior controversy, possibly within the Academy itsolf, as to whether 
scepticism was or was not alien to the Platonic tre-lition. 
I would therefore suggest that Antiochus became dissatisfied with 
not 
scepticism and thus edbranged from Philo, Vlong before the First Mithridatio 
i+'ar. I At-the start of the war Philo and some other prominent Athenians 
fled to Rome. Their arrival there could not have been much later than 
the end of 88 B. C. since Bulls, began his siege of Athens in the spring of 
87.2 Since Antiochus first heard of Fhilo'e new views in Alexandria, it 
is reasonable to infer that they were expcunded only after Philo had left 
Athens and perhaps immediately after arriving at Rome, 
3 
which, boaides, 
offered him a change cf scene and a new audience. There is no direct 
1Cicero 
states that he attacked the sceptical viewv he had earlier defended 
'in senectute' (69). The date of Antiochus' birth is a. mattor of conjecture ('_'rochard p. 209 n. 3). If he was born c. 130 B. C. he would have been about 43 
at the time of th3 meeting at Alexandria. Cicero may be exargerating, or he 
may be thinking of-come later date such as the publication of the Sosust or 
of the lectures he heard at Athena in 79 B. C. 
2 See Reid p. 60; J. van Ootoghem, I. uciury Licining Lucullus, p. 22. 
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would rot then be extraordinary (as Reid suggests, p. 60) that the elder 
Catulus, who died shortly after Philo's arrival, should have known of those 
innovations or that Philo's two books should have reached Alexandria as 
early as the summer of 87. Raid's assertion (p. 59) that 'at the time when 
Cicero first heard his lectures, he almost certainly taught nothing but the 
doctrine of Carneades' is unsubstantiated and in fact refuted by Ac. I, 13. 
Itis other suggestion that Milo may have reserved his 'reactionary doctrines' 
for private conversations and his written works is purely fanciful. 
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evidence that Antiochuc went with Thilo to Rome and mot Lucullus thcro. 
1 If 
the break between the two had occurredfbofore they loft Athena, thin would 
be sufficient reason why Antiochus diel not accompany Thilo to Rome and why 
it was in IºMxanIria that he first hcurd of r11106 innovations. 
(iv) The reasons for Antiochuc! uefectiot, and ihilo's ronction to in 
Cicero's suggestion (69-71) that lrtiochu^ d fecticn was due to 
sudden recognition of a nark of truth or oven to a deoiro for glory in 
polemical (see Dillon, p. 53). Antiochus van certainly influenced by Stoicism, 
though it is unlikely that he had the Stoic 1"nncsarchus as teacher2 or that 
the latter played a major part in his conversion. 
3 Cicero also attributes 
Intiochuc' action to the general opposition of the other cchoolc to the 
scepticism of the Academy ('%0) . Tho Academy had, moreover, acquired a 
4 
'See, 
however, Dillon P-53-4; Long, 1t. Ij . p. 223. Do Vogel 
(creak 1h11osor) y 
III p. 276,119£+: h) relies on P1ut. Luc. 2,3, a passage which 
it is hard to 
take at its face value. Cicero nowhere mentions Intiochus' presence at Home. 
Had Antiochus accompanied I-hilo to Rome, we should have had to seek a 
plausible reason why he should have loft Rome with Lucullun rather than 
stayed with Philo, and thera'is none. Luoullua must have left Rome either 
before or shortly after Fhiio's arrival there, if he wan already in the East 
at the beginning of Sulla's siego of Athens. If lntiochus had mat Lucullus 
in Home, we should have to assume that they became acquainted in a very short 
space of time. Besides, if Antiochus had been in Rome, he would have heard 
of Mile's innovations there and not in Alexandria. If wo suppose that ? -kilo 
did not at first male known his new views at ': emo, this conflicts with their 
being criticised by the elder Catulus, and still fr-ether shortens the time 
interval in which Phi?. o's books were composed and trken to Alexandria. 
2A 
claim made by Numenius (fr. 28,13, Des Places) and St. Augustine (1ýc. III, 41), and possibly based on a misinterpretation of this passage (69). 
It is accepted by M. N. Patrick, The Creek Scet J c: ý x. 193, týrochard, p. 210, 
Zeller, Outlines, p. 253, Long, timFh. ; x. 223. Dillon (x. 53) is doubtful but 
allows that Antiochus may have attended Fneoarchi. ws' lectures before his break 
with Philo. 
3Ac believed by R. E. Witt, Albinvss, p. 22. 
41t 
is very unlikely that these opponents were by now giving up the struggle, 
as St. Augustine states. He believeä that the scepticism of the Academy was 
merely a weapon to fight Hellenistic sensationalism and to conceal Plato's 
spiritual message @c. III, 37-'15). He therefore interpreted Thilo's new 
doctrines as the beginning of an attempt to shed thin disguise and reveal 
Platon message: '... Philonis auditor, hominis, quantum arbitror, circun- 
npectissimi, qui ism ueluti. apcrire cedentibus hostibus portun coeperat et 
ad Platonic auctor"itatem Academism lrgesque revocare... ' Q, -0-111,41). 
It was 
thus easy for hint to infer that the enemy wero retreating. 
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reputation for oophi:, try and its sceptical philcccphy racy no longor havo 
been popular (Polybaus XII, 26C 1 ff. ), 1 espeaially, as it was at variance 
with the ideal, of wisdom cherished by the other schools. 
Scepticism cannot by its very nature offer unlimited ccopo for faw-ther 
initiative, cor. 1-ributions and devolopnont. The negative nature of such a 
philosophy would gradually h? ve become apparent when it no longer had, 
personaiitios like Arcesilas and Carneades to. expound it. Mere was, bccidec, 
the vexed qu stion of what the actual views of, Carncadeo had been on certain. 
vital ibsues. It is possible that Fhilo :: ad been feeling for some time that 
his sceptical-position was a somewhat uneasy. ono, 
2 
and thic feeling m:; / have 
communicated itself., to Antiochus., Account must also be taken of the many,. 
objections,. to scepticism raised by Lucullus. in the first part of Cicerole 
dialogue, which reflect, considerations that must have influenced Antiochus. 
Philo was no doubt affected by the same general presourcn as Antiochus. 
3 
But what finrlly prompted hin to modify his position was, I believe, Lntioehus' 
own desertion. By falling back on I-tetrodorus' interpretation of Carneadcs 
and renouncing E , Ao xfj rhilo may have thought that he was not takint too 
drastic and revolutionary a step, though it seemed so to Antiochun. Still, 
he was advancing a doctrine that he had not publicly endorsed before, and it 
remins' a mystery how he related his new position to his former teachir. 13. 
Most likely he remained silent about his previous position, especially as 
Rome offered him the chance of a now a dienco. 
4 
1The 
passage is b1dosed according to Zoller(Ctniev. Ppicurnann and Scentics p. 565 
n. l). Cicero's deep concern to dissociato Acaaciiii 5cepticifiv iroi scr. 1jotry (Ac-I, 44; 11,7--9; 67) does, however, seen to cuppcrt the evidenee. of rolybius. 
On the other hand., Cicero tells us (De Cr. 1,45) that the school was flourishing; ('Academia florente') around 110 D. C. But the reference there in to its 
rhetorical teaching, not its sceptical philosophy. 
2111; 
also 44. But Antiochus had become hostile to 2hilo and may therefore 
have e; ag,; orated his uneasiness. 
3Lucullus 
gives as the reason for his innovations his inability to withstand 
criticism of the 'portinacia' of the Academy (10). 
4$chr'ekel, 
p. 337, thinks that F'hito did not belicvn that he had changed hin' 
ground. 
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It was perhaps Philo's intention to undermine Antiochua' motives for 
deserting by giving a more positive outlook and a more consistent foundation 
to the scepticism of the Academy. His innovations were also intended to be 
polemical in so far as they were in every way opposed to and contradictory of 
the Stoic doctrines. But though it was clearly Philo's aim not to impair 
the sceptical basis of the Academic philo. ophy or make any concessions to 
Stoic dogmatism, he has been interpreted as moving away from scepticism and 
towards dogmatism. 1 This is perhaps partly due to his more positive attitude 
and also his interest in questions of practical morality2 and rhetoric. 
3 
be ought possibly to make a difference between being positive and being 
dogmatic. If, as we are accustomed to think, dogmatism snd scepticism are 
mutually exclusive concepts, perhaps neither term c'n properly be used to 
describe Philo's position. 
4. The end of the sceptical Academy 
Cicero tells us that Antiochus attacked T'hilo's innovations in a book 
entitled the Sosus (12). 
4 Though he also says that, while Philo lived, the 
Academy did not lack a champion (17), Thilo probably did not write a reply 
to the Sosus. 5 He may have died in Rome soon after propounding his new 
1E. 
g. Numenius, fr. 28,6 ff., (Des Places); Reid, p. 59; Robin, P-133; '. 
A. H. Armstrong, introduction to Ancient Philoso h, p. 146; R. E. Witt, 
AlbinuR, p. 21. Both Stough p. 8 and hast (Stoic Philonorhy p. 150. "51) 
speak of the 'Stoicism' of Philo. 
2Stob. 
F, c1. II p. 39,24 (k'); Brochail, p. 205. 
3&3 
Or. III, 110; 'Puss.:: {, 9. 
4Named 
after a Stoic philosopher, also from Ascalon, possibly himself a 
deserter from the sceptical Academy. Reid, p. 184 n. 9; Dillon, p. 52. 
R. E. Witt (Alblaus p. 25) thinks that the book was written at Alexandria. 
but there is no evidence for this. 
5Cicero 
in his reply to Lucullus (64-148) does not seem to be relying at 
all on any work of Philo which could have constituted Philo'a answer to the 
Sosus. It has been thought that Aug. Ac:. III, 41 ('cod huic arreptis iterum 
illis armis et ? hilo , stitit, donee morerotur') implies that Philo answered 
back. See Brochard, Y. 191, esp. n. 7. But St. Augustine is probably merely ec1oing Cicero's 'Philone gutem uiuo patrocinium Acadomiao non defuit' (17). 
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doctrines. ' And with hin death the 'sceptical Academy camp to an end. 
2 We 
know of no philosopher who continued to support Academic scopticiem or who 
defended Philo's innovations after the latter's death. 
3 
Anti. oahus appears to have been the undisputed : lead of the Acade c" in 
79 B. C. when Cicero heard him at Athens. The Academy itself was deserted at 
the time ans? he was teaching his so-called Old Academic philosophy in the 
cylnnasium known as the Ptolemaeum (Fin. V, 1). But t'.. ts does not seem to have 
Len ^ handiE: ap to him. Several prominent Romans attended his lectures and 
espoused his philosophy, the two best known boing Brutus and Varro. 
5. On the ust+ of certain tei nir. oloJ in thin comr, nt= 
The word 'sceptic' is derived from Creek ext: 'ccoßat 'examine, or 
'consider'). A axeýtiL%6 1, therefore, is one who 'oxamince', or (as defined' 
by Sextus P. 71. I, 3) one who goes on seeking for the truth. The word in 
'on-monly found in later writers, though we do not know when exactly it 
acquired a technical sense. Stough (p. 3) thinks that Timon may have used 
it of Arcesila. s (fr. 55, Diels), but her claim that 'subsequently, the term 
came to be applied with increasing frequency to both Pyrrhonisto and Academics' 
is not supported by the evidence. Polybius, for example, does not use it of 
the Academics (XII, 26C, 1 ff. ). Sextus (P_H. I, 3, etc. ) sharply distinguishes 
Sceptics and Academics. The term 'Academic sceptic' is thus, strictly 
1He is thought to have died at latest before 79 B. C., when Cicero heard 
Antiochus' lectures at Athens. According to 'fuse. 7.107, Philo never returned 
to his birthplace Larissa. Brochard (p. 221) wrongly uses this as evidence 
that he never returned from Rome to Greece. It is, however, probable that 
he died at Rome. 
2Except 
in so far as it was championed by Cicero; See pp. 51 ff-below. 
311oraclitus 
of Tyre is represented by Cicero as defending the Academic 
position against Antiochus (11-12) but it is not clear whether he continued 
to support Philo. Brochard (p. 2225 thinks that }udorus of Alexandria may, 
have been a disciple of Philo; Dillon, however, treats him as a follower of 
Antiochus (p. 115). There is also the view that the sceptic Aenesiderruo broke 
away from Philo through dissatisfaction with his new 'doematic' and 'Stoic' 
position (Fhetius Bibl. cod. 212,170a 14 Bokker); see Stough, p. 9 Brothard, 
P"246. Riot (The tleracliteanism of Aonesidemus, Phoenix 24 (1970) PP-7r, -6t 
even speculates that the break occurred at Alexandria. Too much, I bßlieve, 
is read into the evidence. 
37 
speaking, a misnomer. This may explain why Cicero, who is aware of the 
concept (7-9), does not suggest any Latir translation for it, though the 
Greek word may have been in use. 
l 
The term 6oYµaTLxtý , on the othc: hand, was certainly in use by 
the third century B. C., 
2 
and was employed by later writers to mean the 
opposite of oxevrLx6C . This is because 66Yµa implies judgement to which 
assent is given, but the sceptic by nature repudiates judgement and ascent. 
Ile is an tcccxrtx6c(from 1, t6XcLv), i. e. one who withholds absent. Cicero 
uses the periphrasis 'qüi se scire arbitrantur' (8) and coins 'opiniosissimus' 
(143) to'convey the concept of a dogmatist. 
For Antiochus the conflict was not between the sceptical 
Academy and 
Ii the dogmatic Academy, but between the New Academy and the Old. The terms 
'New' and 'Old' may have come into use as a result of the controversy between 
himself and Philo, Antiochus himself perhaps being responsible for the 
distinction. Cicero, like Thilo, refuses to allow that the Academy from 
, as 
Arcesilas/different from that of Plato, though we find him deciding to keep 
the distinction between 'Old' and 'New' in Ac. I, 46 (and he keeps it elsewhere 
also, e. g. Ler. I, 38-9), presumably for the cake of convenience, and also 
perhaps because of a tacit recognition that the Academy of Arcesilas did 
mark a change of direction of the school. In the 1^acullus, however, he 
refuses to allow that Antiochuo him3elf is properly an Academic (70,132,137, 
143), and even Antiophus' spokesman Lucullus is made to refer to his 
opponents as 'the Academics' (12), as though Antiochus did not contest the 
title for himself. Elsewhere ( in. V, 7; Brut-315) Antiochus is assc"ciated 
"lIt was Aulus Gellius (N. A. XI, 5,1-3) who was later to propose the Latin 
equivalent 'quaesitores et considoratores' to describe the Pyrrhoniste. 
2It 
was applied to a school of medicine opposed by the 'Enpiricists' (Stough, 
Poll; G. E. R. Lloyd, Creek Science after Aristotle, p. 09). 
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with the Old Academy. Finally, one may note that it became fashionable to 
label the various phases of development in the Academy after Plato. Plato's 
was the First or Old Academy, Arcesilas' the Second or Middle, Carneadea' and 
Cl. itomachus' the Third or New, Philo's and Charmada6' the Fourth and lntiochus' 
the Fifth. 1 But the distinction that is rele ant here in that between the 
Old and the ]ew Academy. And for Antioch-us the Now Acaderw starts with 
Arcesilas. 
C. The nature and general. purpose of Cicero's dialogue 
It appears to have been Cicero's intention to use the quarrel between 
Philo and Antiochus as a starting-point for both the Lucullus and the 
Catulus. 2 And. since that quarrel partly concerned the history of the 
Academy, the author was enabled to embrace within a single work a general 
view. of-the controversy between the Academic sceptics and the Stoics. But 
while the Catulus may have had as its main theme a contrast between the 
historical viewpoints of Philo and Antiochus, the Lucullus was intended to 
be much more argumentative and to deal with the conflict of philosophical 
views proper. 
Cicero has accordingly tried in the T. ucullua to give a generalised 
treatment of the arguments for and against the sceptical Academy from 
Areesilas to Philo. Lucullus deploys his arguments against the principal 
Academics and against the school as a whcle, incorporating here and there 
portions of the critique that cNncern only particular philosophers. In his 
reply Cicero similarly defends, for the most tart at least, an ideal and 
impersonal Academic, who displays a combination of the most Positive and 
salient features of the school from Arcesilas to Philo. 
1Sextus 
2_X. I, 220-21; Galen H. Ph. 3 (Dials Dox. p. 599 ff. ); Numenius, fr. 26, 
103-4 (Des Places); D. L. 1V, 28. 
2See 
section F of This Introduction, p. 62 below. 
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The confusion and discrepancies resulting from this line of approach 
are obvious. For example, Lucullus sets out to report a conversation which 
allegedly took place immediately after Philo's innovations became known to 
lntiochus-in Alexandria, yet at the end of his pre3iº: inary speech he de'ides 
to pass over the polemic against Philo and deal with Arcesilas and Carneades 
(12). The historical argument which followo (13 ff. ) would concern Araesilas 
. and Thilo more than Carneades. L"ucullus does nevertheleeo come back to Philo 
a. d his innovations in 18, while his argument from 19 ft, would concern all 
the Academics, including Philo. The arguments against 1o Xf (37-39) are, 
on the other hand, irrelevant to Philo'a latest position. In 32 a poe . ion 
which is presumably that of Arcesilas is brushed aside as hopeless, and no 
more mention is made of him until 59, although the diccusssion of 
bAOXfj in 
37-39 would concern h1' most closely, and some of the arguments about sense- 
deception (47 ff. ) would undoubtedly have been put forward by him. 
1 '. gain, 
in Cicero's reply, nc clear distinction is made between Clitomachus' 
interpretation of the Carneadean doctrine of probability and Philo's new 
standpoint (98-110,111-113). In general Cicero supports the view that the 
wise man does not assent and opine (67,78,108), yet in 112-113 he argues 
for the reasonableness of supposing that the wise man sometimes opines. in 
146 he appears to accent the new Philonian, concept of knowledge ('scientia'), 
without taking into account that it is incompatible with 
17-oXf 
. 
It is natural to think that in the Soaps Antt_chus rebutted cvcry 
olpim Philo had made in his two books and included a statement of his own 
view of the deveiopment of the Academic philosophy in opposition to that 
of Philo. We should not, therefore, aosume (with Reid, p. 51 n. 2) that the 
1 
! The reason for dismissing Arcenilas in 32 is that Lucullu3 is there 
preparing the ground for his criticism. 3 of the MLOav6v . No mention is 
made of the cv? oyov .A number of Arcesilas' arruments are not examined, 
at all (see p. 11 If. above), just as Lucullus does not exhaustively analyse 
and refute a: 1 the Academic argwnncnta about sense-deception. He dismiosen, 
for instance, those concerned with illusion (19). 
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Sosus, being 'polemical rather than expository', did not contain an outline 
of the history of philosophy similar to that given by Marro in Ac. I, 15 ff.. 
Reid also believes that the Sosus 'covered exactly the same ground as tho 
discussions ., hich Lucullus professes to report' (p. 52). Ho infers that 
since the conversation at Alexandria is said to have lasted several days, 
the Sosus was divided into several books, only one of them concerned with 
Philo, which Cicero passed over in writing his work. This assumption ignores 
the obvious fact that Cicero's acc: 'ant of the conversation is designed to 
make Lucullus' knowledge of Antiochus' case against the Academics dramatically 
plausible and to enlarge the scope of the debate in his own dialogue. Unless 
we have definite grounds for thinking otherwise, it is more probable that 
the Sosus, which we are told Antiochus wrote 'contra uuum doctorem' (1a), was 
directed mainly against Philo. It would i, ot have b;, -3n hard for Cicero to 
adapt and extend Antiochus' polemic since all the Academics from Arcesilas 
to Philo had rejected the cataleptic impression on generally the same grounds. 
Cicero may have modified what he was borrowing from the Sosus or relied on 
other workn of Antiochus1 or even on his own recollection of'Antiochus' 
lectures. It need not, moreover, be inferred from his concluding remark in 
Att. XII, 52,32 that his philosophical works are merely word for word 
translations of Greek originals. 
3 In Fin. I, 6 he claims to be not so much 
translating his Greek sources as preserving their thought, while applying to 
it his own judgement and following his own order of composition. In Off. I, 6 
1Sextus. 
A. M. VII, 201, refers to another work of Antiochus, the Canonica, 
which Dillon (p. 60) regards as Cicero's chief source for the Luc llus. See 
however Brocnard, p. 211. 
2 "A7c , S, "p acpa Bunt, minore labore fiun(;; uerba tantum adfero quibus atundo. ' 
This was written on 21 May 45 B. C. , so that the reference could be to the first version of the Academica. 
3See 
A. E. Douglas, Cicero, ed. T. A. Dorey, pp. 138-9. Douglas thinks that 
much of the discusssion In the Academica Priora is 'unoriginal', but that 
Cicero nkiy have been ccnsideräbly freer ei bewhere. 
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where he rakes a similar claim, he explicitly states that this is his usual 
practice. 
1 
Since Cicero differed fron Milo on the question of tnoXfj 0 it is 
hard to think that the two books, which crirked off tho discussion in 
Alexandria, were Cicero's main source for his reply to Luculluo. He may, 
however, have used these books together with others written earlier by ! 'kilo, 
or by Antiochus himse'-Z prior to his defection (69). It is clear that he 
used Clitomachus (98 ff.; 102 ff.; Reid, p. 52-3). But again, we must P4sume 
some degree of independence and personal initiative on Cicero's part. 
Sections 66-78, for instance, look very much like the author's own attempt 
at a preliminary disct_4sion that would match Luoullus' introduction (13-18). 
PhilQ would not, perhaps, have defended Arcesilas with the argument that he 
was merely trying to safeguard wisdom by his doctrine of . %o Xf; (66-63, 
76-78). The argument in 68 is faulty in that the necescit; " of &noXf does 
not follow from the assumptions posited; Cicero here seems to be trying to 
compromise between the traditional view of e%oxfj and Fhilo's new position. 
In 72-76 he gives a very one-sided accoLvnt of the Presocratics and Plato 
that would not fit well with Philo's interpretation of the history of the 
Academic philosophy. The supposed conversation between Arcesilao and Zeno 
on the question of the cataleptic impression (77) cculd easily have been 
Cicero's invention. 2 I would therefore disagree with Raid's opinion that 
sections 66-78 'in all probability' come from Philo's two books. His view 
(PP"52-3) that Cicero's account of the disagreements among philosophers is 
derived from Clitomachus is also open to objection. keile this may be true 
1`. 
I, 6s'sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et had in quaectione putissimum 
Stoico3 non ut interpretes sed, ut solemus, e fontibuc eorum iudicio 
arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo uidobitur, hauriemu3. ' 
2The 
conversation hardly illustrates Arecsilaß' dociro to discover the truth, 
as Cicero claims (76 and). ' Moreover, Zeno's replice are evasive, no that 
the interchange is unnecessarily prolonged. 
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of some sections. esneciall_y those on thvsica (116 ff. ). 
lit 
need not be true 
of all. The pattern of the argument in the sections on ethics (129-141) is 
determined primarily by Cicero's wish to set up a contrast between the ethical 
views of Antiochus and those of the Stoics and to lock forward to a moro 
exhaustive treatment of the subject in the ethical worei that were to follow 
the Academica. In view of his considerable interest in ethics, it is possible 
that Cicero relied largely on his own knowledge in these sections. Again, 
the sections on logic (142 ff. ) are so elementary that it is unnecessary to 
assume that Cicero is translating some Greek original. 
Almost all Cicero's philosophical works, excluding the De Re P blica 
and the De Legibus, were composed during the years 46-44 B. C. 
2 Writing 
provided a means of consoling himself for his domestic aisfortunea, 
3 
and for 
his enforced retreat from public affairs. 
4 Hic main aim, he tells U3, was to 
make good come out of evil by using his leisure for the benefit of his fellow 
countrymen. 5 Philosophical works written in Latin by an expert in the 
language such as himself would fill a long-felt gap in the Romrii cultural 
heritage and make the Roman people independent of, or at least less dependent 
on, the Greeks. 
Cicero tells us in N. D. 1,9 that his intention was, from the outset, 
to cover the whole philosophical field in his writings. It can be inferred 
from the Academica an& the De Finibus that a programme of subjects or 
problems to be treated was already in hie mind by t: 4e time he was composing 
these works. As I said earlier, his survey of ethl^al disagreements in tho 
1Sextus 
A. M. IX, 1; Diels, Dox. p. 119 ff. 
2He 
himself notes the shortness of the time, N. D. I, 6; Off. III, 4. 
3Ac. I, 11; N. D. I, 9; Tusc. V, 5. 
411Iv_. 
II, 1; Off. II, 2-4; I11,1-4; N. D. I, 6-7. 
5_. 
II, 4. A. E. Douglas (Cicero, ed. Dorey, p. 136) notes that Cicero wants 
us 'to see primarily in his philosophical writings a continuation by other 
means, as it were, of his political and public career'. For Cicero's reasons 
for writing philosophy, see Ac. I, 3-14; r_. 1,6-9; Fin. I, 1-12; Off. 1I, 2-6; 
III, l-4; Div. II, l-7; Tusc. I, 1-7; IV, 6. 
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Luc, 
_ ullus 
(129, ff. ) has'been framed, in both presentation and content, by his 
own ethical sympathies and interests and constitutes a sort or argument in 
miniature of his major ethical works. 
' The last two sections (147-8)t which 
refer to the prospect of further discussions in the speakers' country houcos 
at Tusculum, seem to look forward to a series of works on ethics and natural 
philosophy. Torquatus in Fin. I, 26 ('do physicis alias') also appears to 
hint at Cicero's intention of composing works on natural philosophy. 
, 
Cicero's plan2 perhaps went even i`urther bacl: than the Aeide-ic; t, to 
the time when he was composing the Orator and possibly the f. 'ortensius. 
3 
The presence of the came characters in both the fnrtenslus and the Academics 
suggests that these two works, at any rate, formed part of a single design. 
4 
Both were intended as introductory to th_ author's philosophical corpus. 
5 
Since Cicero probably agreed with Antiochus that the problem of knowledge 
was one of the two most important issues in philosophy (29)p and since logic 
in general was normally treated as a propaedoutic tc the other branches of 
philosophy, it is possible that the Acßdemica was conceived, both logically 
and chronologically,, in accordance with the accepted divisions of philosophy 
and their relative importance. Secondly, - Cicero's plan, particularly in view 
of its wide range and didactic purpose, required coherence and a proper 
philosophical method. These are provided by the Acadomio, philosophy and 
H. A. K. H. A. K. Iiunt, h: Huminfrm of Cicero, pp. 19-20.11=t also balieves 
that the sections on physics raise iaauea which are of particular inter at 
to Cicero and are examined in his works on natural philosophy. 
2This 
subject has boei treated by M. F. A. Sullivan i.: Tho Pinn of CieAro_A 
Philnsorhic",. 1 Corru3, fordham University Dissertation, 10 (1951), This 
is an unpublished thesis, and I have not been able to see it. 
3Seo Or. 140. The t'or: 'nsius may have been begun as early as 46 and completed 
30,10 after :,: llia'c death and Cicero's retreat to Astura in February 45. 
Cleo Reid, pp. 29-31; M. Ruch, L'ffortonsiti dp Cicn'ron. hintoiro et 
x_conntitu Eton, pp. 35-36. 
4Rucn, 
on. cit, p. 36. 
5Ifunt, 
cn the other hand, cee3 the Nortonil as the introduction to a series 
of works that started with the Ac. ld. mfea. 
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the author's own adherence to it. On several occasions Cicero states that 
his critics still do not understand his philosophical position and that this 
has been made clear in his Academica N. D. I, 6; 11-12; Off. II, 7-8). This 
philosophical position is especially important in relation to what he was 
trying to achieve. It enables him to range over the whole philosophical 
field, provides him with a method of philosophizing that is 'least arrogant, 
most consistent and refined', 
l 
allows him to shun dogmatism 02 to engage in 
argument with an open mind and to follow what is probable, without placing 
restrictions on the individual judgernent. 
3 In short, the Academic philosophy, 
particularly with its doctrine of probability, suits Cicero's purpose. 
The Academics, therefore, explains the basis of thin philosophy and not only 
gives the author's final word on the problem of knowledge but also provides 
the necessary understanding of his method of procedure in the works to follow 
and the epistemic basis of the arguments there. 
4 In these works, one system 
is pitted against another and the doctrines that are most probable 
(to the 
author) are pointed out. The method which began as a purely nltgative 
dialectic thus acquires a positive purpose, and is justified by Cicero on 
the ground that only in this way can we elicit what is true or at least 
probable. 
5 
1Div. II, 1 'genus philcoophandi minime arrogans maximequo et constans et elegans'. 
20ff. II, 8 'affirmandi arrogantiam uitantam fugere tomeritatem'. 
3Ac. II, 8-9; 2usc, II, 5; Off. II, 8; 1I. D. I, 10-12; "Diy. 1I, 150. 
4Hunt (loc. cit. ) sees the principal aim of Cicero's philosophical works as 
the exposition and examination of Antiochua' vi-sw3. He accordingly sees the 
Academics as merely an examination of Antiochus' theory of perception, in 
opposition to that of the Academy, which would pave the way to the De Finibus, 
where the s! 1nificanc° of that theory for Antiochuo' ethics bocores apparent. 
A. E. Douglas (Cicero ed. Dorey, p. 145) points out that Hunt's view involves 
'stigmatizing large parts of tho works as "irrolevant"', and that 'it is 
easier to believe thr. L Cicero's main purpoce was somewhat wider. ' 
SAc. IIp7; Off. II98; Tuwo. II, 9; N. n. I, 11. 
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The type of dialogue form that Cicero adopts suits his general purpose 
and method of exposition. Action and details of dramatic background are kept 
to a minimum. In the Lucullus, two of the four characters are for the most 
part silent. After tha proem and introductory conversation, Lucullua, an 
Antiochus' spokesman, delivers a virtually ccntinuou3 and uninterrupted 
speech, which is opposed by that of Cicero, again long and uninterrupted. 
l 
Of the two protagonists, Cicero is clearly the principal character in the 
sense that the roles of the other three are subordinate to that of the author 
and subservient to his dramatic intention and his own philosophical position. 
In this, as we learn from one of his letters to Atticus, he was following the 
example of Aristotle, who in his dialogues used to assign to himself the 
chief speaking part. 
2 
The Aristotelian character of Cieero's dialogues is 
perhaps further illustrated by the use of opposing speeches. 
3 Row far the 
philoscphical works which were used as sources, including the works of Thilo 
and Antiochus, may hav: influenced the form as well as the content of the 
Academica, is, of course, impossible to judge. 
4In Fin. 1I, 1-3 Cicero criticises the use of long cpeeches and states his own 
preference for the Socratic method of question and answer. Normally, however, 
he follows the practice of the later Academy in using the continuous speech. 
2Att. 
XIII919,4 'servo ita inducitur cetercrcum ut penes ipsum sit principatus'. The reference is specifically to the Pe F! nihus and the second edition of the 
Academica. " Earlier ir the sarge letter Cicero objects to Atticus' sug; geation 
that Cotta should reply to Marro or. the around that he himself would then not 
have a speaking part. This is acceptable, he says, only when the characters 
are 'antiqui', as in many of the dialogue4 of Heraclideo Tcnticus and in his 
own De Re Pu', lica and 7)e Oratore. Elsewhere (Fa-%I, 9,23) the to Cratore is 
said to be written 'Aristotelio more'. Reid (p. 29) considers this to 75 an 
inconsistency; A. S. Wilkins in his edition of the b Crziarp (p. 4) sug sts 
that in Fam. I, 9,23 Cicero is thinking of the substance rather than the form 
of the dialogue. The 'moo Aristotelius' can clearly have different ccnnota- 
tions according to the context (cf. Or. III, 60). I"!. Ruch, L, rrAantniln dtna 
les oeuvres rhilosophiquea de Cic6ron, P. 40. See also following note. 
31n 
Fin. V, 10 the rhetorical and philosophical exercise of arguing on both 
sides of a question is said to have originated with Aristotle. In Pe f`r. III, 
80 the speaker who can argue 'Aristotelio more' on both sides of every topic 
is said to be the perfect orator. (Wilkin's note nd loc. is misleading; 
Cicero is clearly ascribing the practice Q arguing on both cider to Ariatotlo). In Ture. II99 the practice is attributed to both the Peripatetica and the 
Academy; Cicero says it has always appealed to him both as a means of discov- 
ering what is probable znd as a rhetorical exercise. Cicero's dialogues are 
evidently intended to sefloct this method, -though 
ho does not specifically 
say that Aristotle used it in his own dialogues. 
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D. Cicero as an Academic 
As a New Academic (to use Antiochus' terminology), Cicero is in it 
class of his own. He is keenly aware of the notoriety of the school for its 
entirely negative philosophy, and for such perverse qualities as 'portinaoia', 
'calumnia' and'studium uincendi/certandi' Ac-I, 44; 11,65). lie vigorously 
exculpates both Arcesilas and himself from any such dishonourable motives and 
procl: ims his own and hic school's concorn for the ;, ruth (7; 65-66; 76 ff. ). 
A contrast is thus cot up in hie works between the , +ew Academic's impartial 
but assiduous love of truth1and members of tho other contemporary schools who 
will contentiously and arbitrariliy cling to a position or doctrine they have 
taken up. In general, the New Academic emerges from Cicoro's works as the 
most positive and constructive typo of philosopher pocoible, as opposed to 
the other philosophical groups. 
Like Carneades who defended different viown at different tines (Div. I. 
62), Cicero cherished above all the froedom - to which adhoronco to the 
Academic school entitled him'- of moving{ from eno position to another, of not 
being tied down to any particular cystem, and of being able to examine and 
defend a view on its own merits independently of authority. 
2 Ile is convinced 
that, as an Academic, he can roam freely over the wholo philosophical fiold 
and choose what is to him most probable. This is characteristic of Cicero 
alone. Ibilo had already started to exploit the possibility of a more, 
positive approach, the natural culmination of which would have been a fully 
developed system of philosophical doctrines based on knowledge, except that 
this knowledge would havo fallen short of absolute certainty. This develop- 
ment takes place in Cicero's works but not in tho way wo would have expected. 
In 4 c. I, 17 he admits that he cannot go further than tho probable. But in 
Ac. II, 66 he argues that love of truth is implied in the satisfaction felt on discovering the probable. 
2E. 
q. Tusc. I: ',? i V, 83. 
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Here we have a disconcerting type of eclecticism, with vicwp borrowed from 
the very opponents of Academic scepticism, which previous Academics would not 
publicly have dared to espouse even as merely probable. Cicero is prepared 
to disagree even with Carneades (Fin. II, 38). 
1 In N_D. I, 17 he dissociate? 
himself from the New Academic Cotta, and at the end finds the case of the 
Stoic Balbus to be nearer to the truth. 
It appears at first sight that Cicero's interpretation of the doctrine 
of probability would lead to an extrer; e form of subjectivism, whereby ovary 
man is the best judge for himself of the probability of any proposition. In 
Tusc. V, 33, for example, we find him claiming that he lives from day to day 
and that he says whatever strikes his mind as probable and so he alone is 
free. Elsewhere Ac. II, l34; Off. III, 33) he represcuts himself as unable to 
decide between two alternatives and as adopting first one then the othbr. 
But, on a closer look, it becomes clear that Cicero's freedom to range from 
one view to another is restricted (by himself) within well-defined limitn. 
What he is not sure about is whethar the moral end is 'honestum' alone 
(the 
Stoic view) or whether it is 'honestum' together with the primary natural 
advantages (the Academico-Peripatetic view of Antiochue). hose are the only 
views which safeguard virtue (Ac. II, 134) and nothing olle, apart from those, 
seems probable (Cff. III, 33)" 
Cicero's Academicism too is eclectic. Despite his claim in Fam. 1X, 0,1 
that in the Academica Ise has taken for himself the part of Thilo, 
2he is not 
really Philo's spokesman. For example, ho doec not support Thilo's vier that 
Carneades had actually held the doctrine that the wire man assents and opines, 
but prefers to thinx with Clitomachus that Carneadee had morely advanced the 
view in argunent (78). He does, of course, argue that it is reasorablo to 
1This 
is on the question of tho ethical end, which (rrneades defined as 'frui 
principiis naturalibus' (Fin. II, 35). In Ac. II, 131 Cicero rccognicea that the 
definition was put forward merely in opposition to the Stoics. 
2'zihi 
sumpsi Thilonis (so, parted)'. It should be noted, however, that the 
reference is to the second edition of the Academica. 
4ß 
think thät'the wise man may opino (112-13)9 and at the end or the Lucullun 
(140) he adopts a tolerant attitude towarc: 3 this view. But his final word 
does appear to be that assent should be done away with. 
1 Thus Cicero upholds 
the Clitomachean view, that probability dove not involve assent (104), as well 
as the original Academic view, which coincides vith the Stoic, that assent to 
what is not known, and therefore opinion, is incompatible with wisdom (59; 66- 
68). Yet he is attracted by and backs up Philo'c bid for a now definition of 
knowledge (112; 146; F! n. V, 76), and admits that there can be pcrueption of 
the trae, pr"vided that such perception lo not taken to be incorrigible. 
Thus he apparently fails to roalice that the dootrino*of 7o)f is rendered 
obsolete within the context of Philo'e new definition of knowledeo. 
There are other inconsistencies in Cicero's position. At the beginning 
of his reply to Lucullus, despite his usual rejection of assent, ho quite 
unnecessarily claims to be an 'opinator', 'in contrast to th wise man. 
2 Such 
a contrast would have been more appropriate in a Stoic context, in which the 
ordinary person's assent to opinion is the only alternative to the knowledge 
of the wise man. Cicero could, as an Academic, have represented himself as 
a follower of probability, in which case the contract between himself and the 
wise roan would have been less marked. It is one thing to admit to the 
occasional lapse ('nec tarnen ego is sum qui nihil =jubn falsi adprobem, qui 
numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner... '); it is quite another to claim that 
this is the characteristic feature of his thought ('magrlus quidem sum 
opinator'), and that he steers, as it wore, a roving courao by )lolice, not 
by the Pole star. It is possible, therefore, that ricoro has becom"i confused 
between the Philonian and Clitomachean views of opinion and probability. 
1148. 
'Tollendum' hay a double meaning in that it can roter to weighing 
anchor or to abolishing assent. Cicero taken it in the latter sense. 
266. 
In this passage it is a question of assenting to what is not known, and 
so of weak assent, not of 'qualified' assent, a ^oncept which is foreign to 
this controversy, as has already been said (p. 14 above). 
49 
Again, Cicero does not make a decisive choice between the Stoic concept 
of wisdom ('sapientia') as primarily the possession of knowledge and the 
Academic view of it as essentially avoidance of rashness and error. In 66-67 
he attempts to establish common ground in the fact that neither Zeno nor 
Arcesilas would allow that the wise man opines. But what he appears to over- 
look in that passage is that for the Stoics and Antiochus the 'firmitas' of 
the wise man springs from the possession of indubitable and incorrigible 
kn o%: ledge, not merely from the fact that t ,a does not opine. Elsewhere he 
defines wisdom in more traditional terms, 
' 
which are nearer to the Stoic 
concept. In Ac. II, 112-1.13, however, he is sympathetic to a view of the wino 
man whose judgement is not infallible and whose knowledge is not absolute. 
2 
The lack of coherence in Cicero's position might be taken to suggest 
that it was, for him, a relatively recent one, and that he had not been from 
the first a committed adherent of the sceptical Aca, ý2my. As an orator he was 
disposed to see both sides of a question and to be satisfied with the 
probable, but this alone would have been hardly sufficient to draw him to 
scepticism. Scepticism may have had 'points of eontcct' with rhetorio, 
3 but 
apart from the method of arguing on both sides he nowhere makes a connection 
between them or states that he espoused Academic scepticism because of his 
professional calling. 
4 There is, of course, his own claim in the Orator (12) 
that he owed his eloquence to the Academy rather than the rhetorical work- 
shops, and in the Do Fata (3) he points out that there is a close link between 
the orator L. d the philosophy of Which he is an adherent. The Academy of 
As 'rerun diuinarum et humanarum scientia', Off. I, i53t 1195- 
2 
This is put forward as the Peripatetic and Old Academic view, but in also 
in -agreement with that of Philo. 
3E. 
Rawson, Cicero: a Portrait, p. 236. 
4E. 
Iiavet ('Pourquoi Ciceron a profence la philoaor;, ie academique', Seances 
et trav_aux de 1'Academie den ßciences politiqueft et , noralo3,121 (lß©4 , 
pp. 660-671 argued thy: ` Cicero saw philosophy purely as an auxiliary to 
oratory and, secondly, that he merely followed the fashion in his choice of 
philosophical opinions. Both views arc plainly false and are contested by 
P. Boyened ('Lcu methodes do 1'histoiro litt6rairo, Cio6ron of con oeuvre 
philosophiquc', RFL 14 (1936), p. 290 n. 1 and p. 257). 
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Philo was well known for its rhetorical teaching, but what Cicero has in 
mind in both passages is not scepticicin a: ouch but the general training in 
argument and mental subtlety which the orator derives from the Academic 
philosophy, from Plato onwards. 
Cicero appears to have been by temperamcnt averse to do atism. 
l 
Sometimes he strikes us as having been uncertain in hic decisions and actions, 
for instance at the beginning of the Civil War, though the difficulty of the 
choice with which he wis then faced provides ample excuse for what ham often 
been criticised as vacillation. 
2 Ilia comment on his own indecision with 
regard to his choice of characters for the Academica (10 Academiam uolaticara 
et sui similem, modo h-uc modo illuo', Att. XIII, 25,3) arice naturally from the 
fact that the work in question is about Academic scepticism; there la no 
implication that Cicero considers himself by nature a ocoptio, far lonz, that 
he has always been an Academic sceptic. Had this been so, one might have 
expected to come across some comment in his carlicst letters. 
3 
In the De Legibus (I, 37-39), Cicero antioipatea the approval of the Old 
Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic schools for his attempt to establish firm 
foundations for cities, and he begs the New Academy of Arceoilas and Carncadea 
to be silent, and not play havoc with the discussion. Ile does not speak as if 
he were himself an adherent of this school. Though Atticus points out (36) 
that his friend does not usually follow the authority of others, the ne Leribus 
as a whole is dogmatic in both tone and content. A possible explanation is 
1}ven 
in his earliest work, the De Inuentiono he declares that he 
will not make statemcnts that are too positive, for fear of giving ascent to 
anything rashly and dogmatically -a principle he i:, tendn to follow in all his life. 
2I4. 
Carcopino, Cicero and the Secrets of his Correnrondenco, I p. 233, 
represents Cicero as a sceptic who aspired to certainty In politico, and 
calls him, somewhat obscurely, a 'doctrinaire without a doctrine'. 
3We 
find Cicero professing to put into practice the method of arguing 'in 
utramque partem' as early as December 60 B. C. (Att. l1,3,3). But the method 
is described as being Socratic. 
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that at the' time of writing this treatise Cicero had not yet come forward 
openly as a champion of the sceptical Academy. 
' 
Twice in Ao. I (13 and 43) Cicero is said to be deserting the Old 
Academy for the New. Reid (p. 15) rightly rejects the suggestion that Cicero 
had for a time abandoned the views he learnt from Philo. 11is explanation, 
based on Yarro's uce of the word 'traetari' (I, 13), Is that Cicero is 
referring to a change in his literary sources. This is plausible; I believe, 
however, that the author's main purpose hero is to distinguish the camps of 
the opposing protagonists in the dialogue. For Varro, Antiochus' mouthpiece, 
there are two Academies, so that Cicero in supporting the New has seceded 
from the Old (I, 43). ' Cicero jokingly points out that Antiochus has done just 
the opposite in returning to the Old trom the Now (I, 13). But for Cicero, 
who is looking at things from Philo's point of view, there is only one 
Academy that stretches from Plato to I'hilo himself, so that there is no 
question of a change of allegiance. Nevertheless, it is significant that, 
to both Varro and Lucullus, Cicero's support for the sceptical Academy 
appears as scmothing recent ('quae nunc prope dimissa rouocatur', II, 11). 
2 
Cicero himself implicitly admits a shift of interest (I03), though the 
ambiguity of the term 'Old' Academy enables him to do so without declaring 
any former allegiance to Antiochus. What is now, therefore, in not his 
support for the Aeadeny, but hid defence of its scepticism from Areesilas' 
to Philo. 
1It is very unlikely that the D Ip ibun was written after the AcedemivA, 
as has been argued byM. B. A. Robinson 'The Lite of Cicero's I lrnihuz 
TAPA, 1943, pp. 109-112, arid 1946, pp. 321-2) and M. Ruch ('L3 question du 
22 erlbus', LEC'(1949) pp"3-21). The argumont of A. Coadeckemoyor (Die 
Geschichte des 9ria5 3ihon Skeptizirmus, 1905, pp. 143-144) that when ne 
wrote the DA Hn; ]2ublicc and the D"Lc+oibuý, Cicero had temporarily defected 
from the New Academy to the; 0ld Academy, can hardly be supported. 
2Although 
in the dramatic context (nunc' refers to the conversation than 
taking place, this does not imply that Ci'ero'o support for the sceptical 
Academy goes back to the dramatic dato of the dialogue (betweon 63 and 60 B. C., 
Fee Reid, p. 41). Cicero is alluding to the composition of the Anarkni` 
itself and his own pro=ammo of philosophical writing. 
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ifs before the Academia., Cicero made any claim of following a 
particular system, that system was probably Academic in the broadest sense. 
He was greatly attracted by Plato and Socrates, compared to whom all the 
philosophers who disagreed with them had . plebeian appearance. 
I Be often 
claims that the method'he is following is Socratic. 
2 Although it was from 
Philo he learnt to see the history of the Academy as a unity, it in possible 
that Antiochus, whom C: cero heard in Athens in 79 ß. C., may have had some 
part in directing his interest towards its early tradition. 
I would therefore conclude that Cicero declarod hi=elf in support of 
the New Academy for the first time in hic Academica. ' In N. D. 1,6 he refers 
to critics who were surprised at this unexpected defence ('patrociniwa 
necopinatum') of an obsolete and long abandoned aystem of philosophy. 
3 
Hence in the Lucullus he defends the Now Academic philosophy as ouch (7-9), 
but in later dialogues (N. D. I, 6; 11-12; Off. II, 7-0) he feelz the need to 
defend his own adherence to it. This adherence, an net out in the Luculluz, 
was not the result of long cherished sceptical convictions. Rather, Cicero 
was feeling his way towards an epistemological solution that would be in 
keeping both with the traditions of the Acadcmy and with his on literary, 
purpose. He was not a professional philosopher as 2"hilo and Antiochus were, 
and there had previously been no need to align hima: lt definitely on this 
1Ppcc"I, 
55; cf. Off. I, 2. In Att. IV, 16,3, writing in 54 B. C. about his c-M 
Do Republica, he refers to Plato as 'deus illo no3t: r'. In 64 B. C. Quintus 
Cicero speaks of his brother as 'homo 1'latonicus' (comment. fRt. 46). 
2Tusc. I, 8; V, 11; N; n. I, ll; Att. II, 30" 
3Cf. Lucullus' 'prope dimissa' (11). It may be added that in none of the 
letters relating to the composition of the AcademicA does Cicero in. icate a 
previous interest in scepticism. In F'am. IX, ß, l, where he informs Vurro 
that he has assigned him the part of Antiochus 'quno a to probari intellexiaee 
mihi uidebar', he makes no corresponding statement about his own attitude to 
Philo. In Att. XIII, 19,3, when he rejects Atticus' cugeention to include Cotta 
in the discussion, he does so not on the ground that he wishes to defend his 
own philosophical convictions, but for the purely literary reason that, since 
he is following the model of Aristotle, he cannot ha clf remain silent exccpt 
in a dieogue set in a more remote past. 
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issue. Any lack of coherence in his position in probably due to his attempt 
to act as spc4esman for the sceptical Academy as a whole, and perhaps to a 
residual uncertainty in his own mind on the question of assent and Fhilo's 
new definition of knowledge. He is of course careful to describe the system 
he supports as the Academic not the New Academic philosophy (7), though he 
accepts the appellation 'Now' as given to it by others (. c. I, 46). 
Since Cicero accepts in the Academica the thesis that nothing can be 
perceived or known, he is in principle adopting a philosophical pocition 
whereby, according to his opponents, he can neither act nor advance any view 
whatsoever. Now, though not previously to the Acadenica, the question of 
consistency arises between his past cognitive claims (made, for instance, 
when exposing the Catilinarian conspiracy) and his present sceptical stand- 
point (62-63). In Off, II, 7-8 he refers to critics who, despite the Academica, 
still do not understand how an Academic sceptic can discuss any topic, as 
" Cicero has been doing in his books, and ask whether he thinks he is being 
consistent. Those critics no doubt saw, as anyone would to-day. a certain 
discrepancy between some aspects of Cicero'a life and works and his rejection 
of the possibility of knowledge. For instance, one meets the normal use of 
cognitive language, dogmatic expressions or even positive assertions in his 
writings. Some of his works (e. g. Be Republica, De L crib»o, Do Oratore, 11 
Officiis, Do Fato) are anything but ccoptical in tone. ilia apparent dogmatism 
is perhaps most conspicuous in his statements on matters of 
roligion1 and 
morality. 2 Cicero, in short, appears to be an incez. 3istent sceptic. 
In spite of-his sceptical attitude in the Pe fiuirJ%tione, Cicero stresses 
the value of religious beliefs and observsr.: 
es in the most positive manner In 
the De Legibus. One explanation (see H. J. Goar, Ciccre nrd the Stcnta feligion" (1972 p"45) is that C. cero adapts his assertions to the ratter in hand; thus 
he upholds divination in the Pe Lerib-mi for fear of undermining the religious 
framework of the state. On the other hand, M. P. do Fourny ('lea fondEmento do 
la religion do Cic&ro: i-. LFC 22 (1954), pp"241-253,366-378) insists on the 
seriousness with which. Cicero viewed Koran relig. iou3 cults and holds that he 
kept philosophy and religion strictly apart, the br_ts of the latter being ios 
Mainrum. 
2 E. g, he positively asserts the cuproracy of virtue (Nna. IV. 34; V, 67,147 ff. ) 
and that it cannot be divorced fror, the moral. und (Off. 1,5). Virtue, like vice, 
is not a more matter of opinicn (I-PZ. I, 44 ff. ). Standards of conduct are fixed 
54 
It would, perhaps, be fair to judge Ciccro'o conaistoncy only on the 
basis of the works that followed the Aeadr-rnicl. Ewen co, tho problem is not 
entirely eliminated. One might defend him by pointing out that ho does hero 
and there i-sert phrases or exprossions to qualify his statemonts as non- 
dogmatic. 1 He cannot be expected to have worked out an entirely new 
Cognitive vocabulary. Much of his work in a record of views hold by other 
philosophical schools and he certainly has no reason to change the original 
technical languago into a now :. cep+ica1 terminology. Main, one night argue 
2 
that any sceptic is bound to lapse occasionally into the dogmatic atylo 
or even that it is harder to be a good Academic sceptic than it is to be 
a member of any of the varicus do^matic schools. 
3 
But this kind of defence tells only half the story. When Cicero first 
came forward in his Aca. demica as a supporter of the sceptical thesis that 
nothing can be known, he was perfectly aware that he would have to relate 
his past actions and assertions to his presont 2%6v Academic position. And 
if he puts into Lucullus' mouth the accubation of inconsistency between hic 
claim to have brought to light the Catilinarian conspiracy and hic support 
for the sceptical- doctrines of the Academy (62-63), the implication in 
that ho was fairly confident that there was no inconsictency at all. Cicero 
does not directly answer this criticism in tho Jmcu tun, perhaps because 
he hoped that his position would bocome clear once no had otatod the 
and depend on nature (Off. I, 6). In Off. III, 33 young Cicero is asked to 
assume, like a mathematical axiom, that only what is 'honostum' is worthy 
of pursuit for its own sakes-or failing this, that it in more worthy of 
pursuit for its own sake than anything else. See 11. Y. Henry, Thn R 1ntia 
of Domstisrt and SceEtIcisn in the Philo: torhicll Trontipnn of Cicero, 
Diss. N. Y., 1929. 
1L. 
g. 'ut mihi quider4 uidetur', 'ut opiror'; cf. 'nihil ut adfirmom' 
(Ziv. 
II98); 'falls igitur possumus' (Fin 1915)o 
2See 
A. Naess, Scepticism, p. 14, who quotes 1Itmo, A Tretntinn of Kamin Nlturn, 
Bk. I pt. 4. 
3See 
C. B. Schmitt, Cicero icentirun, p. 88 n. 33" 
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case for scepticism in his reply (64-148). But elsewhere (Off. II, BS N. D. I, 
12) he does indicate why there is no discrepancy between his actions and 
expression of views and his adherence to the sceptical Academy. The Academic 
sceptic is not someone who is always in a state of doubt, for he follows 
probability, and while denying that true impressions can be infallibly 
distinguished fron false, he nevertheless finde that many are sufficiently 
clcar to serve as a guide to the conduct of the wise man. In effect, Cicero 
is saying that we should not see him as 
'a total sceptic. 
1 M. Y. henry was 
therefore right to meet the charge of inconsistency by arguing that even in 
the theoretical sphere Cicero's 'whole trend of thinking is affirmative, not 
negative' and that 'his ppirit is that of a believer, not a aceptio'. 
2 
There is, however, one aspect of the matter to which she does not give 
attention and on which Cicero himself does not elaborate in replying to his 
critics, namely that, as a disciple of Philo, he can make normal cognitive 
claims, with the proviso that these claims do not satisfy the opintemologicat 
requirements stipulated by the Stoics. It is clear that Cicero approved of 
Philo's new definition of knowledge (which he tends to equate with the 
Peripatetic, 112-113, Fin. V, 76), though he does not exploit that definition 
to the full when explaining his own position. 
3 
Patrick, The Greek Sc, 
_, 
tics, p. 194" 
2? 
I. Y. Henry. The RP1n+ton of Dovma. tism And ccontioiar to the Phil omnnhic-il 
Treatises of Cicero, P-5- 
1 
3E. 
g. IT. D. I, 120non enim cumus ii quibus nihil uerum esse uideatur, cow ii 
qui omnibus ueris false quaedam adiuncta esse dieamus tanta similitudine ut 
in its nulle insit corta iudicandi of adsontiendi notws ox quo exatitit 
illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non porciporontur, tanzen, quia 
uisum quendam haberent insi'nem of inluctrom, iia capiontis uita regerotur'. 
't'here is an echo of Philo's new view hure. 
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E. The other interlocutors and their philosophical niE*nificnnce 
Apart from Cicero himself, the persona in the dialogue aro L. Lioiniuo 
Lucullus (c. 110-57 B. C. ), Q. Lutatius Catulus (died 60 B. C. ) and Q. Ilortcnoius 
Hortalus (114-50 B. C. ). Catulus and IIortensiua played a relatively more 
important part in the lost Catulus. In the Lucullus their roles are confined 
to very brief remarks at the beginning and and of each speech by the two 
protagonists, and even these remarks are determined, not by any philosophical 
cunvic. ions they may or may not have had in real life, but by the dramatic 
needs of the dialogue and the author's own literary and philosophical aims. 
We may assume that his portrayal of them, both here and in the Catulus, was 
no more historically accurate than his portrayal of Lucullus. 
1 In his letters 
Cicero nowhere distinguishes between these three characters in point of 
suitability (or rather 'insuitability) for the parts assigned to them. All 
three were now dead, 
2 
all three were 'nobiles', but not 'phil. ologi'S3 they 
lacked not so much tha general culture as the training and exp3rionce which 
would have enabled them to take part in an epistemological diccuacion. 
4 
There were possibly two factors in Lueullu$' life which determined 
Cicero's choice of him. He had been a generous patron of the arts, and he 
had had Antiochus in his company for a time during his military missions in 
the East. Plutarch's ricture'of him (Luc. 42) as a strong supporter of the 
Old Academy of Antiochi: a against the followers of Thilo, of whom Cicero was 
one, is obviously based on the Lucullus itself. Lut if Lucullua' interest 
in philosophy had been more than superficial, 
5 Cicero could hardly have 
1Cf. 
R. E. Jones, 'Cicero's Accuracy of Charaetori. ation in his Dialogues', 
AJPr 1939, - esp. pp. 308 and 324-5- 
2 For Cicero's decision not to include living porsons in his dialogues, ceo Att. XIII, 19,3. 
3Att. 
XIII, 12,3; of, 13,1. 
4Att. 
XIII, 16,1; of. 19,5. 
5See 
J. van Ooteghem, Luciun Lieini, un Lucullus, pp. 25-27. 
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assigned him the task of merely repeating from memory the arguments of 
Antiochus which he is alleged to have heard at Alexaldria. Cn'the other 
hand, it is hard to see why Cicero should have become dissatisfied with hie 
choice, unless his account of Lucullus' presence at the diccussions in 
Alexandria were purely fictitious. 
Catulus is principa]ly the mouthpic e of hic fathor, who, according to 
Cic_ro, had been acquainted with the Carneadean philosophy (148), and had 
condemned Philo's interpretations of the academy before him as more lies 
(12 and 18). The elder Catulus is thus used to back up the view that Thilo 
had deviated from the teachings of his prddecessors. If we accept what 
Cicero says about him as historically true, wo have to assume that he heard 
Philo in Rome, 1 although we need not also assume that he had read Philo's 
two books. It is possible, however, that the older Catulun' condemnation of 
Philo is another of Cicero's fictions. 
When at the end of the Lucullus (148) the younger Catulus is ackod his 
final opinion, he remarks that he is falling back upon2 the view of his 
father, which his father said was that of Carneadea, namely that nothing can 
be perceived (i. e. there is no cataleptic impression), but that the wise an 
will assent to something not perceived, and therofort opino. Thia viow 
constitutes a repudiation of the doctrine of & ioXf 
3 
and is very similar 
112 
'quae heri-Catulus commemorauit a patre suo dicta Philoni'. Reid (p. 42) 
argues unco: zvineingly that there is nothing to indicato that the oldor 
Catulus had either heard Philo or read his two books. Plasberg (Fraof. XII) assumes that he did b)th. 
2'Revoluor' 
is here used in the sense of 'have recourse to' 
(cf. Po Qr. II, 130). 
It does not imply "tnat Catulus had at any time changed hin opinion. In 10 
'reuoluitur' is used in a different sense, 'is led back to'. 
31t 
is therefore impossible to accept 'conprobana' as it stands in the text (P"102,19). The required sense is given by 'quare ... non probans' 
(Madvig) 
or 'improbans' (Davies). Reid's acceptance of 'conprobanu' (followed, but 
without conviction, by Rackham) rests on a minunderatandinß of Clitocnachuo' 
explanation of E io X1iin 104, from which he wrongly infers that an Acadomio 
can withhold assent ir. theory and give assent in practice. 
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to that of Philo. Fhilo himself had attributed it to Carnoadoß (70). It 
is strange, therefore, that the older Catulus should havo adopted a view co 
close to T'hilo's position, 
1. 
and yet be caid to have condamnod hia. innovations 
as mere lie^ (12 and 18). Ile cannot have been a fol]cwor of Clitomachus, as 
(leid states (p. 42), 
2 
and doubt is bound to arise whother the historical 
Catulus wa3 really committed at all to the philosophy of Carneades. 
3 If not, 
tho inconsistency of the view attributed to hin at the and of th3 Lucv11u» 
may merely be duo to Cicero's dish to conclude tho dialogue by contrasting 
two different Academic standpoints conccrnira lv. oXfl . 
Since the death of the elder Catulus must have occurred coon after 
Philo's arrival in Rome, the improbability that he slhould have criticised 
Philo's new doctrines, and that Cicero should havo known about it, to very 
great. In the dialogue, this is concealcd by the d_amttic form, cinco it 
is plausible enough that the qon should have )mown his father's views. But 
when wo examine the time factor, and ask how Cicero came by his information, 
whether from father or son or some other sourco, the difficulty becomes 
apparent. The same does not apply to Cicero's account of tho conversations 
in Alexandria, since he, may have read about them in the Sonus. But whether 
fact or fiction, the criticisms of Milo made by the older Catulus must have 
provided Cicero with a. starting-point for discussion in the Catu1»n, just as 
Antiochus' reactions to Philo's two books did so it the Lucullun. 
See the section on Philo's innovations, p. 29 tt. of this Introduction. 
2Since 
Clitomachus had denied (78) that Carnertdes actually hold the view 
hero attributed to hiw by Catulus' father. 
311e 
emerges from Cicero's works (for references coo I'oid p. 41) as a ran of 
exceptionally upright character and wide culture, with strong loanins 
towards philosophy (Tie Or. lI, 154 ff. ). But apart from the A'ad 'murr, he is 
nowhere particularly associated with the sceptical Acado: ny. For his life, 
character, and death in 87 by order of Marius, see Wilkins' introduction 
to his edition of the De 0_ ratore, pp. 24-5" 
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In real life Hortensius, in spite of his distinction as an orator, 
appears to have had little or no interest in philosophy. 
l 
The development 
of his role in the Academica is presumably continuous with the i; ortenrriuo, 
where, after first delivering'a speech attacking philosophy, 
2 he was brought 
to acknowledge the cogency of Cicero's arguments in reply. That Hortensius 
did experience a change of heart in the dialogue which bore his name in 
proved beyond reasonable doubt by Lucullus' appeal to Cicero at the and of 
his speech (61): 'tune, cum tantis laudibus philosophiam extuloris Hortensi- 
umque nostrum dissentientem commoueris .... '. 
3 Otherwise, the fiction of 
his interest in philosophy could hardly have been sustained to the extent of 
making him an interlocutor in the present dialogue. It is made clear, 
however, that his participation in the'discussion has not the came depth and 
seriousness as that of the other two. In 10 he claims to have made only the 
more obvious points in his speech on the previous day, no that the whole 
case against Academic scepticism has been virtually re3crvod for Lueulluc. 
In 63, having shown his admiration for Lucullus' arguments throughout, he 
expects Cicero to be immediately convinced by them, though Cicero says that 
he could not be sure whether he was serious or joking. At the end of the 
dialogue, when asked his opinion, he answers with a joke ('tollendem: '), 
through the ambiguity of which the author is able to impose his own final 
verdict on the reader. Hortensiua is thus represented as one who can 
the 
appreciate t1 subtlety and force of/argument (63) without being committed 
too seriously to a single point of view. The ambiguity of his attitude 
seems to be a necessary part of his dramatic characterization. 
1Reid 
p. 44. The goner, -, I opinion is contested by M. Ruch (T'irortonaius ý3 
Ciceron, p. 26), who thinks that Hortensius must have acquired some know. edgo 
of philosophy in the eource of his training as an orator and that his 
exceptional memory would have enabled him to retain this. In the _rutt2.0 
however, in which Cicero pays tribute to the memory of Iiortenniua 1 ff., 
317 ff. ), no philosophical interest is mentioned. 
2Lactant. 
Inst. I, 3,16; Tusc. II, 4; Fin. I, 2; huch, oc. PP. 87-95 and 102-115. 
3This 
was the view of 'Xrische, which Reid rejects o't of hand (p. 44). Set, 
Mich, op. cit. p. 169, who, however, wrongly infers from what Raid says that he thought the reference in 61 was to the Cntt_liý:,. 
60 
F. The lost Catulus 
Any evidence we have for the form and content of the Cntult1a in far 
too meagre to justify the elaborate reconstruction attempted by fold (p. 39 ff. ), 
and followed in its main outline by Planberg and W . khan. Apart from the 
surviving portion of the first book of the second editlcn (the so-called 
Academica Posteriors), a few inferences can be drawn from the 1-ticuIllin itself 
and from Ci. c; oro's letters. The scene of the dialop'e was Catulus' villa (9), 
' probably the one at Cwnae (80), where the four fricndn had not on the proviou3 
day. From Catulus' opening remarks in the 1x_ u111av (10) we learn that in the 
previous day's discussion the whole subject had been almost fully covered 
(exactly what the subject was is not defined), except for Luoullur' promise 
to report the arguments of Antiochus. llortcnsius rotors to hie own speech, 
clearly on the same side as Lucullus, since he describes it an moroly a 
preliminary handling of the case, which he might have done better to leave 
entirely to Lucullus. In 28 he is said to have demanded that the Academic 
sceptics shc. ald admit that the wise man knows ct least the one thing, that 
nothing can be known, and Lucullus goes on to attribute the same argument to 
Antipater. It may be observed that in the intermediate version whore Cicero 
rewrote the dialogue for Cato and Brutus (Att. XIII, 16,1), the part of 
Hortensius was probably assigned to Cato. It could be argued, therefore, 
that Hortensius was not defending dogmatism merely from the point of view of 
Antiochus, Lut in a more general way. Reid conjeotrren that Hiortenaius gave 
an outline of the history of philosophy corresponding to Varro'a in 1,15 if. 
but that he also advanced a polemical argument, which has disappeared in the 
second edition because Varro had to speak firnt, not second. He assumes that 
Catulus, Hortensius and, Cicero spoke in that order. 
In 79 Cicero tells huculluc that, when ho him3olf opoke on tho previouo 
day, he 'went out of his way' to say a great deal against the validity of 
the senses ('non necessario loco contra scnaua tam multa dixeram'), with the 
express purpose of forestalling any stock arguments which Lucullus inigit use 
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in this connection. We may infer that in some part of his speech Cicero was 
attacking the dogmatic position, which Ilortenciw had defended, and at the 
came time anticipating the attack on the sceptical position which Lucullus 
was later to make. Hence Lucullus remarks in 10 that his cane has been 
weakened by the previous day's conversation, though he still believes in its 
truth. In 12 his reference to Philo 'minus : niin aver eat nduerearius is qui 
ista quae aunt hers defenses ncgat Academirº, s omnino r. iccro', shoo that the 
case for Vie. sceptical Acadcmv beioro Thilo wau def'ndcd in a fairly orthodox 
way by one at least of the speakers on the previouu day. 
A doubt arises, however, over the place occupied by Catulua himculf in 
the dialogue. From the fact that it was named after him and that a 'laudatio' 
was later added (Att. XIII, 32,3), it may be inferred that he played a leading 
role. But Cicero also spoke, and it is not clear how far, if at all, their 
points of view would have been differentiated. In 63 he indicates that he is 
on the same cido as Cicero. We know that he mentioned his father's criticism 
of Philo! s innovations (12,18), which mrkes it probable that his speech was 
mainly a historical exposition of the doctrines of the Wow Academy along 
orthodox lines. ' In the course of his exposition he might well have main- 
tained what Philo alleged no Academic had over said (12), namely that know- 
ledge is impossible. But Cicero too would have defended this position, and 
Lucullus is rather va5ue here so that we cannot bo uuro if tho referenco 
'quae aunt hers defensa' is to Catulus in particular. Reid further arcucs 
In Reid's reconstruction (p. 43), the main part of Catulus' speech was devoted 
to defending Arcosilac and Carneades against the dogmatists, though more 
emphasis war placed on the Carneadean doctrine of probability and the positive 
aide of Academic teaching than on the destructive criticism. In support of 
this he asks no to compare 'ista quae aunt hers dofenca' with the words 'ad 
Arcesilam Carneademque ueniamus' (12; Reid p. 43 n. 2). Similarly iiortenaiue' 
demand mentioned in 28 is arbitrarily taxen as aimed at Catulus' defence of 
Arcesilas. The positiveness of Catulue' speech in inferred from hic remark 
at the end of the Lucullus (148), that he would fall back on hic father's 
views, etc. Plasberg too thinks that Catulus defended thin view in his 
speech in the Catulus (Praef. XII). But an I have argued in Section g of this 
Introduction, Philo himself attributed this view to Carnoadoo, and Catuluo 
cannot therofore have defended it against Mile. 
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(p. 216 n. 9) that Lucullus' remark in 32 about the emphasis placed on 
probability by the Academics ('et hoc quiden uel maximo uoc animaduertebam 
moueri') refers to Catulus' speech. 
' But here too thorn is no reason to 
suppose that 'uos' applies more to Catulus than to Cicero. 
It is possible, therefore, that in the Catulus the points of view of 
Catulus and Cicero may have been sufficiently close to enable Cicero to merge 
the part of Catulus with his own in the second edition. 
2 If the historical 
survey was divided in the earlier as in the later vorcion, nart..: iniua' account 
of the Old Academy and related schools would have preceded and not followed 
Catulus' exposition of the doctrines of the Now Academy. Cicero might then 
have expressed some jrdgement on these accounts, thou& the main part of his 
speech could have been an attack on dogmatism, including arguments against 
the validity of the senses (42,79; of. Flasberg, pp. 20-21). 
An alternative, however, which I should like to propose for consideration 
is that the clash between Antiochus and Thilo provided the starting point, as 
in the second edition, for two opposed accounts of the history of the Academy, 
one from the point of view of Antiochus, tho other from the point of viow of 
Philo. For this purpose only two main speakers were needed. If liortonsius 
1It 
seems to be on this ground that Reid (p. 43) assumes that Catulus defended 
the 7tt6avb v against M ilo's innovations and showed that a satisfactory 
basis for knowledge had already been attained by it. 
2The 
contrary has often been assumed, e. g. by Plaaberg, Prnof. Xlls '}'ro 
Philone dixit Cicero ipse. ' Reid, on the other hand, disagrees with the view 
of Krische and Engstrand that Cicero answered Catulus' arguments point by 
point, and maintains that Cicero never defends rhilo'u innovations anywhere (p"46). It is true that Cicero does not, in the surviving part of either 
version of the Academica, openly pronounce a personal verdict on T'hilo's new 
doctrines. But he does accept two of fhilo's rinc'tpal claims, (i; that 
there has always been one Academy (I, 13 and 4G), and (ii) that there is 
perception and knowledge, though not in the cenzo stipulated by the Stoics (111-113; Pin. V, 76). But he nowhere attributes this view to Fhilo'r, pre- 
decessors in the sceptical Academy, so that on this point, perhaps, ho is in 
agreement with Catulus. Reid is surely wrong, however, in arguing that it 
can be inferred from 12 that Fhilo's views were dismissed by all the dieput- 
ants, including Cicero, or that when Cicero states in F'am. IX, 8 that he In 
taking the part of }`kilo, he is referring to the 'general New Academic 
doctrines' taught by rhilo prior to his innovations. Though Ciccro'n 
Position in the Academica is not exactly that of Thilo, his view of the unity 
of the Academy, if nothing else, would jjstify hin claim to be supporting 
him, and like Thilo, he has undertaken the 'patrocinium' of the school (17), 
Including its rejection of the doctrine of the cataleptic impression. 
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outlined the earlier period from the point of view of Antiochue, wo may 
suppoao that Cicero, who accepted 1hilo'a view of the unity of the Academy, 
was the speaker who justified the existence of the sceptical Academy as part 
of the tradition received from Plato and other philosophers before him (cf. 
13). On this hypothesis there is no place for a major speoch. from Catulus, 
whose part in the dialogue would have been to open the discussion with a 
reference to Philo's innovations and hic father's reactions to them. 
Cicero's own account of the view of the principal Academic sceptics would, 
of course, have been unaffected by Philo's interpratations of them. 
1 There 
would trus be no difficulty in taking 'ista quae aunt her! dofensa' (12) an 
a reference to Cicero's own speech, which rust also have included his attack 
on the senses 'non nececsario loco' (79, ef. 42). But though Lucullus fools 
(10) that hi.. case has been shaken by the argument in the Catulus, Cicero's 
attack on dogmatism can only have been superficial, to that a more critical 
examination of the case on each side was left for the Lucullua. Some 
Polemical material may also have formed part of the speech of Hortensius, 
unless his point mentioned in 28 was not made during his speech but as , a. 
concluding remark, similar to the final opinion of Catulus in 148. 
1. 'hether the role here assigned to Catulus would have been doomed of 
sufficient weight to justify Cicero in na. *ing the dialogue after him and 
prefacing it with a 'laudatio', is a matter of individual judgement. Cicero 
evidently found it easy to dispense with his part, for both in the inter- 
mediate veroion, whore the parts of Iiortei. aius and Lucullus were assigned to 
Cato and Brutus, and i^_ the second edition, in whio:. Marro takes them over, 
there in no speaker other than himself on the aide of the sceptical Academy. 
Since both those revisions wore carried out very quickly (Att. XIII, 13,1; 
16,1), it is porhap3 c-sicr to believe that there were only two main opdakers 
in the Catulus. Its structure would thus correspond both to the Luculluz 
and to what is left of the second edition of the Acndoaica. 
1Since, 
in any caon, t:, -+y repudiated the doctrino of the cataleptic imprecuion, Philo'o view would be nothing woro than a particular interpret- 
ation of the original Acadomic position. 
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COMT1 NTARY 
The Proem 
Cicero himself tells us that in prefacing each book of a major 
philosophical dialogue with a separate introduction1 he is following the 
example of Aristotle: Att. IV, 16,5 'quoniam in oingulio libris utor 
prohoimiis2 ut Aristoteles in its quos kCwrcpLxot, Cuocat'. It is possible, 
therefore, that he is also following Aristotle in the style and . a=er of 
these introductions, written in propria peroona, 
3 
and used (generally 
spearing) to explain his own literary and philosophical aims, to set the 
4 scene and to introduce the dramatieperaonae. 
He does not always do so, e. g. Fin. III, N. A. II and III. 
2In 
Greek the word is used as a technical term for the opening section of a 
speech (Lat. exordium, of. Arist. Rhet. III, 1414b; Quintilian IV, 1,2), but 
also has the more general meaning of prelude or introduction. The use of 
the Latin prohoimion to mean the author's introduction to a literary work 
seems to have begun with Cicero;. cf. Att. Xtº1,6,4, whore he speaks of a 
'uolumen prohoiiniorum' from which he was in the habit of making a selection. 
l mistake, he had sent Attieus a copy of a work 'On Glory' with an intro- 
duction already used for the third book of the Academism. (second edition). 
This introduction, which must in the second edition have stood in the place' 
of the present one, cannot have been so carefully related to the contents 
of the work. 
31n 
Plato's dialogues there is sometimes an introductory conversation 
prefacing thu dialogue proper, as in the Thera tetun, but Plato himself never 
appears in his own person. That the philosophical dialogue after Plato 
normally had a non-dra. Tatic opening can perhaps be inferred from Froolus' 
criticism of the proems of Thecphrantus and Ileraclidos Fontious as 'out of 
keeping with : hat follows' ( . k1,6ttp ca Twv C7Co . itv )L' , 
Procl. Tn Pnrm. IY 
P. 54 Cousin; Rose, Arist. frag. p. 23). Cicero may also have used Iler.. elidos 
as a model for his proPms, 'although Iieraolidoc' dialurues were more often 
net in the remote past and he did net, therefore tale a speaking part in 
the rent of the work (Att. XIII, l9,4, Cicero's proems are, 
however, never wholly independent of the rent of the dialogue. 
4For 
a full study of the introductions to Cicero's philosophical works, see 
It. Ruch, I.: rcanbuln dn. ns lee o, uvren rh'? oapphinumn do CioiCrnn. 
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There in no 'exact parallel to the Ciccronian iiroocmiun in other forma 
of Latin literature. As explaining the euthor'u aims and conncrding his 
subject, it bears some resemblance to the historian's preface; an a 'captatio 
beneuolentiae', to the opening of a spcocr,; as a non-dramatic preface to a 
dramatic work, and as' an answer to critics, to a prologue of Terence. Th^ 
closest formal parallel is to Varro's prefaces In the three books of the Rea 
Rusticae, each of. whiur, contains, along with other introductory material, 
the setting of the sccne for the dialogue which follows. Varro's treatment, 
however, bot' of the introductory matter and of the dramatic element, is 
comparatively simple; he is under no noccacity to apölogiso for hin eubjeot 
or to explain hic own -position with regard to authorship, and ho has no 
problem with his characters. For Cicero, in addition to the need to explain 
and defend, the dramatic requirements of the dialogue may to a greater or 
less extent affect the whole content of the proem. This particular mixture 
of authenticity and fiction, in the proem as well as in the dialogue proper, 
depends mainly on his choice of characters. and is peculiar to Cicero. 
Lucullus, the philosopher-statesman 
1-4 (p. 26,1 - p. 28,14)1 magnum ingcnium .... de quibus audiabat. ' 
Sumnary. 2 (1) Lucullus' intellectual gifts and liberal culture did not 
win him the forensic distinction he morited because, during the time, 
when he might have won such distinction, he was absent from home. In 
early life he and his brother displayed filial piety by bringing a 
chargo against their father's prosecutor. Following hin quaestornhip, 
he was for many years in charge of the province of Asia, hero he 
distinguished himself. Ile was appointed aedile in his absence, then 
praetor before the legal age; after thin ho wont to Africa and returned 
to hold the consulship, during which he showed remarkable diligence and 
his ability was universally recognised. Sent by the senate against 
Mithridates, he exceeded not only everyone's expectations of him but also 
The page references are. to 0.1'lasberg'n Tcubncr edition (1922). 
2In 
these 'summaries', I have occasionally translated rather than merely 
summarised, to avoid c-nitting points that require comment. 
66 
the glory of his predecessors. (2) This. wan all the more surprising 
since he had had no previous military experience. He arrived in Asia 
a ready-made general simply by conversing with the exports and reading 
military history during the journey. His memory for facto rivalled that 
of. Hortensius for words, and recalls the similar gift of Themistoeles. 
the greatest of the Creeks, except that, unlike Themiatoclea, Lucullus 
developed hic natural powers by training. (3) He accordingly became no 
brilliant and versatile a connandcr that Nithri'iates, the greatest king 
since Alexander, admitted that he found him a greater general than any 
he had read about. His wisdom and justice were such that even today 
the province of Acia preserves his institutions. All these qualities 
unfortunately escaped the notice of the senate and the forum owing to his 
absence abroad. Worse, on his return the slander of his enemies delayed 
his triumph by three years, and it was I myself who, as consul, praeti- 
cally led his chariot into the city. I will not mention his holp and 
advice during this crucial period, since it would mean talking about 
myself. 
(4) In contrast to these much publicised aspects of his life, which 
are known to many, I share with only a few some more intimate details. 
Lucullus : ras more devoted to literature in general and philosophy in 
particular than those who did not know him were aware of. Us pursued 
this interest not only in youth but also for several years as proquaeator 
and even when actively engaged in the conduct of the war against N"ithri- 
dates. During this period he kept Antiochua, who had the greatest 
reputation among philosophers, by his side, and his memory being such as 
described, he was easily ablo to learn through repetition what he could 
have remembered if he had heard it only once. He moreover took great 
delight in reading the books which Antiochus talked about. 
The proem of the Lucullua, as it now ctand3, is an amended versions 
Att. X1II, 32,3 'Catulun et Lucullum, ut opinor, antes (mini). his librin 
noua prohoimia aunt addita, quibus eoru: a uterque laudatur'. 
1 Ilia letters 
(Att. XIII, 12.3; 16,1; ! 9,5) show that Cicero became dissatisfied with his 
original choice of characters for the Acadeaica because of their lack of the 
1For 
attempts at demarcating the new from what ay be loft of the ori, riaal 
proem of the Lucullug, cee 1.1. Ruch, oQ. ni t. p. 264 if. 
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necessary expertise in philosophy. The present proem, with ita laudrtio of 
Lucullus, represents, therefore, an intermediate stage (or ono'of several 
intermediate stages), before Cicero decided to rewrite the work transferring 
the parts of Hortensius, Catulus and Lucullus to Varro. In so doing, he was 
forced to go back on an earlier decision not to include living persons other 
than himself as speakers in the dialogues (Att. XIII, l9,3 'sic enim constitu- 
eram, neminem includere in dialogos eorum qui uiuerent'). 
In selecting his speakers, Cicero seems to havo been torn between the 
demands pf dramatic propriety, which forbade the use of persons whose lack 
of familiarity with the subject was well known, and his wich to commend 
philosophy to his readers by depicting distinguished Roma=s diccuncing 
philosophical problems and combining this interest with their conduct of 
public affairs. For this purpose the dead were clearly more suitable than 
the living, as giving more scope for idealisation and for any fictional 
element which the dramatic treatment might require. 
I Thus the Laudatio 
assumes to a certain extent the character of a Laudatio funebrio, in which 
a man's public achievements and virtues could be praised without an undue 
regard for strict historical accuracy. 
2 In Cicero's account of Lueullua' 
public career there are obvious distortions and exaggarationa, the chief 
being the statement that Lucullus was 'rei militarii rudie' when he took over 
command of the Mithridatic War. Since he had corvod under Sulla in tho 
Social War and as proquaestor in Asia this was far from being the trutli. 
3 
Cicero's motive in micrepresenting the facts seems to be the wish to ascribe 
Lucullas' success as a general entirely to his remarkable memory, a taetor, 
' 
See Introdiu tion pp. 56 ff. Cicero alco mentions, in connection with his 
choice of characters for the De Republica, a wish t, % avoid giving offence by 
encroaching on the contemporary scene: A, F. III, 5,2 'ne in nostra tempora 
incurrens offenderem quempiam'. Cf. _. XII, 12,2. 
2Brut. 62; Livy VIII, 4094. Cf. Do Or. II, 341" M. Ruch, o. o. pp. 263 ff. 
3J. 
van Ooteghem, Luciun T, ieinun Iiucullus, p. 61. 
60 
which he stresses again in 4 when speaking of Lucullus' association with 
Antiochua. Lucullus' success was not, in any case, as great as Cicero makes 
out; he became unpopular with his troops and Pompey wan eventually sent out 
to replace r+m. Moreover, Cicero's asauiption that he would have made his 
mark at home if he had not been abroad so long is hardly consistent with the 
fact that, when he did finally return, he hoed aloof from public affairs and 
devoted himself to a life of refined luxurj. 
The laudatio of Lucullus ahc"+ld not. however, be judged as a historical 
record. It is a brilliant piece of dramatic charaotorication, deeigned to 
dieguise the inadequacies of the real Lucullua for the role assigned to him 
in the dialogue, and to create from him what in virtually an ideal character, 
in which practical achievement and theoretical interest are combined to the 
highest degree. It was not enough, therefore, to magnify the intellectual 
gifts of Lkcullus; Cicero had also to raise his practical abilities to the 
level of near-perfection. 1 The creation of such an ideal, here represented 
by Lucullus, is part of Cicero's plan to justify the pursuit of philosophy 
to the practically-mindcd Roman. 
2 
His method is to look for those aspects of Lueullue' career which 
simply required a shift of emphasis to transform his life into the perfect 
combination of philosophy and statesmanship. Ho dwells much on what 'might 
have been' Lucullus' impact on the political scene at homo, if his qualities 
had not been put to such good use elsewhere. In aneeecing his ability as a 
commander, he appeals to the judgemcnt, not of the senate or any competent 
Roman, but of Mithridates, who found him a graator general than 'any he had 
read about'. Thus part of the ideal rests on inference and part on a personal 
opinion not admitting confirmation. Lactly, in 4 he difforcntiatoe between 
It follows, in the context of the argument in 6, that if Lucullus had 
distinguished himeelf so highly in practical affairs, no one could reasonably 
object to his spending his leisure time in cultural puruuitu. Hin memory 
had been of service to the state as well as to philosophy. 
2It 
also, of course, looks back to the T)e' llepubl icrt and Cicero's attempt to 
transfer the Platonic ideal to the Roman scene. 
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the well-. known facts of Lucullu3' public life ('ex'. 'rna') and the ir. Ride 
information ('interiora') which he shares with only a few, namely Lucullus' 
devotion to philosophy and long association with Antiochus. 1j intrcdücing 
fiction in the guice of what is less well known, he gives it verisimilitude 
without flying too openly in tho face of fact. 
For the real Lucullus' lack of philosophi'al equi; =ront for the tack 
aesigned to him in the dialogue, we have the evidence of Cicero himself. 
1 
In lieu of t;. e necessary expertise, Cicero offers uft Lueullus' remarkable 
memory, 
` 
and by admitting that repetition also played a part, he makes the 
tour de force seem plau: iblo and well within the capacity of Lucullus. 
A defence of Creek literature andphilosophy 
5-7 (p. 28,15 - p. 29,16) ac uereor interdum .... mortuis inuidoro. 
S umnary. (5) I sometimes fear that in trying to increase the fare of du--ii 
mer. I may be diminishing it. For"msny dislike Crook literature and still 
more philosophy; the rest, even if they have no other objection, contider 
the discussion of such topics uziauitable for loading public : igurea. In 
my opinion, however, 'the fact that Cato learnt Creek literature in hic 
old age3 and that Africarius. took Panantiua with him on. hie famous enbaaay4 
sufficiently auppo_te the case for Creek litere. turo and Zhiloaophy. 
'Att. 
XIII, 12,3; 16,1; 19.5. Plutarch'c picture of Lucullua as an ardent 
philosopher seem3 to be ba3ed uainly on the first edition of tho Academic:, 
which he mentors (Luc. 12). 
2Probably 
a dramatic device. Ths deliber; ste men: oricirg of reported subject 
matter also plays a part :n dialog e, ef. ; _m. 31 Plat-5 . 
. 72 P. ff. 
3The 
tradition that the elder Cato . 'as a 'late loan. -r' in the field of Creek 
studies is certainly i uch exagGeratcd= see Ji. Fetrccniloa, ßorý, ºn Attitudes 
to the Greeks (Athens, 1974), ; p. 166 ff. R. E. Jr,.. an ('Ciccre's Accuxacy of 
Characterization in hio Dialogues', AJP, 1939, pi. 510-12) arcuca that the 
portrait of Cato in thr DoSentetute a; an cnthu: rittat for Greek literature 
and Fhiloccp'. y is inaccii. at3. Sce A. E. Antin. Cato the Cnmr. or 
(1978), p. 157 ff. 
4For 
the dating of thic embassy and Scipio's friendr, Hip with Tenmetit: a, coo 
A. E. Astig, Scipio Aemji. ianus (Oxford 1567), x"127" 
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(6) It'remainsl for me to reply to those who think conversations of this 
kind unbecoming; to persons of dignity. But are we to expect them to meet 
in silence or talk about frivolities? If I was right in my praise of 
philosophy in a certain book of mine, 
` 
surely it is a subject worthy of 
the most eminent persons, provided that we whom the Roman people has 
elevated to this rank do not allow-our private interests to interfere 
with our public duties. But if when I had public work to do I devoted 
myself to the service of my fellow citizens and wrote nothing that was 
not concerned with my public life, who will blame me if, in the absence 
of such preoccupations, I try to keep my wits sharp and at the same time 
to benefit as many people as possible? As to the fame of auch men, I 
consider that I an increasing it not diminishing it by publicising their 
less widely known claims to distinction. (7) There are those who cay 
that the characters in my books did not in fact possess the knowledge 
attributed to them; these critics seem to me to be jealous of the dead 
as well as of the living. 
From the praise of Luoullus, Cicero passes on to a defence of hic own 
literary methods and activites. Be starts by mcntioning two sets of critics: 
(1) those who dislike'Greek literature and philosophy; (2) those who think 
philosophical discussions unsuitable for men of rank and position. The first 
are briefly disposed"of by the examples of the older Cato and the younger 
Scipio, which are sufficient to justify the study of Greek literaturo and 
philosophy respectively. The second criticism is more serious because it 
concerns Cicero's own works and the literary methods employed in there. In 
his reply Cicero maintains an ambiguity, which seems to be deliberate, 
1Reid (p. 176 n. 4) accuses Cicero of carolcssness in using the expression 
'restat ut' at the beginning of 6, on the ground that Cicero has not yet 
ccme to the end of his argument and that 'Testat' is used again in 7 ('restat 
unuv genus reprehensorum'). M. Ruch repeats this criticism (=. M t., p. 265)ß 
which rests, however, on a confusion. The phrase 'Testat ut' though it is 
sometimes used to state the conclusion of an argument (aa in N. n. Il, g4 
'restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit uoluntarius'), can also indicate merely 
a transition to a fresh subject, not necessarily the final one (as hero and 
in j fl. II, 45 'restat ut qualic eorum natura sit consideromus'). 
2I. 
e. the Tlr,. -tensius, mentioned also in Fin. I, 2 and Tuse. 71,4 to Cicero's 
answer to ti..,, sse who disapproved of philosophy as such, not any particular 
System of philosophy. Cf. Tunc. III, 6; niv. lI, 1. 
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between conversations in real life and those portraycd. in his dialogues, and 
between his own role as an author and that of his leading charactorc (of whom 
he is, of course, himself one). What is common to. both Cicero and his 
characters is that they are men of high tocition in the state using-their 
'otium' in a fitting manner: the sentence 'etenim in quodam libro .... 
detrahamus' (6) applies, accordingly, to all concerned. In the next sentence, 
however, still in the first person plural, Cicero states his own personal 
position: if while he had a part to play he never neglected nis public duty, 
and committed to writing only his public speeches, 
1 
who would grudge him,. in 
his enforced 'otium', an occupation useful to himself and others? In the 
next sentence ('gloriem uero ... adiungf. mus') he is a ºin speaking as an 
author about the (real or fictional) philosophical interests of his characters. 
This leads him to mention a third set of critics, who object that his 
characters did not in fact possess the 'scicntia' needed f: r the discussions 
in which they are represented as taking part. Although Cicero dismisses the 
objection briefly, as due to jealousy of the dead, it must have weigher with 
him sufficiently for him to write out the parts of IJortencius, Catulus and 
Lucullus in the second edition. 
In giving the claims of public. life priority over philosophy, Cicero 
is conforming both to Roman feeling on the natter end to his own opinion of., 
the paramount importance of servico to the stoto. 
2 Thus in the opening 
chapters of the Pe Republica he rebukes certain philoscphers for their 
deliberate abstention from public affairs and arcueu that, since virtue 
1This 
interpretation of 'ne litteram quidem ullam fucimus nisi foronscm' is 
supported by Off. II, 3 'prim= enim, ut stante ro publica facere solsbamus, in 
agpndo pluc quarr in scribendo operae poneremus, deindo i1aia acriptIs non ca 
quae nunc, sed actionos nostras mandaremus, ut saepo fecimuae cum autem reo 
publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni colobat, nulls asset 
omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt foremen at cenatoriao. ' In 
Div. Il, 3 he tells us that only the lo Rerublica was written before his retirement from public life (completed in jl 13. C., Att. V, 12,2= F`nm. V21I, l, 4). 
2Cf. 
Rep. I, 8, where he argues that the individual should expect for hic private 
use only just so much of his own mental powers and efforts as was left over 
from service to the slate. 
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depends on practice, it is more perfectly realised in the work of government 
than in the mere talk of the philosophers (ßß. I, 2). This somewhat extreme 
position is modified later, when he points out that the greatest philocophors, 
though not actively engaged it political life, have contributed much to it 
by their inquiries and writings (2=. I, 12). Thus he aometimee argues that 
his own philosophical writings, far from being responsible for any neglect of 
the public interest, are now his only means of contributing to it. 
l During 
the period of his active public life, however, he spent only his spare time 
on philosophy, and this time, he tells us, was spent in reading and not in 
writing (Off. II, 4). 
In answering the third set of critics (7 'aunt etiara qui negent... '), 
Cicero does not step outside the dramatic convention to which ho has conformed 
throughout the proem, of treating the fictional element in'hic character 
portrait as if it were historical. Hence he is unable simply to reply: 'The 
idealisation of character is an accepted feature, from Plato onwards, of the 
literary genre in which I am writing. ' The attribution of the criticism to 
jealousy is not a very satisfactory answer, 
2 
and seems here to be Cicero's 
way of shelving a problem which continued to trouble him. The objection may 
have been first raised in relation to soma previously published dialogue 
(the De Republica or the Hortensius), or, since the present proem is a later 
addi :: on, Cicero could be answering criticism arising from the private 
circulation of some copies of his original version of the Academical or he 
could be anticipating criticism. The somewhat perfunctory treatment, and 
the suggestion that such critics are hostile or malicious, perhaps lug eta 
repetition of a"point made in a previous dialoguo. 
3 
1niy. 
Il, 1; L- D-1,7; Tusc. I, 5; Off. II, 5; Ao. I, 11, 
2For 
Cicero's tendency to attribute opposition to 'inuidia', see J. P. V. D. 
Palsdon in Cicero , ed. T. A. Dorey, p. 189 with n. 
118 on p. 210. 
3Arusianus 
Messius, a grammarian of the 4th contury, quotes from Cicero's 
üortencius: 'qui hodie bellum cum mortuo gorunt' (Koil Gr. )., VII9 P-458). See 
TI, -Ruch, L'IIo__rtAsius d+ Ciceron, pp. 64-66. The quotttion is referred to vi 
well known by Trebellius'Pollio (V. 0.20,1). 
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A defence of the sceptical Academy 
7-9 (p. 29,17 - p. 30,26) restat unum ý, enua .... dicatur exquiroro. 
Summary. There remains a class of critics who disapprove of the Academic 
philosophy. But who approves any system except his own? Since we argue 
our views against others, we must allow them to disagree with uä. Yet 
, 
our case is easily stated: we wish to discover the truth without 
contention, and we search for it with unflagging zeal. All knowledge in 
hard to come by, owing to the obscurity of things themselves and the 
weakness of our po.: oro of judgement, no that with good reason ancient 
thinkers doubted that they could reach their coal; yet-they did not give 
up the search nor shall we tire of it. Our debates have no other aim 
than by arguing on both sides to bring out the truth or what comes 
nearest to it. (8) The only'difference between ourselves and those who 
think they know is that they do not doubt the truth of what they maintain, 
whereas we consider many things probable, which wo can follow but not 
positivcly affirm. We make free use of our faculty of judgement and are 
under no necessity to maintain a position that has been laid down for no. 
Others are caught and tied down before thoy are of an ago to judgo for 
themcolves; influenced by some friend or captivated by tho first speech 
they listen to, they form judgements on matters about which they know 
nothing, and cling to whatover system they have drifted up against, like 
a rock in a storm. (9) They claim to have faith in one whom they 4'idge 
wise, but even granting that it was in their power to make auch, a judge- 
ment, they could not have done co on a single hearing and without 
learning; the opinions of other schools. But most people prefer to be in 
error and to fight hard for the doctrine they have fallen in love with, 
rather than to seerch without obstinacy for the most consistent position. 
Cicero here uses the proem not, as in N. D. I, 11-12 and Off. II, 7-ß, to 
explain his own position as an adherent of the New Academic philosophy, but 
rather to defend that philosophy as such. I have suggested in t"a Int*ýc%)- 
duction (p. 52) that this difference of emphasis may be due to the fact that 
Cicero is now coining forward for the first time in support of the aeeptical 
Academy. 
Tho main basis of hin defence in the present paaaago is the distinction 
he mace-, between those who would be calloa, in modern terms, sceptics and 
ýAcý ptir. 
Reidlo 'contra onuica dicoro' in'lino 21. 
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dogmati3ta. 1 Cicero sees the formor as keen anti indefatigable cookers after 
truth, whose rinds are freu and uncommitted, whereas their opponents, havJnd 
no doubts about what they maintain, are content to defend their position 
tenaciously on lines preecribed by authority. The theme of freedom is 
ir-portant in Cicero's works' and becomes for hin a means of projecting the 
positive'side of the sceptical Academy and of countering the charge that 
ucept+. cism would, if adopted, plunge us in total darkness and chain us down 
to iuunobility (61; of. N. DD. I, 
6). Cicero hera brings out as sharply as 
possible the contrast b^tween the freedom of individual judgement allowed 
the Academic sceptic and the restrictions y? aced on others by their depond- 
ence on authority. Reid points out that complete trust in 'one w-=-they 
judge to have been a wine man' is particularly characteristic of the 
Epicureans. 3 Cicero must, however, intend his remarks to apply to any 
dogmatic school (cf. N. D. I, 10, where the 1ythagorea. n 'ipso dixit' is 
criticised). The saying, that it takes a wine man to judge a wise cyan, in 
attributed to Eplcuruo. 
4 A longer ", rsion of Ciceru's argument occurs in 
Lucian, }ierrnotimus, 14 ff. 
The claim that the purpose of the Acndemic 'disputatio' is to bring 
out the truth, or what comes nearest to it, by arguin; on both aide of a 
question, is distinctive of Cicero, and perhaps of the Academy In Its latar 
daya. 5 It can hardly have had this purpose in the Academy of Arcosilas, if 
1See Introduction, pp. 36-37" 
265; 337; Off. III, 20; r-iy. II, 150; Turo. IV, 7; V. 03;, Ii. n. I, 10. Introductýun, 
p. 46. Scepticism may avo been associated with froadom from the beginning (Introduction p. 21 ... 2). Renaissance writers warn 1A 'Or to uuhold thu came 
opposition (Schmitt, Cicero Secnt-icun, p. C4 ff. ). fcwuver, Cicaro door not 
f. lwoays reject authority Div. I, 6; I . I, 36; l o. 
I, 40). 
SRoid 
p. 179 n. 24; of. N. D. I, 72; 11,73- 
4Aet. 
IV, 9,19/Us. 225. Cf. Plin. rr. I, 10,4 'stt er. im o ^ictorn coalpptore iiotornn 
nisi artifc:: iudicarn, ita nisi eapion" non potent oýr. "piaara uapientesa. ' 
5Cz'. GA; 192. III, 3. 
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indeed Arcesilas did use this method, no Diog ncr. tzertiue otatca (1M 2ß). 
1 
Usually Cicero makes a clear distinction tetwecn the 'moo patrius Academiao' 
of opposing all views without stating; one's own2 and the practice of arguing 
on both sides of a question, - which orleii,, ated with Aristotle and wan taken 
over by his school and by the Acadeny. 
3 Cicero always assocfateo Arcesilpq, 
and sometimes Carneades, with the former method, which beprs, with Socrateo. 
4 
In AI. D. I, ll, however, the two methods scam to Lct confused, and the task of' 
the New Academic is said, as in Ac. JI, 60, to be that of arruing : or and 
against all ; philosophical views. There is a nimi]ar confusion in 4ff. 11,0, 
where Cicero states that the purpose of erguing ngairiet all views is to 
elicit the probable bý comparing the case '©x utraque parto'. It acem3'likely, 
however, that as practised in the Academy of Arcosilas and Carneades, the 
only outcome of either method would have been cuapension of judgenont. 
" ", ` 
1Plutarch, 
Sto. Rep. 1037B (SVI' II, 129) quotas from Chrycippun' 'Usuof Reason' 
a statement, which seems to be aimed at Arcecilas, that reason should 
äa. uced 
'for the discovery of truth and its cognates, not for the opposite of : aia, 
though many do so, ' Plutarch suppocen that 'those who suspend judgement' are 
the target of attack and proceeds to'dofend them an follows: 'they argue on 
both sides without having knowledge of either, thinking that if anything 
is 
knowable, only so, or mainly not would truth allow itself to 
be known'. This 
defence, which seems to owe something to eicero, does not necessarily prove 
that Arcesilas used this method, although Plutarch, like Aiogcnes, may have 
thought that he did so. Nor does it prove that, if he used the method, he 
did so for the reason given. 
2Do Or. I, 43; N. n. 1,11: Fin. II, 2. Cf. 7 'contra omnes dieere' (Reid). 
3Tuse. II, 9; Pin. V, 10; ? )o Or. III, 00. See Introduction, p. 45 n. 3" 
4N. n. I, 11; Fin. II, 2; cf. Fin. V, 10; ne 0r. 111,00. But in Att. I*, 3,3 the practice 
of arguing on both sides is said to be Socratic. 1+ 'e know iris. hie spoochec 
for and against juztico, delivered in Rome in 155 13. C., that Carneades also 
employed this method, though whether from the motive which Cicero alleges It 
would be hard to say. 
5Cicero is nevertheless anxious to maintain that Arcenilas too had a serious 
purpose and wished to discover the truth 
(76). Pence in 77 he picturor hits 
conversing with Zeno in what seems intended to bo an imitation of the Socratic 
manner. See von Arnim, }7V. s. v. Arkcailaoo (L0n ll. ih. p. 91 n. 1). Ian ; 
(p. t39) 
describes Arcesilas' philosophical method an 'thv 
ccratic procedure updated 
to take account of the state of philosophy in the third century D. C. ', and 
illustrates it from his critieicm of the catalertic impression in Sextun Apt. 
V1I, 150-71 and the paseaCe of Cicero referred to above. 
76 .. 
It may seem that Cicero has been lcd into an inconsistency through his 
desire to present the New Academic philosophy as entirely positive in its 
approach and outlook. The search for truth presupposes that truth is, in 
theory at least, attainable, however difficult this may be in practice. - But 
the New Academic, though he does not deny that truth exists, 
denies that it 
can be known or recognised with certainty. Are wo to suppose that, in spite 
of this, he still goes on searching for the truth in the same sense as anyone 
else? As St'. Augustine will later argue (o. 192,5; 4,10), doubt is surely a 
'desperatio uori', and there is nothing pleasant or laudable in a life spent 
in an unsuccessful search for truth. 
2 On the other hand, it could be argued, 
as Cicero does in 65-66, that the Now Academic is motivated by a genuine 
desire for the truth, since he welcomes the probable as the nearest approx- 
imation to it. '3 In principle, there is no end to search except discovery=4 
what differentiates the sceptic from the dogmatist is that the latter's claim 
to 'know' and to have : orraulated this knowledge in a system implies that he 
has already found the truth, 
5 
Whereas the sceptic Is still searching. Whether 
the truo or tho probable in the ultimate goal of his search In therefor* 
immaterial. In 111 Cicero argues, like Thilo, that we perceive the true and 
1I11 1,44 the view that there are obotacleh to knowledge is attributed, not 
without, reason, to the early philocophera and unod to justify Arcesilas' 
sceptical attack on Stoioicm. See below, p. 91. 
2If 
nothing can be known, the beat course would be to avoid desiring the 
truth (Aug. ' . I, 3,9), or to give up the search, like Ifermotimuo in Luoien's dialogue. I. the Sexteen sceptic leaves the issue of knowledge open (A. 1{. I, 
1 ff. ), it is perhaps from a realisation that a dogmstic 'nothing can be 
known' is incompatible with a philocophy of search. On the Academic dc. ire 
for truth and how this differentiates him from the Pyrrhonian co tio, see 
11. Concha, Pyrrhon ou l'arparenco, rp. 107-0. 
31t is a corollary of this that he should wish to avoid the false. Cicero*° 
deduces from this the necessity of bnoxfj (60). 
426; Fin. I, 3. 
5For the cceptic, this claim involvca 'arrogntia' (Off. II, 8)= cf. niv. I1,1s 
'quod genus philoaophandi minima arroranc iiaximequo et conatano at slogans 
arbitrarcarar, quattuor Acadcrnicia libric c. ctendimua'. Similarly Montaigno (7 aio II, 12) considered tho Fyrrhonian aceptici to be '10 plus aaaa parts don phi1ocophor'. Cf. 3extwn P. }i. It, 11; A-14. VII, 314. 
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the false, though not with certainty. Elsewhere he says that the Academia 
sceptic cannot advance further than probability and the appearance of truth. 
l 
In the present passage he does not commit himself to either alternative, or 
raise the question-whether the New Academic can make knowledge claims, 
perhaps in order to make the contrast between the sceptic and the dogmatist 
as clear as possible. 2 
Cicero is here defending a philosophy which in its last days had become 
increasingly unpopular and which, since T'hilo's death, had lacked a repre- 
sentative, though in N. D. I, 11 he refuses to allow that hi, case has already 
gone by default, on the ground that doctrines do not die with their human 
exponents-. Thus his preliminary dofenco, addressed to Roman readers, is 
designed to remove prejudice (cf. 64 fr. ) and to indicate broad differences. 
In stressing the importance for tho New Academic of the discovery of , 
truth, 
he is rebutting the charge of 'contentio', or argument for argument's cake, 
and 'pertinaeia', wilful obstinacy, 
" 
a charge which he turns against his 
opponents, who stubbornly defend their preconceived notions instead of 
keeping an open mind. Tie brings this charge indirectly, by criticising not 
the schools as such but their effect on immature and inexperienced adherents, 
and by concluding that most people prefer to be in error rather than give up 
their cherished opinions. 
cf. 17. In Off. I1,8 the purpose of the 'diaputn ' is simply to 
elicit the probable. This is perhap3 cuff. ciont to refute M. Y. Henry (The 
Restion of TM, rnatinm and !: cepticinm in this T iloconhicnl 'rettlt o8 of Cicero 
p. 29 -3U , who compares 
Ciouro with W. J= &s Prnrratirm, p. 207-0) and contend 
that he 'looks toward "; omo ideal world where the tr+ath to which man can only 
approximate ohall now bo verified and known'. 
2Cf. C 'nos probabilia nulta habemus, quae coqui facile, adfirmaro uix 
pocuumue'. Reid p. 178 n. 14 tranclatec 'coqui' as 'act upon'. Thera oeeme no 
reason to confine the aord to this meaning. In Off. It. 74, where Cicero cots 
out ilia position in'greator detail, there is clearly a reference to thought as 
well as to action. 
3Theco 
charges, if loft unanswered, would convict the 1cw Academia of a total 
diarecard for truth. Cf. Dn Or. 7,47, whe"i the Creeks are said to be an a 
nation 'contentionia cupidioron quan uori`:. tio'. For 'pertinacia' coo hold 
x. 156 n. 10; Varro, L. L. V, 2. The 1, cndcmie who in chiefly attacked on this 
score in Arcc: i. ilau 14-16; of. Fiin. V, 94 for Hn o's opinion of him as 'in 
diceerendo perti: nacior'); Cicoro dofcnds him in An. I, 44 and I1,76-77. 
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Dramatic a©ttin 
9 (P"30,27 - p. 31,12) quihus do rebus .... conscdimuo. 
Summa 
_. 
I have often inquired into and discusecd thou subjcoto at 
length, 4. ncluding one occasion at iiortenoiua' villa at Bauli, when 
Catulua, Lucullus and I had gone there on the day after we had been at 
Catulus' villa. We were there early since Lucullus intended to to by sea 
to hie country seat at Naples and I to mine at Pompoi, if thero was a 
wind. After a short conversation in the garden walk, we cat down. 
The scene is now set and the characters are introduced; the passt a 
forms 'a transition between the proem and the dialogue proper, and links the 
two books of the Academica by supposing the diocuzsions to have taken place 
on two consecutive days. A similar stage setting, usually brief, occurs in 
moot of Cicero's dialogues; in the Academica ror; terfora, where there is no 
formal proem, it'is the only introduction to the di. 1ocuo. Unlike thone of 
Plato, 1 which are varied and often highly elaborated, Cicero's settin,. are 
simple; the characters are brought on with the minimum of explanation and 
comment, as a small group of-friends already known to one another and 
probably to tho reader. 
As in a number of Cicero's dialogues, the scene is sot 01 utaido Rome, 
though not at one of Cicero's own villas, as is often the case. 
2 It was to 
his country houses that Cicero usually retreated to meditate and study, 
3 
and 
hero that he carried on philosophical discussions with his friends and 
neighbours. 
4 During the unhappy period in which hin philosophical works 
1For 
a brief compariecn between the opening passages of Cicero and Plato, 
see A. E. Douglas in Cleo, ed. T. A. Dorey, p. 140. 
2Of the dialogues we have, the Academien (Priorn and Fontertorn) and )M Fini__bun 
III-IV are set in the country houses 
of Cicero's friends. Cicro's v11'7ä at 
7'unculum is the scene of the De1)ivinritý iono and the Tauulan Dinrutationas_, 
his place at Cumao of Po Finibun 1-II; at iuteolit of the fiýe to. iho I) 
Realbus, which (like Platos Laws) opens as a dramatic dialogue, is not in 
the countryside near Arpinum; this information is conveyed in the course of 
the conversation. 
'ZO-Z-1; Ftn. 311,7; Att. II, 6,1. 
4Att. 1I, 14,2; of. Quölenneo. 'Cicäron dann sea villas', Aauuäc 11 34 
(1930), 
pp. cog ft. 
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were composed, his time was spent, he tells us, in wandering from one country 
house to another (Off. IIl, i). Thus for various reasons philocöphy becama 
linked in tho author's life with his stay in the countryside, and the villa 
or garden cetting assumed a certain 'intellectual' rolo. 
l 
The country villa, ensuring privacy and retreat from the multitude, 
symbolises both the aristocratic nature of Roman culture and the seclusion 
needed for philosophical pursuits. Further, it serves to demarcate the 
'Otium' of men of affairs from their public obligations. The fact that the 
discussions take place away from Rome, or if at Rome, during a public holiday, 
2 
emphasises that, for a Roman, philosophy is a leisure pursuit and in no way 
interferes with public business. Moreover, the characters do not meet 
expressly to discuss philosophy, but always for some other purpose, social or 
recreational. In Tura. I, 7 Cicero takes advantage of the fact that he has 
friends staying with him; in ßrut. l0, Brutus just drops by with Atticus, as 
he often did; in Fin. I, 14 Cicero's friends have coma to call on him; in Fin. 
III, 7 Cicero has gone to the young Luoullus' villa to borrow a book and 
happens to find Cato in the library. So here, Cicero and Lucullus are waiting 
for a wind to'take them to their country estates; it is a fortunate coincidoreo 
that, by the time the wind rises, the conversation ha' come to a natural end. 
A short preliminary conversation is menticnod ('cum"igitur pauca in 
xyato locuti essemus')3 after which the characters nit down. This act of 
4 
sitting, which is referred to also in otht: dialoguoa, marks the beginning 
of tho main diocussion. Other common preliminary features, the greeting and 
the stroll, are here c'nitted. 
5 
1P. Boyancc, 'Les methoaos do l'histoiro litteraire, Cicöron et non oeuvre 
phiiosophiqu? ', RFL 14 (L936), pp. 288-309; P. Grimal. t'a . 1nrdjnn r: mm, -tin+; 1a fin de In Rern+bliiuo (Paric, 1943), p. 300 ff- 
3 
N. D. I, 15; cf. j. I, 14; De Or. I, 24; II, 13. 
Cf. Fin. I, 14 'pauca primo inter noo do litteric'. R 1eº. I, 18'cum coacnt p'rpauca 
inter ce uno atquo altero spatio conlocuti'. 
4E. 
p. 1in. IJI, 9; 21rut. 24; Fat-4; niv. II, 8; It Or. I, 29,111918. 
5M. 
Ruch, Le rrcrwýle dann let; oc++vrea Thilornrhic+, ný do Cirr'ten, p. 372 ff. 
Co 
In choosing the villa of 1Iortcnnius as the scene oftho Iucullu-1, 
Cicero may be, intending to link it with his firnt work in the philonophical 
series, the Ilortenciun (coo Intrcduotion, p. 9 and p. 59). Although Ciearo 
makes it clear in his letters that none of hic cha':. cterc would in real life 
have been qualified to take part in a technical debate of the kind pictured 
in the Academita, 'only Hortcnsiuc has been prcvioac y rcprcncntod as actively 
opposed to ; %ilocophy. If the conclusion of the Itortensiu"i wan, as seems 
likely, a modification of this attitude (61), the two cubnequent dialogues 
confirm that conclusion and use it to givo credibility to his present role, 
and with it to Ci: cero'o treatment of the other characters. Cicero's r: ature 
of Roman intellectual life may be a fiction, but it is a consistent fiction, 
and one that gives unity and a degree of verisimilitude to his dramatis 
characterization. One cannot help fooling that much of his self-criticism 
on this score was misguided. 
Preliminary ^. onversa, L. ton 
10 (p. 31,3 - 24) hic Catulus .... animos oreximu3. 
Summary. Here Catulu3 remarked, 'Though our inquiry was almost completed 
ycaterday, I am looking forward, Lucullus, to your tolling us, an you 
promised, what you heard from Antiochus. ' 'I only wich, ' said Hortcnsius, 
that I had left the whole subject intact for Lucullu3. But pcrhapo I 
have; my treatment was only superficial and I look to Luoulluo for the 
finer details. ' 'Your expectation, ' replied Lucullus, 'does not trouble 
me, as it would if I carcd about making a rood impression. The doctrines 
are not mine, and if they are false I would rather loco my case than win 
it. However, as the case now stands, thou& it cuffered come setbacks 
yesterday, I an deeply convinced that it is true. Co, to heighten your 
expectation, I will sot the matter out as Antiochuo used to, for I am 
very familiar with his treatment of it. ' Thic beginning captured our 
attention. 
It is possible that Cicero in likewico exaggerating hie own ability to take 
part in impromptu debate of this kind, ninco much of hie natcrial must have 
been taken direct from Greek courcen. liin roferoncn to the frequency of 
euch dobatec ('quibue do robun at alias caope nobin multa giiacoita at t inru- 
tata Hunt') probably roflectn hic intended prof-ramr: o of philoionhical a"orkn 
rather than occasions in real life; cf. "nm. IX, O, 1 (to Vorm) 'puts ford ut 
cum leGerin mirero nova id locuton eueo inter nos quod nnr^oluvn lncuti n++mu. ; 
oed nonti morem dialoporum. ' 
a1 
The purpose of the preliminary conversation is to rave the way in a 
natural manner to the main subject of the dialogue, and to give it continuity 
with the previous day's discussion an depicted in the Catu]un. 
1 This In done 
by a reminder to Lucullus of his promise to give an account of the views of 
Antiochus. We gather that he has been anticipated, though not to a serious 
extent, by iiortensius on the previous day. Lueullu31 account is to be more 
searching and exact, owing to his closer acquaintance with Antiochua and 
his doctrines. 
The division of a longer work into separate conversations hold on 
different days is, as compared with the length of come of Plato's dialogues, 
a gain in realism, but creates a need to reintroduce the subject and provide 
connections, the artificiality of which is to coma extent apparent. Ciecro'a 
handling of the opening conversation is successful, partly because it in 80 
cuceint, and partly because hD draws on his own professional idiom in making 
Hortensius and Lucullus talk as If they were two itdvocatos supporting the 
same case. The interest of the listeners in roused chiefly by the assertion 
(for which the reader has been prepared in the proem, 4) that I. ucullue has 
on numerous occasions paid careful attention to Antioehua' line of argument 
and will thus be able to reproduce it exactly. 
As Cicero point: out in his letters, the real Luculluc could not have 
done such a thing oven in his dreams.? Cicero docc not entirely succeed In 
overcoming this difficulty, for in hic attempt to justify the role he has 
gone to the opposite extreme ni, d built up a character whoco talents and 
devotion to philosophy would lead us to expect that hic participation in the 
dialogue would be anything but trivial. Yet he makes him the more mouthpiece 
of Antiochus' doctrines. The reader has been prepared for thin by references 
to his remarkable memory; even so, it seems that Cicero may have fallen 
1Cf. Po Or. II, 13 ff.; III, 17-10. 
2Att. XIII, l9,5. Introduction p. 56. 
02 
badly between two stools in first endowing the historical Lucullu3 with an 
intense interest in'philosophy# then representing this interest as satisfied 
by memorisation of another'a views. 
Although he defend3 the cause of dogmatism, Cicero chows in Lucullus 
none of the dogmatist's narrow-minded obstinacy which he criticised in the 
proem (8-9). Lucullua has admittedly boon strongly influenced by Antioehua 
and believes his case to be 'ueriesima', 
1 but he is prepared to give way with 
a good grace if he should in the end be proved wron;. Cicero thus antici- 
pates the conclusion of the dialogue and his own intention to bring a 
stronger case on the other side. He does not indeed represent Lucullus es 
openly admitting defeat (this would have been unfair both to the historical 
Lucullus and to Antiochus), and Luculluc' last comments are doliborato:, y 
directed away from this issue (148). Throughout his own reply Cicero treats 
Luoullus as the representative of Antioohun, often addressing him as if he 
were a member of a school ('uos', 'uester'), but he sometimes points out to 
him the consequences of his commitment to a dognatie position, as if these 
were not fully realised. 
2 So here, by making Luoullus say that the views 
he will state are not his own and he will not be porocnally concerned if 
they are defoated, Cicero avoids representing him as defending too stubbornly 
a doctrine which in real life he probably did not hold or attributing to him 
faults which are inherent in the dogmatic position. 
3 
1There is, however, a note of dogmatism in the use of the superlative 
'uerieaima', in spite of the admission that his cats had been weakened by 
Cicero's arfun ents on the previous day. 
2E. 
E. 119 'tibi hoc repudiaro, illud gutem superius nicut caput et famam tug 
dofendero nocecco erit'; 137 'haoc tu, Lucullo, ci co adcenuua Antiocho 
familiari tun, tam aunt dofondenda quarr moenia, miht tutcm bono modo tantum 
quantum uidebitur'. 
3At 
this stage, moreover, Luoullus has to win the Eoodwill of his audience 
and cannot therefore be wade to display the faults attributed to the 
dogmatist in the proem. 
03 
The ononint, of t cii11a ' r. rrcch: tht- crnvc-rnntio^z at AlornnMlrL 
11-12 (p. 31,27 - p. 32,31) at ills 'cüm Alexandri¬o ... Carmademquo uoniamus. ' 
Summary. (11) Antiochu2 was with me in Alexandria when I was there as 
proqua,. ator, and I used to listen to his troqucnt diacunsiona with his 
friend Heraclitus, who had preceded him thcra. }: oraolitua had been for 
a long time a pupil of Clitocaachus and Thilo sind wan hihly esteemed 
in that school of philosophy which, ^fter btu+r.! almo-t Given up, in now 
being championed again. 
1 Those two books of Friilo, mentioned by Catüluu' 
yeuterday, had then been brou&it to A. lexcLdria and for the first time 
reached Antiochus. To my surprise, for he wann a very gentle person, he 
became angry and kept asking IIoraclitus if such doctrines had cvcj. been 
professed by Philo or any other member of the Academy, 1craclitus 
thought not, yet the work appeared to him to be Ihilo'a; besides, my 
friends Publius and Caius Selius and Totriltui Rogua had not only heard 
those doctrines from Fhilo at Homo but had even copied the two rooks 
frone Philo's own originals. (12) Then Antioch. n voiced a numbor of 
objections against Thilo, ineludin!; those aenticned by Cotulus yesterday 
as having been brought b; - his father, and he even published a book 
against his former teacher entitled the _ionijR. In the ensuing discussion, 
which occupied several days, Iloraclitus argued saint Antiochus and 
Antiochus against the Academics; I paid special attention to Antiochun' 
case. Also present wore Ariatus, Aitiochus' brother, Ariato and Dio, 
and we apent much time on this single discussion. But since Thilo is 
a less challenging opponent in that ho denies, though falsely, that the 
doctrines clýß... ýl«l yesterday were ever stated by the Academics, lot us 
pass on to Arcocilas and Carnoados. 
The present pascago is usually taken as hintorically true, 
2 
at lcaot 
in so far as it explains the o1rcuastanceo in which ihilo'e two books 
reached Antiochus and his reactions to them. The whole episode, however, 
is eo clearly adapted to Cicero's dramatic purpoac that it cannot be 
accepted without question. 
1Tho New Academy had more or leas died with Thilo until ite cauao wan taken 
up by Cicero in the Acaiemien. See pp. 36 and 51 above. 
2As by Sandbach, ? oblcmA p. 9; Dillon, p. 54 ff., M. DAI Fra, 1. Scotticlýc 
C_ rco, pp"? 31-2, Drochard, p. 210. 
04 
Cicero has already opokcn in 'ºcneral tcrrc of l. "cullus' oppprtunitien 
to become acquainted with Antiochuc' teaching!, once in the proem (4), and 
again in 10, where Lucullus himsolf states that he uccd to litten to, 
Antiochus 'uacuo animo' and 'cadem do ro Eacpiuz'. Lucullua now Fees on to 
recall a specific occa; icn at the very outcot of their friondohip, come 27 
years before the dramatic date of the dialoruo. In 07 U. C. Lucullu: 3 wan 
sent by Sulla to Egyp. to collect a fleet (1'lut. T c. 2; Ar. p.. 4It)-r. 33). Thilo 
and other prominent Athenians had fled to Rome at the beginning : +f the war 
(Brut-306), and it is very probable that Antlochuo went to Alexandria. 
l 
It is even possible, if we accept Cicero's account or their friendship, 
that he wont in Lucull, is' company, or that ho not Lucullus there. What is 
highly unlikely is that a scene such as Cicero describes should have taken 
place in Lucullus' presence, or`that Lucullus would have had time, while 
carrying out his mission, to attend lengthy philosophical diccussions. 
2 
Antiochus ray, however, have indicated in the Son rn that ho was in Alexandria 
when he received the two books of Thilo, and he may have described his own 
feelings on reading them, with other circumstantial details. 
' Cicero'o 
contribution would then be to make this coincide with Lucullua' minsion to 
Egypt and to assume him a witness to what happened. 
Apart from othor implausibilitice in Lucullur' account of the meoting, 
4 
the aupgestion that Antiochu3 argued againct the Now Academy in Ccnoral 
('contra Academicos') and did not confine his criticism to Thilo's two books, 
is clearly directed to providing Luculluo with an opportunity to attend to 
and memorise Antiochus' objections not only against Thilo but also against 
For reasons against supposing that he firnt wont to Rome with T'hilu and met 
Lucullus there, see Introduction p. 33 n"l" 
2 J. van Oote1rhem, Luciun I. iciniun tucullus, 1.20. According to I'lutarch, 
In10.2,10, Lucullu3 did not even take time off to visit Memphis and the other 
wonders of F, iypt. 
3Dillon, 
p. 54. For Cieero'e use of the S'uui, ceo Introduction, p. 40. 
4If the doctrines contuincd in the two be-, kn were new even to lleraclitus, 
how could he have recua raised them as genuinely I'hilo'n? Some of Milo's 
new claims had proviouzly been made by Metrodorua, yet both Antiochun and 
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the school as a whole. Antiochu3 is thus represented an arguing from two 
standpoints: like Catulua' father, he is accusing Ihilo of miarepreaentation, 
as if in defence of the sceptical Academy; he is also attacking the sceptical 
Academy, including Thilo, which he could only do fr. n his new docmatio 
standpoint. We are not told what Iieraelitua' attitude was to Philo'a now 
doctrines, but weroly that he argued 'contra Antiochum', while Antiochua 
arCued 'cont,. 1 Academi.; os'. 
1 Furthermore, in spite of the occasion which 
g°vo rise to the discussion and Antiochus' anger, which would cutest that 
Philo was the chief target of his attack, Lucullus dismisses Thilo as 
'aduersarius lenior' and decides to pass on to Arcosilac and Carncades. 
It is difficult to judge how deep the fiction iroea in this account. 
But, as it stands, it does not provide evidence that Antiochua was shocked 
into deserting the sceptical Academy by Philo's innovations. He is pictured 
as disputing with Heraclitus even before the two books arrived, and though 
his attack on Philo may have been spontaneous and enpremeditated, in the 
discussions : hich followed (if Cicero's account of them is accepted) he 
cannot have been maintaining a position which was wholly now to him. I have 
argued in the Introduction (p. 31 ff. ) that Antiochua' defection is likely 
to have preceded, not followed, Fhilo's innovations. Philo claimed that his 
predecessors had denied the possibility of knowledge only in the Stoic sense 
and so had not deviateu from the true Academic tradition. For Antiochus, 
whose positicn depended on keeping a clear distinction between the Old and 
Ne'. ' Academies, this was as plainly false as it was for Catulus' father, who 
perhaps locked at the matter from a more orthodox sceptical viewpoint. The 
angry reaction of Antiochus, which in not in Cicero's account very clearly, 
motivated, was perhaps due to a feeling that Thilo had outraanoouvred him. 
lferaelitus are said to have never heard of them. 
1For 
Cicero'a use of 'Aeademious' to refer to the i; ew Academy* nee Intro- 
duction r. 37. Here by implication Cicero denies the application of tho word 
to Antioch= (of. 132 'qui appollabatur Academieus, arat quidem, ai perpauca 
mutauicnet, germininairauc Stoicu3'). 
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Fhilo's claim that no membor of the Academy had denied the pocutbility 
of knowledge except in the Stoic tense, is probably truo enough. It would 
be false, however, to infer that any would have wiuhud, like Thilo, to affirm 
the possibi. 1ty of knowledge in a different, non-Stoic conso. This inferenco 
is easily drawn and on it depends Lucullun' formulation of Fhilo's position 
('qui ista quae aunt heri, defensa negat Academicos omnino dixisso') as a 
simple denial that the Academy had ever maintained that knowledge In imposs- 
ible. Lucullus regards this denial not only as false ('etai aperto mentitur') 
but also as a weakening of the sceptical position. Ilia dismissal of Fhilo 
as 'aduersartus lenior' / 'minus aper' shows Cicero'a tendency to polarise 
points of view in the discussion. The attitude of Ihilo'a predocessora, who 
did not make a distinction between two kinds or knowlcdge, 
1in both simpler 
to formulate and more sharply opposed to doematiom. 
Of the other persons oa: d to be preccntj Antiochun' brother Ariotus 
succeeded him as head of the Academy (Drut. 332; se, Raid, p. 7.8). Aristo 
and Dio were both natives of Alexandria, the former a Peripatetic (D. L. VII, 
164) and the latter an Academic (Strabo XVII, 796), whose murder in Rome in 
57 B. C. cau.. r; d a scandal (Pro Caelio 24 and 51). 2 Nothing further is known 
about Iieraolitus or the friends who brought T'hilo's books from Rome. 3 
Objections Againnt tha Academic attempt to vindicate the acantical 
tradition as an ancient ono 
13-15 (p. 32,32 - p. 34,19) quao cum dixiscot .... idem tuorit in Eocrate. 
S Tom'. (13) After this ho began againt 'First, in quoting the old 
physicists, you seem to me' - he wan addressing me in particular - 'to 
be behaving like revolutionaries who claim to be imitating distinguished 
men of the past, to whom they attribute popular sympathies. They go. 
lUnless 
we believe Metrodorus' interpretation of Carnoadaa (Introduction, 
P. 18). 
2It 
can probably bA inferred from the context that he was a follower of Antiochus (Dillon, pp. 61-63 and 115). 
? Brochard (p. 221) places them among Ihilo'a continued supporters, but this In 
more conjoctrro. Iieraolitun continued to oppuao Antiochuo in the dicouooionf this dodo not nocossarily moan that ho supported Ihilo. 
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back as far as P. Valerius, consul in the first ye Ur after Lha expulsion 
of the kings, and others who as consuls passed copular leg1nlation about 
appeal; then they pass on to the more familiar'naros, C. Fla: miniuz, who' 
as tribune carried an agrarian law against senatorial opposition a few 
years be0ore the Second Punic War and was later twice connul; L. Cassius, 
Q. Pompetus; even Africanus himself is Included In the lint. They claim 
that those two distinguished and learncd b othorn, P. Cracrus and P. 
Scaevola, supported the legislation of Ti. Craechun, the onu openly and 
the other secretly. They also add I'Larwua, and in hie case at least they 
do not lie. Pointing to those ; amouo men, they claim to be following 
their example. (14)In the came way yo::, wishingI to overthrow an established 
philosophy, cite Empedooles, Anaxagoran, Demooritus, Parmeniden, Xcnoph- 
anes, even Plato and Socrates. But aunt as Caturninus (to name my own 
family's chief enemy) had nothing in common with those men of old, co the 
sophistry of Arcesilas cannot be compared with the restraint of Domocritus. 
But in any case2 it is not very often that, finding themselves in a 
difficulty, those early philosophers cry out an if in a frenzy (Flapcdoeles 
sometimes seems to me to talk like a madman) that everything is hidden, 
that we can see and discover nothing in its true nature; most of the time 
they make very emphatic assertions anci claim to know more than is justi- 
fied. (15) But if in grappling with now ideas, like now-born infants, they 
got into difficulties, has no progress towand3 knowledge been made ainco 
then? Had not important systems of philosophy been not up when Arreeailas 
became, like Tiberius Cracchus, a rebel against the establishment, hiding 
behind the authority of those who had denied the possibility of knowledge 
and perception? We must remove Plato and Socrates from their number, the 
former because he left behind a completed system, that of the Feripatetica 
and Academics, who differ only in name not in substance, and from whom 
the Stoics differ in terminology rather than opinion. Socrates, on the 
other hand, regularly used to employ the kind of colt-depreciation which 
the Greeks call c tpwve ta, Ld did Africanus# according to Fannius; this 
characteristic was not considered a fault in Africanus because he shared 
it with Socrates. 
1Reid, 
followed by Rackham, takes 'curn.... uelitis' as frequentativo, but thin 
is clearly wrong. Roby, Latin Crnm , 1716, which Reid quotes, says that 
cum and subjunctive in this sencoyic 'rarely, if over' found in Cicero. The present subjunctive is especially rare in thin construction, even in late 
authors. Cf. F. C. Woodcock, A r? ew iAtin SVntrK_, p. 190; Ktlhner-. ^, tojnann II, 
pp. 206 ff. Cum here is plainly caunal. 
2Again, 
Reid's note on 'et tarnen' in misleading, though Munro'a note on Lucr. 
V, 1177, to which he refers, rives the Benno correctly an 'putting all proviourz 
considerations aside'. Cf. Sen. 16. 
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By indicating a fresh start at thic point, Cicero r. arkn the transition 
from the opening preliminaries of Lucullu3' opeech, based on the mooting in 
Alexandria, to the beginning of the areumcnt proper, which is rrobably 
adapted from Antiochus' Soaus. 
1 Lucullus begins, however, with a political 
analogy which must have been added by Cicero an part of the Roman Getting, 
to interest and involve his Roman readers. It is introduced an an nr1rumentum 
ad hominem directed especially at Cicero himself, whom Lucullus regards an a 
political sympathiser even if a philosophical opponent. The common political 
background of-the participants in the discussion is thus emphasised and 
Cicero is at the same time singled out a3 the representative of the Now 
Academy who will later reply to Lucullus' argument. 
It is not clear who these 'soditioai ciues' are, or whether it wad, as 
Lucullus states, common practice for rembera of the popular faction to 
justify their actions by. quoting precedents from Roman. history. 
2 In 14 (so 
in Cicero's reply in 75) Saturninus is singled out for special mention, 
3 
but there is a discrepancy here in that hie contemporary Marius 1., inoluded 
in the list of famous precedents quoted by the Iaeditiooil, acme of whom 
must therefore be later than Saturninua, perhaps even later than the draatic 
date of the u3. alogue. 
4 
IIntroduction 
p. 40. 
2Plasborg 
conjectures that Cicero himsolf used a similar crgunont when in 
65 B. C. he cuccessfully defended the tribune C. Cor-neliuo on a charge of 
'maiectas', arainat the united opposition of the optimate party; see M. 
Ruch, L'IIorten3iurs do Cic4iron, p. 84. Soo also following note. 
31n 75 Cicero makes it clear that S.. turnisius was one* of those who cite 
famous names ('uideor tibi non ut Saturninus nominare modo illustres, nod 
etiam iiitari munquam nisi claruri, nisi nobilem? '). In rrut. 224 Cicero 
says of him that of all the agitators after the Cra,, ichi ho eppoared to be 
the most eloquent, but he produced this i. 4 rension more by the use of 
flamboyant effect than by any real power of speech or mental endowment. 
The family feud to which 1, ueullus refers concerned his uncle, p; etollue 
?: umidicus, who tried as censor in 102 D. C. to remove Saturninua from the 
senate; he was forced into exile but recalled after Saturninus' death 
through the. o. fforts of his family (1I. 1I. Scullard, Frnm thf% Cr+ec! ýi to F(Irn, 
Pp"57,61-2). 
4Cf. 63 'ut cauoros ne quis improbus tribunus plehin, quorum uides quanta 
copi. a cemper Futura sic... ' and 144 'ut seditiosi tribuni nolent'. By 
Cicero's time the tribunate had become a political tool, from which he 
personally suffered when in 50 Clodiun secured his exile. 
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Lucullus takes a broad look at four centuries of Roman history, citing 
come of the classic examples of popular legislation, but dwelling mostly on 
the opposition to the senate in the Gracchan and poet-Cracchan period. Of 
the persons mentioned, Publius Valerius (surnamed Ioplicola and reputed 
consul in 509 B. C. ) is a virtually legendary figure; his law on 'prouocatio' 
was, according to tradition, the first passed by the centuriato aesembly. 
l 
The anonymous consuls may be L. Valerius and*M. lioratius, mentioned by 
Cicero in R= . II, 54 as having passed a law providing that no magistrate not 
subject to 'prouocatio' should be elected (449 ß. C. ). Moving on to better 
known times, Lucullus names C. Flaminius, who in 232 B. C. not the precedent 
for Ti. Gracchus by going to the people with his land-bill, L. Casciuc, 
2 
who as tribune in 137 extended the use of secret ballot to the judicial 
assemblies of the people, 
3 
and Q. Pompoiu3, one of the first pair of plebeian 
censors in 131. Lucullus indicates surprise that the younger Coipio should 
be included in the list, 4 probably owing to hie support of Laolius' land- 
bill, which was later dropped. Of the two brothers next mentio"ed, P. 
Llcinius Crassus took Ti. Cracehus' place on the land commission after the 
latter's death; P. Mucus Scaevola, as consul in the fatal year (133 B. C. ), 
refused to take illegal action against him when asked to do no by the 
senate-5 Lucullus suggests that his support of Cracchan legislation roots 
on mere suspicion, whereas in the case of Marius there was no doubt of his 
popular lcaninga. 
1Le-R"II, 53-4; Livy II, 8,1-2 with Ogilvie'o connenta-y, p. 252. Ogilvio 
concludes that the law of 509 is a fictional 'doublet' of the Valerian law 
passed in 300 A. C. (Livy X, 9,3-6). 
2H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, p. 27. Livy XXI, 53,2 has an account 
of his opposition to th'; Senate as consul in 223 and 217- 
3 Thus giving them 'greater freedom from pro3nuro by the noblou' (Seullard, 
S. cit. p. 24). In 7, eg. TII, 35 he is opoken of as 'dicoidente a bonic atquo 
omnis rumucculoo populari ratione aucupante'. 
4Cf. 5. For Cicero, Scipio was obviously on the aid. of the establishment, 
being; the ideal combination of intellectual, militL'7 and political qualities. 
51n 
Tuso. IV, 51 Cicero criticicoc him as 'faint-hearted' ('lanruentem conoul- 
em'); cf. Dis Or. 11,205- 
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On the philosophical side, Arceeilaa is oinslcd out by boing twice 
mentioned; no other New Academic (apart from Cicero himself) In referred 
to by name. That Arcesilas juctified hic noopticism by attributing it to 
famous philosophers of the past is also attested by Plutarch Adv Col. 1121F), 
who names Socrates, Plato, Parmenideo and Horaolitus' and, like Cicero, 
makes it a reproach brought against Arcesilas by his opponents. In I, 44 
Cicero roproeents Arcesilas no a grnuino follower of those early thinkers 
(Socrates, Democritus, Anaxagc--as, Iunpedooles, 'on+r, uu paene uotoros'), to 
whom, somewhat surprisingly, he attributes total scepticism ('qui nihil 
cognonci, nihil porcipi, nihil sciri posse dixorunt'). Similarly, in his 
reply to Lucullus In 72 ff., Cicero maintains that the statements of the 
Prococratics, Socrates and Plato do in fact cupport the low Academic 
position. Whether Arcosilas himself made oxtravaLpit claims of this nature 
is open to question. 
2 
.. The exaggeration which ascimilatos 
the Sociatio 
'confession of ignorance' to the Vow Academic thocis that nothing can be 
known (cf. 74 'dubitari non posait quin Svcrati nihil sit uisum coiri posso') 
Is probably Cicero's own, since he points out that Arco3ilas did in fact 
distinguish his own position from that of Socratoa. 
3 It 'is unlikely that 
Arcesilas saw no diffcronco botwoon hic own viowo and thoae of the Prosocra- 
tica, although he may have claimed an affinity with thorn, perhaps in order 
to dissociate himself from Pyrrho. 4 The scepticism of Pyrrho In nowhore 
1As Reid points out (p. 157 n. 13), Cicero does not spocifically name 
iieraclitus In this connection, although the development of hin theory by 
Cratylus is probably the only instance of pure scepticinn in the ? rosocratio 
period and had an impcrtant influence on Plato (Cuthrio, Hinter' of Crook 
Philrhv It p. 450). Sex tust on the other hand, ret, ardo iioraclitun an a 
dogmatist (P. I;. I, 210 Sf. ). 
2The indiscriminate use of the precedent argument is further illustrated in 
D. L. IX, 71 ff., where even Homer is cited as a sceptic. 
3i1y denying that, like Socrates, he know his own ignorancos I, 45 'itaque 
Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod coiri ponoot, no illud quidom ipnum, quod 
Socrates sibi reliquic ot'. Cf. 74. It is of course obvious that Socrates' 
denial or knowledge had nothing to do with his perception of"the oxtornal world. 
4Soe 
p. 20 above. Lucullus does not mention any of tho Megarians, probably 
because Arceoilas also dissociated himself from this school, although, hia 
contemporaries saw the connection (Soxtua 1'. 1º. I, 2341 D"L. 1V, 331 l: umeniua, 
fr. 25,15 ff. ). Cicero in 75 declines to quote thorn as procodento. 
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mentioned by Cicero, from which we may infer either that he was unaware of 
it, 1 or that it was official New Academic policy to ignore it. 
2 The latter 
seems more probable. 
Lucullus argues that the 'sceptical' remarks of the early philosophers 
were mere emotional outbursts caused by the difficulties they encountered at 
an early stage of physical inquiry: for the most part they were dogmatic in 
outlook and iirofessed to know more than in fact they did. While agreeing 
v. '. th the second part of this statement, we must have serious reservations 
about tho fist. Lucullus does not deny that the Fresooratics actually made 
such statements ('abctruna esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernera, 
nihil omnino quale sit pooso reporire'), 
3 but he claims that these are 
nullified by their very positive assertions of their own doctrines. it would 
be more correct to make a distinction bet"3en the distrust of the senses 
displayed in varying degrees by most philosophers of the early period and 
the confidence they felt in the power of reason to arrive at truth, either 
independently of the senses or by interpreting their evidence in come special 
way. For Lucullus to have admitted such a distinction would, however, have 
been to play into the hands of the sceptics, whose case no doubt rcctei on 
the attitude of these early 'physici' to sense-experience, which contrasted 
significantly with the theories of knowledge they were attacking. 
4 
1Pyrrho is mentioned by Cicero only once in the Acadamica, an having denied 
that the wiso man even perceives morally indifreront things (130). This 
might be taken to be a reference to Pyrrho'u ethical scepticism. But Long 
H. Ph. p. 76 ff. ) has argued that Cicero his probably confused iyrrho's pocition 
with Aristo's rejection of the orthodox Stoic doctrine of indifference. 
2Cf. Broahard, P-97: 'Si Pyrrhon n'eut pan exicto, la nouvello Academic 
aurait 6t6 ä peu prey ce qu'ollo a otJ. ' Robin, p. 45 Cr., contests this 
judgement. The influence of }'yrrhoniom on Arcesi3au is usually accepted, 
cf. Stou6h, p. 7; Long, H. Phe p. 88. 
3Xenophanes 
fr-34; Horaclitus fr. 123, and porhaps 781 Fzpedooleo fr. 2, but 
contract 3,9-13; Anaxagoras A 96 and 97, cf. A 46 (DK II p. 18,39-41); 
Democritus fr. 6-11,117. Cf. Protagoras fr. 4 (D. L. IX, 513. 
4Cf. 
Stough, pp. 31-33, who deduces I'yrrho'e ocepticinm from distrust or the 
senses combined with acceptance of the 'empirical axiom' that knowledge has 
its origin in the data of sense-experience. 
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Secondly, there is no reason to believe, with Lucullua, that remarks 
on the limitations of human knowledge were thrown out by the Prosoeratics 
in moments of discouragement or extreme excitement, even in the case of 
Empedocles. That is not to say that Ebpedoclea did not sometimes use the 
'prophetic' manner, but this style is clearly more suited to the revelation 
of truth than to a confession of ignorance. 
' If Cicero know of any frenzied 
utterances on the part of this philosopher, deopairi, ig of human knowledge, 
they havo not come down to us. 
Luoullus contrasts the 'uerecundia' of Democritun with the 'calumnia' 
of Arcesilas. 
3 
probably on the ground that the 'oecpticism' of the forwer did 
not involve him in dialectical debate or an attack on the established system. 
At an early stage of inquiry, doubt of man's power to attain to knowledge is 
not inappropriate; at a later stage it becomes 'sedition'. For the mein 
establishment of the system should remove the doubt whether knowledge is 
possible. This sy3tem was mainly the work of Plato who cannot, therefore, 
be regarded as a forerunner of sceptieicn. 
4 Even the Socratic profession of 
ignorance was not seriously meant, but merely a device to compliment those 
whom he intended to refute, by disparaging himnolf, a trait which he shared 
with Scipio Africanus. 
1Cf. Guthrie, A History of Greek Fhilosorhy II, p. 240, speaking of the 
combination of pride and humility to be found in i}podooles as wall as 
Horaclitus: 'Pride in possession of certain truth is the mark of the seer 
who believes himself divinely inspired; c. n ciousnean of the fallibility of 
the human faculties belonsa rather to the scientific mind. ' 
2Unless 
he is thinking of Emped:. oles' comments on the cognitive limitations 
of other people (e. g. fr. l1 'Fools, for they have no far-reaching thoughts'). 
fnpedoclea' theory of sense-perception might well have led him to a cubjoot- 
iviet view similar to that of Domocritus, but apparently did not. Cf. 
Theophrastu3 de sennu 7, DK A 06: 'Wherefore one cannot judgo the nenrations 
of others, since the sense-channols of some are wider and of others narrower 
in relation to the perceived object. ' 
3Cf. 
N. D. II, 20 'Academicorum calumninm'= Raid p. 107 n. 17. Sextun like 
Lucullus, questions the 'scepticism' of Democritus (11.11J9213-2M. 
4On 
the controversy whether Plato was a sceptic or a dogmatist, sac C. C. Fiold, 
Plato and htz Contemporaries, pp. 236-7. 
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Whereas, for the sceptically-minded, dicaf; rcement ssnorg philosophers 
may be evidence of the impossibility of knowledge, 
1 Lucullus points to the 
fundamental agreement between three of the main, schools after Plato (the 
Academic, Pks. ipatetic and Stoic) to back up hin arVuaont that progress in 
philosophical investigation has in fact been rnado, which in turn roste on 
the possibility of knowledge. Profcreions of ignorance from early thinkers 
should, therefore, be understood historically, not used to undermine the 
efforts of generations of great in-tolleotc. Whether tho Proeocratios are 
included among those who have contributed ponitivoly to the advancement of 
knowledge is not clear in the context, but Plato and Socrates are put in a 
different category ('quorum e numoro tollendua cat of Plato of Socrates') 
as affording no precedent at all for scepticism. 
The belief in progress in art and science, spalning more than the 
lifetime of the individual, guns back at least to tho fifth century ]3. C. 
2 
Aristotle may have extended the concept to philocophy, 
3 but what is now here 
is its use to combat scepticism. If knowledge has in fact been attained, 
a fortiori it is possible. Lucullus does not actually claim this, but he 
1These disagreements are noted as early as the sophist Gorrian, for whom 
they illustrate the power of Topos to persuade without truth (T'raiso of 
Nelen 13, DK II, p. 292). The same in probably implied by the fraccnt of Timon in which he congratulates Iyrrho on escaping the decnptivo persuasion 
and empty opinions of the philosophers (D. L. IX, 65i Diele Poet. pp. 196-7). 
In hie reply to Lucullus, Cicero uses the differences among philo"3phern to 
prove the absence of certain knowledge (114 ff. ). Edelnte! n in The idea of 
Prorress in Classical AntiqnitZ, pp. 165-6, miaataten Antiochus' arGument 
by exaggerating the im; ortance cr dissension among philosophers for the ! ow 
Academic position. He calla it 'the argument basic to . scepticism', nand 
represents Antiochus as 'renouncing' it or explaining it historically. It 
is, on the contrary, the profession of ignorance by early philosophers that 
Antiochus wishes to explain historically, or in come other way. 
2See 
Dodds, The Ancient Concept of ProrrPRR, p. 11. Cf. Xenophanes fr. 1©s 
'The (rods have not revealed everything, to men from the beginning, but search- 
ing with time they discover what in better. ' The idea in particularly 
explicit in medicine (Hippocrates, uAt. med. 2 and 12). Cf. Cicero's joke in- 
Ac. I913 'certe enim recentinsima quacque cunt correota at emendata maxima'. 
3tzc. 
III, 69 (Arist. otl: fr. 53. Rose). Cicero ntaten that Aristotle banned 
the old philosophers for thinking that philoaorhy had been completed by their 
efforts, but said that, in view of the oreat prorrena that had been mruio in 
a few years, he saw it would soon be brought to perfection. Cf. Edelstein# 
OP-Oft. pp. 126 ff. There is not enough evidence to determine whether Cicero 
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allows it to be assumed in the rhetorical question 'nihilne tot saeculi©, 
summis ingontis, maximis studiis oxplicatum putemus? ' Apart from an initial 
boliof in progress such a conclusion would not be particularly plausible, 
and it is more likely that Antiochus argued, not so much that knowledge has 
in fact been attained as an and result, but that progrl: so stop by step is 
possible only on the basis of certainty. 
1 Thi: would be equally the coos 
for the TeXvtvc , who relies on empirical observation, and for the philo- 
sopher, whose concepts are ultimately derived from it. But whereas thz 
scientist or historian also looks fortard to progress in the futuro, 
2 
Antiochus (on the evidence of this passage) looks only to the past and 
appears to regard philosophy as already near to completion by the time of 
Arcecilas. In this we may see the beginning of a tendency to sea philosophy 
'not as a matter for free inquiry and argument, but as a revelation of truth 
to be handed on to succecsivo generational (C. C. Fiold, cpoaking of the 
later Platonists in Plato and hin Cnntor.. rnrnri. n, p. 228). 
The interpretation of Socrates given hore,. which implies chat his 
profes31on of ignorance was a more facade, is clearly biaasod. In him reply 
in 74 Cicero goes to the oppoaito extreme in claiming not only that the 
profeccion was sinccro but that it amounted to an almost total aceptiaiam. 
Yarro's account of Antiochus' views in ß. I, 15 ff., on the other hand, 
ceema to give a doccr. uution of Socrates that is free from distortion and 
Iiiatorical-inacouracy. 3 In 1,17 Varro prints out that the formulation 
is correctly roprooontinr Arietotle'o view. The analogy with the arts is, 
however, explicit in Sn hý, . Rof. 103b 17 ft., uhoro Aristotle claims to be laying foundations on which others will build, juxt as in the arts groat 
roputationa are now made by carrying on the rosuite of other people's work. 
Cf. V417.1090a 20-26. 
1Cf. the importance of tb oagpt C for Thucydidos (I, 22,4), as for Hippocrates (i t. N, od. 1, end). Cf, the argumort in 23 ff. 
? Dodds, e, pit. pp. 16 ind 23. There cre interesting pa3aagnc in the Elder 
Pliny and in yoneca oxproasinb faith in the advance-ont of knowledge, pact 
present and future (l'lin. N. fl. II, 62= Son. t:. t . VI, 5,3; '1IIj25,3-51 30,5 ft.; ha-64t7). 
3Sao Roid'a con onto (p. 264 n. 2) on theao throo paaeaCoa. 
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of a philosophical system by the follow}cru of rl. to and Arictotlo went 
a&ainst the Socratic custom of discussing cverythilin in a doubting ranner 
and avoiding any positive ntatement. Cicero atntca in several plaoca that 
it was Socr: A;: eo' method of refuting an opponent without giving his own view 
that was revived by Arcesilas. 
1 If Varro is correctly ropreacnting Antiochua, 
it is possible that at times the latter would havcs been willing to concede 
r 
the link between Arcesilas and Socrates. 
In the dinpute between Anti. o;. huc aM the 11cw Academy the position of 
Plato himuelf is much more crucial. The fact that, unlike Gooratea, Plato 
left a system of philosophy that was developed by tho schools tends to draw 
him into the ranks of the dof, w. atiats. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that the character of many of the Platonic writin n is closer to the Vow 
Academic position (cf. Ae. I, 46 'hano 1 cadumiam now..: appellant, quao rºihi 
uetun uidotur, oiquidem Platc.. em ox ills untere numoramuc, euiuc in librin 
nihil adfirmatur et in utramquo partem multa diascruntur, do omnibus quaor- 
itur, nihil certi dicitur'). In Do Or. II1,67 Cicero ctatca that Arcesilac 
found his icepticiam in the urritingu of Plato ('ex uariis I'latonis libris 
scrmonibusque Socraticis hoc mraximo adripuit, nihil coca ccrti quod auf 
sensibi: s auf animo porcipi pocoot'), and in his reply to Luculluc in 74 he 
argues that Plato would not have not out the Socrat4c doctrine in no tawny 
books if he had not agreed with it. This view of I'lato perhaps roflcoto the 
standpoint of Philo rather than that of Aracailan. 
2 It may, however, have 
provoked Antiochua into removing Socratco as well an Plato from the list of 
'sceptics' by denying the sincerity or his profession of ii orancc. 
3 
1Do Or. III, 67; Fin. II, 2= N. 2. I, 11; cf. 4`u_c. I90. Soo Com. iuntary, p. 75. 
2For the view that Arcosilaa took Socrates an hie nodal rather than Plato, 
sen Long, HH. Ph, p. 89. Brochard, p. 9( n. 1, contents this view, an rut 
forward by Hirzel. Arceeilao' contemporaries aunt have aeon him as a 
follower of Plato, to judgo from Arioto'n parody ('Plato in front, Pyrrho 
behind, Diodorus in tha middle'), Zono'o retaliatory attack on Plato (llumonius fr.. 25, Dua Places) and Plut. Adv. 1121F ff. Coo Introduction p. 23. 
p. 446, Friedlander. Illnte I. p. 137 
3For 
the Socratic irony, coo Guthrie 1119' 
ff.; A. Naury, 1, _, ironie et 1'humour rhnz Cic4ron (Leiden 1955), r+. 13 ff. For irony ac a trait common to jocratcu and Africnnunq of. 1+j. 299p 'T! Or. 
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It is difficult to be sure how closely Cicero ie following Antiochuo' 
thought in thane sections, owing to the somewhat arbitrary way in which he 
has generalised the precedent argument, an if every New Academic justified 
his position in the same way. Although there in little doubt that Areosilaa 
quoted the Presocratics in support of his scepticism (cf. Aa. I, 44), there is 
no evidence that Carneades did no, and the hint^rical question assumes 
importance only in the context of the debate betwvon Antiochus and Philo. 
In this debate the relation of the New Academy with Plato, not with the 
Presocratics, was the real issue. In claiming that there was one Academy, 
not two (Ac. I, 13), Philo must have stressed those aspects of the Platonic 
writings which provided a link with Socrates on the one hand and with 
Arcesilas and Carneades on the other. But Philo had also maintained that 
no Academic had denied the possibility of knowledge, except to the Stoic 
sense. There was therefore no need for him to claim that Socratoj and Plato 
had been total sceptics, as Cicaro dooa in his roply to Luctllus in 74, and 
no need for him to bring the rresocratica into the picture at all, unless he 
wished to defend Areeoilas and repeat his arguments. Cicero oeemß to have 
put together two linen of attack, firnt, against . 'hilo'a arguments for a 
unified Academy, secondly, against Arcosilaa' use of precedent, and so has 
confused the picture., Thus Plato and Socrates are dissociated from the 
Presocratica and made a separate case an if in answer to i'hilo, but a more 
uncompromising scepticism than that of Th'. to in ass yaad on the part of the 
opponent. 
' Cimilarly Cieero'o reply in 72 ff. is c'nduntea on the assumption 
that any precursor of the New Academy must be shone to be a total sceptic, 
although hin view of the Platonic writings as aunnorting the Vow Academic 
position is probably thbt of Philo. Cicoro gives the argument as a whole a 
spurious unity by identifying it with his oim philouophical position. 
11,270. Cicero eluowharo treatn the Socratic irony 1a a form of jesting; of, 
1'[. I9103; R_. 292 (where Attiaun accucez' Cicero cf 'irony' in prainin;; the otyle of the early oratoro such ;w Cato), and the dincuicicn of 'urbana din- 
uimulatio' in De Cr. ]I, 269. 
1Cf. Luculluo' atatcmnnt at tho and of 12 that he will be concerned only with 
Arccoi lai und Carnoadcn, nince Milo in '. aduerntriua lenior'. 
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It should not, thorotoro, be nn umod (as by Long, tt. Ph. p. 223) that 
the precedent argument Lucullun is hero attacking is exactly that of Thilo, 
or that the counter-argument accurately reflects Antiochus' roply to him, 
or even that this was the argument that mainly influenced Antiochuo to 
break from Philo at Alexandria. The break did not occur at Alexandria and 
what chiefly annoyed Antiochus was p4rhapa iliilo'a denial that Arcenilao 
and Carneadec had been total sceptics. ;.. though tl.. # attack on Arcocilan 
and Cicoro's reply to it only rako oonso in the context of the main debate 
between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero has, for the purpose of this whole 
argument, adopted Antiochus' view of the 1cw Academic no cacentially a 
totalccoptio and rejected T'hilo's. 
. Review cf thA sc. pticn] Aca_my 
16-17 (p. 34,20 - p. 35,9) sod fuorint ills uctora .. " non dofuit. ,. 
Summary. (16) But oven suppo3ing that thoco old doctrines did not 
constitute knowledge, has nothing boon gu. inod by inquiries purcuol 
since Arcesilaa disparagcd Zono (as it is thought) on tho score that 
he merely reproduced the ideas of earlier philosophers with verbal 
changes, and wishing to invalidate his definitions tricd to cover light 
with darkness? Arcesilas' philosophy did not gain much ground at first, 
although his inte]ligcnco and charm of style won him distinctions only 
Lacydes, his immediate successor, kept it going, but it krau later 
perfected by Carnocdos, who was fourth from Arceailaa (being a pupil of 
llegesinus, who studied under Ev ndor, Laoydos' disciple). Carneades was 
" head of the school for a long tima 
(ho died at ninety), and had dieting- 
uiched pupils; among them Clitomachus was the most industrious (an his 
extensive writings oho:: ), though t'agno, Charma. daa and r'. alanthiua of 
Rhodos had their merits. Metrodo? us of Stratonicoa wan thought to have 
known Carneados e4pooially well. (17) Your Fhilo was a pupil of 
Clitomaehua for many years, and while he lived the Academy did not 
lack a champion. 
Luculluo' train of thought io not entirely clear at this point, The 
uorda 'ills uctora' aorm to bo an ocho of 'uatoroa' In 13 and 14 above, and 
to refer to all the philoaophora allocodly cited by the Now Acudomica, up to 
and including Plato. Zho meaning would thon bo equivalent to 'oven cuppooing 
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that the old philosophern did not attain Iniowledge'. But 'illa uetera' is 
also the subjiot of 'inuestigata aunt', and na auch can hardly include more 
than the common body of knowledge bequeathed by Plato which is referred to at 
the end of the preceding section. 
' It must be admitted that Cicero's language 
here falls short of its usual clarity. An even greater difficulty arises, 
however, from the use of the progress argument to introduce a historiecl 
review of the 11ew Academic philoeophers. In the first place, the supposition 
'red fuerint illa uetera ei uoltis incognita', if it means that no advs: *co 
towards knowledge wan made before Arcesilas, contradicts the conclusion of 
the previous section and is unlikely to have been conceded by Antiochuss eve3 
for the sake of argument. Secondly, no use is made of the argument, except 
as a transition; we are not told what the investigations were or who made 
them; presumably they must be credited not to the New Acadomic but to 
their opponents. There is also come inconnistoney in representing Arcesilas' 
criticism of Zeno as purely negative and destructive ('conatue eat olarisei- 
mis rebus tonebras obducoro') and yet as conducive to progress o. ring to the 
inquiry it stimulated. 
It seems probable, therefore, that Cicero himself rather than Antioehua 
was responsible both for the historical sketch and for the faulty transition. 
The reoult is that Lucullun shows here some appreciation of individual New 
Academics and of the inportanee of their criticism. Arconilas' attack on 
Zeno is, however, reported unfavourably, :: arising from a defire to damage 
his opponent and undermine his system. Cicero elao" ero emphatically denies 
this motive (76-7; I, 44). The element of fact whic). underlies tho tradition 
lHence Bentley's emend:. +. ion 'ueteribun', which prenumably exoludea Plato 
from the earlier part ^f the sentence while 1eavinT 'ills' to roproncnt, 
somewhat vaguely, the common body of post-Platonic doctrine. Reid in no 
doubt right that hero 'incognita' is used absolutely (" 'incorta'). For 
other suggestions for mending the text, none of which carrion conviction, 
see Reid's note Ad loe. (p. 109 n. 21). 
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of personal conflict between the two men' in that the Now Academic philosophy 
of doubt was in the main a reaction against Stoic do atism. Antiochus, who 
identified this dogmatism with Platonic doctrine, condemned Arccoilaa' attack 
on it as mere intransigence. Philo, in defending the link between the 
earlier and later Acade. ny, had no reason to play down the confrontation with 
Stoicism. It was therefore left to Cicero to defend Arcosilan agninot the 
more frivolous charges brought against him, 
2 by atresning the seriousness of 
his motives and the ancient and honourablo character of the sceptical 
tradition he was following. 
Aruesilas' disparagement of Zcno'o originality is not particular). ' 
damaging, since it agrees with Antiochun' own aacocanent of Ctoioiom as a 
'correction' of the old Academy (It 43; of. 'uerbio magic quain eententiio 
dicsentiunt', 15) , Lack of originality Mac similarly alleged by Epicurus 
against Arceoilas(P1ut'. Ady. C, 1.1121F). The charge of attempting to aubatituto 
darkness for light was commonly brought aainat thn Academic ceepticn (cf. 26, 
30,42,61; N. D. 4,6). For Arceailas' arguments ngainat Zono'c doffnitiona, aco 
Introduction pp. 12-13. 
In the brief hisoory of the school which fellows, Cicero gives what 
appears at first sight to be little core than a lint of names, arranged on 
the doxographic principle of master-pupil relationship. Within this outline, 
however, he contrives to suggest a difforenco of importance between the 
earlier and the later period. He begins by caying +hat, in opito of the 
admiration ancorded to Arcesilas for his penetrating, lntel: oot and remarkable 
1According to rruneniuw (fr. 25,10ff. /SVF I, 11) thi^ dated from the time when they 
both studied under Polerso; of. Strabo XIII, 614 ('vP 1,10). Zeller (Stoicn, 
Fnicureans and Scentica, p. 529 n. 1) objecto on the Round thnt they cannot 
have been ctudentc at tF. o came time (Zeno wac older, A0. I, 35). Tradition 
suggests that Arcecila. 3 wan on better terms with Cler. nthas (D. L. VII, 17l; 
Plut. do adul. et a-m. 11,550- 
2 These are in any casR the sort of accucation which Cicero is at pains to 
refute in the Acadenica (coo p. 77 above). 
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charm of speech, Academic seepticlcm did not at first rain r. ny adherents 
('cuius primo non admodum probata ratio'). This statement is not repeated 
elsewhere and is probably a comparative one, since Arcesilas' own popularity 
is not in question. 
I 
Cicero seems to be inferring from the mediocrity of hie 
immediate successors that his scepticism did not at that time attract much of 
a following. This is confirmed by the next olause, 'proxime a Lacydo solo 
retenta est' (in contrast with the number and distinction of Carnoades' 
pupils). 
2 Since Arcesilas himself wrote nothing, it was solely duo to 
Lacydes' written record that the school survived. Cicero then passec to 
Carneades, who completed what Arcecilas had begun ('poet gutem confeeta a 
Carneade'), before reversing direction to fill in the gap with a succession 
of bare names. 
3 
Cicero says little about Carneadee, although the pattern of the 
tricolon ('probata... retenta... confeota') seems designed to focus attention 
upon him. Valerius Maximus (VIII9795) also says that he lived to the are of 
ninety, but Diogenes Iaertius (IV, 65) given his age as eighty-five when he 
died in 125/6 B. C., an does Lucian (Microb. 20). If, an Cicero Implies, he 
presided over the school up to his death, the length of hie headship would 
in itself have been remarkable. 
4 Probably Cicero considers it unnecessary 
to say more in so short a summary. 
5 Each of Carneades' pupils, however, 
receives a brief word of praise, giving the Impression that here Cicero is 
chiefly concerned with tho vitality of the tradition. 
1D. L. ]V, 37. Plutarch (Adv. Col. 1121E) says that Epicurus wan jealous of his 
reputation, as the most popular philosopher of his time. 
2This 
seems more likely than that Cicero intended to exclude a certain 
F'ythadoruo, who was caid to have recorded the opinions of Arcesilas in a 
treatise (Index Here. 20). 
3D. L. ]V, 60 states that Iacydos was succeeded by Telecles and tvander, who 
presided jointly. Cicero mentions only Evander, probably because he survived 
his colleague and was the one to hand over the school to Iiefesinus. 
4lie 
was already head of the school in 155 P. C. when he went to Rome on the 
famoun embassy of philosophers (I'lut. Cat. Nwti. 22). Cicero seems to know 
nothing of a younger Carneadea, who according to the Index Herculansnsis (24920; 25,36; 30,1) took over the school in 137/6 P. C. 5For 
praise of Carneades, see tie Cr. 7]l, 68 'hinc haec recentior Academia 
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Clitomachua, a Carthaginian, was tho chief literary exponent of 
Carneades; he is here praised for his industry, which according to D. L. LV, 67 
produced more than four hundred books. In 102 Cicero quotes from a work on 
probability addreaood to the aatiriat Luoiliua, and rentiona another on tho 
came subject addrecood to Luoiu3 Consorinu3, who was consul in 149 B. C. In 
98 we hear of four books on withholding assent. 
1 The next name is conc. 'clod 
by a corruption in the taxt. Of the two cuggeationa, Itagno is usually 
2 
favoured an nearer to the MSS, though nothing in known of him apart frc7 a 
passing . referonoe in Athenaeus 
602d and a possible wontion in Quintilian II, 
17,15. Aecchinee (profcrrod by Raid) Is mentioned with Clitoiachun, Crormadrun 
and Motrodorua in Tn Or. I, 45 as a pupil of Carnoadeo and a loading figuro in 
the Academy at the time when Crasaue viaitod Athena after his quaeatorohip. 
3 
Cicero speaks of the Academy as 'flourishing' at that time. Chazmldas, hero 
commended for his eloquence, was enpocially noted for hin memory. 
' Virtually 
nothing is known of lielanthiux of Rhoden, except that D. L. II, 64 epcake of 
Aocchines as his pupil. Metrodoruu of Stratonicoa, formerly ar. Epicurean, in 
bore singled out an having been thought to be woll acquaintod with ('bone 
nos3e') his master Carncadeo. For his interpretation of Carnearles, which 
difforod in important rospcots from that of Clitcmcchus, coo Introduction, 
p. 13. 
manuit, in qua oxstitit diuina quadaa coloritato inprinii dicendiquo copia 
Carneades'. De Or. II, 161'Carnoadi uoro uis incrodiL,. lio i)la dicondi at 
ylriotao perouam esset optanda nobin, qui nullen u.: quf in tll! n aufs disput- 
ationibu3 ro- dofendit, quarr non probauit, nullen op}-u nauit, quamn non 
euertit. ' Fin. III, 41 montions his outstanding ekil', in dialectic. 
1In TuQe.; II, 54 Cico: o alco montiona a book cent .o his follow countrymen to 
console them for the dontruotion of Carthago (146 f. C. )t it contained his 
written record of an a.. tual speech of Carnnndon against the theoia that a wieo 
man would feel pain at the capture of his city. 
2 in hno nennot the reading in hoc guum is an obviouu attempt at correction. 
3Thore is a difficulty In chronoloCy hero, nince Craacu3 was quaestor in Asia 
in 110, the year in wr.! ch Clitomachun in caid to have died and Thilo to have 
cuceooded him as head of the Academy. Brochard rcer-dn the dato as uncertain 
(p. 109 n. 7). Plutarch (an non! 13) nayo that he of 4med to be a pupil of 
Carneadea in the lattor'u old age. 
4lntroduction 
p. 17 n. 4. 
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The review cnd3 with Milo. Cicoro'n tribute, that while Thilo lived 
the Academy did not lack defence, draws attention to the increasing pressures 
on the school, which after his death brought about the virtual extinction of 
the New Academic tradition. It is therefore significant that Lucullua 
passes on in the next sentence to his proposed attack on the New Academics. 
The unspoken inference in that, for purponen of defence, Cicero ban taken up 
the mantle of Thilo. 
Should one arFUe with an Academic ncertic? 
17-18 (p. 35,10 - p. 36#2) sed quod nos facers .... dinceratur put4nt. 
Summzr". Some philosophers have thow, t that our present task of arguing 
against the Academics should not be undertaken at all, on the ground that 
it is pointless to carry on discussion with man who accept nothing as 
true, and they blamed the Stoic Antipater for occupying himself so much 
with this. There was no need, they said, to define knowlcdE; o or percept- 
ion or (to translate literally) 'gresp', which the Sto+cc1 callxu, c4, at1* tr. 
-, 
and those who wished to prove that there is ecmathing which can be 
grasped and perceived were displayinu ignoranco, since nothing can be 
clearer than &vüpyeta, an the Creeks call it (lot us translate this by 
'perapicuitas' or 'euidontia'; you are not - he said to me in Jost - the 
only one allowed to invent words); ne verbal proof, they thought, could 
be more convincing than what was self-evident,. and torus co clear did not 
need to be defined. Others coif that they would not have taken the 
initiative in defending the cal: -evident, but that arR mentn brought 
against it should be answered, so that no one L; iould be deceived. (10)Tho 
majority, however, do not object to the definition even of what is 
already colt-evident; the subject is thought to be suitable for inquiry 
and the persons fit to engage in philosophical liacunaaizn. 
Cicero reforo to three groupo of philooophero oppocsd to the New 
Academy ('quidam', 'alai', 'plcriquo'), the first or which have thought it 
The use of 'illi' (p. 35,18) might be taken to indicate that the oubject of 
'uocant' is different fron that of 'aiebant'. Thin in not nocenMarily no, 
however, since 'ills' may be a way of rcforrinr; back to the cub4ect of the 
main clauno in what in virtually a parcnthA; iss. The contract is with 
'uolumu3' rather than 'aieban t'. 
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wrong to argue at all against the cceptical ponition. ttono of thcao groups 
can be idontieied with certainty an member3 of any one echool. The rofurenoe 
to' xaT&Xn LC nuggesto that at leant some of Antipater'a critics were Stoics. 
The appeal to & v&p yeta is common to more than one school, though the 
protezt against definition seems more characteristic or Epicureans. Possibly 
Cicero is profenting a composite picture drawn from various dogmatic nouroos. 
Plutarch tells us that Antipater'n attacks on Carnoadac, vociferous an 
they were, were made only in his writings; hence ho was nicknamed xa1apoß6ac 
('noisy with the pen'). 
' Cicero rotors in 20 and 1C9 to his argu.. ont that 
it would be consistent for one who asserted that nothing could be known to 
assort that this one thing could be known. Like Chrysippus, he maintained 
that there is neither impulse nor action without naaent. 
2 Although the rain 
controversy must have continued after Antipator, it in possible that aalt 
attitude of non-belligerancy was advocated by some Stoics, especially if, 
as some writers ouggost, 
3 they were being woratad in the argument. 
But such an attitude would probably have boon characteristic of many 
who reco@nised the general difficulty of communicating with anyone who takes 
up an extreme ecopticat position. Epictotua, for Inetanco, complain: s that 
it in hard to find arguments that will convince n poroon who resists what in 
ab3olutoly obvious (DinR. I, 5, I). Am I to carry on a dincunoion, he anke, 
with someone who does not know whether he is awake or dreaming? Such a man 
in worse than a corpse, for though he has parcoptio:, he prc-tends not to 
have it (ibi.. 6-0). Luarotiua, in his refutation of ncopcici:. m, utters the 
1Plut. Carr. 23, üVF III Antipater 5. Plutarch l:. -iinuates that he had 
noither the ability nor the courag3 to face his opponent directlye flumaniua 
elaborato3 this (CVP ib! 4.6). Cf. Cie. An. I ap. Von. p. 65 'quid Antipater 
digladiatur cum, CArne? Aa tot uoluminibun? ' )' ibid. 4). 
2Flut. C1'. o. Po . 1057A (S' III, 177)"Aocordir4 to Plut. A4v t'n1.1122A-B the Stoics brandished this argument lika the Gorr+cn'a hc: u1, but, without e2ning 
the victory. For Antipater's dispute with Carnoadee on the question of the 
ethical end, Boo A. A. Long, 'Carnaadev and the Ctoin Toles', il1rononi! 12, 
1967, ap. 59-90. 
3Plut. ibid. (coo provioua noto)=ulco Aur,., Ac. III, 41 (Introduntion p. 33 n. 4). 
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samo sentiment of doupairs 
huio igitur, contra caittara contcndort, cau: zzua, 
qui capita ipso aua in etatuit uc,? Ltigia cuss. 
IV 9 Q71-2 
The clear implication is that the ceeptiu is debarred by hie perversity 
from meaningful Speech and dincuncoion. 
I 
The further objeotion, that the clarity of experience renders argument 
pointleco, is also a cj=on one. 
2 It rusts on the belief ct the dogmatist 
that one cannot refuse assent to what is plainly evident (38) and, that the 
sceptio is -lading the faets. 
3 Such evasion has in it an element of wilful 
intransigence or 'pertinaeia' (9= 18), which Dcrtrand Russell saw as 
'frivolouo insinoerity'. 4 It also raunen a opecifio point of loCic. Dy 
refusing to accept the obvious the oceptio virtually forces his opponent 
into the logical error of trying to prove what in self-trvident. The 
argument 'eoaquo qui persuadore uellent eure aliquid quod .; jmprehendi et 
poroipi posaet inecienter facers' in reminiscent of Aristotle's view that 
failure to distinguish what can and what cannot be demonstrated is a mark 
of ä'ta&bcvota .5 
1For the Epicurean argument, cf. F'in, I, 64" Aristotle voices similar 
objections against those who deny the principle of contradiction 
(1"1et. l008a 
31 ff. = cf. 1063b 7 ff. ). 
2Soxtus P. 1?. 110244 ff.; 111,661 021 120. 
31ience Chrysippus' assertion that those who claim tr, be following impressions 
without assent are making meaningless statements (nut. : +to. fion. 1057A, VF III, 
177). 
4'Scepticiam, 
while logically impeccable, is psychoiorically impooaible and'' 
there is an element of frivolous insincerity in any philosophy which 
pretends to accept it' (ituanell, Pun.. Yn-Owl6drf+ ItR more Pnd 1-i tn, p. 9, 
quilted by A. r'aesa, ^ec+rticýism. p. 57). 
Plutarch, Aesv«Co1.1122E, quotas 
Epicurean objections similar to those rained by Epictotua 11,20,28 fr.: 
'l. hy doesn't the sceptic run off to the mountain instead of the bath, or Go 
to the wall, not the door, when ho wants to Co out? ' Cf. Epict. 1,27,1© ff.; 
Ariat. i4At. 1008b 14 ff- 1 1063a 20 ff. 
5t1t. 1OO6a 5 Lt. 
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The second group of critics ('alti') are also following Aristotle in 
their belief tnat, although a self-evident truth cannot be rendered more 
certain by proof, one may support it by bringing arguments against those 
who contest it. 
1 
Lucullus will later (45-46) adopt the same position as 
this group and contend that it is necessary to come to the defence of 
'perspicuitas' to avoid being deceived by the ceptious arguments of the 
other side. Epicurus in mentioned in the context (45) as being relatively 
unsuccessful in his attempt at defending knowledge. The Stoics also 
believed that opposite arguments should be answered, with the object of 
destroying their plausibility. 
2 In the attitude of tnis second Group there 
is already a hint of the view that the Academic sceptic is a sophist ans a 
deceiver ('no qui fallerentur') , which is further developed in 45-46. 
Lucullus also mentions a difference of opinion between the first group 
of philosophers and the majority ('plerique') on the question whether 'clear' 
terms, such as 'knowledge' and 'perception', need to be defined. 
3 If 
definition is regarded as superfluous, it can only be on the gr_und that the 
terms in which X in defined should be clearer or better known that X itself. 
The primary objects of knowledge, and perhaps knowledge itself, would thus 
be indefinable. 4 Such a view, with its corrollarj that verbal statement 
('oratio') can add nothing to the clarity of exporieneo, seems nearer to 
1M-n t. 1C06a 
11 
ff. For Aristotle it in a qucntion of establishing the 
principle of contradiction, for the dogmatiat, the ; ropoaition that 'there 
is something which can be grasped and perveivod'. 
2Plut. 
Sto. ReZ. 1035F ff. (SVF I1,127). An opporont'o -. iewo should be stated with 
caution, however, as in the law courts, to avoid maKinC them sound convincing. 
For dialectic as a means of guarding against dec.. ption, ace Pin. III, 72; 
D. L. VII, 46-48. 
3Cicero's Ivrguago thr. ughout implies that definition is of things, not of 
words. This is not usually accepted by modcrn logicians; of. S. Stebbing, 
A Modern ]ntroduetion to Lnglc, p. 426. R. Robinson, Thifinition, pp. 149 ff. 
4Many 
modern philosop:: lrs hold the view that there are indefinable terms, 
and that it is logically necessary that thin should be no. See R. Robinson, 
Pafin ttion, rp. 4-5. 
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Epicurean theory than to Stoic. 'A ; tole would not expect a definition to 
be in simple or familiar termn, or to be 'clear' in the same came as the 
original experience. Ho is thus more likely to bo among the majority who 
do not object to defining cognitivo terne and aro willing to dicounc the 
subject at a dialectical level. 
In Orat. 116 (aß in Fin. I1,3-4) Cicero tells ua that in any cystematic 
Inquiry or debate the ; isputants runt fi. rot of all acrce what the cubject of 
discussion is, and this is made clear by a dofinition. 
2 In the tontrolvercy 
between the Academics and the Stoics the definition of the cataleptic 
impression assumed considerable uignificrunco and beeme the pivot around; 
which the dispute centred. So Lucullus first establishes the need to define 
even clear terms. Then he proceeds in 18 to state Zeno's definition of the 
cataleptic impression and the conditions that must be fulfilled if knowledge 
is to be possible. Section 18 appropriately ends with the remark that the . 
aim of his whole speoch (19 ff. ) will be to establish the validity of Zeno's 
definition. 
1The 
grammarian Erotian, who compiled a glo.; sary of Hippocratic terms in 
the first century A. D., refers to an 'accepted principle' that the less 
well-known should be explained in terns of the more familiar, and ascribes 
to Epicurus the view that clarity of meaning is ruined when a familiar term 
is tricked out with a definition (Us. 250). Cicero says of Epicurus 'tollit 
dofinitiones' (Fin. I, 22; cf. 11,4 ff. and Torquatus' reluctance to define 
pleasure). In the Letter to Herodo'. un (30) Epicurus lays down: 'Attention 
should be paid to the primary meaning of each term and there should be no 
further need of explanation. ' Cf. ? ir. III, 9-10; Aug. An. I, 15" 
2In F1n. II, 4 this yule is referred to Plato's Th1er non (237b 7 ff. 
). Cicero 
rays that Epicurus, whilo recognisinC the need for agreement bout the point 
at issue in any discussion, failed to realise the importance of definition 
in this connection. Cf. R. E. Witt, AlbimI1, p. 35. 
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In section 17 Cicero uses two Creek tor ms, xa"tä 1$ LCand lvd, pyc to . 
The first of there is undoubtedly Stoic and goon back to Zeno. 
l As Cicero's 
translation indicates, it denotes the mental 'grasp' of a certain class of 
impressions, to which Zeno attached the adjective 'cataleptic'. 
2 Cicero 
introduces I v5ryeta as a characteristic cf this kind of oxperienee, which 
renders unnec'esary any verbal persuasion that 'there is something-which can 
be perceived and grasped. 
3 Reid and others have assumed that h väpycPa too 
in a Stoic term going back to Zeno, 
4 but there seems to be no evidence for 
this beyond Cicero's own paraphrase in Ao. Ir411'uisfs, non omnibus adiungebat 
fidem sod its solum quae propriam haborent deolaraticnem earum rerum, grao 
uidorentur'. Sandbach believes that the Stoics took over the word from the 
Epicureans, by whom it was used to denote 'just that quality of a phantasia 
which Zeno denoted by the word kn+AikA, that quality which makes a man., 
feel certain of its truth'. 
5 He observes that the word is not found in any 
Stoic writer before Antipater, who uses it in an Epicurean sense (of the 
clear concept we have of the gods, e %p61t14tC ). 
6 
Iie omits to mention, 
however, that the word occurs in a remark attributed to Arista by Diogenos 
Laertius (VII, 162) in the context of the Stoic debate with Arcesilas. 
7 It 
lAc. I, 4o-42; 11,145 LV. ' 1,66; 6ß ff. ). 
"2Sandbach, Probleme p. 9 ff. Ipitroduction, p. 12. 
31n the pascape of Quintilian quoted by Reid p. 193 11.13 (VI, 2,32, VIII, 3,61 
and IV, 2,63) tvüpycta is a stylistic t.. rm, though the Ciceronlan equiv- 
alents 'illuetratio' and 'cuidentia' may `a partly based an th.: preJent 
paseaf; o. Ar stylistic terms, 'euidentia' and 'pers; fcuitas' are not 
synonymous (cf. Quint. VIlI, 3,63). 
4Reid, 
p. 193 n. 12; Bevan, Stoics and See tr tcn, p. 35s nackhflm, P. 480. 
50n. 
211. p. 32 (cf. Rist, Stoic Thilo! orZ, Fp. 140-141). Similarly Descartoo 
was later to attributc indubitability to iudf, ementn that have a certain 
clearness and distinctness about thorn (Selectlonn, R. M. Eaton, p. 44 ff. ) 
6P1ut., 
to. . 1051E-F(SVF III Antipater 33). Sandbach points out that the word is not included in vo-aArnim's index (e, c. p. 37 n. 3). 
7Diorenen 
relates that, seeing a bull with deformed parts, Aricto rem-irked 
that it rave Arcenilas a chance to attack the orcd. b: lity of the canoes ( oLµat., ecpi, 666c'rac 'Apxea0(up lltiyctpTnpm xat& Tyr. cvapyctar. ). As in so ~any canes, v&py to seems bore to be used simply as an equivalent 
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is frequent in the writings of Epicurus, where it is uzed to indicate the 
clarity of experience and, becauuo for Epicurus all impressions are clear, 
it is virtually a technical term, applying to oonso-improasions and general 
concepts as well as to the primary meanings of woids. 
1 The Epicureans did 
not, however, have a'monopoly of the tern. 
2 It may well have been used by 
Epicurus' contemporaries, as by later writero, of the evidence of the ser, nes 
and the clarity of percoption, 
3 
and it In likely that by Cicero'o day It was 
the common property of the schools. It can be inferred froh 34 that even the 
New Academics admitted that some sense-impressions were 'perspicua', without 
allowing tat they wore 'porcepta' in the striot sense. 
The Latin terms which Cicero given as equivalent to xavCATjrLC are 
'cognitio', 'perceptir' and 'eomprehon3io'. In so far as there is a differ- 
ence of meaning between the three terms, 'cognitio' is possibly being used in 
the wider sense in which it can also be distinguished from perception. The 
Stoics made a distinction between perception (the experience of a cataleptic 
impression) and knowledge, which only the wide man possesses, but as fa as 
for sense-perception. This passago, like Plutarc}., 'n reference (Cor, m. Not. 100 3C) 
to the Stoics as ot 7Lc)6Ö txo L otN e vapyc tar. ou'to 1. cannot therefore be 
taken as endorsing the view that the early Stoics uned the word with particular 
reference to the cataleptic impression. On the other hand, Numcnius alleges 
(fr. 26,28-99Dos Places) that Lacydes learnt from Arcesilac that there was 
nothing clear or sound ( tvapYie tf i ytLC ) iii eight or hearing, which 
might be taken to imply that contemporary Stoics ae: oeiated tvü, oyELa with 
the cataleptic impression. In Div. II, 126 (SVF II, 62) Cicero attributes to 
Chrysippus the argument that impressions received when awake are 'olariora at 
cortiora' than thcse which appear in sloop; it is possible, though by no moans 
certain, that Chrysipp,: s used tvfipye c. a or 1vapyf)C in this connection. 
In 87 we are told that Chryeippus had collected every argument 'contra sensus 
et porspicuitatem', and in 99 that Carneades ocnsinored argu ento 'contra 
census contraquo perspicuitatem' as relevant to the cataleptic impression. 
But in the last two passages, 'perspicuitas' is oomowhat ambiguous. 
1For 
references see Bailey, Creek Atorninte, p. 243 n. 1; p. 269. 
2Sextus 
A. M. VII, 218 attributes to Theophrastus the view that 'r &v apyj r. 
is'a common factor in perception and intuitive knowledge. In Aristotle the 
word is used chiefly in connection with sense-perception (see Ponitz, Index 
Ariatotelicus, p. 248). Cf. Plat. 1'h rodr. 250d. 
3Sandbach 
complicates the issue by supposing that the Epicureans meant by Iv6 pyc,. a the came quality which Zeno denoted :y the term cataleptic. 
Since Epicurus assigned this quality to all sense-i-prcnsions, the nature of 
n clear impression in the Epicurean sense must rbviously be different from 
that of a cataleptic impression. For the samo reason, it is tempting to 
assume that, if the Stoics used the word, they used it with the same general 
meaning of the ovidoncg of the senses. 
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the wino man himself is concerned the diutinction does not apply, either in 
theory or in practice. Any cataleptic experience of the wine man automatic- 
ally constitutes an item of knowledge. 
l ConccZuently, in Antiochus' arwnents 
against the New Academv, the cataleptic exrerienco ie assumed to be equivalent 
to knowledge. Hence, though Cicero for the moat part toes 'ccmprehenderc' 
and 'pcrciperu' (usually both together) and their derivatives to corve: ' the 
concept of a cataleptic experience, he eometimco uses 'cognoncere' au cn 
equivalent alternative 2 . 
Phi1o'a now definition of perception Is unnltißfne-torv 
18 (p"36,3-23) Philo autem .... peroipi nihil poaae concedimui. 
Sum=EX. But Philo, unable to resist attach on the atubborness of the 
Academics, put forward certain new theories which are plainly falco, for 
which he was blamed by the elder Catulus, and as Antiochus showed, he 
involved himself in the very difficulty he wished to avoid. sor in 
denying that there is anything that can be -rasped (this is our rendering 
of . xar&Mj t. cov), if he was referring to Zono'a definition of an 
impression ('uisum' - our conversation yesterday has made thin a familiar 
word for gav'tao(a) - an impression bearing the imprint and stamp of 
its source in a way that would not be possible if it were not from that 
source (and we mair. tain that Zeno's dofiniticn is absolutely correct, 
for how could anything be grasped in such a way that it is indubitably 
perceived and known, if it could possibly be fulco? ) - in undermining 
and doing away with this, Fhilo does away with the criterion of known 
and unkno%m; the consequence is that nothing can be grasped, and Thilo 
unawares is back in, the position where he least wishes to be. Thus our 
The place and significance of y in the co.; nitivo proceno can be 
inferred from Ac. I, 40-42 and 11,145, whien record !;; no'& illustration of 
this process by hin famous manual cimilo. flirt, _Nn. cit. pp. 139-40, wrongly 
argues that the acquisition or knowledre involves a further ntare after 
xaTü)ýl1tC. But (cont: ary to Riet's asawnption) there in only one act of 
assent in arv pcrceptt .1 or cognitive not (37), co that any act of xaTäjQ"jrtr 
will result in the possession of knowledge by the wine man. So the texts 
usually equate iT. LoTc g7l and xar6J pit' LC if the latter in auch that it 
cannot be undermined by any fora of reasoning (syF 1,60). 
2E. 
g. 23,31; cf. Fin. III, 17; V, 76. 
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whole argument against the Academy will centre un the defence of thin 
definition, which Thilo wished to dentroy; for if we fail to maintain 
it, we allow that nothing can be perceived. 
Although at the end of 12 Ihi1o was di3misacd as 'adueroarius lenior' 
and attention directed to Areesilas and Carneadee, the presont ceetion is 
again concerned almost exclusively with Philo. One reat. on is that Cicero has 
been trying to widen the scope of the diecuanion, which will concerntho Vew 
Academy as a whole, from Arcesilas to Mile. The apparent contradintion in 
Philo's new standpoint affordn him an opportunity to introduce the Stoic 
definition of the cataleptic impression and its central importance to"tno 
dogmatic case. Once the point at issue between the two camps (i. e, the r'cw 
Academy in general and Antiochua Wending Stoic do aaticm) hen been clarified 
in this way, the main üiscussion can proceed, with sections 19-60 representing 
Antiochus' arguments 'contra axcV aT$ taa+'. 
l 
^he definition of the cataleptic impr2asion hero ascribed to Zeno is 
given soveral times by Sextua as ý &7 'O ýSr, &PXOVTOC xat )a'T'a&t T6 
v7äPXov 1va%o4C4ayjAV'n x0161 Jva7ce0ppaYtoµtvn bxo(a o6x äv YLvotvro. 
6 tb Ah vidpxov roc (A. M. VII, 248,402,426; ^. 11. II, 4; cf. n. M. VII, 255P 
410). D. L. VII, 50 adds &vuxoce%u u itvr) (: 3 I p. 10). In 77 Cicero gives a 
shortened version without the final clauses 'ox co quod cosot, sicut essot, 
impressum et tignatum et effiotum'. Tho cataleptic improssion in one that In 
an exact copy of an exii: ting object, and ouch that it coul'+ not arise excopt 
from an existing object. It thus produces 'grasp' ''oth of itco'L and of ita 
source, and (for the wise man) indubitable kriowlodg*'. 
2 
1For the exp: 4soion see Att. XIII, 19,3" 
2Sandbach, Problems p. 13 ft.. 
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Since a representational theory of perception was accepted by both 
parties in the dispute, the chief difficulty of this definition clearly lica 
in the interpretation of the final clause and the exact nature of the 
guarFuitee offered. If we examine the various pocaiLalitiec of porcept"I 
error around which the controvercy wao trade to revolvc, 
l two cmergo as having 
received the greatest amount of attention, namely (1) the danger of taking an 
impression to be causeu by an actual external object when no such object in 
p. dsert,, and (2) the possibility of misteking one object, which is preuent, 
for another, which is absent. Taking (2) into account, ]Rist (Stoic Philosophy 
PP"137-3) argues that ü, xö µ? I h(pxovvtoC cannot merely mean 'from a rnon- 
existent object', but must also mean that the imprerzion could not have come 
from any other object. Ito accordingly translates the final claune in the 
definition ac 'of such 1 kind an could not have comp from what in not that 
#ýYisting object'. Although it is clear that such a guaranteo is needo3, it 
is equally clear that the Greek words do not, as flint claims, actually mean 
this. As the examples in Soxtus spow, what is common to Loth types of error 
is that what is not 'there' is falsely supposed to be 'thero', and this, 
rather, than non-existence , 
in an absolute sense, in what is implied by ä%. b µh 
kP Xovtto C. It may be noted, however, that Cicoro's translation in the 
present passage ('shaped and moulded from its source an it could not have 
been from what was not its source') is on the whole nearer to that of Rist. 
2 
179 ft.; Soxtus A. M. VII, 244 ff.; 402 ff. 
2According 
to Reid, -PP-194-5 n. 14, Cicero'o version guards only ar; ainst the 
second type of error, mistaking one object for another, prcßumably bocause 
it is not specifically stated that the courco intuit be an axictin& objec"4. 
It teems to be extremely difficult to find a form of words that would clearly 
cover both kinds of deception. As Reid points out. Cicero'c rendering in 77 ('ex co quo( esset, siout caret, impressum at aignatum at effiotum') is in 
Como ways nearer to the Greek. 
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Acoordine, to Sextus (A. M. VJ1,252), the Stoics added the last clause 
to tho definition ('such as could not arise from a non-oxistont objoot') 
because the Academics did not, like the Ntoica, think it imrossible that an 
exactly similar but falso impression might be found. The implication in 
that the clause was added under the influence of Academic criticism, ' though 
there is no really firm evidence for this. By ponitinr a strict causal 
relation between external object and impression, the Stoicu attempted to 
show that the cataleptic impreeciL:, would not appcar the way it does unleso 
the object that gave rise to it were real and auch as it is repreccnted'tn 
be in the impression. Sextun complains that, whon'askcd to define the real 
object (TL iicfipXo v )'they would reply that the real is what excites a 
cataleptic impression (f. M. VII, 426; VIII, 09). As ho points out, the 
reasoning is circular, but this does not, as he o1i: ms, invalidate the 
definition. 1 For if, as the Ctoics maintain, the existing object can be 
apprehended only through the cataleptic impression, and if there is an 
exact correspondence between them, it is obvious that each can be defined' 
only in relation to the other. 
-Like his predecessors, Thilo denied that a cataleptic iaproscion, an 
defined by the Stoics, existed and could be experienced. The hypothetical 
form in which Luculluz states this ('ai. illud esset, sieut Zeno dofiniret.. ') 
merely points to the ambiguity of 'comprehcndi', al does not moon that 
Lucullus is not sure of w'iat Thilo intended, as is made clear by 'hoc cum 
infirmat tollitque' further on. If Cicero actually wrote äxc:. -r&atjT. Tov, 
though the structure of tho sentences requires XaotaatjntG v, the reason 
could be that Thilo himz olf used thin word when contesting the Stoic 
Cr- 1Stough, p. 39 n. 3= 'The circularity{is obvious, oinco the cataloptic impression is defined by reference to the vary facto who: o existence it is 
alleced to confirm. ' For the Stoics the circularity wAo no doubt doliborato 
and designed to exclud4 the possibility of doubt. 
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definition. According to Sextus, (P. U. I, 235), Milo maintained that things 
were ýxati°ýa vvt in relation to the Stoic criterion, but xwra', %Tjpr& in 
their real nature. 
I Wo may infer from Antiochus' argument in this passage 
that Philo *elieved that the Now Academic, in spite of his rejection of the 
Stoic cataleptic impression, could justifiably make claims of perception or 
knowledgo, though these would fall short of absolute certainty. 
2 According 
to Antiochus, such claims are meaningless, since nothing that could concoiv- 
ably be false can be regarded r. s known. Lucullua' question conveys the 
dilemma: 'qui enim potost quidquam comprehendi ut plane eontidaa perceptum 
id cognitum aase' - the Stoic demand for certainty - 'quod eat tale quale 
uel falsum esse possit? ' - the proviso attached by Milo to any perceptual 
experience. For Philo, acceptance of the Stoic criterion would moan that, 
since nothing corresponds to it, nothing can be knc: m; for Antiochua, 
rejection of it means that th"ro in no way of distinguishing known from 
unknown, so that, again, nothing can be known. Fhilo'a rejection of the 
cataleptic impression thus automatically vancols his claim that perception/ 
knowledge is possible ('ox quo officitur nihil posse eomprohendi'). In 
this conclusion the Philonian sonne of perception/knowledge is being equated 
with the Stoic, for this is the only sense that Antioehua will allow. 
3 
On the basis of this statement Riat (Stoic 1hileýcýýhý", p. 150) makes the 
extraordinary suggestion that 'perhaps ibilo wanted to argue that "present- 
ations" give only superficial understanding but that some kind of Aristot- 
olian essence can be v_rasped by other means', and further, that 'T'hilo was 
worried about "things-in-themselves". In 'The I? oraolitoanism of Aonoaidocus' 
I'hoenix 24 (1970) p. 313, he adds that Fhilo perhaps thought of'inforunce as 
a means of understanding '"r& IcpdryrtaTa . It is obvious, however, that the 
passage in Sextus merely means that Milo thought wo could have true experi- 
ences of the external world but not by means of the Stoic cataleptic impraso- 
ion, so that we cannot make absolute Ynowled5o claims. It Is very unlikely 
that Philo's main innovation was the introduction of the word xa"taarj, vt6v 
into the New Academic vocabulary and it-, tau this that had angered Antiochus (as suggested by Hirzel, Untrnuch. III9 p. 198; see i3rochard, p. 193 n. 2). 
2Cf. 111-1139 146; Fin. V, 76. Though the argument is about perception, 
ultimately it concerns knowledge 
('scientia'). 
3Sinco he believed that there Is only one standard typo of knowlodgr, 
Antiochu3 naturally saw Ibilo'a now position as a futile attempt to move 
away from coepticicm and into the dogmatic camp. For T'hilo's uneasiness as 
a sceptic, Rf-o 34 and 111 (Introduction p. 34 n. 2); Numoniun tr. 20,6 ff. 
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Antiochus' argument that, without tho Stoic criterion, knowledge oven 
in the F'hilonian sense in impossible, points the way back to the more 
orthodox position according to which the poncibility of knowledCe stands or 
falls with the catalepýic imprecsion. 
l Týe New Academic does not question 
the existcnce of external objects or even that there are true impressions 
of them, but he denies that a true impression can infallibly be distinguicned 
from a false one. He. e the battle was fought over narrow ground and trough 
the point at issue was the possibility or knowledge in gone:. il, !t was 
knowledge of the external world that was mostly the focus of attention, and, 
due to the simplistic interpretation of perception in terms of 'appearance' 
impressed upon the mini, it was the ccrso of eight that provided most of the 
examples. Cicero's choice of 'uisum' an the Latin equivalent of cctvTactc 
reflects this bias, for though 'uideor' like putvc o0a6 can have the core 
general meaning of 'seem', it is not ordinarily used of any sense-experienco 
other than sight. Cicero obviously intends 'uisum' (and sometimes 'uideri' 
and 'uicio') to be understood in a general way, as applying to any some- 
experience. 
2 
ý1_ defence of the cornitive faculties and t+roeftnn 
19-21 (p. 36,24 - P. 30,6) ordiamur igitur .... diaputari rotnot. 
Summary. (19) To start with the eennea, their judgements are clear and 
ce_tain. Could one ask for anything better than sound and uninpairad 
senses if one were given a choice by coma god? I omit the bent oar and 
the pigeon's neck, for I do not hold that evorythi , is as it appears to 
be, leaving this and many other matters to Epicurus. But in any opinion 
IAntiochun 
here endorses the usual Stoic view that the cataleptic lipreacion 
is the criterion of truth, the definition of which he traces back to Zeno. 
The argur. cnt of Fohlen: that Zeno made xavrO'ny tc the criterion (bated on 
Ic. I, 42 and Sextun A. 14. VII, 152) and that Chrysippus' substitution of the 
cataleptic impression was a significant chance, in refuted by Sandbach, 
Yroblers 
_ p. 
15 ff.; cf. Rist Stole Tiln: ecýrh ,r, p. 130-147. Some Stoics spoke of other criteria (D. L. VII, 54 , while those whom :e tua calla the 'youncor' Stoics (A-M-V'II, 253 ff. ) added the proviso that tho cataleptic improcrion 
is the criterion only when thorn is no obetaclo (Introduction pp. 24-25). 
But as this passage chows, though diffore't nupecto of the cognitive process 
may have been etrcc oe from time to time, the bnsiie criterion always remained 
the cataleptic imprenc4on. 
2U. 
1r. 33 'ut enim illa oculia modo ngnoncuntur, via roliqua uiaia... '; 
_. I, 4O'quae uina runt ct quani nncccpta acnolbua'. 
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the senses report most truly, provided that they are normal, healthy and 
unobstructed, which is why wo often make adjustments of l1Sht, position 
and distance in order to obtain a reliable view. Similarly with sound, 
small and taste, so that no one could wish for a more accurate jud,; emont 
than that of cact+ sense in its own fiý: td. (20) The power of the senses 
is especially evident when increased by artistic training. 1'aintoro coo 
many thing in a picture which wo do not, and musical exports can recoa,. - 
nice the Antioro and Androrranhe at the first note of the"Pluto-pla; "nr. 
Thbre is no need ... elaborate on taste and small, which have a certain 
power of discrimination, though a loan perfect one. What of touch, or 
of that so-called 'inner touch' which registers pleasure and pain, and 
is the polo criterion of truth for the Cyrenaics, because it is u datum 
of dense? 
1 Would not anyone who dvniee a difference between pleanuro and 
pain be most evidently mad? (21) But what wo speak of an perceived by 
the senses has a certain character, to which correspond those judgcmentc 
which refer to the sensible character though wo grasp them not by the 
senses but by tha mind, for instance 'that is white, this is sweet, that 
is tuneful, this scented, this rough'. Next comes 'that is a home, 
that is a dog'. After this follows a chain of wider tci-ma, among them 
those which comprise, an it were, the complete Grasp of the thing: 'if 
it is a man, it is a mortal rational animal. ' Prom this class, concepts 
are derived, which are indispensable to all our intellectual activities. 
Although Lucullun concluded the pro. iouo section with the avowed 
intention of establishing Zeno's definition of the cataleptic impression, 
he begins here with a general eulogy of the senses into which the quoction 
of the definition enters only indirectly. The possibility of sense-deception 
is mentioned, probably because the subject had been raised by Cicero in the 
Cat]us, 2 and also because Lucullus seems intent on making it clear right at 
the beginning that Antioehus aided with the Stoics and differed from the 
1'quia 
acntiatur'. The reading 'cui adeentiantur' has no MZ3 authority. 
? advig's 'cui adoentiatur'(paceive) has the support of the Balliol M. 3 and 
makes acceptable censo, but the graaur, ar seems unusual for Cicero. The past 
participle 'adsensa' is used na a pacaivo in 99, and the active 'adaontio' 
cccura a few times in the letters. 
2Cf. 
79, when) Cicero complains th.; t Lucullus hsa ende a very inadequate 
reply to what he himself had said on the previoun duy. Introduction p. GO ft. 
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Epicureans in allowing that not all. tho data provided by the gensec are 
re)iable. His position, therefore} in not only nearer to connon sense but 
alco (; u=c agai: n;. t the risk of deception in a way that the Epicurean doca 
not (cf. 45). The main argument is an emphatic acs -rtion that, Eivcn healthy 
sense-organs and favourable perceptual conditions, the sensco do enable us 
to have true pc:: ception of external reality. Perception is seen as irvolvinZ 
both the ser_es and ti-e- mind and the ascending complexity of the procesaI iri 
reflected in the order of treatment: firnt, the power of the cont, oa 
(. 9-20), 
and secondly, the mind's involvement in perception end knowlcd 
(21). The 
first of these topics divides again into twos 
(a) the potential of the . iortaal 
sensory organs and faculties, and (b) the definito perceptual advante. gc3 
that result from artistic training. lucullus concludes this ccotion with a 
mention of the Cyrenaic criterion, the fooling of pleascro and pain, which 
provides hin with e transition from pure sensation to reco&nition of the 
character of objects, with which he begins the next section 
(21). 
In saying that he will begin with the senses, Lucullus coo= to be, 
anticipating the distinction between the Benson and the mind which is taado 
in 21.2 It becomes clear, however, an the argument develops, that the }ýowcr 
of the senses ('quanta uis sit in sensibus') is not illustrated in any and 
every sensory experience nor in what might be called 'bares sonsaticn, but 
in complex perceptual situations to which the mind 
has contributed by chock- 
ing the conditions under which the senses operate or by training them to 
greater exactness. it alto becomoc clear that the judgements 
('iudieia') 
of the nenses, w)-ich were ceid at the outset to be clear and certain, are 
On whether perception can properly be rrCarded an a proceca, sco G. Pyle, 
hilf, p. 103 ff. 
2The distinction is not, of course. intended to be an abaoluto one, sinco 
the mind is involved in sensation at all lcvolc, and is dcacribcd in 30 as 
'fonts ccnyuum' and 'ipca consuu'. Plato and Aristotle aloo treated the 
sense: e an a critical faculty, though tho distinction bctwoen vctic and 
o LautG ib sharper. Havlyn, i n-i ttien nn, ' 11rrcrrtion, pp. 11»12. 
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not simply about the content or character of a given sensation, but about the 
nature of real objects. This is shown by the admission that cence-doccption 
is possible (as In the case of the bent oar or the pigeon's ncek), 
1 
which 
makes it necessary tc restrict what was r.. first taken to be a feature of all 
sense-experience to what is now spoken of an the 'roliablo' view ('dum aspcet- 
us ipso fidem faciat sui iudicii'). 
2 In the cane of artistic training it is 
especially evident th;. L the increased efficiency of th' senses is not simply 
a matter of discrimiz, ation but of recognition, an Jn the caca of the nr9ioian 
who recognises the first notes of the Antiopa or Andromicho. 
3 To a lessor 
extent smell and taste involve both these factors, which seem to be combined 
in what Lucullus calk 'intelligentia'. 
4 Only the fooling of pleanuro and 
pain is treated as a bare sensation ('quia ucntiatur'), so that in terms of 
certainty Iricullus has hero returned to hin original position, that in conso- 
experience as such is the highest degree of truth. 
1For the bent oar, cf. Luor. IV, 440-2; Son. LA. I, 3,9; Soxt. P. H. I, 119; A, ºl. VII, 
244 and 414; Tort. Pe An. 17. On the pigeon's neck, of. Pin. 1II, 18; Lucr. Il, 
801-5; Sen.. a. I, 5,6 and 7,2; D. L. IX, 86; Sext. P. H. I, 120. 
2For the need to ensure the right perceptual conditional of. Sextun A. M. VII, 
258; Introduction p. 24-5. Lucullus may by trying to refute the view that, 
cince impressions of the came thing vary according to place, distance, etc., 
none of them can bo regarded an true (P. 11. I, 121; cf. A. MM. VII, 412 ff. 
). On the 
difficulty of establishing what is normal or standard in perception, see 
H. N. Price, Perception, p. 31 ff., p. 209 ff. 
3For tii. 3 view that the artist aces more in a work of art than the laym.. n, or. 
Off-I, 145; D. L. VII, 51 (end); Sextus A. 11. VII, 55 ff.; Pliny F,, i°s. I, 10,4. The 
Mti. orc and And. romachq are playa by f'acuviua and F]titua re3pectively. It 
would appear from wnat Cicero says that tragedies produced it, Rome were 
preceded by a regular musical 'overture' on the part of the 'l utt-player. 
Bearo, The Roman Stare, pp. 168-9, interprets this passage as a reference act 
to the playa themselves but to the appearance of thu leading characters. P. 
also suggests that Cicero might be referring to an early form of pantomime. 
4In 1I. D. II, 146 Cicero mentions arts auch as perfumery and cookery which have 
been invented to appeal to these senses. In allowing that their 'inti. llig- 
entia' is defective an compared with sight and hearing, Lucu1ltw is again 
adopting; a standpoint other than that of more sensation. In contrast to the 
Epicurean view that all the senses are equally valid 
(D. L. X, 32), 1ntiochua 
may have followed Aristotle in stressing the importance of sight and hearing 
for our understanding of the world around un (Arint " Do i; ennis 437 a 4). 
Aristotle regarded smell no the weakest or the rjnnos ib. 441 a 1); the sense 
of taste he rated more highly, as a form of touch 
(cf. Pliny t, '. ft. X, l91). 
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Tho concept of the tiudioia ocnauum' in in fat highly arabiguoun. In 
PJn. 1964, as used by the I? picurean speaker, the phraao weans little mcro than 
'our censaticnc'. In N. P. II, 145-6, where Cicero at-, tin uses the example of 
the arts, this time to illustrate the superiority of human over animal cense- 
organs, the 'judgement' of the eyes, earn and other conses becomes a capacity 
to distinguish colours, shapes, sounds, smell; thsteo in great variety and 
detail;. aesthetic and even moral qualitiek are inolt od, 
l but in the context 
the queotior of the relation of uuon judgements to external reality does not 
arise. In the present context, on the other hand, the validity of sense 
judgements dr, ends entirely on their reference to external, objects, anal if 
they are 'clear and certain', they must be so in the sense of CivinE, reliable 
It about them. 2 It should be pointed out, however, that in ordinary 
experience a distinction between those two aspects of senco-perception doss 
not often arise; it is therefore easy for Lucullus to pass from one to the 
other and, by hedging it round with some obvious imitations, to transfer the 
subjective certainty of sensation to our awareness of external objects. Once 
the difference has been brought out, however, the criterion of clarity and 
certainty can no lonCer be taken for granted. Cicero is therefore right in 
criticising Lucullua in 79 for having merely employed a 'ooauaunia locust, 
3 
without having given adequate trcatment to tho problcrna involved. 
1Cf. Orat. 164, where 'iudioium auriun' In applied to rattern of eu; hony. 
2Ct. 
the corresponding passage in 1'. D. II, 140, whore the ccnaea are called 
'interpreter ae nuntii rerum'. i;: e example of painting was used by the later 
sceptics from the opposite point of view, to illuatrato the gap between canoe- 
Impression and reality (Boxtun ?. fl N, 75; A"11. VII, 35C; D. L. IX, 105; of. J. P. 
Dumont, be ccipticieme et le rh 0n', p. 125 n. 100). 
3Lucullus' 
argu.. nent that, given healthy and unimpeded nencee, their efficiency 
could not be improved, hau corething in common with the teleological argument (developed in 30-31) that the ccnoco and the mind have been adapted by nature 
or providence to the ecquloition of kncwledgn (cf. N. L). II, 145 ff,; }pietotus 
I, 6,3 ff. ). Like the Stoics, Antiochta believed that a sound condition of the 
cethoe3 was n-. ccpoary for this purpooo, though he differed from them in holding 
that the ccundnccu and u. ~iimpedcd activity of the cortuoc were part of the 
cvn. mtL, a bonuni (Lin. V, 3G-31). t? no argument from the arte, re nrded an an 
extension of he senoos (' uasi eencun alteroc', 311 can be fitted into the 
earae talcoio, -,.: a1 pattern 
? 
cf. TT. D. 1I, 145-6). In CO Cicero also criticieeu 
Lucullua' use of the ccnvontionai 'i'. oux' (cf. 7vrc. ]I, ti7; Vor.:: at. 1,1,15 fr. ). 
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Lucullus maintains that since ho does not, liko Lpicurun, hold that all 
appearancos are true, he has ro need to explain the bent oar or the pigeon's 
neck. These are the caucs which Antiochuc and the Stoics would consider to 
be examples of unreliable sensation. In his reply 4n 79"Cicero pointe out 
that the Epicurean view is in fact the more cenuistents the veracity of the 
senses can be hold only on the assumption that all sensations are true, 
since if sor.: are fal-. r, iheLo is no reason why any should be trusted. Both 
Fricurus and the Stoics were trying-to overcome a difficulty inherent in any 
representational theory of perception, that of 'bridging the gap' between 
impression and external object. Either the data of sense posses in pens 
cases a guarantee of truth which the mind infallibly rocognicca (the Stoic 
solution), or it is the task of the mind to judge the data correctly (the 
Epicurean solution). Epicurus reasoned, perhaps rightly, that since the data 
of sense are the basic indispensable elemento'of knowledge and adzit of no "} 
other verification (P. L. IX, 31-32), all impressions should be regarded as 
equally val'v. This naturally led to the difficulties instanced by Luoullue. 
l 
Cicero argues (79 ff. ) that auch cases cannot be merely brushed aside, even 
by the Stoic. 
What Epicurus meant by tho 'truth' of sensation has been much debated. 
It ceems unlikely that he meant no more than that there is a real physical 
contact between the scaße-organ and the external object through the c16WIov 
(as interpreted by Riet, picu_, pp. 19 fr. ). On the other hand, Bailey's 
view that 'the truth of a sensation can mean nothing else than its corre- 
spondence with the-object which it reproeents'2 oeema equally unlikely, if 
by object in meant the external object or 'thin; -in-itself' from which the 
etÖwa a are emitted. At the same time, it does not seem possible that 
1Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomicta, p. 253-71 Lamlyn, ^onIfttion And 1`erccrtion, r-34- 
2 Crock Ato: nintr, p. 256. Cf. p. 257: 'Fcr b; " the truth of a cor: ation F'picurun 
meant and could only nv an ito truth to thu external object which it repro.. 
dented. ' 
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Epicurus merely had in mind what in modern terms would be called the indub- 
itability of sense-data. If that were the caae, Timagoras would not have 
needed to deny that he saw two flames and to attribute the error to opinion. 
(60). 1 There seems little doubt that for Epicurus sensation is true because, 
being irrational, it exactly reproduces its object, adding or subtracting 
nothing, 
2 but whether this object can properly be identified with the external 
object (or srme property belonging to the external object) is by no means 
clear. In Sextus' account (A. M. VII, 207 tf. ) there ii a certain ambiguity 
betwcen the external object and the ct6waa, which suggests that in come 
cases the eL8wj a themselves might have been thought of as the object of 
sense. 
3 Alternatively Epicurus may have included modifications of light, 
position and distance in his notion of the external object. 
4 Sextun rightly 
points out in his account that it is opinion, not sense, that identifies the 
round and the square tower (A`M. VII, 209), though if, as he cuggosts, it is an 
error to suppoco that the object close at hand is the came as the object aeon 
at a distance, we are left with no juatifiablo ground to prefer the opinion 
that the tower is square. 
1One 
must, of course, allow for the possibility that Timagoras' denial does 
not accurately reflect the position of Epicurus. Part of Epicurus' meaning 
must have been that we cannot. doubt the truth or actuality of the content of 
any single sensation (D. L. X, 31; Luer. IV, 478 ff. ). Cf. Ar5atotle's view that 
error cannot arise with regard to the special senaitlea (An. 418a 11 ff. ). 
The Stoics too may have hold that all sensations are 'true' in the sense that 
one is actually experiencing them (Gee Rict, Stoic Mailoaophy, PP-135-130- 
Cf. Lucullus' remark in 19t 'ut nemo sit nostrwd qui in censibus sui cu4uaque 
generis iudiciura requirat acriua. ' 
2 D. L. X, 31; Sextun A, M. VII, 203 ff.; VIII, 9" flan1 , Sonnntion. and Peraoptton, 
P"33, add3 V: a Important point that Epicurus thought of sensations as 
incorrigible because they werd canned. This is, of course, quite different 
from believing that the character of the external object is exactly reproduced 
in the impression. 
3Cf. Plut. Ad"". Col. 11211 ff. (Us. 252). The objeotior that error might arise 
through the ;: toration of the c tÖw), a in transit would thus be irrelevant, 
since sensation would still be true in the cerise defined; any lack of conform- 
ity between 9 avTaCta and external object would affect opinion only. 
41n 
F_. %-_P th. 91 Epicurus distinguishes the size of the sun and moon'rolatively 
to us' and 'in itself'; the latter is, of course, a matter of opinion cly, 
though confirmed by sense evidence of torroatrial fires aeon at a distaa+co. 
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Lucullus mentions the Cyrenaic criterion, on the other han3, in support 
of his ou-n viow that clear and valid distinctions can bo dlncorned through 
the censer. The Cyrenaicc held that only the i=ediatc ccruoty exporienco 
(xÄ o¬ ) can bo known and that things in thcca3elvco ar-3 unknovablo. 
I :t may 
cecui strange for Lucullus to appeal to a philosophy that hau fcaturea in 
common with scepticism, 
2 but the reason is not far to nbuk; the feolins of 
pleacuro and rain is the most obvious example of a :.. nnotion that in basically 
tactu,. i and : -slid indapendently of the rccognltion of objects. 
' The subjeot- 
ive certainty'of the Cyrenaic criterion provides him with a starting-point, 
from which in the next section (21) he will build up the complex procene of 
perception as a combination of cencation and recognition. 
Section 21 begins with a contrast between these two factors in 
perception. A correspundcnce is stated botwoon 'hace quad consibus percipi 
4ieimus' and 'ea quas non sensibus ipaic porcipi dicuntur sed quodam a. odo 
ceneibus', for instan: o, 'illud oat album, hoo dulae', etc. In view or what 
has immediately preceded, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Lvoullus has 
in mind a distinction between the actual sensation of white, swept, etc., 
and our awareness of these characters as belonging to an object, which is 
expressed in a judgement or statemcnt. This is especially plausirlo in view 
of Sextus A. M. VII, 344-5, which has a ole&r affinity with the present posoa e 
(Reid postulatcs a com:., on source), 
4 though the argument is diffcrcntt 'For 
S^xtus A. M. VII, 191 ff. 
2Cf. 76; Sextua P. H.!, 215; Cuthric, III, p. 245 ff. 
3We 
cannot be mistaken about our own cencationo (Cextue A. M. VII, 199). In 
the came way come modern philosophers have arrued that etatemento which 
confine themselves to describing personal states of mind (o. r. I havo a 
headache) a: e immune from doubt; Ayar, The )I-ob3em of Krowled e, p. 53. 
4p. 199 n. 13. Dillon, p. 66. In translating the Ciceroni. an ptccr , Dillon 
acoidentally omits the stage 'that in white, this is sweet', etc., and ao 
losoc the parallel with Sctxtua. In tranalatinC Sextun, hin rondorinr; of eta 
zo . oVTo ^: pü, Yµa ac ': uch an object', ':. n object of that kind', doca not 
quite convoy the cenco of tho Crook, which is of an object or 'thing; ' 
bearing a distinct character as opposed to the indiotinet and incohrttt 
sensation. w 
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the faculty which is going to grasp thu truth in real objeota must not only 
be moved in a whitoich or Sweetish way but m'at also be brought to have an 
impre-ccion of the charactcriccd thing 'this is white' and 'this is owoet', 
and similarly with th" rect. For it is no longer the tack of sense to lay 
hold on the characterised thing; for sense can only grasp colour and flavour 
and sourdt but 'this is white' or 'thin is sweet', being neither colour n.:: 
flavour, cannot be presented to sense. ' 
Sextus is arguing that the sennen, being irraticnal, cannot interpret 
the impressions they receive and so cannot discover the truth about real 
objects (he will of coursa argue later tr-t the mind is equally incapable of 
doing co). Lucullus' point is a different one, that in any act of perception 
the character which is 'given' in soncation muRt be rocognisod by the mind 
and assigned to a particular object. Theco two factors are complementary 
but inseparable, and both have already been included in what has loosely been 
referred to as the 'iudicium' of the sencoo. But here, in order to build up 
a picture of the complex process of perception, Lucullun treats ncnsatifin 
and judgement as two successive stages, the firot being the experience of 
the sensible character, the second the arzigning of the character to the 
object. These roughly co'rrccpond to the two stages in Sextun, though they 
are descrit-ed differently, land Sextus regards the second as being outside 
the coolie of the senses altogether. 
2 
lk'here 
Sextus, in order to strocs the more receptivity of eonoation, opeakc 
of a whiteich or sweetish movement of the sencen, Cicero uaoa 'porcipi', as 
jr a minimal act of judgement were alrerdy included in the ctnsation. As 
Hamlyn points out (renaation and Pcrcepticn, p. 191). it is in practice 
extremely difficult to oeparate these two stages or aspects of the perceptual 
process and ordinary 1anruare is not dosigncd to make the distinction. Cr. 
Watsen, Stcic Theory of F: now]Fdco, p. 35: 'weir to look at a thing and say 
simply 'white' is a contracted statement of "Ihm in white". ' 
2The 
arfunonta in both Sextun and Cicero thus rest on the Antiochoan view 
that sensations an such urn not porceptionc (A. j. VII, 201) and the Stoic 
ascumption that truth and falsity apply to judgrsontu and not to dicconnocted 
and unjudgod nensatioi. e A. M. VII1,10). 
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Tho description 'haco quad ncnsibuo poroipi dioinu3' would normally be 
taken to apply to 'sensible' objects or qualitiea a3 auch rather than to a 
stage in our awareness of them. Hore it socros to refer to the primary 
information given in sensation before the addition or mental judgement. The 
next description, 'ea quas non scncibus ipsie peroipi dicuntur aed quodara 
modo sensibus', 
Icovers 
the relating of this primary information to an object 
in the form of a statement or judgement. Such judgements are 'not precisely 
sensible but in a way sensible' because, though grasped by the mind, they 
have reference to sensible qualities or objects. Like Sextun, Cicero gives 
examples in which a common term is predicated of a demonatrativo. The first 
group consists of statements which correspond to the simple data of each 
sense ('that is white, this sweet', etc. ). The second group 
('that is it 
horse, that is a dog') contains terms which are definable, but in similarly 
related to the perceptual situation. The third group, however, consisting 
of definitions, replaces the direct reference to the perceived object by the 
conditional, 'if it is :3 man, it in a mortal rational a+nimal$. 
2 This is the 
normal Stoic formulation of the universal atatement. 
3 
The Greek equivalent would be 06X &LOChoct xm'rQ)7j%'r& hWOT v atoe1locL. 
Rackham (followed by Dillon, p. 66) is wrong in translating 'quodam iodo 
aensibus' as 'by a sort of cenzation'. For tho form of expression, cr. 
D. L. VII, 61: 'Evv6-nµa U. icrt glzvtaoµa 6iavota4, otrc Ott 8v oü-tc %cot6v, woavct H' öv xat waavet AoL6v, otov ytvc rc 4cvatiUxwµa Nxov xat 
µßl 7ap6v roC. 
2T'nis 
third Group is spoken of as 'interlinkod' 
('aeries, esaiora nectei. ') 
possibly because the wider terms used aru common to more than one definition. 
With the definition, Lucullus liaa passed beyond the scor; of the introductory 
sentence 'atqui qualia cunt .... tatia aee':; itur ... 
' 21 . 
3So:: 
tus A. 14. XI, 6; Watson, Stoa,,, io Th? nry of KnowledE! o, P. 52; Lone, Tlh. p. 141. 
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Although a man or a horuo may be recogniood from visual appcturanco, 
the complete grasp of hin nature ('qusai crxplotw rerum oomprohentionow') can 
be obtained only through the definition. 
' It in therefore from thin clans 
('quo ox genera') that 'notitiao rerun' are said to mice. These are, like 
Benno-improaoions, imprinted on the mind ('nobis imprir'nntur') and there it; 
a continuous progression from censo to the forr. ation of auch concepts. 
Lculluc does not, in thin pascago, 
2 distinguish betw9en the different kinds 
of conocpt, and Reid may be right that 'quo ex gonoro' refers not to the 
third group of statemonto only but to the whole par'age (x. 200 n. 6). It in, 
however, implied that 'rotitiao' are the culmination of the perceptual 
procecn, and that they go further than eoneo-impreoaiono in revealing the 
nature of the object. 
3 The mention of definition ouggooto the oolentifio 
concept (e"vvota )' which 13 developed through deliberate mental attention, 
rather than the nptS? ý-n*tr. which in acquired naturally, but both would be 
equally nocancary for the purposes r4cntioned$ undcr'tandirg, inquiry and , 
discusaion ('wino quibus nec intolleei quidquzm non quaori dieputoriuo 
potent'). 
4 
The two types irre not always Ci3 tinEuinhed and both can be called 
ývvacýc. 
1In N. n.? I, 147 the Stoic cpoukor refers to the ability to roanon from 
premir.. ccc and frame definitiono as the highest form of knowledge. Cf. -Aa-I, 32. 
2 Cf. thou fiillsr occour.,; in 30. 
3Aet. mn! .: '., 11,3 
(VV II, 03); Zandbach, Probleme pp. 22-37. It is 
poricihle that, Liicullun inform 'notitiau' from tha third! , up of atatancnt8 
not beaaucc they are definitions but becauio, in his achemo, theca mono 
can be noparated fron the particult e pomoptual ai '. Lation. To say 'that 
lo a horajo' imflico that I am looking at a homo= to say that a. horio is a 
four-log, rrd i, =atior.;. l anirutl dooo not. Wo neou to bo : ble to think and 
talk about horocn -. without a. horns boing actually prortont. Cf. D. L. VII, 6 
(quoted or the previous p . go, n. 
l). 
4For thin argument, Roo 27, p. 147 below. 
0 
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Some con_eouencec of Acnlemic ncepticicm 
22 (p. 38, G-31) quod si eacent falaao notitiae ... iu1ta percep'rit? ., 
Summa. But if concepts were false (for 'notitia' uecced., to. be your 
word for e vvoi. a) - if these were false or derived from impressions 
indistinguishable from false ones, how could we use thc: z or see whit was 
coherent or contradictory? Memo-. y would be impossible, yet notonly 
philosophy but daily life and the arts depend upon it. For no one. 
remembers what is false or what he has not firmly grasped with the mind. 
Every art consists of not ore or two but c: any acts of perception. Take 
I this away 
Iand 
you erase the distinct on between the artist and thu 
ordinary person. For it is not by chance that we give this nase to the 
man who has a firm hold on what he has perceived and L -rasped. Arts nay 
be theoretical or practical. How can the Boma trician contemplate in 
his mind objects that are either unreal or of dubious reality, or the 
" lyre-player complete his tunes and verses 
(without perception of the 
real)? The same will apply to the other practi'al arts= for how can 
anything be made by art, if the artist's skill is not based on 
perception? 
4 
Tho idea that cor. cept3 cannot be false may striko us an an c:: aggeiation, 
since it assunes that all concepts are derived from , he cataleptic impresaaicit 
by reliable mental processes. The Stoics seem to have made this assumption, 
at least for all concepts acquired naturally, and prosuxabiy for all or most 
of those developed by the arts and sciences. In 38 Lucullua states thrt 
memory, 'notitiao rerum' and the arts would all be impossible without assent, 
and in 1942 Varro 8ives it as Zeno's view that 'comprehennio facts senvib. w ' 
is nature's foundation for all knowledge: 'undo postva noticnai rerun in 
animip impr.. urstur, e tuibua non principia colum sod latiores quaedan ail 
raticnem inuenicndr^, uiao aperirentur', It in thus hard to see how error 
could arico, except by assent to a false irproscion, or at a later stage by 
a false inference, either of which the ordinary person would t capable, of, 
though not of courzo the wise n. 
0 
i'quam' 
must, as? Madvig oww eat , refer to 'rerception. m' under:. tood from 
'lie 'p6rceptionituc'. Reid is wrcnr, in thirking{ that antRocdent to 'quay' 
1 'cri' (p. 20;. n. 1ß). It is urnoccüaary to emend to 'quas' ('at: ccr). 
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. Lucullue i. oca not, in this eection, argue positively that valid. 
concepts mutt bo. baued on the cataleptic impression. Instead, he aeka. us 
to imagine the concequencos, if concepts were either false or based on censo- 
imprassion3 such as the Academic oceptico suppoood: then to be, possibly true 
but indistinguishable from. faloo. 1 (The acoptical position that true 
impreauiona are Indistinguishable from false iss from this point of view, 
nc improvement on supposing them all to be tales). The argument takes the 
form of a rc, r! uctio rtd nbsurdum, exproscod in a eorio3 of thotorical 
" questions. 
Luculluo does not explain what he means by a 'false' concept. On the 
analogy of sen3e-improssioni, a concept night be said to be false when it 
fails to correspond to any existing object, e. g. the concept of a black 
horao would ba faleo if there were no black horaos. Such a view is Qbvioualy 
too aiinpie, since concopta can legitimately bo formed in ways other than by 
direct acquaintance with the corresponding objoot3.2 A concept might, 
however, be fulco if Ito couapononta wore put together in a way that contra- 
dioted nature, e. g. that of a Centaur or Chimaera. Others might invol: o 
falco inforonce,, like that of a stationary oarth. Dut Lucullu3 is. not asking 
us to i»cvino what would be tho conaoquar: es if, in our proaant concopttml 
framework, thorn were to be found a numbar of 'falao' concepts. 
3 no is 
asking us to picture that conceptual framework itocl: as falao, in the sense 
1Tt"a Acadoric ar ont from indiotinguiohability ( (ixapaaaarta 
), 
. ccordi: ig to which, for every true improsaion, a 
fn1Re ono inipiit be found 
oxaotly like it and indistinguishable in every roapoct ( xo rä -ý; wTa 
k(LO L) ? . x%ov , Sextun A. M. VII, 252), will 
be discussed later iu connect- 
ion. with 40-41. 
2D. L. VII, 52-53 (SVP II, 87); Soxtus t. VIII, 56-60 (_^vi^ II, 69)s ýº_it. Ix, 393-5i 
Xi, 250-510 1111 those modes are, however, t. ltirAtnly based on direct obasa- 
oxporicnc: e. 
3Tho Latin 'quoll ui caoent 1'alolo notitino' 
(22) should be taken as 'but 
if con' pt: i were faloo', not 'but if thnro were fn1 e concepts'. This io 
shown 1y te rope-tLtion of t h, prottsic, 'if than thine wero rinse ... '. 
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of not relating et all. or not relating with certainty, to the world around 
U3. Such coticepto would lack tha other test of truth, that of coherence; 
they would be usoleso for thought and communication, and abovo all for 
inference ('quo modo gutem quid cuiquo rel consentanoum ensot, quid 
repugnaret, uideremu3? '). No place would be left for memory, since there 
in no memory 3f what is Falco, or not held with a firm grasp in tho mind. 
Thug philosophy, the arts, and even the conduct of everyday life would be 
rendered impusoibl©. 
For Lucullus, coherenco is not something impoced by the mind on the 
indeterminate data of exporicnco; it doponds on tho mind'o ability to Lyraop 
the nature of things as it really la,, an orderly and intoroonneoted cystem. 
If r: e were in faot unable to distinmiieh true from falte irapronsiono, wo 
should have no idea of what wan poaoiblo or imponaibla in nature, we could 
not porform tho most ordinary aotions, 
l 
and wo should be unable to think or 
con-municate with one anothor. 
2 The phrase 'quid ouiquo roi connentanoux 
csnot. quid rcpunaret, ' hau thus a wide rango of applications, covering 
1ogir, 1i1 connection, physical compatibility, the consistency of art and moral 
conduct. In Ac. I, l9 to judge 'quid connentienn, quid ropugnans oasot' In 
ono of the tauku of dialectic. 
3 In Fin-M4 the virtuous life is compared 
to a practical art lik_ dancing cn the ground that its rode of action in 
'cenuoniens connentaneur ua'. 
a When thin inner cozwin toney Is interpreted as 
'con. enicnte-, raturae uiucro', itn depend'nce on the certainty of perception 
becomes even more apparent (23-25)#5 
1! Tence Epirtatan arr , uou that the actions of 
daily life are in thorn etveu a 
rcfutrition of tno ucepticc; (Dirq. I, 27,1f f.; of. 1lut. Ac: v. Co1.1122Efts 
p. 104 r.. 4 of thin Comr.. ntary y. Cf. Soxtur L.. . Xi, 162 2Ct. the position of Cratylua, who amphaaaard hin belief in the Horaclitoan 
flux by refua tnt; to speak and mcroly waving his finger (Arint.; "ot. 1010a 10 fr. ). 
3, 
Dnrined by i'o3idoniua on 'tho. ncicnoo of the true and the Enloe And what ie 
roithCr'(D. L. V11,62). For Stn importance to the wino m, ýan, coo D. L. Vt1,47. 
4cr. 
, c: hr, ^lppurr' t'or; ýu11, xa. ý' 41mrLr(av ýrwv Tb1CL ou; 0a. v6vtwv r. ' v(D. 1.. V1I, 
tai) i banal ittrt by ri. nctro 'uiunr, ) (WhIb+onrem rcientimi ratan, rerw, t quie 
ouonirant' {lýin. iV, 1Z). 
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The argur:: nt abuut memory seems intended to apply to cenze-impreaniona 
as well as c, oncept©. 
1 Lucullus' claim that there is noloemory of what is 
false, or not graspcd firmly by the mind, is highly ac, biguouc. Admittedly 
we do not normally speak of 'remembering' what is not the cane, e. g. wo 
should not cay that wo remembered that it rained yesterday, unless it did 
rain yesterday, although we might of courou be mistaken in our belief that 
we remembered. Thus we think of memory as a kind of knowledge ('quid quieque 
meminit quoa non animo comprehendit et tenot? '). But in another sense it in 
quite possible to remember what is false, as Cicero points out in his reply 
(106); Siro, for instance, renembora all tho doctrines of Epieurus. 
2 It is 
also possible to remember what you believe to be false, as Polyaonua 
remembered his geometry after he became ah Epicurean. Thus the truth or 
certainty of sende-improasiona could not be proved from the fact that wo 
remember them, and the 'grasp' of memory need not extend beyond sensation to 
its object. Cicero is right to point this out ('quid? mominione uioa nisi 
comprensa non pons wnun? ' 106), but Lucullus is also right that if impressions 
are false or dubious, memory in at least one of its noaningo becomes impoas- 
ible, for wo should never be justified in saying that wo 'remembered' events 
or objects, or that co and no is the cast. And if Canso-improssioni are 
doubtful, why nhould vn assume that the memory imago is more reliable? Thus 
wo could not oven be Caro that we are correctly rcm'mboring cur own oon3o' 
improsaiona. 
The whole Rif-umcnt should be looked at arainat the background cot the R oic 
view (which ! ntiochun probably accepted) that the mind at birth is a 'tabula 
rasa' and all experience in built tip fron the data of nenne. In this process, 
: rcmozy in aancntial (Aot. Plcc. TV, ll, 1 f:. /SVe I1, ß3). 
2Thi. 
z simply meann th"t% wo can rencmbor ckto onto or judgemonto, irracpcotivo 
of their bcinj. º true or falca. It remains crie that we cannot remeraher what -it falaoly ctatod or judi, od. Wo cannot, for in: itaneo, rencober that the gun in 
thh :a io 'a izo ca 'it cppzurd, thnurlh we can remember that fpicuris caid that 
this w33 no. Tho carno diatincticn would apply to oerace -ImprecsIona : Panthirdua 
mif;, ý: t (if he had lived) have reri'm: hored that he now to aun3; he could not 
have rerncm'mrcd that thoro wore two suns that day. 
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It is misleading to uay, na Raid does in hin note on thin paccago 
(r. 201 n. 15), that Lucullue 'hair cot hold of the Cr: ek notion that '[b *C not C 
is identical with 'rb jiJ ev', i. e. that he is eonfuning what Is false with 
what in non-existent. On the Creek aide, the equivalence only concerns 
false judgement and statement and could not apply to memory in the came hay, 
as we do not normally c'. istinguich between true and false memory. Protagoras 
apparently argued that, since it is impossible to think the thing that is 
not, all opinions are true. 
' Plato, distinguishing false opinion from, 
thinking the thing that is not, idontified the latter with thinking nothing, 
2 or not thinklag at all. Reid seems to mean that Lucullus is arguing that 
memory of'falee concepts and 1mprC83icne would be tantamount to remembering 
nothing, and so to not remembering at all. It may well be that Lucullus is 
exploiting tho ambiguity of the phraso 'memoria falso-rum' and that the 
3 
argument is to that extent sophistical. But Cicero's ridicule (106) does 
nothing to answer the question how in a world in which concepts and sence- 
impr ze ion3 were false, or no bettor than false, there could be memory at 
all in the accepted sense. For if nonce fails to grasp its object, then 
surely memory mutt fail to do no. Wo can speak of false sonar-impressiono, 
but a memory which is 'false' in no memory at all. To say that wo should 
simply remember what is presented to us ('quid? meminisce ulna nisi 
comprenoa non poßsumuo? ' 106) does not solve this proble: a, for if 
what in presented is false, wo should not, strictly speaking, remember it, 
any r.. 3Ze than we should remember that two , nd two make five. And if true in 
indistinguishable from false, it will'nover havo the dogroo of certain--.. v that 
ti 
would justify our saying that we havo rcmerbcred it. 
1P1at. ^uthyd. 2C6c, Cco Cornford, P1atols ähcory of Ync'. 1edf'o, P-215- 
2 F1at. Thoaot. 1L3 c ft. 
311110 
it p1Eu3iblu becat; aa both the wtoio definition of the cataloptio 
imprcraiion And 4cadomio thcoit of ü: rºupaaXaF; ta intorpret faluity in tortna 
of what iu not 'there' (T6 Ith vi4pxov ). 
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If Lucu11i'q wore arguing that without the cataleptic impression we 
could have no memory at all, he would obvic. ualy be overstating his case. ' 
The conclusion only appears to follow because the sceptical thesis that true 
impressions are indistinguiihiblo from false is substituted as a hypothesis 
for the plain man's acceptance of ordinary' experience. By saying that'no 
place would-be left for memory (Imemoriae quidem certe ... nihil omnino loot 
relinquitur'), he does not necessarily mean that the mind would have no 
power to retain imprecsion3, 
l but that i: could not build them into any 
sort-of system, since if all impressions were false or dubious the activity 
we call 'remembering' could not take place. Cicero in his reply points out 
that we can 'remember' in ways that do not imply the truth or certainty of 
what is remembered. But he does not answer Lueullust main argument that 
without a criterion of any sort coherent experience, including memory - 
experience, would be an impossibility. 
Lucullus goon on to argue that art ('0Xvtj ) would be impossible 
without many acts of mental perception. 
2 what the geometrician 'sees'in hie 
mind both exists and is necessarily true= to say that it could be non- 
existent or indistinguishable from false would imply either that geometry 
was invalid or (as Lucul. lus really intendi to chow) that the sceptical 
hypothesis applied to geometry is meaningless. In the came way the art of 
the citharodo involves an exact perception of musical and metrical form 
1Plato calls 
memory in this sense aw, tTýpta atn 1 oewCand dintinCuiehcs it 
from 'rccollention' (phileh. 34a-b). Similarly the Stolen define memory as 
aTiacLVpLoµac. c, av,: aoL&, v exextus A. tli. Vi', 373). Sextun (ibid. ) te: in us that 
ono-of Chrysippu3' criticiema of Clrlanthea' interpretation of Zeio'o idea of 
tiro impression na rO%uic, was that it made the retention of improasiona 
1mpotisible and no aboliuhed memory and art. 
2cf. 
the Stoic definition of 'tjyVTj as C601T1ia &x xM'M1 icwv vuYYcYutL- 
vavAtvwv -%p5C Ti rtloC cüXwnc7rov "c&)v Iv Tq, Otto (SY? 1,73; 11,93-7). 
Quintilian translates 'artem corctaro ox peroo tionibua conuentientibus et 
coexorcitatin ad finem utilem uitna' (11,17,41) and goe, on to distinguish 
'arton' an theoretical, practical or productive lh. tlo of Alexan-, 
drin, divider 'r , tvat into thoorcticll and pr.. ctical, giving Eoonetzy and 
nctroncry an ox. %mple i of the torn: or (: ßt2' 111.202).. %1t. 1juurh Void arnica (n. 202 n. 4) that Cicuro'a lanq; uago auppcrtc only a twofold di%'iaion, a throe- 
fold division dor, n acom to undcxl. i. u' Lucidity' thought in thin pviuagu. 
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(scale, pitch, quantity, etc. ), on which his skill as a performer depends. 
Lucullu3 concludes that, in general, the doing or making of anything 'by art' 
implies exact knowledge (many acta of perception) on the part of the artist. 
In what way the geometrician's points, lines and oiroloa 'exist' 
otherwise than as objeot3 of thought is not raised. In 116 Cicero grants in 
a derisory way that thu primary objects of Teomotry (points without magnitude, 
lire3 without depth, etc. ) may be 'uera', but throws doubt on the application 
of its methods to the phy3ical world and the problems of natural science. 
Protagoras was probably the first to attack geometry on to ground that no 
ouch objects exist in nature; a straight line, for instance, does not touch 
a circle at a point (Aria tXet. 998a 2; heath, Greek 1"tntharmatice I, p. 179). 
Epicurus had rejected geometry as inconsistent with atomism; 
2 his followers, 
especially Zeno of Sidon, continued the attack, 
3 
and it would appear from 
Cicero's argunents in 116 that the Academic sceptics joined them. 
4 For 
Antiochus and the Stoics, on the other hand, the study of geometry has , 
consiZerablo importance, both for itri logicality and for its presumed relation 
5 to the physical structure of the universe. 
The expression of this sentence ('is qui fidibun utitur ... ') it elliptical; the original protasis 'gaam (perceptione )bi subtraxeric' must be understood. 
'Conficere uorous' may perhaps be taken of singing the vorsos, although it 
cugg; gists actual compoattion. 
2Us. 229a; Bailey, Creek Atomirtn, p. 234. Demooritwi, on the other hand, ' 
wrote ntunerous mathematical works (Heath, Greek t"tlther. attca It pp. 176 tt. ). 
3Procluc (on 
,' uc1. I, pp. l99.3-200) tells ur that whereas the epicureans usually 
attacked only the first principles of geometry, Zcno df Sidon argued th. tt, 
even if the first principles were granted, the conclusions did not follow 
without the addition of other unproved n8uumptiona (; death, Greek '^Al. hwr, 1ties 11, "t, p. 221-2). Pocidoniun wrote a whole book refuting those criti: cismn (-frs. 
46-7 Idelstoin and Kidd; LonC, it. T. p. 221). 
4According to Galen (to optima doctrina I, p. 45, coo rrochard p. 132 n. 2), 
Carnnades questioned ti: q certainty of mat)' aatical propositions auch as 'two 
quantities equal to a :: iird are equal to . r: another'. The sceptical attack 
continues in Sextun (e.,. A. i;. III, 10 1'f. ), and is mertioned"by ? ro lus (1. c. ) 
as Part-of the campaign aaainct knowledge. 
5'Cf. Ac-1,6 'nuatra tu psiynica nosti, quase cuin cuntinoantur ex etreetione of 
ex rateria ea qwu fing ct format cffoctio, wlhibenla ction goometria eat', 
For mr)dification:, introduced into the concepts of goo: rotry by the Stoics, ceo 
Sarnburcky, 11, ynior, of tl. v ;; Loics4, pp. 66 rr. and 96 ff. For I'osidcnius' 
cpeci; tl interest in mathcnaticu, u, sea IToath, II, p. 219 ff. -. Long, p. 221. 
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Geometry is chosen by Luculluo to represent the purely theoretical 
aspect of tita; vT1 beci%uno it is the most obvious example of an art where 
probability cannot be substituted for exact knowledgo. Similarly music, 
though a practical skill, has a rigorous theoretical element which is compar- 
able to mathematical science. In his reply (107) Cicero mentions, but 
without giving examples, arts which on their own admission rely more on 
'coniectura' than on 'scientia', and others which simply follow appearance 
since they ari not in possession of the Stoic criterion. The former group 
might include medicine, pilcting a chip, business manigemont, military 
strategy, the first three of which are cited by Aristotle as matters about 
which we deliberate, since they concern the variable and general rules do not 
cover all eventualities (F_N. 1112b 1-11). It would seem that here again 
Lucullus has loaded the scales in favour of the dogmatist, and that in many 
cases the degree of certa. nty demanded by the Stoics is not required for a 
satisfactory technical performance. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
deny that accurate observation is essential even for those arts uhieh, as 
Cicero puts it, merely follow appearance* 
IBy this he seems to moan any art 
based on cerse-experience, as practised by the ordinary craftsman who has 
never heard of the cataleptic impression. In 146, however, Cicero turns the 
tables on th. ý dogmatists by maintaining that an artist like Fhidian possesses 
'scientia'thougi not i:, the Stoic sense. This is something that Luoullus 
cannot claim., since for the Stoic 'scientia' as oppcred to xa; uaTTjLC 1ö in 
the power on'-;, ' of the wino man (145). 
1Although 
Cicero seems to attribute importance tr. 'appearance' in the ephero 
of the arts . ail sciences, he does not suggest wa;,;, in which the artist and 
the laymaz'i caii be dictinauished if both merely 'follow appear=co'. For the 
Tyrrhonist vie-4 that art is 'the obaorvati: n of apt3arances', see Saxtua M, 
V, 2. 
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T'nc arriment from ethics 
23-25 (P"38,32 - p"40,3) mime ucro uirtutum ..., qucd occurrit uideri. 
Summary. (23) Above all an undorotandinglof the virtuce provides proof 
that many things can be perceived and grasped. On this solo basin ucienco 
rests (which we retard as a rasp of things which is firn and unshakable), 
and likewise wisdom, the art of living, which has its own internal stabil- 
ity. That stability must arise from perception and knowledCo. Otherwise, 
how could the virtuoua man resolve to endure any torture rather than 
betray a duty or trust? No one could value justice and faith so highly, 
if he had not assented to indubitable truth. (24) But if wisdom does not- 
know whether cr not she is wisdom, how will she deserve the nano? If, 
there is nothing certain for her to follow, how will she embark on any 
action or confidently carry' it through? If she doubts or is ignorant of 
the final end, the ultimate standard of all things, how can she be wisdom? 
Clearly there must be come starting-point for her to, follow, and this must 
be in agreement with nature. For otherwise appetition (our rendering of 
6P µf1), which prompts us to act and to pursue what is presented to us, 
could not be moved. (25) But what moves appetition must first be present- 
ed to us and be believed; this cannot happen if what is presented is 
indistinguishable from false. The mind cannot be moved to desire anything 
if it is unable to, perceive whether the object presented is in agreement 
with nature or alien to it. Likewise, if the mind is not made award what 
its own function is, it will never act or be attracted to any object. If 
it is ever to aot, what comes to it must be precentcd as true., 
In saying that knowledge ('eclentia')i like art, Is baced on many note 
2 
of perception and defining; it as grasp that is stable and ir=utable, Luoullun 
allows the rca, dor to assume that this 1aut. nj certainty is wholly duo to ito 
depcndcnco on tho cataleptic impression. Thin in the cac , of course, only 
3 
for the wise man, who never makes a mistake or nente to a false tmpreosion; 
1Thid (n. 203 u. ll) in rrobably rieht in interpreting 'cotmitio' as 'etuwy' or 
'theory' rathor than 'knowlcdgo'; of. Fin. V, 58 'con3ldaratio oc, itioquo serum 
caoleu. ium' . 2 is 1.3 Zeno'a derinition; of. 1451 1941; Soxtua M. VII, 151: orfIµrlv 
cIvat ýc? v'&O(PMM) vat . 9ciiatav vat 
dtLCr6. OZTO S7ö 16you Vr. 1 a1j+IfLY. 
D. L. 11: I, 47; Otob. T'cl. II p. 73, l9 L 1+60. Lucullun hero implicitly rujeote 
Fhilo'K new definition of 'onivntia'. 
3'in 
quibui nolin inesne oti: u ceientiam dicir., ui'(23). ti. 
Acitti- (SVF IV, p. 25 
top right-hand column) interprets 'in quibua' an m; a"in, 4 'in uirtutibu. c', : 'ut 
thin is ; surely im, onoiblo; con Roid'a noto, p. 203 n.: 2. 
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it is only in the context of the wise can's experience that the relation 
between the certainty of knowledEo and its foundation in acts of grasp and 
perception can clearly be seen. For the ordinary person 'comprehensio' can 
at beat be translated into opinion (Sextun A. M. VII, 152; of. Ac. I, 42). 
The same is true of wisdom, 'capientia' or tars uiuendi', i. e. virtue 
in both its cognitive cud practical aspects. Without identifying 'seiontia' 
and 'sapientia', Lucullus sees a clone relationship between them. Just as 
knowledge is stable and immutable, so wisdom has its own inner consistency, 
which he traces to the same source, acts of indubitable #, ranp and perception. 
It follows that virtue or wisdom is, like knowledge, the polar oppositr of 
doubt and"scepticism. 
2 What Lucullus does not cake explicit in that the 
'constantia' of moral action, whether displayed in the particular act or in 
the good life as a whose, does not depend merely on individual acts of 
perception but on the fixed disposition of the agent, which, for the Stoic 
at least, results not from training or habituation but from 'ecientia'. 
3 
This disposition, which gives consistency to the emotional nature of the 
agent4 as well as to his life, is brought to bear in each individual action, 
'which thus depends on knowledge in a more thoroughgoing way than Lucullua 
appears to be claiming here, unless we take into account that he is speaking 
about the 'uir bonus', who already posaesres the 'ara uiucndi' and whose 
acts of perception will automatically be equivalent to knowledge. 
1Cf. 31,39; Plutarch ((orn. Not. 1C61F) reterc to the Stoic view that the 
nig::, ist of the goods is to be unswerving . nd steadfast in judgement. 2 Similarly in 1942 we are told that Zcno 'separated from virtue : nd wisdom 
error, rashness, ignorance, opinion and suspicion, in a word ove&ything that 
was alien to a firm and steady assent'. 
3Thus, 
although the arts too are based on grasp and perception, virtue is 
set apart as comprielro 'stability, atrcr. J'h and consistency of the whs.: e 
life' (Fin. III, 50). 'i:, is scemi to be Cic"'o's way of describing öt4oraLc öµ0OTOU. L Y11 (D. L. VII, e9/SJ? 111# 39); cf. Plut, V$r t. ', r. 441C ( wF It 
202). Seneca argues that the consistency ana even tenor of 
perfect virtue cannot be attained without 'rerum oeientia'. 
4Hence 
Cicero uses 'con3tantia' (in contract with 'perturbatio') to translate 
ev (lac to , the correct state of the emotions 
found only in the wise 
man (Tuac. IV, 14/SVF 111,430). 
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The next stage of Lucullus' argument (24) again stresses the need for 
perception and knowledge if coral activity is to take place, but is expressed 
in curiously abstract terms. If wisdom herself does not know that she is 
wisdom, she will not deserve the nano; she will havc no confidence to act, 
since there will be nothing certain for her to follow; if oho hesitates 
through ignorance of the ultimate ethical end, how can she be wisdom? It is 
clear that a beginning must be laid down for her to follow when ehe initiates 
action, and this must be in agreement with nature ('naturao accommodatum'), 
since otherwise impulse ('adpotitio'/ 6p µfj) will not be stimulated. All this 
presumably means that the wise man must, in the first placo, be able to know 
1 
with certainty what the ultimate end of action is, and in the second placo, 
must be able to receive true and indubitable impressions in which he can 
recognise this end and respond to it. 
In regarding agreement with natura as the starting-point of 'oapicntia' 
and action, Antiochus is on common ground with the stoics and othar contempor- 
ary philosophical schools. This is made clear in Fin. V, 16-17, whore reference 
is made to an ethical survey of Carneadec which, we are told, Antiochus was 
accustomed to use. Carnoados argued that every art sets out from and In 
concerned with something outside itself; as medicine is the art of health and 
piloting a chip the art of sailing, co wiedom ('prudential) is the art of 
living. 2 All philosophers agree that the cubjeet-matter and aim of wisdom is 
what is fitted and adapted to nature ('aptwa at accorr odaturn naturao', 17) and 
auch as to attract appetition (öppth ), = they disagree about what it is that, 
1Tho inportanco of certainty as to the nummum benum is ntronsed by kntiochue' 
cpokesntin Pico in Fin. V, 15: without knowledge of the chief poodo thmre is no 
'ratio uiuendi' and action becomes erratic. Cnce the chief rood is known, 
one will havo discovered a way of life, a conccptio.: of all the duties, and 
a& andard of action. Cf. Vin. I, 11. 
2: Jero 'prudential (Qp6"cLC) i$ aaoimilated to the productive arts, as often 
by Arintotle, but without Aristotle's distinction betwoon7cp&CLC a. 1d ; tot int. (T? 
_1:. 11g0a 25-8; b 6-7). Tt is doubtf:: l whether ? ntiochun him-olf wou'; ' have ignored the dietincticn. Contrast the occparieon between wisdom and the arts 
in 1'in. TJI, 24, where it in stated that wisdom 1v' no end outside itself and 
is . 
omplotoly roallsed in nach and every ri&ht action. 
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from the moment of birth, attracts appetition; hence they disagree about the 
cnmnum bonum or ultimate end, for in that ultirate end the first allurements 
of nature ('prima inuitanenta naturae', 17) must be included. 
In using the concept of 'agreement with nature', Lucullus in again 
being deliberately non-specific. t lithout going into details about the 
definition of the ethical end, he relies on the general acceptance by the 
schools of the psychological principle that aprotition can only be moved by 
what is 'naturae accommodatum', and argues that it is therefore self-ovident 
that such must be the starting-point of moral action. 
l The inference is then 
drawn that the impression which convoys this character to the mind must be 
capable of being perceived and no dictinguishable from false: 'quo modo 
autem moueri animus ad adpotendua potent si id quod uidotur non pereipitur 
accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? ' (25). It in characteristic of the 
generality of his account that we are not told at what level the perception 
takes place. At one end of the scale are the 'prima naturae', the response 
to which, though basically natural, is non-moral, at the other end the fully 
dcreloped concept of virtue as an abzoluwa good to which wran'a rational 
nature is adapted and to which action muht be directed if'it is to be right 
in the full sense. In the cdntext of the good men's fortitude it is clearly 
rightness of the latter kind that must be capable of being perceived and 
of moving the mind tc action. 
1The theory that every living creature from the moment of birth in attracted 
by what is adapted to its nature and repelled by Vaut is alien to it, in 
ecmmon to Antiochu3 and the Stoics (Fin. 'r, 24 ff.; L1,16 ff.; cf. fipicurua' 
view of pleasure and pain, n. L. X, 34)" It would app. ar to follow that these 
are the only motives capzblo of stimulating action. In Fir. IV, 46-7 it is 
argued that concepto of right and duty by thomuolves will not nupply a motive 
for action; for this the Stoical like eve-one else, have to raturn to nature. 
Cf. the view attributed to the ancient philosophers in Fin. IV, 58: 'dicunt 
appetitionem animi mouori cu: m aliquid ei cecundum r.:. turam esso uideatur'. 
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In insisting that the steadfastness of the rood an in abiding by a. 
moral decision, even in the face of torture, must be based on the certainty 
of perception and knowledgo, 
1 Lucullus endorses the old belief which gooo 
back to Socrates, that knowledge is the strongest principle in . an, through 
which he is proof against all contrary influencoc, including plea3uro and 
pain (P1at. Protaý. 362c; Ariat. E. N. 1145b 23). 2 iiut he is not very specific 
about what in fact the good man perceives and known when he makes a moral 
decision. Does he perceive and know certain moral principles ('legen'), 
and does his cognitive experience include an appraisal of the particular 
circumatancea and perception of the appropriateness of the action in rclation 
to those principles? The occurrence in the context of moral terms such as 
'officium', 'fides' and 'aequitan' suggests that the good man's decision 
must be at least partly based on what is sometimes called a 'moral intuition'. 
Lueullus would thus be arguing that moral truths are in many cases as clear 
and self-evident as our perception of external objects. This self-evidence, 
coupled with the fact that for Antiochua virtue is still the chief part of 
the summum bonum, 
3 
would cnsuro, as in Stoicism, a consistency of behaviour 
and fixity of purpose that are ancumcd to be lacking in a ccoptie. 
4 
ý'quacro 
... cur has oibi tars grauen logos iwpoouerit, cum qunm ob rocs ita 
oporterot nihil haborot couprehenei porcopti coj; niti conatituti' (23). The 
emphatic repetition of cognitive termz indicaten the firmeas of the moral 
decision which recta on thin basic of khowlodgo. 
2The 
view that the wise man is 'happy' oven on the tack was hold by St; toa, 
Epicurean3 and Peripatetice (D. L. X, 118; Fin. III, 42; V, 77 ff-9 60 ff.; Ls-Ili 
134). The iwportanco attached to goods other than moral worth by Antiochu3 
rendered hic. position an open to objectirn an that of the Fcripatotics. To 
avoid the difficulty, he aooraa to have it:: onaicton: ty uphold the Stoic 
doctrine of apathy (135)" 
3Fin. V, 71-72. Since other natural edvanta¬oo are necessarily rejected by 
the good man undergoing torture, their contribution to the nu=um bonum 
han to be disregarded for the purposes of the argument. 
4Aug. Ac. IT, 12 argued that the Acadomie wise man must of necessity be it 
'decfartor offioiorum omnium'. In Fin. V, 22 Pieo eritinises the ethical and 
of Carncadoc (the enjoyment of the primary advantag*. u of nature) on the 
ground that it leaves no room for duty, virtue or friendship. 
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Antiochun dinarrecd with the ytoicn on thu quention or the nummumm bonuni 
becau. e their conception of it involved a complete break with the empirical 
foundations c, f their ethical system. k7iile agreeing that virtue is the 
perfection of man's rational nature, he reFnrded it as an inconsistency in 
the Stoic system that the primary advantaF; cs of nature ('principia' or 'prima 
naturao') should be man's first objects of arpotition and thus provide the 
starting-point and material for virtue and yet not rank a place beside it as 
constituents of the summum bonum (Fin. IV, 26 ff. ). 'ino consequences of this 
disagreement emerge cicarly when the account of man's psychological and moral 
development given by Piso in Fin. V 24 ff. In compared with that of Cato in 
M, 20 ff. Both accounts start from the primary instincts of nature for 
self-preservation, but for the Stoio a motive difformnt in kind develops 
toGether with the awareness of order and regularity in conduct, whereas for 
Antiochus progress and maturity depend on soll-knowledCo and a clearer 
understanding of what is 'naturae accommodatuf'. Airreerucnt with nature thus 
has for Antiochus a more general significance and hie conception of the nummum 
bonum includes the perfection and catisfaction of man's entire naturo, not 
merely the rational part of it. 
It should be noted, howevor, that thcugh ho criticinod the Stoicu, 
Antiochua fell into what in, from the Stoic point of view; the greater 
inconsistency of laying down an ethical end that etuinot be completely 
realised in moral action. On hie theory iti is not . any to coo why the wino 
man prefers to undergo torture rather than betray a trunt, i. e. chooses to 
respor. ' to to moral stimuluu rather than the phyoiological. 
l If it is the 
task of wisdom to protect and develop the whole of man's naturo'and not 
merely a part of it, an Antiochus claims (Fin. IV 6 ff. ), then either wisdom 
1If 
pro ned, Antiochus would have to nay that an immoral action would be 
even mere alien to mann nature than p1iyaical mutilation or death (of. b'in. V, 
71-2, whore it is argued that the contribution of natural advc+ntaren to the 
nuffJrurº borrim in minimal compared with virtue). Buz this in by no means colt... evvid nt, -If the claims of both body and mind are to be united in the concept 
of 'a. pxrcr. icnt with itaturo'. In 135 Cicero criticinen Antiochun for accuptine 
Rome Stoic doctrirca, Brich an the 'apat y' of the wtca m. ºn, which his own 
uyctom done not requi. 'o. 
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and virtue are not cynonymoua or Regulus, who died under torture in the hands 
of the Carthaginians, failed to perform a part of hiv duty and Q. Piotollus, 
who died after a successful public career and left none and daughters behind 
him, was the happier of the two men (b'in. Y, o2 ff. ). Unless virtue as the 
supreme good has an absolute priority over the primary advantages of nature, 
it is impossible to justify Regulus' choice, and in wishing to assign it a 
comparable priority within the concept of 'agreement with nature', Antiochus 
commits the same fallacy as the hedonist who wishes to retard some pleasures 
as 'higher' than others. Nor can his claim that there in only one object of 
appetition, embracing both the primary instincts and tho ultimate end of 
rational-conduct, he accepted as a satisfactory basic for moral action. 
The account which Lucullu3 gives, in 25 of the psychology of action is 
again very general and not exclusively linked with any particular ethical 
theory. He assumo3 a type of action that is neither purply instinativo nor 
fully deliberated, but a straightforward response to a true improscion, which 
reveals tho object au either in agreement with ar contrary to nature, and no 
as an object of pursuit or avoidance. If unsent lu Civen to an impression 
of this kind, appetition would automatically follow. Assent in specifically 
mentioned in these sections only ones, in connection with the good man's 
choice (23), but seems to be implied in the later part of the argument in 
25 ed a factor linking porcnption and appotition. '4o arc told that, before 
appetittonn or action can take place, the mind must be nano aware what its 
function is ('quid offioii sui sit'); this is pro3urably the function of 
recognising what in ti-ae and in agreement with nature and aoncnt, nc to it. 
Although the subject of these sections is 'snpientia', the argwrcnt, 
about appotition door not acem to be confined to the 'sapiens'. Luculluo 
rr. intains that appetition either requires or implies that the impression is 
accepted an true, 
l 
which would not be tho cane if it were Indistinguishable 
1'ciquo 
crocii'; 'ncrenco est id ci ucrum quod occurrit uidori' (25). It in 
clear fror the uzn of 'crodi' and 'uidori' that Luculluc in not oxclunively 
talkinr^ ahc, ut th(" 'anpicrin' or tho cataleptic imireanion. Wh :, %% mattere for 
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from false', ' Thin conclunion applies to the oxperienco of tho ordinary pornon 
and not only to the wino man, although only the wine tan would -never bo 
mistaken in his acceptance of an iirprennion an both true and agreeing with 
nature. If, on' the other hand, the irpresnion could` not be dintirgulahed 
fron false, not only the vice an but also any ordinary Fercon would 
withhold assent and so, on the Stoic view, be unable to act. In extendirg the 
ar#uitont to the ordinary person, Lucullus ceems'to be relying on the unspoken 
arct. mption that the plain man's belief that he can distinguish a true from a 
false impression implies th. t, in all or most caoen, he can in fact do so. 
The point at issue in not, therefore, whether a given impression can be 
infallibly rccounißed as true, but whether appetition and action imply assent, 
i. e. the acceptance of one's experiences ei true. If they do, the ability 
to act refutes the view that true impressions are indistinguishable from 
faloo, and so makes perception possible not only for the wise can but also 
for the ordinary person. 
The argument in 25 differs f: o: n that in 39 in being directed against 
the Academic 'thesis of &; tapaTaaF. ta, r'hereaa in 39 it is directed against, 
which is perhaps why Lucullus does not mention assent explicitly in 
the pxenent passage. It is clearly implied, however, that action deporis'fon 
oppetition which in turn dnpenda upon assent. Thte waa one, or the focal 
points in the controversy butwoon the Stoics and th. Academic aseptic.. The 
Stoics, especially Ch7-jaippun and AntipitPr, strongly maintained that thorn 
cannot ho impulse or action without annent; 
2 thair opponents were bourn. to 
ari; un that motion is posaiblo without anent, if the wico intn, who anncnts to 
nothing, is to be deemed capable of action. 
action by any agent is that ho should o. ccnpt his oxFc: icncu an truo. 
1Ihe 
ir.,;, ortanco of activity is porhaTn overa tracced in Antiochus' ethics (see 
EDn. V, S5 ff. ). 
21057A (vv lit, 177); Mv...,.... Onl. 1022A-i3. 
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In stressing the importance of aaocnt, or belief in the truth of one's 
experience, as a precondition of appetition, which in turn is a precondition 
of action, Lucullus is on common ground with the Stoics. 11tu outline in 24-5 
suggests a temporal sequence, 
1 but it need not always be no, which is vhy 
6 pµc. t are said to be acts'of assent. 
2 Although there is no suggestion 
in Piso's account in Fin. V, 24 ff. that app'tition changes in character or 
direction with the attainment of moral maturity, it is clear that it must, at 
a certain stare in the human development, cemo under the control of reason. 
3 
A perception or reasoned judgement that one's not accord', with nature would 
thus be a precondition of moral acticn. Luoullue' account is too brief and 
simplistic to give any clue to this development. He seems, at this stago in 
the argument. to be concerned mainly at the level of sense to render conduct 
proof against aceptioi. m, and no to ensure the possibility of moral behaviour 
that is both stable and consistent. This raises the question whether moral 
action can ever be wholly consistent, in the sense of conforming to a single 
principle, and whether we could ever perceive or be absolutely certain that an 
act accords with nature in the required sense. And even if those two 'ints 
wore granted., the ambiguity of the term 'nature', though perhaps lass in 
Antiochus' system than in Stoicism, and the genoral disagreement as to what 
it is that accords with nature (Fin. V, 17)9 hero work against Lucullus. 
1Seneca, Fn. 113,18 (SVF III, 169), places nsoent tetween Appetition and action; 
cf. Riot, Stria Phioao h, p. 40 n. 2. Cov also cootion 30 and p. 160 of this 
Commentary. 
2Stob. Rcl. Ii. p. e8 (SVF 111,177). The two psychological events may not always 
be clearly distinguished in practice. Whin the Stola Sphaerus toi. k tht wax 
pomegranate, hiu impulse was interpreted by Kinjr Ptolemy I'nilopator as an act 
of accent (D. L. VII, 177/0VF 1,625; cf. Sý I, 624), i. es to a judgement that 
what he saw was a real pomegranate and good to eat. On the other hand, the 
act of assent could be taken as including in some cases $an appotitivo 
element'; see Long's ivccount of 401 in . 
flj " p. 176. Done points out (n. 1) that although all impulses are acts of assent, not all acts of assent 
are impulses. 
3Cf. 
D. L. VII, 86. Antiochus accepts the Stoic psychology, with its extreme 
intellectual approach to the explanation r.. " fealiný and desire. Chxysippua 
described ap etition as 'reason prescriptive of action' (Vlut. Sto. He . 10 7F' /SVF` II1,175) iuid the passions as ' juýigomcnts' ( Vptrt LC, D. L. VII 111); 
Long, . 1h. P-175 ff.; Watson, stoics Theory of }nowle(Im., p. 61. 
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The Academic view or imrrezMions undermines the ration-ii fnam 1t find 
ultimntely philo:. ophy and wisdom 
26-27 (r"40,4 - p. 41,4) quid quad, ci inta uara aunt ... K talolc interoaao. 
Summary. (26) Reason, the light of life, in totally destroyed if your 
case is true. will you still persist in your perversity? Reason started 
inquiry, and being strengthened by inquiry has perfected virtue. Search 
is the desire for knowledge and its end is di: covery. But no one 
discovers what is false or permanently unknowable; when thingo that have 
been, as it were, hidden are unvoilod, then they are said to have boon 
disno: "ered; thus the beginning of search and its end in perception and 
grasp are hold together, 
' 
and demonstration (in Creek kb ScL&6S) is 
defined as 'reasoning which leads fron the perceived to what was not 
perceived'. (27) But if all impressions wore, as the sceptics claim, 
such that they could be false and no concept could distinguish them, how 
could we say that anyone had infoxred or discovered anything, or what 
confidence could be placed in logical method? Ihilosophy, which must 
proceed by logical reasoning, will be at a loco; and no will wisdom, who 
can doubt neither herself nor her decrceo, called 66ytaTa by philo- 
sophors; To: betray any such decrees to to conm~it a crime against truth 
and morality and usually leads to botrayJof friends and country. There- 
fore there is no doubt that the judgement or the wine ran must not only 
not be false but must also be fixed and irreversible. But this in 
impossible on your view that the impressions, on which such judgements 
are based, are no different from falno ones. 
A tranoition is now a Me to the nced for cortainty as a basis for all 
reasoning procevacc; the sceptical view (Lucullun is still arguing against 
the Aeaclemin thoeio of cinapa? »a&ta) wou: a nbolinh reason, and with it the 
perfection of virtue, by ruling out the woaoibility of inquiry or search for 
knowledý; o. The arý; ºýraent is complicated by the linking of 'inquiry' or 
loth 
the mnanir anfl the text are uncertain. P1tkobire, retains MSS '"r. onot' i 
Reid and Rackham occopt Bentley's correction 'tcnetur'. Von Arnim (. ýVF II, 
103) reach 'fann1tate terentur', thus coparating; 'rerciptun'li et comprcndendi' 
from 'exitun', wh. rh neemn too eny. Taken with 'exitua', 'T, erciptundi' and 
'comprehndondi' are prcbabl;, dnfininv ; cnitivaa. ema ! wä (followed by 
Fackhan) omit 'itaque' at the beginninf; i" the next c ntonco. 
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'search' an an activity of reason with logicrtl dcm^natration or deduction, 
procumably on the ground that both involve the revealing of what was previously 
hidden (though in fact 'there' to to discovered), and that both are a movement 
of the mind from a 'borinning' to an 'end' that was somehow contained in it, 
though not previously apparent. Luculluu arruea that the desire for knowledge 
('adpetitio cognitionis') only crakes sense on the ruppocition that truth is 
discoverable. 'Inquiry' and 'discovery' are complenontary terms and if truth 
is to remain permanently hidden the whole ccncept r! ` rational inquiry is 
rendered futile and meaningless. The same applies to the logical process by 
which the mind is led from premise to conclusion; if the promisees cannot be 
grasped and the validity of the infor. neo in in doubt, there can be no 
certainty in the conclusion. It is obvic": a, to Lucullus at l'mst, that this 
would destroy the possibility of rational areumont and no spell dicastor for 
philosophy 
Iand 
morality. 
Antiochus probably shared the ütoio belief that manes not endowed 
with reason at birth but that reason develops, at an aV given variou. ly as 
seven or fourteen, on the ba2ia of nonce-expericnco and natur111y acquircd 
concepts. 2 The first and not obviona wt%y, therefora, in which re=on would 
be abolished if true ia, proaaions were indiatinruichablo from talge, iev that 
it would have no chance to develop. 
3 It would be imposniblo to pace juIa: ont 
on the data of nonso or extend the rant of porception to intolligibloa, 
logical connections and rational concept'. In lntiochu3' ryctcm, as S. 
Stoicism, sensation is the startinj76; point of exrortoroe and mason and 3Qnno 
are riot separated but interdependent. 
1Comparo Lactant. Init. II1#4 ( V' Ir54)r 'ergo of ^oque ociri quidquam 
potent, ut ; ", crateo docuit, roe opinari oportet, ut Zono, tots philocophia 
eublata oat. ' 
2Aet. IV, II, 4 (sVF 1103); cf. '1,149. Chrysippus In onid to have defined 
reason av e: vvoLwv Tbvwv xcL %P ? h. tcwv uCo cc( týt'rý I1ý041). 
3Cf. Lucullua' argument in 22. 
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But assuming; that a rudimentary form of rcaaon could devclop, 
l : ho 
next step, the strengthening of reason by inquiry, encmai equally inpo^sible 
except on thn basis of true and firm perception. Since Lucullus does not 
specify what kind of inquiry he has in mind, his argument can be interpreted 
only in very general term:.. Inquiry is initiated by reason, 
2 
which is in 
its turn strengthened by inquiry; since moral virtu. - in perfected by reason, 
3 
the full development of rationality will naturally culminate in perfect 
virtue. Thus the abolition of reason in seen by Lucullun c. inly an a 
consequence of the impossibility of inquiry, or search for knowledjo, which 
owing to the link between reason and virtu has a vital bearing on the 
moral issue as well as the opiotemological. 
4 
1Cf. Cellius' account, H. AA. XII, 5,7 'postea per incrementa notatis exorta o 
seminibus Buis raticet ... ' Seneca X1.49,11 'doeileo natura nos edidit of 
rationem dodit imperfectan, aed quac perfici possot. ' 
2It 
seems natural to take the sentence 'nam quaerendi initiun ... quaerendo' 
am referring to the development of the individual who, through th3 ncarch 
for knowledge, attains to rational and moral perfection, not an a statement 
about human evolution and progress. It is nil; nificart that both Cato in Fin, 
1II, 17 and Flso in Fin. V. 48 use the natural inquiaitiveno3s of children as 
an illustration of the dccirability of knowledge for its own Bake. 
31narn 
quaerendi initiu, n ratio attulit, quad porfecit uirtutem, cum onset 
ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo' (26). Thin just falls short of a completo 
identification of virtue and reason. In Pin. V, 36, hc. wevor, virtue is (: afinod 
an 'rationis absolutio'; of. the itoio definition of virtue as 'ratio perfecta' 
(Seneca, n-, 1-76,10 /"VP III, 200a). Cf. Cic. T,, f. I, 22 Ny 171,339) 'quao corn 
adoleuit atque perfecta cat (so. ratio), nominatur r: to aapientia'. 
4For the metaphor of lirýht, see Iteid, p. 2C5 n. 5. Antiochus and the Stolc3 
applied the naive metapnor to the senses (Cixtuc A. N. VII, 162-3,259-60; Aot. IV, 
12,1/SVl I1,54), in which connection the derivation of cpav-vaata from wt'ur. 
was considerid significant (Aet. I. e.; nine mgntloncd by Aristotle, An.. 429a 3). 
The application of tht metaphor to reason on back to Aristotle's 
comparison 
"betwcen light and the active and passive roles of the intellect 
(An. 430a 15), 
this in turn being suggested by Plato's snalor in Pon. VI, 500R 'ff. between 
the two sources of light in the visible and intelligible worlds. As used by 
Luculluo, it has special significance owing to the . song moral overtones; 
hence his next remark: 'tamenne in ista prauitate p'. rstabitio? ' Tlha Academia 
mc:: ptic, in 'destroying' reason, is comiitting a moral sin. 
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Inquiry, as conceived by Lueullus, in not simply concerned with the 
collection of directly observable facts but involves inference from what in 
directly observable to what in not. This is made explicit in'the Stoic- 
definition of search, which probably goes back to Ch: ynippuntl 'search is an 
impulse towards apprehension that discovers ito object by ©eana of sign; 
diceovery is the conclusion and end'of search in the act of apprehension. ' 
Similarly Sextun (P01. I, 178) states that every object of apprehension is 
apprehended either of itself or by ciennn of something else, and elsewhere' 
(PPFi. I1,7) contracts direct apprehension with apprehension by means of 'some 
11 , kind of search and inquiry'. It is clear from £oxtus' ardent that tha 
object of inquiry is the 'non-evident', 
2and this in confirmed by Lucullw ' 
analogy between inquiry and logical proof, 'as a movement from the percertic'n 
of the evident to the perception of the non-evident. ilia definition of 
discovery ('cum ca quae quasi inuoluta fuerunt aperta Bunt, tue inuenta 
dicuntur', 26)3 suSFestc that he in already identifying inquiry with proof, 
or at least taking demonstration as the characteristic form of r^ancning 
involved In inquiry. 
1Cleri. 
Strom. IV, 14 (SVF 11,102). Lucullus' description of 'qutcotlo' an 
'adr. etitio c., A-niticnis', apart fron beirr loan e"plcte, is . 
lse loss toshnical 
and more o ent"ral in meaning. In view of his pr vioua ar, 7unent about appotition 
in 24-5, it :a noteworthy that here cppo-t1tion in directed towarcio 'cobizitio' 
nc such. Similarly in Fin. III, 17 acts of copnLtior and t. erccpt: nn are said to 
be desirable for their own ceko, and in Fin-V#40 'eogntttonis amor et scient: ao' 
is spoken of as one of nature's ntronfmnt impulAen. 
2-oxtus (P. N. II, 97 ff.; A.?. VITI, 349 f£. ) divid'n the non-evident into the 
absolutely nor-evident whether the nu, aber of r. tar in even or odd), the 
temporarily i, on-eviden, (e. g. the city of 4 then: tu )-im at the time of ti citing), 
and the naturally non-evident (e. g. the exictence of invLoible pores in the 
skin or of an infinite void outside the universe). The, last two can both be 
apprehended by niFna, though nor'ally nearch, like proof. would br. concerned 
with the naturally non-evident. For the difference art' sen 'eon emorative' 
and 'indicative' signs, lee Pensen Pate:, Stoictc, p. 13-14. 
3Cf. So:: tua' termn exxaat7. zr. cv, crscx(AvrTCxiaC VIII. 309-310, eto) of 
demonstrative argument. Ior demonstrative argumen , nee Pencor. I'. ateo# Stoic 
14, icy, p. 61.3. 
146 
It is clear that-the grasp or perception with which inquiry endo 
('exitus percipiundi et comprendendi', 26) must be that of reason and not of 
the senses, if the analogy with deconatrative proof is to be maintained. 
After a broad reference to 'omnia uiea' (27), which may include impressions 
of reason as well as those of cense, Lucullus subsequently narrows his 
consideration to the results of inquiry as ouch; bocauso he is here concerned 
with rational inference he leaves aside the problem whether the sceptic can 
have a 'notio' of the object to Inquiry (see p. 147 :. nd p. 170 below) as well 
as the question of initial evidence. The evidence provided by oense- 
experience is clearly indispensable to inquiry, an may be inferred from. tho 
definition of logical proof. 
1 The conclusion of proof reveals what is not 
directly perceptible on the basis of perceptible evidence contained in the 
premisses (26). Reason can thus extend the range of the senses without 
being wholly independent of them. 
2 
In claiming that no one discovers what is (also, Luoulluo may appear 
to bQ again pr tting forward a purely specious argument which relies on the 
strict meaning of words (as in the argument about memary in 22) rather than 
on the facts of exporience, for it is of course poaeiblo to be mistaken in 
the belief that. tho results of an inquiry are true. In explaining discovery 
in terms of perception of the non-evident, Lucullus is placing himself nn 
difficult ground, particularly when inference from : ºiprossion to external 
1'An 
arepment which infers the less clearly apprehended by means of the 
more clearly apprehended' (D. L. VII, 45) or 'an argu. ont which by means of 
agreed promisso3 reveals deductively a non-evident conclusion' (Sextun v. 11. 
II, 17C, A ; q. V. [II, 314). An example given by Sextun in 'If there in motion, 
there 13 void; but there is motion, therefore there ii void. ' Cf. Quint. V, 
10,11: 'ratio probationem rra¬ut&ns, quit colllgitur rliud per aliud, of 
quas quod ost dubium per id quoll dubiuci non oct eonfirmnt. ' Lueullus here 
chooses to gtvo the definition in a form that explie4tly requirca that the 
premisues be oatalepticctlly perceived ('ratio quit, ov: rebus percoptia ad id 
quod non percipiebatur cdduoit', 26). It will be noted that the Aristotelian 
conception of de onstraticn as an argument which doduaeu the particular from 
the universal in much more restricted in meaning than the Stoic. 
2The 
sceptical argument of Carncadoe that reason cannot be a criterion 
apart frota the senses (Soxtua A. MM. VII, 165) would consequently be endorsed by Lucullus. 
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object is`itcolf in quention. On the other hand, he does not need to prove 
that the results of any and every inquiry are necessarily true. It is 
cufficicnt' to point out, as jr. his previous arguments, that the consequences 
of supposing thcci always to be false or indiatingui3hablo from (also -a view 
which would place the objects of inquiry on a lovol with the permanently 
'incerta' - are unacceptable, since . hin would uako noncence of the who3o 
idea of inquiry. 
I 
In ctre3cing tho nood for the kind of aenae- pre3sicn: that can bo 
distinguished by a concept ('notic'), Luculluo ray be thouCht to be alluding 
to the part played by the concept in linking the boginninc and end of search 
('initium quacrencli et oxituo percipi: indi et comprendendi', 26). Just an 
ooarch cannot tako placo without ai p6arjytC or preliminary concept of the 
subject to be inventigated, 
2 
so discovery implies a complete craup of the 
aasig aub j ect, 
3 
rocogniäod throuth the %PIAI1V &C which thus functions an a 
critorion. 
4 This is tho Stoic answer to the problem first raise in Plato's 
reno, 5 how eoarch for knowledgo (l; fj i ctr 
) is poaeib1o, sinco eithor wo 
know or do not know %. hat wo aro seeking; if wo alroady know, thoro is no 
point in search; if wo do not, wo cha11 not know what to look for or bo ablo 
to rocogniso it when wo find it. We know from Coxtuo that this dilomm. ' in 
an adaptod form was uwod against the sceptioa by both 5tolce and t`picu: vana, 
especially the latter. 
6 
Lucullu$ is not, however, voncerned hero with this 
particular problem or with tho cnawor to it. J. 8au: nin the pon ibility of . 
1From tho orroaito point; of view, SsxtJO 
(A. '"*. VII, 393) argues that, if . t11 
impressiona P. re true, thoro is nothing ncn-ovident, which mlken nonsense of 
Inquiry. 
2Cf. 21; Soxtuu A. M. IX, 12 etc. The principle wa. i aloo accepted by rpieuruct 
D. L. X, 33; C1gm. Strom. II, 4 (Ue. 255); Soxtuo l1. H. YI, 2:; Cie. V. f. 1,45" 
3Cf. 21. This would be the 'aciontific' concept 
(Ao;,. IV, 11 / SVw' 11,63). 
4Ct'. Sextuo A. 14. VII, 140. 'Mtn may have been why Chzycippua in tho'firat 
book of hits work On Reason p; sve nensation and preconception an the criteria 
(n. L. VII, 54). Coe, nowevor, Riot'a oommonts (Stoic Ihilnnorhy, pp. 133-4). 
5Plat. Mcrio COd 5 ff.; i'lut. ap. Oiycp. in Plat-}'hr. ' . p. 125,; : iVIý, 11,104). 
6Cextuv 
V. f. II, 1 ff. -, A. LVIII, 337 ff. 
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inquiry he is concerned to affirm the certainty of ita rcculta, for othorwia& 
no trustI can be put in the validity of the rational process, on which philo- 
sophy and morality alike depend. Hence the emphasis is on the end-result 
rather than the beginning of inquiry, and it is in relaticn to achieving this 
result that the sceptical view of sense-improasiona is judged unsatisfactory 
2 
According to Lucullus, the Academic view that true itpreosions are 
qualitatively indistinguishable from falbo prevents reason from reaching a 
firm conclusion and so undermines both philosophy, which can inly advance by 
way of raticnal argument, 
3 
and wisdom, which must nat lack confidence in her- 
self and her decisions ('decreta'/ 06yp rzm ). Although any philosorhical 
tenet to which ascent is given can be a 66YI CL ,aL cullua seems hero to 
be confining the word to moral principles or judgemonts. 
5 For the wine man, 
a moral decision is essentially an item of knowledge and the came predicates 
apply to it ('stabile fixen ratum.... quod mouaro nulls ratio queat', 27). 
The decisions of wisdom can nevertheless be 'betray.: d', it Is not very clear 
by whom ('quorum nullum nine cooler* prodi potorit.... quo a uitio of 
Rnicitiarum proditionos at rerun publicar»m nanci aolcnt'). We must suppose ' 
that the moral law in embodied in principles of action which are binding on 
all and not only on the wino man, though only the wino man is completely 
steadfast it, his adherence to them. The ran in whom reason is imperfectly 
1'fides' 
d 7LtaTtC, defined by the Stoics na xa'rü7t i' tr, vu (, iýßucoüaa 
orb v"ro) ap0avbµcvov (Stob. F o1. II, p. 113,12 / SVIa I11,540; Cf. Arint. T p. 
131a 23). Clement's un-) of'lc'rtC in oonrectien with proof (Stro: n. VIII, 7,2) is commented on by II. E. Witt ( ibj.! s rp. -34)" Who traces 
it to Antiochus and through him to Zeno (An. I, 41T; can also moan 
rhetorical proof and evidence and i... c diffurentiatcd from demonstration by 
Aristotle (Rhot. 1355a 3 ff. ). Cicero's 'iirra opinio' (Ezivon an a definition 
of 'fides' in Part. Or. 9) is reminiscent of its ordinary meaning and also of 
its place on the divided lint, in Plato's 'ROM 0112 (511. ). 
2Lucullus' 
argwnont also affects Cicero's claim that the Acadomio is a 
'searcher' (7-8; cf. 32,127). 
3Cf. Ip20. By evoking thc, logical process from promiea to conclusion, Lucullus' 
1. a. nguw.. ao tends to identify the 'progress' cf philosophy with that of deductive 
argumont. Compare 'progrodi' with 5extun' uro of :: no, 1utvPLV A. ir. VIII, 367 oto. ), 
4Defined 
as xaý t1lýrl ýtC -t LC' oytki (Clem. trc 5/; Vt' 11,121), or a33ont 
to a non-ovidont object of inquiry (S. xtua . rj. i, 13,16). Cf. D. L. III, 51. 51heso, in so far rar they conform to the 'lat. iieri rectiquo', are directives 
of reason rena, rdcd as a universal law. Cf. Ner. 11I, 33; 1 . 7I, 0; Clcm. St? om. II (Svv 111,332); Ctob. flnl. It, 7"p. 96 And 102 : t1, ' Sß:. 613 and 614). 
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developed may fail to mako the right decision, or to keep to it, when made. 
Since any cuc; i failure constitutes a breach of the moral lsw, it may lead to 
nerioua crimes such as the betrayal of fricndahipa or otates. 
1 Lucullua does 
not clearly explain why these consequences should follow. Since Antiochun 
did not, like the Stoics, believe that all sins are equal but held that there 
are decrees of vice as well as of virtue (Pin. IV, 64 ff. ), there seems leas 
reason to suppose that, in his system, even 
n minor derolicti^n of duty would 
involve an absolute violation of the moral law, thus impairing its control 
over the individual coneernad. The main reason why Lucullus is led to see 
the result of undermining 66ygmra as 'the betrayal of friendships and 
states' can only be Antiochus' view that the human and social relationship is 
the most important concern of morality (hence justice in the leading virtue 
and every virtue has a certain social relevance), 
2 
so that any action that 
offends morality is first and foremost aeon an one which may have undosirablo 
social and political consequences. 
Luculluc concludes that, given these considerations, there can be no 
doubt that the decisions of the wino man ... ust not only be true bvt also fixed 
and immutable. 
3 He thus makes the possibility of moral deterioration dopend, 
in the last resort, on the difference between knowled, -n and opinion, between 
the incorrigibility of the one and the fallibility of the other. The wise 
The notion of 'betrayal', which is repeated throaig-hout the paaeage, auggecto 
failure to en, rry out a rocogniaod obligation rather than ccmpleto iGneraneo 
of what is morally appropriate. Duties to country and friends are anong the 
ticst obvious of the 'appropriate actions' (xc O( -,. ovta) prescribed by reason 
(D. L. VII, 108). The Stoics held thr. t the wise mtn 'osld justifiably , vivo his 
life for the sake of country and fi: endo ýD. L. VII, 150). Cf. Acc. I, 23. 
2rin. V, 65 ff. Antiochun followed the ütoioc in atreauing the ooiaon bond 
which exists among men and their natural rroponsity to forrn friendships and 
o tabliah comaunitie3 and states (Fin. IIl, 53 fr. 
). Put in allowing doý; reen 
of virtue and vice he did away wit z tho sharp diatirotion between xclVjxovTu 
and xaTOpOC Lotta rund made it poRnible to judgo the moral niCnifieance of an 
action partly by its effect on society. The plural 'reruripubliearum 
(proditione3)' suggests a Greek political background rather than a IZomnn. 
3Cf. Fin. II, 28 (Cicero speaking of N'picurus)t 'ast Brim tanti philosophi 
t nqüo nobilis audacter crun docreta defendoro. t 
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man will never give up any decision bccauao of the firm co, nitivo bann on 
which his judgements rest, and he is thus cafe from moral sin which is duo 
to weakness and instability (Fln. IV, 77), and ultimately to false assumption 
or ignorance. 
1 But on the Academic view of eenco-improaaions, dintinetiona 
between doubt and confidence, knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly break 
down, with serious implications for morality and htman relationahipe. 
2 
Since only the certainty of absolute knowledge can safeguard the moral 
decision, Lucullus contrives to suggest' that in undornininZ; the i+erooptual 
basis of all 86Yµa' a the Academic sceptics are behaving no better than 
criminals. This conclusion follows, like the reut, from their refusal to 
allow the existence of tho cataleptic impression. 
Attempt to force the AePdemic into a rielf-refuting nrrument 
28-29 (P"41,5 - P"42,4) ax hoc illud out natura ... opinor dictum antio. 
Summary. (28)This consideration underlies the demand m. 1d4 by Aortensiua 
that your school should admit that the wise an at lea3t perceivos that 
nothing can be perceived. Antipater used to make the cams demand, 
arguing that it was consistent for or.: who affiraod that nothing can be 
perceived to say that this at lcact can he perceived, though not anything 
else. Carnoadec, opposing him with greater subtlety, used to point out 
that such an admission would on the contrary be moat inconaietcnt, for 
ro exception had been made in the atatem'nt that nothing can be percoivod. 
(29) Antiochus seemed to grapple with the point more closely by arguing 
that, since 'nothing can be perceived' was a 'C"oinion' of theirs 
(you 
lDefined by Stobaous as 'chnngoful or weak a3cent' T'a1.1I, p. Illy 21/SY^ III0 
540). cf. Ae. I, 41-42. 
? 'Me stoics hold that true friendship can exist only among the wino (Stob. Fgl. 
II p. 100,15/SVF 111,630; D. L. VII, 124. On the danß r of plaoinß the certainty 
attached to friendship on the came levol an logical certainty, ceo BQvan, 
Stoics and F tepticn, p. 152. 
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understand that by this I mean 66yga). the Academics should not have 
been doubtful about their own 'deoiäion' an they were with retard to 
other matters, especially since their entire position centred round it; 
for this was the fiulding principle of all (their) philooophy, 
1 the factor 
determining; true and false, known and unknown. Since they undertook this 
type of argument and wished to chow which impressions should be accepted, 
and which rejected, they ought at least to have perceived that principle 
on which every judgement of truth and falsehood depends. For the two 
most-important is'ues of philosophy are the criterion of truth and the 
ethical end. Any ignorance or uncertainty in regard to the starting-point 
of knowledge and the ultimate goal of appctition is alien to wisdom. 
: his, therefore, was the ground on which the Academics should have boon 
required to admit perception of at least their principal thesis. But I 
think enough has bean said about the unstable nature of their theory, if 
a sceptic can be said to have one. 
The intention of all three opponents (Hortenaiun, Antipater and 
Antiochus) is' the came in that all three want the Academic acoptie to admit' 
that he at least pcrcoivcc that nothing can be perceived, with the result 
that iie would be trapped into self-rofutation. 
2 The difference between 
Antipater and Antiochuc lies in the ground on which they argue that the 
Academic might be expected to admit thin. The statement attributed to 
Hortensiu3 consists of the bare demand that the edmisoion should be mado, 
and we are left to, infor that the underlying reaacning derives from Lucullue' 
previous argunont abo"it the cognitive roquircmcnta of any deoinlon of wisdom 
('ex hoc il : ad ost natura ... ', 28), and it, therefore nimilar to that of 
Antiochua. 
1Thi3 
may roter to certainty as to the truth of one's doh (cf. 27), if 
by 'totiua phildsophiaa' 1, uszullus does not morn only the Academic philocophy. 
But if, as seems equa?! y likely, he u; enn the Academia philosophy, the 
reference mat bb to the 'd', gca' that nothing can be irercoived. 
2See 
also 109, where 'u3ttatwn of eaopo repudiatum' is Ciecro'c description 
of this ar(; uifOiit. 
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Antipater may not have been of the came calibre as Carneadon in 
dialectical' argument, but he must surely have known that any such concession 
on the part of the Academic sceptic would be self-contradictory and damaging. 
He could not have been so naive as to think that a claim that nothing can bo 
known and an admission that this itcelf can be known would really be conoiot- 
ent, although: his argunont was no interpreted by both Carnoades and Antiochus 
(109). Since we are not given the precise details of his argument, wo can 
only have recourse to conjecture. 
One of the objection:, that can be raised nºainst Academic sceptictem 
is that it implicitly assumos the truth of certain L:. cic principles and 
conceptualisations, or at the very least it roots on the tacit acceptance of 
the proposition that nothing can be known. 
' Unlike the Sextoren ecoptic, who 
leaves the pcsaibility of knoviedgo an open quostion, 
2 the Academic denies 
that anything can bo known, and in so doing taken up a philoaophlcal position 
no lean than the dofimatiut. Hence Seneca F: . 60,44) accuses the Academics 
and other sceptics of introducing a new form of knowledjo ('ecientia'), that 
of knowing nothing ('nihil co're'), and Caxtus differentiates the Academic 
fron th, 3 Pyrrhonian sceptic on the ground that the former positively afrirma 
that all thtnga are non-approhenaible. 
3 But Antipater porha'o thought that 
1Cf. A. Vc, oaa, Sne- tic_ nn, p. 126 and 151. Epictotua II, 20,4-5. Similarly 
the Pyrrhonintc were 4omotinoc accuaod of 'dogr: ztiaing' in their rnfutatlone 
of the d u. "tintn (D. L. IX, 103 cf. S xtua fi. 1Iff. 
). Cluumnnt of Alr, xrn- 
dria firne tho come difficulty in the notion of 
I'Loxf) II0 
121). Cf. a1-. o Aristotle's ar, 3 mont (11-t. 100Ea 11 ff. 
) in defence of the 
prinoipln of contradiction, that even one who donitre it iu o. auuming its truth, 
for othorwiac he will not bo able 'o m: tks mcanir f i:. atatomonte or enpngo in 
ttrgunont. 
2Sextug 
fI. Ii. I, 1 ft. Cf. &11. II, 79t the Coxtoan ccoptio does not assort that 
there it no criterion of truth, for this would be a doerxtic etatomont. 
3P. 1f. I, 2 G. Cf. i'hotiun ftb1. cod. 212,169b 30 Cnlliue 1". A. XI, y, ©. P. Do 
Lacy ('Cv pt7 ovand the Antocodonto of Ancient Scoptieircn', Phronesia 3, 
1950, P. 67) points out that the kcadcm'Ao claim is no more thin the opposite 
to the Stol-i view that oomo things can be purculvod. Vacau (n. cit. pp. 4,27 
and 56) accapta Coxtua' dintinction and finde a clone rocomblanco between the 
Academic co. n't thn modern ucnptio, Loth of whom differ from the Fyrrhoniat in 
that they tnko an notivo part in philocophioal dincuaaion (pp. 4 and 110). 
But did not ; oxtua do an? 
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ho could not argue along these lines because the Acadopic3 (including both 
Areosilao and Carneadoe) had already anticipated the objection by allowing 
no exception to the statement that nothiig can be known no that it applies, 
also to itself, ' Antipator does not, on the other hand, seem to hivo used 
the argument that in this unqualified universal form the statement that 
nothing can be perceived might be regarded as soll-refuting. 
2 For if nothing 
can be known, the sceptic cannot know oven thio, 
3 
no that any argncnt to 
the contrary would be just as credible as hin own claim. This criticism of 
course ignores the issue of probability, by which Carneados would no doubt 
have defended his own position (cf. 110). 
So what Antipater may have done was to resort to a typo of argument 
commonly used against-the later Dcoptica, 
4 
which offered tho, Acadomio a choice 
botwoon two alternatives but in a cense required him to choose one of them.. 
Either the Academic knows that nothing can be known, or he does not know. . 
If 
ha does not #know, his. otatcment har, no foundation and cannot be taken coriouu. " 
ly. Conciutency therox'ore requires that he should allow perception at leant 
of his claim that nothing can be known, 
5 though if he ware to make ouch an 
admission, ho would be trapped in another inconaictenry. 
1ý'_, 
o-It45 'itaqu') Arceailas nogabat ease quidqu. vn quod ouiri poacot, tic illud 
quido, n ipsuý:., cuod Soorat03 eibi roliquinsot. ' Cf. Soxtuu P-1,. I, 14, A. M. VIII, 
4BO ff.; D. L. IX, 76. In 4C1 Soxtuo ucen the Sa. ýoua analorj with the ctcp-lodc±ojr 
that is 
. Eirat iscd and than. ovorturnod, which 
in al; o unad by l1ato 1+n . 511b) 
and Witt anatuin (Trnrt%ttun 6.54). 
2Cf. tho famous p: xradox of the Cretan liar (96; Dio1c-Kranz Vora. I p. 72). Other 
oxarplos of ccolj'-ro1'utir ntatemonta are 'nothing is true' (1+rict. rnt. 1012a 
29 if., 1C6Io 'j f G); 'a, ll droamu aro fn'. no', if h9r. rd in a drourn +: lem. t mm. 
VI3I, 5/SVF II, 121); 'all noral prcnopta -: e nupor0uoun' (which is itself a 
pY"ecopt, Sons .9 , 
6O). Cf. Soxturt P. II. I, 14; E0i. II, 1E+ß; 1+. t2. VII, 3133 ft. 
3J. 
uoretiu3 IV, 469-70. AocordinC to t i1ey'e Coauaontery (III, p. 1238), the 
a, rL am%nt lu particularly at Motrodarua or Chios Q9.. II, 73), but, as Do 
Lacy notes (V. 6) n. 3), i trodoruo v: ao in fact oxprsaain, the aaxw Idea. 
411-11. rt, 130,1«;.. 105; A. rI. VIt, 337, '134 ff., 440; VIII, 278 ff., 463 ff. 
5It is unl ikoly that Antipater wan cu ; gcutin ; that the Academic claim be oxolu-. 
dod rya a , rr. -bur from tht, cl! n of p, "opocitione to which it refers, as to Lacy 
p. 70 ) ": hinkt. It tja hid, he would in a canao havo been anticipatirV; 
I! uscnli's coluti. on to thr; paradox of the Liar. 
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Antiochu3 cecaw to have felt that his approach wa better because, 
firstly, he avoids th4 issue of inconaistcncy, and secondly, he carries the 
attack a step further. Arguing that 
, 
'nothing can be perceived' is a 'dog a' 
of the Academics, he stipulates that they should not be doubtful about it 
('non debere cos in oue dccreto cicut in ceteris rebus fluctuari', 29), not 
so much because dogmatism by nature excludes the element of doubt as because 
such an attitude contradicts their claim to to philosophers. Luculluc has 
already established in the previous cecti: n (27) that philosophy en, i wisdom 
can rest only on certainty and that the decision of a wise . an must be 
indubitably true. Ile now represents Antiochu3 as arguir.., on the basis of 
the above contention ('ex hoe illud eat natura... ', 28), that unless the . 
Academic admits perception of his one 'dogma', he will be undermining his 
Philosophical credibility and his or rather the Academic wise man's claim to 
wisdom. 
' Carneade3 had,, in Antiochun' opinion, evaded a logical inconsistency 
at the expence of weakening the corneretono of hic philosophy. 
The question of what constitutes a 'philosophy' probably admits of 
different answers. 
2 The Academics would to doubt have thought of themselves 
aa having as much right to be conaidorcd a philoaophictl echobi ao. any of. tho 
do tilts, even if their main contcntion routed maroly on probability. 
3 
But, for Antiochus, a doctrine au3t rotzt on a firm perceptual ani cognitive 
Cf. 109, where Cicero nummarisos the argument thus: 'cince there can be 
no decision of the wine man that is not groiped$ perceived and kuown,.: ujyone 
who said that this very dcoiaion, that nothini; c: n be porcoivod, was that of 
the wine man, should, admit that it is perceived. ' , º]. rzbcrg'n 'c{ui v : pientio 
once diceret' makes acceptable sons^ of t4is pacoale, though the text is 
uncertain. 
2Cf. Naocn, '£Ce ticicm, pp. 20 -33, especially p. 29, d2feniing I rrhoniam: 
'Aa to whether oceptician counts as philosophy, if we accept is a necessary 
condition for anything no be a philorophy that it mutt contain at least one 
proposition, or at least one doctrine, claimed to be true or probable, then 
scepticism is not a philosophy. ' Cf. Sextun 
3In 
109-10 Cicero diamicces ar abr: urd the idea that the wise roan could have 
only one 'de. urotum' ('proinde quani sapiens wollu: a alind decretum habeat at 
sine decratin ultam aeore pocsit'). It in not clear whether or not ho i3 
still using 'decrottrj' in Anticchun' coma and in contrast with 'probabilia' 
I" the following ucntcnco. If he is, it nigh . be more connietent to read 
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base if it is to be the foundation of a philosophical system. At the end of 
29 Lucullus raiueo the question whether the Academic, who approves nothing, 
can be said to have a 'sentential, just an Clement of Alexandria concludes 
that the definition of atpcotc as 'an adherence to a number of dogmas 
consistcnt with one another and with appearances, tending towards the good 
life' cannot apply to those who withhold 1udgemont about everything. 
' 
Antiochus is prepared to treat the Academic system as a proper philosophy, 
but only on condition that its basic principle, that nothing can be perceived, 
is itself regarded as certain and therefore an providing a criterion of truth 
and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance. The paradox of this argument is that 
it ignores the nature of the particular 'criterion' involved, which is in 
effect a denial of the possibility of a criterion. In a negative way, 
however, the principle that nothing can be perceived does offer a test of 
every experience that is-dither accepted or rejected, i. e. judged true or 
false on grounds of probability, and if the 'prohablo presentation' is'to be 
followed (cf. 33 ff. ), this itself ariaes from the basic principle that 
nothing can be perceived. Antiochus not only aeon the claim that nothing can 
be known as the ultimate basic of every judgement the Academic makes about 
truth and falsehood, but also ironically represents it as a criterion of 
perception and knowledge in the came sense as the cataleptic impression, 
which it denies. 
'nec' (with Lambinun) in place of 'et' ('nee nine deorctic uitera agora 
resýit'), t,, -at*h there is no MM authority for this chano (coo Paid p. OS 
n. 31). If 'rice' is road, the aantwr, co could also be interpreted as giving 
two alternativen which cnablo the Academic to occape the di1err . presented 
by Antioff hjs: the Aandomic wino man MY have 'decreta', though not in the 
nonce däfinnd by Antiochua, or ho nay not need 'decrot: i', o: recially in 
Antiochuo' nenne. Cf. S'extua P. fl. I, 13 ff., where it in explained in what 
conao of 'dog-ral the ccoptio phUof3orhor any be said 'not to docrmatiao'. 
1Clc: 
'. "tro . ViII, S 
(; Vý' II, 121, p"37,9 ff. ). The firs. part of the definition 
is also j; ivon by ;; oxtu., who proponen an alternative definition more nuitablo 
to the 8ecptic (P. 11. i, 16-17). In 99 Cicero dean not retrain from apcaking of 
'tota Carn, e. Jic : jententia'. 
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Antiochus maintains that anyone who makes a claim to wisdom must be 
certain of two things, the starting-point of knowledge and the final ethical 
end. His insistence on the central importance of the former may reflect the 
change in hic own philosophical position, from support of the sceptical 
Academy to opposition to it. Combatting scepticism or dogmatism respectively 
becomes, in the last resort, a question of asserting or denying the existence 
of a criterion, and this is the widest and most crucial difference that 
divides philosophers (cf. Sextus A. M. VlI, 27-28). By foisting at least one 
dogmatic principle on the Academic sceptics, Antiochus attempts either to 
lure or to force them into the opposite camp. But the question of the 
criterion is also relevant for morality, for to abolish perception is also 
to abolish certainty as to the ultimate goal of moral action (of. 23-25), 
and it is here that uncertainty is most damaging (Fin. V, 15). By bringing 
in the concept of the chief good and shifting attention to moral wisdom, 
Antiochus shows that his principal concern is, after all, with moral action. 
If he persists in refusing to admit the certainty of his own basic principle, 
the Academic twice' man will have neither starting-point nor ultimate 
standard on which to base his judgements and actions. Hence Lucullus' final 
accusation of 'inconctantia', connoting both lack of firmness and stability 
in the Academic system1 and the moral weakness which is inseparable from it: 
'omne peccatum imbecillitatis et inconstantiao cat' (F3n. IV, 77). 
2 
11n Div. II, 1 Cicero makes the counter-claim that the Academic philosophy to 
'minime adrogans maximeque et constano et elegana'. 
2Cf. L . I, 45, where 'perpetua ratio vitae' is identified with virtue and 'inconstantia' with vice. See 23 on the 'conetantia' of wisdom and the wise 
mm (p. 134 of the Commentary). 
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The arframent from to1eoloCy 
30-31 (p. 42,5 - p. 4396) sequitur disputatio .... postulat dicrro. 
Summary. (30) There follows' an orguient which, though niply supported, 
is rather, less obvious - for it borrows come material from physics - 
no that I fear I may be giving greater scope to my opponent, for what 
would he do about mattem that are shrouded in darkness when he is trying 
to snatch away the light of day? Nonetheless, it could have been argued 
in detail how artistically nature has constructed every animal, and man 
in particular: how efficient the senses are, ho' impressions first affect 
us and move impulse and we then direct wir 3cnshJ towards perception of 
objects. For the mind, being the fountain-head of sensations end itself 
a sense, naturally turns its attention to what affects it. It acts upon 
some impressions at once, others it stores, giving rise to memory, and 
the rest it groups by virtue of their similarities, forming concepts, 
called sometimes Pvvobct , sometimes %po7fjctC by the Greeks. The 
addition of reason, demonstrative argument and a myriad of foot s culnin- 
ates in perception of all those thingn, 
2 
and, with the gradual porrocting 
of reason, in wisdom. (31) Therefore, since the human mind in adapted 
to knowledge of things and coherence of life, it welcomes apprehension 
above all, and that3 VaW tjy tC (which, as I said, we shall tr3. n. slate, 
literally as 'grasp') it loves both for its own cake (for it holds nothing 
dearer than the light of truth) and also for its trsefulrean. Thus it 
employs the Gences rare', moreover, produces the arts, which are as it were 
further senses, and invigoraten philosophy until it brings about virtue 
on which the whole of life depends. Therefore those who deny the 
possibility of knowledge tute snatching away all that dervoc and cqu. pa 
life, or rather, utterly overturning it and robbing the living creature 
('animal') of the mind that gives it life ('animus'), so that I cm at a 
loss properly to dc. cribo their tcmor! ty. 
An ow+cnßibla viforenro to the order of treatmont by Antiochus in the 
discucaion at Aioxatidritt (11-12), although Cicero may have been influenced 
by tho arrangumcutc of tho ar cntc in the 2or, »ws (lioi p. 120 n. 14). 
2Ise. 
of the Oijecto revealed to the mind throuj; h aanoo and reazon working together a do, cribod. 
31ioro ' ietam' means, not 'that of yours',, but 'that, tirhi'h you know about'. 
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If it were a self-evident fact that our perceptual and cognitivo 
faculties are dorigned for and capable of thtaining knowledge, there would be 
no room for doubt and ucepticicm. But in resorting to this ardent ana 
basing it on the craftemanlike, purposes of nature, Lucullus is not really 
bringing any significant help to his case, as he him33lf is fully aware, not 
only because the argument from teleology as such belonged to physics, and 
physics, or the science of nature, was generally considered to treat of 
matters that are mysterious and veiled fron direct human observation, 
l but 
also because this argument and the doctrine of which it is a part, that the 
world is Governed by a divine providence, were strongly contented by the 
Academic-sceptics. 2 If the Academic can elaborately argue against perception 
of objects which are directly observablo, 
3 his orposition will certainly 
increase when it comes to matters that are to a large extent beyond the range 
of'the senses and, arguably, of reason. 
Antiochus horn accepts the Stoic and Aristotelian view that the works 
of natura display artistic skill and that nature, like art, in guided by a 
purpone. 
4 But while Aristotle's teleology did not an a rule include the idea 
of a divine purpose-or personify nature as an artist, Antiochun seems to have 
fully accepted the stoic view of nature ar divine reason, working with foro- 
thou, ht and intelligent eraftamariship (TCXvLxa'C ). 
5 Since Lucullua' aim 
Antiochu. a, however, believed that the secrets of the universe can be 
unravelled by reanoi (Fin. V, 56). 
207,119-121; 
rs_p. 1,4,11,73,111,65 ft. 
3For the accusation that the Acadomica 'steal the daylitht' and ever .. th 
darks eon mattarm that are clear, cf. 16,26 and 61; R'. 1). I4. Sea also p. 144 
n. 4 of this commentary. 
4Cf. f? 7, Aa. 1,23-29. Aristotle arr,: ed that, since art imitates nature, if 
art is purpoeorul, so is nature (fhºy+z. II, 199a 15 ff. ate. ). 
5Caicn, 11,11781 p. 329,36. Cf. Leno'c definition of 
nturr (r; r God as 'a oraftwmwnlika tiro proceeding, methodically to the work 
of ercation': f. f. II, 57; n. L"VII, 156; Cnlult 1cffAn Icd. 95/r,. _, 
r"r' II, 11331 Clem. 
Strc, m. V, 1A/tWP 11,1134; Aet. I, 7,33/ Yj 11,1027. 
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is to demonstrate the existence of purpoco in the skilful construction of 
man's perceptual faculties and that thidpurpose is the attainment of 
knowledge and ultimately moral perfection, he quickly narrows the discussion 
from 'animal omne' to man, the, most favoured of nature's creational and in 
particular to the function of the seneos and the mind ('meng'), which is 
clearly intended to emerge as the most important of the human faculties. 
2 
This conforms to the Stoic view of the mind or reason as the cotmanding part 
of the soul (t yepovtvhv) , responsible for every human activity and the 
seat of all perceptual and cognitive experience. 
3 
To illustrate nature's craftsmanship Luoullus points to the efficiency 
both of the senses and of the mind ('quad uia ceaut in sonaibus', 
4 'naturalera 
uim habet', ; 0), and the way in which our responses develop from the first 
stirring of sensation right down to the fornation of concepts and, finally, 
the perfection of reason and attainment of moral wisdom. It is obvious, 
particularly from the point where he mention's memory ('alia quasi reaoMit'), 
that Lucullus is not describing any random stages in human experience but a 
progressive development from more sensation to full rationality and moral 
enlightenment. On the other hand, it is not clear whether, from 'quem ad 
Man in superior to the other animals in the structure both or hic body and 
of his mind (Fin-V, 3 34 ff. ). The Stoics hold that man in r oro or leas eharply 
differentiated from the other enirnalc by the pocaeaaton of receon (VF 1,377, 
119725 ff., 034 etc. ), a distinction which goes bac' to Alcmacon c. 500 D. C. 
(DK I, p. 215). 
2Cf. 1'in. V, 34: 'animumque ita conetitutum ut et acnnibua inatrucitus sit of 
habest pracetantiam mentis cut tots, hominia natura p: ireat, in qua sit mira- 
bills quaedam uie raticnis at cognitionia at scientian uirtutunq-% ocintw. -n. ' 
3Aet. IV, 0, l, of. 23,1 (svi IT, 050 and 054); D. L. VII, 159 (, y I1037). For the 
relation of the parts of soul to the i)yrjL0VIx6v, ce0 SVF Ii, p. 227 ff. and 
235 ff. The ima o of tho fountain-hood is also found in Chalcidius in Tim. 
220 ('uolut e capite fontis', "VP II, 879, p. 235,30)" Other im, -ce are th 
branchoc of a tree, the thre:: a of a npidor'a wob (Chaleidiua ).. e. ), and the 
tentacles of an oetopua (Aot. IV, 21/ VF II, 336, p. 227,27). 
4Reid (p. 211 n. 20) correctly observes that the efficiency of the sonees formed 
part of the argument in 20, which is rcfo: recd to ugain in 37 ('cum uim qu3o 
eoeet in cenaihus explicabauuua'). But hie cueeestion that Clcuro is being 
careless overlooks the fact that Lucuullun' point is now a different one, 
namely that the validity of thy: ccnaec is guarantaod by the part they play in 
the attairment of naturo'a ultimate purpoatr for man. The two argumunts have, 
revcrtholeca, comothing in common (ere p. 110 n. 3 of this Co: mientary). 
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modum' to 'intenderemus', he is tracing euccee3ive atepa in the human 
development from the moment of birth (i. e. at Eirat we merely receive 
impressions, as the result of which we are attracted to certain objects, 
and it is only later that we conaeioualy attend to perceiving them), or 
whether he is analysing the combined cognitive and appotitive act as it may 
occur at a more mature stage. Both logically and tempo mrily, impressions 
must come first and, perception follow afterwirda. Similarly appotition can 
only occur after the experience of impreasiona. But in placing appetition 
before perception. 
,, 
Lucullus appears to be contradicting hie account or 
appetition in 24-5, where it wan implied that assent and at least a minimal 
act of perception must precede appotition. 
I 
One explanation of the inconsietcncy may lie in the fact that thorn 
is often a certain overlap between appetition and, u&cant, to which a 
schematic outline may fail to do juatico. The Stoic view that sensations 
('census', cLLa6hocLr. ) are themselve3 aot3 of aoaent2 cannot offer a 
solution here, since in that context sensation acems to mean perception 
and the claim is meant to demonstrate that accent must precede appetltion 
(108), while in the present passage Luoullu3 appears to be placing accent 
after appetition. One might (as ouggcsted in the previous paragraph) 
interpret his statement as a list of human roeponaen, fror the moment o: 
birth, in accordance with the temporal sequence in ". nich they occur, or 
even as a more list of the principal activities of th* mind 
(tlie experience 
of impressions, appetition and psrception). 
3 Altornativoly, it minimal not 
of ap; atition may be %hought of as rcavac&ry to diract attention to tho 
objects which are to be perceived, or oven to the action or choice of 
actions which may be performed by the percipient (ann pp. 101 and 203 below). 
le- ee p. 141 above. If 'burn ut sennus ad res porcipiendaz intendereruo' 
(30) 
is taken as final or consecutive, T, ucullus' stataºnont irr even more inconsis- 
tent with the previous account in 24 bcrcauje it DUJi Bets that imp_ocnic.: and 
appotition are the prercquicites of attention and judgucnt. IJut 'ut' is 
probably being used in the sonne of 'qucß ad taoci: ia' above. 
2cr. 103; -111-Y 7:, 72-74. 3Cf. 
Aet. IV, 21 OTT I7.036), though here the activitioo i:. ciudo n ent and 
are lioted in the correct order. 
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. Although in describing sensation and appetttion Lucullua uses words 
('pellerent', 'pulca') that might uuggcnt that we are at the mercy of 
impressions, he corrects this by emphasising the active role of the mit: d 
in perception ('intenderemus',. 'intondit'). The experience of an ic: preccion 
is involuntary, but the act of attention, like the not of annont (implied in 
'arripit'), in a necessary condition of perception, and both must depend on 
the percipient. 
' 
Why we respond in thin way to impression, or to Remo 
impressions, is explained by the fact that the mind, being 'the source of 
the senses and even itself a sense', is 'moved' by them. It is presumably 
hero that apretition plays a part by guiding the attention of, the mind to 
what has some use or value for the living creature. 
In seeing a close affinity between the mind and the senses, Antiochua 
sides with the Stoics against Plato and Ariatotlu, who never regarded 
intellect and sense as a single faculty. 'Their virtual unification in Stoic 
theory helps to minimise the possibility of perceptual error and to counter 
the Sceptical arg ment that, since the intellect has no contact with external 
objects, it cannot ; judge of natters that have no relation to it. 
2 The view 
of the mind as itself a sense follows easily from its identification with 
the f re1to vtxb v, as the centre of sensory and cognitivo awareness, and 
from the material unity of the whole acnsrry I: ynt6m. 
3 The Stoics expressed 
this interpenetration of ninel and sense in different w3ya. Sextun rerreoents 
them an arguing that 'the same thing is both intellect and ucnno, but in 
1Cf. Watson, Stoic Thenryv of Knowled , p. 35. rar aaaont .a voluntary, see 37-38; Fat. 42-43; Soxtua A. ý:. VII1,397" 
2Soxtuc A. Ai. VII, 352-3 otc. Cf. Aillon, p. 60: 'If, any diatinotion at all ie 
undo botweon the h'". m. on(ken and its fivofold inatru ent, thoro in room for 
a Sceptic to drive a wAdgo. ' 
3Act. 
IV, 21/SVF 11,036. Hcnco Chzycippuu' comparison of the f 'gtovtxf6v to 
a spider who cpni feel any contact with any of i. ta threads 
(^V! ' 11, p. 236,12). 
The Stoics seem to have boon anticipated in their view of the 
i1Yrµnvtxöv 
by Thcophrastua' aucceasor, Strato of La. npaacus (Zoller. Arintootle. And the 
Pariser rcri`atotica II, p. 460-9; C. J. do Vor al- Gr"-pk Ihi3er____ if, pI 
258-) . but in :: trato'n c. ao thoro scene to 
have ccn a Lota1 identification 
of Mind with the ounces (Soxtus 1.. M. VYI, 350). 
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different; respcata', just an the same cup in concave inside but convex 
outside (A. M. VII, 307); elnowhero, that 'there are in principle two faculties 
but as properties of the whole soul they aro combined and coextensive with 
each other, as honey in throughout both liquid and sweet (ib. 359)"l Thv 
intellect is thus able to uco the senses an its instrument (ib. 354)"2 
Lucullua' account of the mind's active rosponso to improaciona ('alia 
ulna sic arripit ut its statim utatur, alia quasi rccondit.... cetera autoirr 
similitudinibus conatruit.... ') in mialenAinL; in that it represents each atop 
as concerned with a different cot of impressions - come for immodiato use, 
others to be stored asp it were. -for 
later reference, while yet others are 
classified by mutual resetoblanco. One would, however, assume that any 
impression, whether 'used' (i. e, acted on) or not, can remain in the memory 
and also provide material for the classification of particulars. We must 
conclude, therefore, that these groups of 'uiaa' are not intended to be 
mutually exclu2ive, and that their differentiation in merely a convenient 
way of drawing attention to the mental operations involved. Again, though 
the antithesis between 'used and 'stored' in hardly applicable to impr. auions, 
the distinction between the immediacy of a perceptual experience and memory, 
which ariaca only when the sensible object in no longer within view, is a. 
valid ono. 
3 Similarly the grouping; of impromaionn by renomblancuc raprosento 
a further cognitive stae, Yo after memory, thou. h aennution and memory are 
clearly continuous and complementary thro%: ghout the process. 
1According 
to Stoic theory, thin intarponotration (wp'. catC) can tgko pluce 
without 1030 of identity ('/oller, stoir: n, T'nirý, rnýn wnKl : ýr. ýr tlc.., 1). 1 . 77). 
2Cf. 
Dillon'n exposition of Antioehu3' view of the relation between mind 
and the oense3 p. 67-60). fo contracts it with tho 'low' view of the aenaoo 
taken by Sextun in A. il. VII, 343 ff., although Coxtus in thoro stating L. 
po: iition very similar to that of kntiochus and the Stoics namely that 
porcoptu&l judgements involve more than the conccc (cf. 21j. I would su(oat 
that the opposition botwoon Antiochuo and Coxthu emerioa moro clearly in. 
A. M. VII, 354 ff., whora . ooxtun is artruint aCuinst the view that truth is diccovorod by tho mind in conjunction with the conces. 
3Aot. IV, 11 (^vP 7I, 83). On the whole, Luculluz' oxponition seems to conform 
noro to pr. inciploo of style, such ai antithcs; in and tricolon arran emont, 
than to accuracy of detail in the cubjcot.. mattar. 
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Comparable account3 of the dovolopmcnt of tho grnoral concopt from 
sensation and memory are 1., *ivcn by Aristotle at the outset of the Votnrhynicn 
(900a ff., cf. An. Post. 100a 3 ff. ) and by Aetiua P1nr,. IV, 11/SVF' 11,33), 
who is quoting the Stoics. In both these accounts memory is oucceded by 
experience (rýEtýF ýpta), which arises from any memories 'of the same thing' 
(Aristotle), or 'of the same kind' (Aetiun). Aristotle adds that art or 
science1 arises when 'from many reflections of experience one general concept 
is formed concerning similar cases, ' i. e. exporionce, as cocpared with art, 
is otill concerned with the particular. 
2 Aetius, on the other hand, passes 
without comment from experience to concepts, which ho divides into those 
forayed 'in the ways described and without art' (Apoaý'i tr ) and those which 
are acquired 'through instruction and attention on our part' (lv votat ). 
One may infer that 'natural' concepts are still closely linked to experience, 
but that 'scientific' concepts go some way beyond it. Since reason in said 
to develop from 'natural' concepts (Aotiua ib. ), they clearly telong to an 
earlier cognitive stage than 'scientific' concepts. In Lucullua' account, 
the grouping of impressions by similarities ('caters asten similitudin. bun 
construit') seem3 to correspond to the stage referred to by both Arintotlo 
and Aotiu3 as 'exporicnco'. Although he . ppoaro to unoign both 7Mo l'sc6C 
and E vvo wt to this atngu, he does not-clearly differentiate botuoen 
them, 3 and tho emorcnoo of roanon is mentioned only in the following 
acntenco ('No cum accc33it ratio... '). Again, a certain ovorlop runt bo 
allowed for, ainco the achemitic cnd uirn ltatio naturo of his account makes 
Met. 9ß1 a5 ff. Science la added in An. Pomt. 100; 0. 
2Accordir. 
C to Ttoca (Arintntlc'r. Motnrhvnirn I, p. llG), oxperiencn forooawowo 
the univcrcal, without boinZ aware of it a univcroa.. 
31t 
13 curious that in Tor-31 Cicoro ohould givo the same dcuoription of 
'notio' ('notioncm appollo quod Craooi tum %vvot. üv tum nr6), i v cv), and then proceed to explain it in termu which would rtpply only to the 'natural' 
concept. Porhapn he is uzinr X vvo t, u. hore an a grenoral and incluiivn trz, , as the -Stoics thcmt, olven numotirnca did (, lotiun ib. ). 
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it difficult to assign each type of concept to its appropriate plcce, or 
elaborate fully on the ways in which thef can be formed. If ho selects for 
mention the grouping of cimilars, it is perhaps becauso thin comes clocost 
to suggesting the universal, and recognition of the common elements in 
sensible objects is the cimplect and most natural way in which concepts can 
be formed. 
Both Sextun and Diogenes Laertiusl give a lint of tho various waya in 
which concept3 can arise otherwise than by direct efcquaintanco with objects, 
including similarity (xae'bµot&riTa ) and analogy (xar'üvaaoytav ). 
Since these processes are supplementary to tho wimple conceptualicing of 
sensible experience, they are unlikely to provide a clue to our prcacnt 
2 
passage. Cicero's phrase, 'cetera (cc. uisa) nirtlitudinibu3 construit', 
recalls Aetiun' description of ýLC LPta as Tb Twv 6µ6e LOZZv tpavTaoi&5v 
ýa'ýeoc .3 The concepts which would first arine are those which fi o in 
section 21, 'white, si"recr' etc. and 'dog, horse', not those formed by the 
'analogical' processes given in Sextua' list (e. g. 'pyemy', 'centaur', or 
the notion of Socrates derived from his bust). The plural 'oimilitudinibug' 
is perhaps used to allow for different principles of grouping; e. g. a white 
ball and a white stick are similar in colour, a whits ball crud a ro3 ball 
in shape. The word 'construct' ('rut together', 'ruiid'Y eug cots a of rtain 
complexity of arrangement, which might result in a t'urthor Claaaificatio)n of 
sensible objeotu by species or kinds. 
1Sox:. 
43 A. M. VITI, 50-60, of. X1,250; III, 40$ D. L. VII, 52-3; of. Pin. III, 33. 
2Thero 
in no justification for Heid'u view (p. 212 n. 4) that Marc, is here 
i norin, g concepts formed dircotly from experierioo and that ';. intlitudinibu: 3' 
represents tho sum-total of the indirect mnthoda ll. ttod by Sixtus under the 
nurse of 'anwiogical inference' (A. N. XI, 250). Paid ! c, mor^over, wrong in 
saying that 'sinilitudino' in b'In. II1,33 is equivalent to vrzr'Ava? cytQv, for 
this Cicero translates as 'collationo rationio'. Dillon, p. 13, is perhuprl Influenced by Raid in giving thu Crook equivalent of 'oiriilitudinec' an avaaoytai. 
3Cf. ütav bý 6Jtoctbrt4 r. o)ºu t µv%jliatytvwv-zu, L, -tb, tcgzuty rxccv rpi tptuv, (Aetiun ib. ), and Diogonoo' doccripticn of a %pW, tj; i nccordirw to Epieurua, 
as 'a memory c! ' what ban orten been presented externally to Ounce, e. g;. "such a thing is man", (D. L X, 33). 
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The ]ast Dart of Lucullua' nccovnt, from the eurer enco of reacon to 
the attainment of wisdom ('co cum accoecit ratio ... ad oapicntiam peruenit'), 
ic, like the rest, treated only in brief outline. With reason comers 
demon3trative ar^ument, and the meaning of 'porceptio' can be widened tö 
include the wealth of knowledge acquired not only directly through the acmes 
but by the logical praeeoa. Having earlier accepted the idea of virtua e 
the perfection of reason (26), Lucullue assumes a utraightforwar4 progress 
from the growth of rennon to moral maturity, but except for hints contained 
in the earlier argument (26-7) and in the next section (31), he is fairly 
vague about the sort of knowledge and mental activity that is included in 
thin final etago. 
Except at the level of oensc, huculluz has not mentioned the function 
of appetition, but it is clear that it must have boor. present throughout the 
cognitive procoon, directing the mind's response to what is perceived to be 
In agreement with nature. This in no lens true in the final stage, when man 
becones aware of the summum bonuni. In 31 wo are told that the mind is 
attracted to'knowlcdgo both for its own cake and for the cake of Ito utility 
('c wa tpnain per cc anat... tun otiam propter usum'). This applies to the 
oxcrcise of the sencec, to the production of the arts, which are an oxtonaionn 
of the cenno ('gvasi conaun alteroa'), end also to the pursuit of philosophy, 
which above all tends to virtue an a unifying factor in the whole of life. 
'T'hus the artq too are drawn into the cognitive scheme which culmtnaten in 
the p;, rfeotior, of reason und virtue, as e.. tending the powere of they mind, the 
exerc. tco of which in, for Antioehuuz, no negligible part of the rur m: rn an_,, _m1 
IN-en if, for at iy indiv. Ldual, the practice of the arts nay be limited and may 
seam to have little tc do with virtue, for man no a whole it roprooenty an 
important ntep in his co,, njtivo dovolopx cnt and in the fulfilment of nature'o 
purpose for him as a rational boing. 
lr, iýý. l'rzýýOs 11,3 ft. 
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Antiochus' ponition in these two sectionn is entirely that of an 
empiricint, and there Is nothing to suggent that he nayr, as part of his 
allegiance to the Old Academy, have attempted to reconcile the Platonic 
theory of Forms with Stoicism. This view hau been put forward principally 
on the basin of An. I, 30-33, where Varro gives nn exFosition of the Ideal 
theory and Aristotle is said to have undermined it. 
l It Is contradicted, 
however, by the preccnt passage and by Ciceto'a explicit statement In 142 
that in his view of the criterion Antiochun was a Stoic and not a Platonist. 
2 
If Antiochus had in fact urhold the theory of Forma we would not have 
expected Cicero to conceal it, for the vary reason that it would have made 
him much more vulnerable to sceptical attack. 
Apart-from the Academical there is no direct evidence to link 
Antiochua with the theory of Forma. The version of it that appears in 
Cicero's Orator3 may or may not have emanated from Antiochua, but the Form 
is there treated an an ideal pattern and could not have been identified with, 
an ordinary concept. 
4 In the Do Legibus, however, Cicero rofers to the 
'cormuuiie intelli. fentia' which rakes . hirqu known to no and determines our 
zoral judgements (1 . I, 44-5)" It in po©aiblo, 
therefore, that Antiochua 
1W. Tholier, Di e Vnrhf rfvi tunr drin WeunlAtnniniruz (1930)p p. 40 ff.; C. Luck, 
Per t, kademikrr Anttochun 1973), p. 2U IT. U oo the dineusaiona in Long, 
IJ" F'h. pp. 22'1-228, Dillon, pp. 92 ft., P. 1 orla. n, Caml! rt ITtrytn"Y O inter 
Pýroc, k end T'rr7y tlndinva Fhiloýorlty, PP"53-55; R. E. Fitt, Al inun, p. 52 and 
Pr-57-50- 
2 *n cupport of his view that Antiochus did hold a modified form of IdE,. l 
theory, Lon, arguos (p. 228) that the neorau to have regarded the acquisition 
of valid co, copto an is necessary conditi' or accurate perception', and that 
thin is un-Stoic. 1ho ur(eumert ce"Ina to be based ^: i Lueullun' Mention of 
'pcrcoptiu' at the end of 30, where it follown the acquisition of concepts. 
Lc"ntr, admitrn that if Antioch'xn is dnccribinK what the Stoics called 'knowledge', 
there is no problem. T have asnumcd that perception is montioncd here because 
it includou rational it, terenco as well as cenae-porception. I, onf; 's point is, 
hownver, an intere3tin, T, une, namely that, for the Stoic, the cataleptic 
Irnprorsion does not rnattiro general concepts as a teat of its validity, and 
that the stress laid by Antiochus on the role of the Intellect in his defence 
of it may be in thin respect unorthodox. 
3tºrctt. 
ß ff., quoted by Dillon, pp. 93-4. 
4 he ; tome are said to have identified tho idea with thouihto in the mind (Aot. 7,1O, 5,3tob. 1'a1.. I, r. 13G/ýVt' 1,65). In 't'u: c. I, 57 Ciccro dcocribca the 
as 'inlitao of quani connignatac in minis n'tionac, quan ivvotar. 
110cli11L 
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may in some way have cubatituted the universality of human experience for 
the objective existence of the Forms, and to equated them with. the )coLvai 
Evvotat of the Stoics. 
1 To go further and suggest that he identified the 
Forms with thoughts in the mind of God, 
2 
and these in turn with the 1 6? o. 
cncppmortxot of the Stoic universe, is to go considerably further than 
the evidence. 
3 
The teleological argument which Antiochun uses here in the Academiea 
is not a new one, 
4 but it is debatable whether it can be proved that knowledge 
is possible on the ground that our perceptual faculties have boon adapted 
for that very purpose. For only by takinj for granted that perception occurs 
can we show'that our faculties are adapted to it. On the other hand, the 
obvious complexity of the perceptual process creates a presumption that it 
has a purpose and that this purpose is what it appears to be, the perception 
of external objects. Lucullus does not, like Dalbus in ' D. II, l4O ff., 
elaborate fully on the nature and function of each of the sensory organs,, 
but he does assume (like Balbus, and like Piso in Fln. V, 34 fr. ) that the 
mind has been fitted in the boat possible way ('aptissi a', 31) for acquiring 
knowledge and virtue, and that the Academics by their philosophy of doubt 
are robbing man of the equipment nature has bestowed on him for living and 
for attaining the goal of life, Bence his strictures on their 'rachnese' 
('temoritas'), a charge more often brought by the sceptic against the 
do natint. But whores the sceptic accuses the dogmatist of rash assent, 
5 
1See Dillon; P"94; it"LLWitt, Alb 1n i, p. 58. 
2Cf. Long, lt_ Feh. p. 220. The identification is to be found in Seneca x. 65,7. 
31f 1. ntiochua had dovined auch a theory, he would have left the eccptio 
little room for manoeuvre. By the close ro3ationnhip entabliahed botwcen 
the physical world and the coneeptn both in Cod'n mind and in the human mind, 
cxtornil objocte would be brourht within our grasp, and the uniformity of 
concepta, no matter who the percipient, would naturally entail that knowledge 
in possible. Therein no trace of ouch a view in the Aendemicn. 
4F. '. g. Plat. Tim-46c-47d: Arist. An-434a 31,435b 20-25- 
50(. 68,100, Soxtus p. 1,1,20 etc.; ftnid, p. 255 u. 22. 
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the dogmatist claim: z that ccopticism and by implication btoxfj is 'rash' 
because it entails unacceptable consequences. It therefore belongs to the 
same. clas3 of moral sin as 'error', 'louitas', 'opinatio' and 11Cnoratio' 
(67; 1,42; Fin. III, 72). 
Lucullus' charge that, by rejecting the cataleptic impression, the 
Academic ocepticn are depriving the living thing of its life-principle 
('animal', 'animun') implies that, like Aristotlo, he sees the living thing 
( r, Ov ) as differentiated by sensation. 
I In 37 he makes the diftorcnce 
between the living and the non-living; ('animal', 'inaninaa') primtrily one 
of action, which depends on sensation and voluntary assent; those who rofuse 
assent to their sense-impressions are thus robbed of their 'animus'. It is 
clear that the basic meaning of 'a'nimus' in these contexts in the power of 
responding actively to sensations which is common to all animals, but th. %t 
any Ions or diminution of the 'animus' in thin sense would take with it the 
higher facultie3 as well, including the poaoibility of wisdom and virtue and 
all that can be developed from the proper exercise or the huiaan 'onimun'. 
Etymolc. ically, 'a. nim. il' in more closely eonneotod with 'anima' than 
with 'animu3', but the latter is uned because of ito cognitiva n. ccociationa. 
2. 
The Greek $uXfj can be tranalatod by either Latin word, but in not itself 
so conveniently related to Y, (7ov .. If the word-play wan proaont in the 
original Greek, Antiochu3 mutt have u3od EILpuxov rather than r ov, in 
contrast with üyrv Xo v "3 It is poooiblo, howover, that the word-play'ia 
1Arist., ln. 4; 5; a 31. Thia was the prevalent view (cf. "VF II, 450,718,7f4), 
also Mn1d, by Cax-neader, (Coxtua A. . VII, 160). Arintotlo adds the power of 
novement (An. 434a 34). 
`Coe R. D. Oniana, Ortrina of Yurona rht# pp. 160 ff. Seneca rr. 1l3,2 
also uaea 'rýnimuo' of the principle whereby we are 'hýir. ýalia', but the course 
of tho arm. unmt clearly id'ntitico it with the iycf'ovtxGv . In ??. b. IIIý3G Cicero uzo 'anima' of the air or breath of which the 'animus' consiHHts, and 
dc, riven 'animal' from 'animus'. 
3Unlika 
Axintotle, the Stoics sc, . to 
have confined Wvxtl to anirala, 
using othr, r termu euch as cp'O Lc or cC 6c for ,! ant lire (Calcn, III7715; 
ý; extus l1. M. IX, o1). Hence t ttov may be contra:; tod directly with u1rvxav (as by Carnaadas, :; cxtuu A tt. VII, 16O). In Fn. V, 59 P3no nrcuka of the growth 
and life-cycle of p) nto ar aiii]er to that-RI rnimalo, but implies that 
plante do not havo tho came natural power of porfcctisud their naturo. 
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1% 
Cicero'o and that Antiochuo' version was nearer to the Stoic argument 
recorded by Sextun (A_M. VII, 260), that by rcjecting nenso-tnproanions the 
sceptic is placing himself on a level with the inanimate ( . ot 4 &ýGXoL4 ). 
1 
In 101 Cicero answers the charge by pointing out that the Academic wine man 
is not a statue of wood or stone; he is moved by his cones and his mind, 
though he accepts his exporiencco moroly an probable. 
Lucullus' other accusation, that the Academic sceptics are do3troyin3 
human life, was also brought a. ainot tho Pyrrhoninn scoptica (D. L. IX, 104). 
Sextus (A. M. VIII, 157) has occasion to deny it, an does Cicero (99). A stmilar 
charge was brought by the Epicurean Colotca against numerous phtlonophors 
whose doctrines seemed to him to make life imposciblo (1'lut. Adv. Co1.1107E ff. _ 
cf. Lucretius IV, 472; 500-506). 
Luculluc introduceg the doctrine of rrohnbility 
32 (P"43,7-23) neo uero oatin ... quaorondo ac dteecrondo. 
Summary. I cannot underotend their intention. $ometimca when confronted 
with our objection that, were their cane tru©, everything would be 
uncertain, they answers 'What in that to use? It is not our faults blame 
nature for having concealed truth in the depths, an Dcmoeritua caya. ' 
Othcra use a more cophiotieated approach and even complain that wo ccouao 
them of aaytng that everything is uncertain, attempting to diatir. ruich 
between what is uncertain and what cannot be perceived. Lot un thareforo 
dicmic as hopoleca those who nay that ova yth. ng in as uncertain an 
whether the number of the ctara in even or odd and deal with those who 
make the above diatinotion. For they maintain (and I notieod that you 
were very enthuoiantie about thin)2 that there is eomothing probable and 
as it were like the truth, which they use both An a pra: tical and an an 
intollertual criterion. 
Soxtuo tollo ua that the doe=tioto distinguichod three otaaacn of 
Ur, * Am , the aboolutoly non-ovidont, thu temporarily non-ovident, and the 
naturally non-evident (P. 1I. II, 97 ff.; A. M. VIII, 145 ff. ). 
3 An in 26, 
1Cf. Epiot. I, 5,8 (also referred to on P-103)- 
2 
Probably a reference to the provioun day'o diccucainn; ace Introduction p. 62, 
3 Seo p. 145 n. 2 above . 
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Lucullue is using 'incerta' (given ac a translation of &b1)a a in 54) in 
the absolute sense, as his example, whother the number of the otarc is even 
or odd, 
' 
shows. It is in this nenne that the one group of Academics admit 
that everything is uncertain and the other group deny it. Unless thin second 
group can make good their distinction between 'ineertun' and 'quod percipi 
non pos©it', Academic scepticism must be soon not merely as erasing the 
natural distinction between the evident and the non-evident, but also an 
placing the world of physical objects beyond the razz of even indirect 
perception, and so as resulting in uncertainty in the highest dogroo. 
Although Lucullua reporto the arg=ont as it it were part of the 
contemporary scone, it is probable that the first of thoao two groups Is to 
be identified with the Academy of Arcoailas, and the second with Carnoadea 
and hie followers down to and including i'hilo. According to Numeniua, the 
distinction between ci8tjaov ('incertum') and &xa'CUTIMov (lid quod 
percipi non poasit') Boos back to Carneadoo, vho in caid to havo hold that 
all thinga were &'XWr a'naVta but not 11611aa .2 In 34 Lucullus refero 
to an Academic distinction botween 'perapicua' and 'forcepta', and I shall 
there argue that thin diotinotion wa3 made by Philo. Since tho denial that 
all think are 'incorta' would be consiotent with a belief that come thins 
are 'perspicua', it in possible that Luculluu' second group in 32 is 
intended to include Philo. Cicero does not, in the argument of the 
Acrdemicrt, make a sharp difference botwoon tho Carnearlean and philonian 
viowpointa, 
3 
and the objootiona broujht by Luculluri e inot the genoral 
theory of p-. bability vould apply equally to Milo. 
1A 
stook eýrcmplo, cf. 1101 Soxtua P, ýN, II, 9O and 97; AIt ,, YII, 2qj, VIIIo149. In VIII, 137, whero a different cluernification In ad^;, ted, the number of the 
stars is ri. vvn as an evunplo of the naturally ncn-evident. 
2 
tlumeniua £r. 26,102-11 (D03 Flacon). 
31n 98-110 and 111-113 the two roaitiono are juxtnpono1 as if there were 
no diffor^roo brtwcen them. Lucalluo cioco the Q: u, e in 33 and 34. 
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The reason given-by the cecond group of Academics for objecting to 
the charge that they make everything; uncertain, namely that they hold that 
there is eoucthing probable, is based on an assumption accepted by the 
Stoics themselves, that the absolutely non-evident is neither probable nor 
improbable. 1 This means that 'probabilia' are not 'incerta' in the sense 
defined. 2 Lueulluo is clearly interested in the do-itrine of probability 
and bruches aside the firnt group of his opponents in order to prepare the 
ground for criticising the second. The reply attributed to his imaginary 
interlocutors in the first group, who accept that everything is uncertain 
but throw the blame on nature, is in line with the argument in 1,44, where 
Arcesilas is said to have joined issue with Zeno for the same reason that 
led the philosophers of old to derer the possibility of knowledge, na sly the 
obscurity that surrounds things, and Demooritua is min singled out for his 
well-known remark that 'truth is in the depths'. 
3 Arcenilas' scepticism had 
been so sweeping in its scope that it precluded even the probable (%Le av6v)4 
There can be no doubt that the effect of his philosophy would have been to 
discourage any interest whatsoever in the objective validity of impressions, 
and the only function he seems to have intended hic c 0oyo v to have was to 
regulate and justify action. 
Lucullus does not himself accept the distinction between what is 
uncertain and what cannot be porc. ttvod. If the Stotce allowed that what is 
probable (7tLO avb v) in not uncertain, this was becauzo it cculd be measured 
1Soxtus A. H. VII, 243. Cf. 110 'in incortia onin nih 1 oat probabilo. ' 
2If it in not the case that all things are uncertain, then it should follow 
that come thincr are certain. Rut thin is an inference which the ftmdomlo 
sceptic avoids. Cf. OfC. II, 70non autom, ut cotori alin carte, alia incorta 
cane dicunt, nie ab his disaentiontca alia protabilia, contra ai: a aicirua. ' 
3D. L. IY, 72 (L. K fr. 117). Cf. Soxtuo A. M. VIJI, 325; Seneca ^ . VII, 1,6. 
ANumeniun fr. 25,70 (Doe Knees) = Cextus P. H. I, 232. Pence the answer given 
by the firnt group could easily } . "o been inforrod from the arCumrnt !.. 
Ac. I, 44 and tho fact that rejection of even the probable entails that cvorything is uncertain. 
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against an objectivo standard of truth and falnchood. But if nothing can be 
perceived, or if true and falco aro indintinguichablo, then nothing is evident 
and even the doctrine of probability is undermined (33 ff. ), and in spite of 
their denial the second group of Acadcmica will be found to occupy a poettion 
similar to the first. 
I Although Lucullu3 does not explicitly draw thin 
conclusion, he allows it to be understood from hin criticisms in the next 
sections, and when in 54 he repeats the charge that hin opponents make every- 
thing uncertain, the reference is clearly to those who deny that they do no 
('quod nolunt'). 
2 Luoullus' opening remark in 32, that he is unable to 
understand his opponents' intention, and part of the following sentence ('ai 
ea quas disputentur uora eint, tum omnia fore inoorta') must be taken an 
applying to the ccoptical Academy as a whole, thouth the Subject of 'respond- 
ent' would still be the group representing Arecailac and his followors. 
3 
lI 
would dina«reo with the view of Droch, rd (coo p. 245) that 'illoa qui 
ox, nia vie incortn dicunt ..... doaporatolt aliquoa roliqualaue' in a pocuiblo 
reforence to Aenenidcmua. Lucullua in clearly addrenaing the . %cpdomicn in thin section, and, on i3rochard'a view, Aoncnidcraw: a would already hnva 
left the Academy. l)rochard'n nugguntion in accepted ±nd oxpnnded by U. Cnncho 
I"XILIhon ou . 'rýtýnarcnca, pp. ß3-ßý',, 120 ). Ile arruou that Antiochun in here 
tolling the "cademica, particularly Thilo, that their rejection of the 
cataleptic imprecaion and their doctrine of &xupaa), cF. Eavould, despite their 
wich, lead them to the 6011a(' %&VIC, rund the cxtrorse nihilism of the 
followers of Pyrrho and Acnociidemus. 
2It 
should be noticed that the charge which thin group explicitly denien in 
32 in not that of m. 311cins" everything uncertain ('omnie noruddoro incerta') but 
that of rs inn that everything in uncertain ('orinieº incerta dicoro'), which 
according to them rentn on a misinterpretation of their axiom that nothing 
can be perceived. ;: encca'u aeucription '/'ademicun ornia ineorta diean em' 
(i? ýi. ßn, iý) no doubt reiz on a similar mia: -ndor&atana1M. ; tout . p. 50# apßakn 
of Luculluu' remark that the Acade. rto criticism rondos ovarythinn uncertain 
au 'mitidirt)o) cd', but this ic, of courser, the point at issue. 
3AD if 'irntovdum' stood in the place of a previous 'alit' to which 'alit 
r: utcm ole(; 1"Vntiuc' correaponda. 
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The use of two words, 'probabila' and '"iori nitntlo', to express the 
moaning of the Creek r tt; uvb v1 uoom3 to be prompted by a deeire to brine 
to the fore that anpoct of the probable on which Lucullue' counter-argument 
in the following ceetiono will rest. In his analysis of corlitive exporienoo, 
Carneadoo had distinguished two relations, one which exists between an 
impression and its source, the external object, and the other between 
impression and poroipient. 
2 Sin--e the former cannot be known with complete 
certainty, the criterion of judgement nut be sought in the impression- 
object relation, that lop in the way impreoaiona affect us or appear to us. 
The 'apparently true' (ý fpaLvoµtvil bt1C ) or 'probable' impression 
( %ctu. vý cpavTaota ) thus becomes a criterion, Carneadeu' object boing 
to emphasiso the subjective aspect of any cognitive act3 and to destroy the 
dogmatic illusion that experience can carry with it a tarantco of its own 
truth. 
But Carneadec did not lay aside the conceptual framework of the Stoic 
theory of perception, with its azaumption that there in an cxtarnal world 
made up of p7, yoical objects which affect U3 through impressions. Although 
he ntro3sod the eubjeotivo or 'phenomenal' aspect of impreuaiona, he did not 
deny that they have objeoti. vo or external cauaca. Ceneeq»cntly the dooLrlnn 
cf probability accapte that judgonantn and beliefe are about the oxtornal 
world. An impreeoton may be 'probablo', or 'seen' true, but actually be 
faloo, eines it may fail to correspond to oxtorlal reality. 
' The improenion 
C. P. 1: +., *rmum cu v; n tvd that 'uori cimtlo' Ia a ron4orirg or the Creek c 66C 
and that llhilo used thia word in pinoo of C:. rnc&Jou' %LCuvc5v . Thnc Iu 
no cvidcnco to support thin viow, Goa Raid, p. 216 n. 1, who howovor our, nta 
that thero 1.8 no roforonco at all to Milo in this paaa. n. 
2"oxtua A; 11. VII, 1G6 rt. Cf. Intrbiuction p. 15. 
3 
Cf. Coll. N. A. XI, 5,6 'ced ox oinibua ribua prnindo uiaa dicunt ficri, quits 
rýavttLCtaC appollant, non ut carom ir-alrura natura cat, acci ut udtactio uniniL 
corporiuuu cat cozum, ad quoa uica pcruvniunt. ' Colliua in creaking of both 
tho 1lyrrhonian and tho Acadornio aoeptica. 
4 , exam A jj. VI1,1Gß and 174. 
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is spoken of an 'reporting truly' ( a), 71fcuoCcn ), 
l 
and the testing of 
impressions is compared to a doctor's examination of symptoms or the 
interrogation of witnesses. 
2 This inclination to match impressions with 
external reality exposes the weak point of the Academic system, against 
which Lucullus will direct his attack. 
By assuming that truth is measured in terms of correspondence with 
external reality, and by recognising that there are degrees of probability 
which depend not only on perceptual conditions but also on the coherence 
of the many different impressions that make up a single experience, 
' the 
Carneadean doctrine does not avoid being faced with the problem of the 
reliability of the individual impression. If the Academic makes judgements 
about external reality, he will have to concede the possibility of their 
being some evidence of a more or less objective nature on'which to base his 
inferences. The problem becomes more acute in view of the Academic doctrine 
of &aapaa? a&ta. For if true and false impressions look qualitatively aliko, 
the evidence on which one might base judgement about an external object 
become3 totally ambiguous. It will then make no difference whether my 
impression is 'uori simile' in the sense of appearing to me to be the truth, 
or in the e:.: ce of being a copy of external reality, an Lueullus will tend 
to interpret it. In neither case can the inference be drawn from impression 
to external object. 
1Sextus 
A. M. VII, 175. 
2A. M. VII, 179 and 184; cf. 163 wher: it is said than impressions may be 'bad 
messenger3'. Stough, p. 26 n. 54, suggostc that the medical analogy may have 
been introduced by Sextun himself. 
3A. M. VII, 171,183. Wo are told (176 ff. ) that Carn:: adea reasoned that 
impressions do not come singly but hang tigothor like a chain, so that they 
can be seen as contradicting or confirming ono another. Ne accordingly 
distinguished between three degrooc of probability: (1) the probable as auch; (2) the probable and uncontradiotod; (3) the probable, uncontradicted and 
tested, which is the highest degree of probability attainablo. Cf. 33 and 36. 
In ] rt. Or. Af, Cicero's explanation of probability in terms of concurrence 
shows Carneadean influence, 
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In principle, the Academic denies the existence of an absolute 
criterion, 
1 but cinco he is, according to Cicero, a seeker who. ee aim in to 
find out the truth or what resembles truth, 
2 the probable is by implication 
a criterion of truth, and Lucullus will treat it an auch (33 ff. ). ßextuo 
regards the Carneadoan 7tLfav6v as a criterion for both judgement and 
action, which is valid 'for the most part' A. *1. VII, l73-5). It is posctblo 
that it may In the first place have been put forward, an an improvement on 
Arcesilas' c? o yov , to justify beliefs and aaservions concerned with 
action, 
3 
and only later extended to serve as a theoretical principle in 
search and discussion. 
4 One of its main purposes must always have been to 
counter the argument from . icpaCtcc , to which the opponents of the Academy 
attached considerable importance. 
5 In his outline o: the doctrine in gß ff. 
Cicero lays almost exclusive stress on its use in motivating action and 
making ordinary practical judgementn. Lucullua, on the other hand, has a 
vented interest in making explicit the use of the probable 'in gmacrcndo 
so discerendo' (32), because ho hopes to chow the inconsistency between the 
Academic asviration for truth and the undermining of their own criterion 
by the doctrine of kapaTl, aJtw. 
1According 
to Sextun A. M. VII, 159, Carneadec argued that nothing was a 
criterion 'without qualification' ( (IrMr. ). Stough, p. 50 n. 53, po! ntn 
out that Bury'c translation 'there is abwolutely no criterion of truth' 
in incorrect. 
2 7-9; 60; 65-66; 121-28. 
3ThiJfporhaps 
the con"lusion to be drawn from Coxtu3 A. AS. VII, 166, wheru it 
is said that. in spite or Carno. d ca' rejection of te Stoic criterion, he 
was forced +o introdu-e his own criteria 'for the conduct of life and the 
attatnrsnt of happiness' (cf. ,j . 1,231). Arcenilaa' ctAo'ov , although it prov. t1od ju3tification for action, did not apply to perceptual experience 
as such and co offered no kind of Cuarontco of the external circumnitanccn 
curroundine an action. Carneadee may have wished remedy this cicfioinnoy. 
4Wnethor 
Carnoadea liimaolf took this stop Me been debated. Cf. C. J. do Vogel, 
Greek Vht'iono phv 111,1116. 
5P1ut., 
ý,, to. . 1057A/r, YF 111,177; p. 140 of this Ceannantary. 
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Tho v of r»nhnhl: ity eriticiied 
33-34 (P"43,23 - P"44,16) quao iota regu1a ... item. falcum uidori. 
Summzrv. (33) What in thin criterion of truth and falsity if we have 
no concept of these since they cannot be distinguichod? For possession 
of a concept presupposes a difference, such as there in between right 
and wrong. But a man who experiences impressions with featuron common 
to both true and false can have no standard or mark of truth whatocever. 
It is childish on their part to say that all they object to is the 
possibility of a true impression being such that a faloo one could not 
be qualitatively like it. 
I Having taken away the only criterion of 
judgcmont, thoy claim that they leave us everything else. It in like 
removing a man's eyes and saying that he is loft with the objects of 
sight. Buw dust as these can be ceen by the eyes only, so everything 
else is perceived by impreasions, but by a mark peculiar to the true 
only, not common to both true and (aloe. So whether you follow the 
probable impressioo or the one which is both probable and unhindered, ai 
Or SOMOL, LV9 &(i 1 Carnoades put it, Xyeu will have to come back to the sort of improsuion 
we are talking about. (34) But if it ban anythin, C in common with the 
false, there will be no criterion, boeaucc a epecial characteristic 
cannot be indicated by a common feature. But if thorn is no common 
feature, I have whs. I want, for I am cooking something which will 
appear to me to be true in cuah a way that it could not likewise aprear 
to bo falao. 
The Acadomic claim that till poreipi. nt cannot rocognico a quulitativo 
and therefore generic difference bctwaen the true and the false is hero seen 
as a woslcneso in the Academic position which undorrtirec hie own theory of 
probability. This claim particularly conflicts with the lust olauco in the 
Stoic definition of tho cataleptic imprec6ion, 'euch that it could not havo 
core from a non-exiutont cbjeot'. 
2 Some Acndemica accordingly scan to have 
openly admitted that they would allow tho -Stoica the rent of their definition, 
1The 
addition of 'uorwn' to the text brin(; u out tho ocnco Toro u1oa ly, 
though oven without it the maanint would hive to be the oar). 
2Soxtu3 
A. N!. VII, 240 oto. = nee pp. 110-112 -: ' this Corn ntary. In A. u. V1I, 252 
~ 
Caxtur3 otatee that the Stoics added the last clause to thoir dofinition 
becauno of tho /! caddie theory of wýýupcý1). w''! a In 77 Cicoro rerrooonta 
Zeno an adding the last c1ucco when uz: ked by Arcc3ilaa whnthor hin dofini.. ton 
would hold even if a tme impreanion were of the came kind an a falze one. 
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and it in to this that Lucullue appears to be referring when he arguoo^that 
it in absurd for his opponents to say that, although they rake this ono 
exception, they concede the rest ('nam du: m dicunt hoc co unum tollere ... 
cetera autem conceders, faciunt puerilitor'). In their attack on the Stoic 
criterion, the principle of u7cupullu. r. tu wan invoked by every member of the 
Academic school from`Arcosilas to Milo. But there in no evidence that 
Arcesilas granted the Stoics the validity of"tho rest of their definition. 
1 
Sextus, on the other hand, refers (A. MM. VII, 402) to Carneadea and his followers 
as conceding the definition to the Stoics except for its last clause. But, 
unless we are prepared to accept Thilo'n interpretation of Carneades, the 
concession, if Carneadec had made it, is unlikely to have amounted to an 
admission of the possibility of perception even in a now un-Stoic censo. 
Lucullus has obviously no interest in elaborating on the meaning of the 
ccneession, aineo any form of cognition would in his view be undermined, 
whatever may have boon meant by it. His objection takes the form of an 
analog,; between impressions And the eyes as moanc of recognition. As visible 
objects are recognieod by the Ayes, so the rest ('reliqua') are recognised 
by impressions, but only by those bearing the peculiar mark of truth. The 
same analogy appears in Soxtuc (&&. VII, 255-60) in a Stoic context but with 
a clearer ro'eroneos the man who allows the existence of rights and sounds 
but abolishes eight and hearing is behaving no more absurdly than one who 
admits the existence of external objects but attacks the impressions of conco 
by which they are grasped. 
We may therefore infer that L'tcullu.. in examintng the validity or the 
probable in the light of Academic criticism of that catalcptio impression, and 
that he b&licvea, like äextu (A__; j. VII, 433), that the probable can be objected 
to cn the came ground on which tho Acadcraica had faulted the cataloptio 
1According to 77, Arcooilrn wu prepared to rrrnt Zeno the cerrectnc^o of his 
definition in principle, cinco trios porcaption would only be possible on tho 
condition stipulated in the lout claunc. But then every Äcldonic would in 
principio have agreed to it. 
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impreasion, i. e, that the true and the false are indistinguishable. It may 
of course be objected that the probable cannot be treated ac a criterion of 
truth1 in the same oenso as the cataleptic impression, nor can one expect the 
same perceptual conditions to underlie both a true perception and a judgement 
of probability. But in treating the probable in this way, Luqullus seems 
chiefly concerned with that aspect of the doctrine of probability which 
assumes that judgement . 
to about the external world. He consequently objects 
to it on two grounds. 
Firstly, if the true and false cannot be distinguished apart, we can 
have no concept of them, and it is therefore pointloaa to talk of a criterion. 
The Academic position entails that we can never ace or recognioo the truth 
with certainty, since an experience that could be either true or false cannot 
carry with it a distinguishing mark ('nota') of truth. 
2 Having previously 
argued (27) that if impressions wore of such a nature that they could not be 
diatinguiched by a 'notio', wo should never be able to treat the reoulta or 
inquiry, Lucullua now extends thin argument and raieea the question whot2ior 
the A: ademio can have a 'notio', although it is not necessary to confine 
'notionem ucri et falsi' to the preconception of the object of inquiry? The 
Academic is again faced with a dilemsa: Dither he must admit that he has a 
concept of true and false, in which case there in a difference between them, 
or there is. no differeaco, which would undermine his own criterion. - 
The Aeademio may not, of course, nee himself iaº this dilemma. He could 
point out that there are some imprcoaiona that appear to him to bo true, even 
if they cannot be known to be no. But can the Acadenio consistently differ- 
entiato between improsaiona on the basis of their 'appearance'? To bring out 
1Lucullus is possibly being sarcastic in treating the probable as a criterion 
of true and false. It was more usual to speak of a criterion of truth only. 
2If 
one never perceives the truth, one cannot know if an impression is even 
'ueri simile'. Cf. Aug. Ao. II, 7,16 ff.; ; extue 4, _M. VI1,35n, 3851 Plat. F'haedr. 273d. 
3Cf. 
the general type of dogmatic (eapcoially Epicurean) argument illustrated 
in Sextus (A. M. VIII, 337 ff.; P. 11. I1,1 ff. ), to the effect that the sceptic 
either has no conceptual frame of reference and so cannot understand, inquire 
into or discuss a subject, or ho has one and thus has no ground to be a 
sceptic. Cf. Lucr. IV, 469 ff.; 1in. I, 64; 1p. 153 above. 
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this second weakness in the Academic position, Lucullus contends that an 
impression that has features common to the true and the false cannot prosenit 
a peculiar mark ('nota') of truth. Ho correctly points out that the amno 
property or 'mark' cannot both be a common character of two things and the 
distinctive feature of one of them ('quia proprium co=uni cignoi notari non 
potest', 34). This arguncnt seems to have something in common with the Stoic 
view reported by Sextus (A`ii. VII, 252) that the cataleptic impression has a 
special character ( iöEwjim ) which narks it off from all other impronsions 
. and would preclude 
the poo3ibility of a false one beine found exactly like it. 
2 
Lucullu3 is also reverainr aCr_inct the Academics one of the arguiacnts used by 
Carneades against the Stoics (Sextun A. i4. VII, 164), that since there is no true 
impression of such a kind that it cannot be false, the criterion will consist 
of an impression that is common to both true and falao (kV xoLvt gav'taßtg, 
, cot re &? r Ool% xat ire OOour. ). Tho inrerenco 'drawn is that, since auch an 
impression is not cataleptic, it will not be the criterion (i. e. in the Steia 
sense). It is clear that, accordinG°to the namo argurent, the probable 
impression will also fail to qualify as a criterion, eine, even if true, it 
will be 'common' in the sen3o defined. 
Since the doctrine of &nap c. )) acta primarily affects porccption, it 
is'natural trq. t Lucullun should be ^Aen as arVirg for a rehabilitation of the 
conditions necessary for perception. This does not more that he in confucaing 
a judgement of probability with trtto perception. But, according to Luculluo, 
probability makes sense only if porcuption in possible. While the Acad mio 
doctrine of probability anoumos that. there are some impreceions that do not 
1 car to be both true and false, 
3 the claim of 67tapna) a, r to can be taken to 
imply that any impression appears to be both true and false (cf. 40). flence 
1? he deletion of 'in' (rotained by Plusborg) is necoccary for the venue. 
2Raid (p. 218 n. 7, p. 270 n. 3) ta3. ce 'nota' and 'cicr: un' to be Latin rordorin a 
of nrtjLetov , although in ; toicicra tho latter is a toc:: nical word which doeu 
not aeem to be uned of the relation between improcaion and external object. 
3Cf. Soxtua A. TT. V1I, 173-175. 
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his arGurient is conducted in such a way au to 'bring out the / cadcriio cmphan. ic 
on cubjectivity ('uideatur', 'uideri', 74) and at the came time make a cace 
for the Stoic xa rf.? yit. c. For the came reason, he interprets 1L, ap(L)") at ta 
in terms of a common property, as though thin were, like the mark of truth, 
a visiblo charaoteriatic. 
The problem raised is in fact tho problem of evidence. There is a sense 
in which the requirements for a jud, ei cnt of probability must parallel those 
thet dotermino perception, particularly it what the Academio conaidora probable 
are just those impressions which the Stoic would consider cataleptic (105). 
It is irrelevant that the Academics had in the first place denied the exictenco 
of a mark, of truth, 
1 
since their shift of emphasis to the subjective aspect of 
experience had only transferred the problem to another level, particularly in 
view of their clain of Lcapaa? acta . Given the nature of their polomio 
against the Stoles, they wore not in a position to provide a formal definition 
of the probable imprescion and a definite theory of evidence. The doctrine of 
But 
concurrence2 was perhaps a way of avoidini. the issue. A the coneurrenco of 
improaeions does not in itself constitute objective evidence relating to the 
external world, vhich in the last resort must derive from the intrinsic nature 
of at least some individual impressions themaolveu. 
3 Hence Luoullus arguoa 
that even the 'probable and unhindored' ii raesion would require 'ovidonoo' in 
his sense as a teat of its validity. He thud anticipitac the argument in 36 
that if any impresion that is taken for true nay also be false, this would 
put all imprrssions on the same level as lair as the validity of oxporienco is 
concorncd. It is therefore uaeloes to cl,: lm that one imprceion is more 
probable than another. 4 
ICf. 04,101,103; r. n. I, 12. 
213extu* A. td. V1I, 179. 
3Cf. ß. I!. C; 3ioholm, Theory of 
_ 
Knowle(I , pp. 69-70. 
4Cf. Flutarch'o argwnent in Mv. ('1,1121C-r a, Tainat tho F, picurcnn viow (an ho 
ceoo it) that come ccncationa can provide infori. ition about the real character 
of objeotn but not othcro. P: o amount of 'confirm-atioh', ho arguoa, ci2n ovorcomo 
the initial difficulty that all fmprc3uionn tiro equal in roapect of 't'uth'. 
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Lucullus objects to the distinction between pol pj Via' and 'per': c ' 
34 (p"44,16-27) aimill in errore ... perepicuum ullum roliquitur. 
Summary. They are involved in a similar error when, constrained by the 
rebuke of truth, they wich to distinguish thinC3 evident from things 
perceived and try to show that comethin; y evident oxiatc, stamped as true 
on the mind and intolloat, yet it cannot be perceived and grasped. For 
how can onmethinrr be evidently white 4f what in black could appear to be 
white, or how will those thine-cl be caid'to be evident or stamped accur- 
ately when it is uncertain whether the courco is real or dolucivo? Thue 
neither colour nor bcdy nor truth nor proof nor acnao nor anything evident 
remains. 
The separation of 'pcropicua' ( 
&vapyT ) from 'percepta' (xaTa) i r. t c) 
can only remain an 'attempt' ('uolunt', 'conantur') and is from the start 
doomed to be rejected by Antiochus, for whom, as for the Stoica, there is a 
total identification of what in evident with what in perceived; no further 
proof of perception, beyond 'porapicuitas', iss possible or required 
(45,51; 
of. 17). Cicero's way of phrasing, the nentance, 'aimili in orrore... ', uthcea 
it difficult to follow, since it nu, s nta that the Acadomiaa were yielding 
to the pressure of truth in co, mitting an error. Lucullua must mnan, however, 
that their acceptance that some things ara 'peropicun' is a concoanion to 
truth, thou'. their rofunal to allow that it followa that the came things 
are also 'porcepta' In an error similar to that pointed out in the previous 
section an involved in the thaory of probability. 11knon, if the distinction 
between 'penn picua' and 'percents' in intended as a now and better oxpl<ºnation 
of the diffc_anco botwoon 'incortum' and 'id qüod Xaroipi non poacit' 
(32), 
thin further Academic attempt to refute the charge that they make everything 
uncertain is likoiino a failure. 
2 
1' Inta. ' moano (an in 71 ' tatam x( 6. ) rL v') ' thoao wo am talkir. 1; about'. 
2Thc 
word-play, or similarity between tho two wordo 'prrapicua' and 'percopta', 
could not hive bcon ropre3entett in the Crook. Cf. 'nninal', 'nnimur', in 33. 
(rp. 168-9 of thin Commentary). 
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While it is virtuzlly curtain that Arcooilaa did not retard any cenao- 
impreasions as v vap y, 
1 there is insufficient evidence to determine whether 
Carneades did no. Although the word does not occur in Coxtua' account of 
his theory in A. M. VII, 166 ff., other terms are used which cuggoat that 
dictinctneaa and clarity worn an important aspect of the probable impression. 
2 
The word itnolf might not have appealed to Carneades, owing to its ambiguity 
and dogmatic aanociation3, though it is uncertain whether at this timo it 
had becomo an important technical tern in the Stoic syntem. 
3 In Sextun A. M. 
VII, 403, where Carneades is pictured in dispute with the Stoics, some false 
impressions are said to bo no leas clear ani otrikinc (i vapyctC cat 
7?. 11(Ttxat ) than those ragarded by the Stoics as cataleptic. These 
particular words could, of course, have been supplied by Soxtus. But If 
Carneades did, an Scxtua (l. o. ) states, concedo the firot part of their 
dofinition to the Stoicss the decoription of the 'perapicuum' as 'uerum 
illud quidem impreaeum in animo atquo monto' night not bo inconoietent with 
his view of tho nature of probability. 
4 
It seem probablo, howovor, that the pocition here doocribcd is that 
of Thilo. First, tho phrano 'conuioio uoritatla coati' recalls othor 
rcfcrencoa to T'hilo's apparont unoaoinaos n3 a oceptic, duo both to the 
forco of anti-Acaderaic argumont (10,111) and to the pre pure of cenco- 
oxporienco itcglf. 5 Secondly, tho phrase 'uorum illud quidom iäpreoaum in 
onimo atouo -onto' loo. cu forward to 112, whero Cioo; o, oayz that ho wou34 
IAccording 
to ltumcnius (fr. 26,29, Ike I'1a., ac), Iacydon learned from Areecilaa 
that nothini; aeon or heard is i vap-; '61r, or vytb, . Cfe p. 108 above. 
2Cf. Long, N rh. p. 97, who however taco 'perapiouitao' in hie account of 
Carrc idea. 
3For the Stoic uae of the word ft-v4pYCPa (to 'porapicuitau', 'ouidantia'), 
al? O rrp. 107-100 of this Coziaontary. 
4iitn 
clans f. 'aation of improaaiona uoam, howovor, to imply that probable' 
iuprosuionr, are not Operapioua' (99). 
51unoniua fr. 23,13-9 (Lou }ýlacea)t ý1 at iv ntL 1I. süTwv uvTbv b. výmtpecpEv 1 vllryf; L& . tr. xuit 61 o) oyta. 
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not disagree with a Peripatetic who held that 'quoll impreecum coact a uero' 
can be perceived without adding the qualification 'quo modo imprimi non poscet 
a falco'. The latter passage (112) may reasonably be suppoced to ropreuent 
Philo's view of perception, whereas in the pr03cnt passage (34) 'percepts' 
is still being used in the Stoic sense. 
1 
As an answer to the charge that the Academics make everything uncertain 
(32), the claim that there are 'perepicun' is more effective than the cimplo 
assertion that there are'probabilia' bceaume 'perzpicuum' (ý v apyl c. ) is the 
direct opposite of 'incertum' (äbrIao v ). Philo wan no doubt even more 
concerned than Carnoadea to repudiate tho charge and to stress the differenco 
between what is uncertain and what cannot (in the Stoic sense) be perceived. 
But part of his innovatory move nee= to have been to turn Carneadeo' 
acceptance of the first part of the Stoic difinition. of the cataleptic 
impression into a specific claim that the Academics were arguing for a now 
definition of perception. It was a logical step to point out that there is 
a certain clarity ( &vA. pyet, a ) which attends such perception but does not 
guarantee its infallibility. As we have seen, one of Carneadea' criteria 
for accepting an impression as probable may have been its distinctness or 
clarity. According to Cicero (105), it is just those imprecnions which are 
taken to be catuleptie by their opponents that the Academics consider as 
probable. . Carnoadea htd also recognised that the probable can sometimo3 be 
false (Soxtus A. M. VII, 174-5), and one of tits arguments aainat the Stoics was 
that false improaciona can be just as evident and striking as Eruc ones (ib. 
402 ff. ). It would thus have seemed reasonable for Mile to use the word 
'evident'(kvap, tr. /'porspieuura') to dnnoto, as it wore, an upper linit of 
probability, which would justify a claira of percepticn on the underatru tng 
that what is accepted as true could always be false. These impressions are 
the saran as those which the Stoics regard as cataleptic, and like them have 
II. 
e. Thilo would not havo denied that't& Humpy' I are X aItjVt , unle3e he 
wore tminq the word in the . ^, toio cenne 
(Soxtus P. 11.7,235). l. l: cullU3 would 
naturally U30 tho word in the Stoic cenoc. Cicero loco not uce 'poroiporo' 
in t; ho Philoninn renno in the Aoademlen, except where the context makes the 
meaning; clear, no in 112. 
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the quality of JvÖ, pycUL. 
In Fhilo'a terms, there is no divorce between perspicuity and 
perception. But in Lucullus' terms there is, bocauao Fhilo still insists 
that a true impression is indistinguishable from a talge one. Alpart from 
this, his view of the 'clear' impression as something; 'Imprinted as true on 
the mind and intellect' is essentially ; toic. 
I How much of the rest of 
Lucullus' description is taken from Thilo ant how much from the Stoics is 
hard to decide. For the Stoics, one of the requircmpnta of perception is 
that the impression should faithfully and accurately reflect its source2 
('impressa cubtilitor') so that, as Lucullua argues, it is hard to see how 
this condition is fulfilled if it is uncertain w ethur the ecurce is real 
or illusory. F'hilo's answer would be that the clarity of the ioproccion 
itself ensures that the uncertainty is minimal. It remains true that, on 
a representative theory of perception, it is not really poaciblo to define 
perspicuity in terms of accurate representation of the object unless the 
object is real, and there is no reason to think that Thilo did ro. 
3 Thus 
Philo'a definition of 'perapicua' may have diffored in this important roapoot 
from the Stoic, and it is perhaps Philo who is particularly vulnerable to 
Lucullus' criticism in 33, that the Academics have substituted for the 
'nota' of truth a common 'nota' of the trio and the faloo. 
4 
Lucullua exaggorr_toe the inconsistency incuront In Tbilo'a position 
by giving as an example of 'indistinguishability' the mistaking of black 
for white. How could anything be 'evidently' white if auch a mictsko were 
always theoretically possible? The Academics would hardly have mood that 
1Hcminn 
and Zeller have infurrod from theco and cinilar axproacioni that 
Milo supported Plato's Idcai theory. ]3rochard, p. 193 ff., hen refuted thin; 
cf. Reid, p. 56 and Robin's comments, p. 1j2. 
2'Subtiliter' 
a" 6o(pLßWC ., 1 oid, p. 221 n. 
3, quotes: Boxtun N. 11. I2,123. 
3Cf. 
Stob. E21. I, p. 475,6, whore the Academics are said to have naintained that 
the cenacs arg ytct C, bocauuo it is poasiblo to rcceivo true tnprcrsiono 
through them, but not cixp I, pc't t. Brothard, p. 2C0, ceem3 to be wrene. In 
taking 'inpre sa oubtilitor' to bo exprnu: ninr; Fhilo'c roint of view. 
4The intention of Philo himself may, however, have been polemical in that 
he was allowing the Stoics their theory of perception without granting them 
their definition of it. 
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their position cntailc that one can confuse opposite senuiblo qualities in 
normal situations. To support their case, they relied vainly on instances 
of deception due to similarity between objects (54 ff. = 04 ff.; ) and the 
delusive experience of dreaznz'and madness (08-90; Soxtus A. M. VII, 4O3 ff. 
). 
It should, moreover, be noted that Lucullus seems to be curgeating that the 
actual character 'whit', ' might be visually confused with 'black', not merely 
that it might be wrong)y assigned to an external object. It is true that 
there was an Academic -rg'. Lrcnt that colour, like size, fort and motion, in 
inapprehensiblo, since one may be acquainted with the variations but not with 
the actual colour of anything (Sextun A. TT. VII, 412 ff. ). In 105 Cicero 
advances an argument with similar effect, but he there emphaniaca that 
colours will appear to the Academic wine man nz they do to the Stoic, I. Q. 
they will have the same definite, sensible rharactor. In 100 he arcvca that 
the Academic would be more Inclined to accept that snow iu white than 
Anaxagoras was. To Anaxagoras, who knew that the water which composed it 
was black, snow did not even appear whits. The upshot in that, even if it 
is possible that snow is, or could appear to be, blade, thin does not alter 
the fact that to most people it a; paHra white, and the Aesdcmio will 
form 
hie judgement accordingly. 
Lu ullus' two questions ('quo enim dodo porspieue dixeria .... quo modo 
iFta auf perspicua dicemrs... ') are perhaps meant to correspond to the two 
main types of deception which are guarded a ainct in the last clause of the 
Stoic definition of the cataleptic imprasclon, na ely mistaking one thing for 
another, and Mistaking a delusive experience for a true one 
(p. 1i0 above). 
' 
Pressed to its logical conclusion, the Academic cxrument might moan a complete 
rsversal of normal exp:: 'ience, or simply, that it is uncertain whether there 
iP anything 'there' at all? In Lucullun' list of item abolioho1, colour und 
, confused with what in not'thnro', nco in both cases what is 'there' iu being the second question could also be taken no explanatory of the first. 
2rhilo's 
new definition of knowledge in thus beset with the aar, o difficulties 
that are inherent in Prota6praa' position. Cf. Nisei, ;: a' tininm, pp. 147_6. 
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body tol ther represent the world of material objects as revealed through 
the cenaca, truth and demonatrutive argument the faculties of the mind? 
which cannot operate without a 'nota' of truth, con3e and 'perzpicuun ullwm' 
the cenae faculties and the clarity of the iupreraiona on which all the rast 
i3 based. Thus, for Lucullur,, 'p'arapicu.. a' without 'perceptum' io not 
'pernpicuum' at all. 
The Acadenin cannot rake a reliable Rtitement or iudrement 
35-36 (x"44,27 - p"45,25) ox hoc illud ... ne ip3a defendot. 
1mayr . 
(35) iicnee it toads to Tappen to thew that, whatever they say, 
people aal: them, . 
'So you do perceive that? ' But they resort to ridicule, 
for they are not anxious to n.. *. o it obvious that no one can arguo 
positively about anything without attaching cone definite ch»ractoristio 
mark to that state or afrairo which each individually favcurrý. 
l What, 
the-z, is that probability of ycurs? If what looks probable at first 
glance is positivoly. affirmod, what could be more irresponsible? (36) 
But if they adopt the carefully tested impression, they will still be at 
a loss ainco imprearsionc that have no (ualitativn difference are all 
equally untrustworthy. Again, since they admit that even after most 
careful consideration the wine man maj encounter comothing which appears 
probable but is very far from the truth, they will have no confidence 
in themselves, even if they come a great part of the way (as they nay) 
towards tho truth or approach it an closely us ponsible. If they are to 
havo confidence, a mark of truth must be known to them, and if this is 
hidden, what truth will they suppose thomsolvos to have rcaahod? What 
could be mar` absurd than their claim that they cceept no and co as a 
in or rroof of a certain thing, whereby they follow it, but what is 
eignificd may be either false or non-oxtatent? Eut enough has boon caid 
about perception; if anyone wirbou to attack t?. e, ao argumonta, truth will. 
easily defend herself without my help. 
1The 
moaning of thin oRatonco in not vary zlcar. 'CoarF; uo' in to 'convict' 
or 'chow up' aa: criminal or falte; th4 to of the inCinitive in ununual and 
ceonn to require that what in tshoam ao frlco in not tipot nc7, ttivo but the 
corrcrpondirig positive. Nonce here it will moan to cctablinh y point which 
tells against the Academic case, though the Latin could also mean the 
oppocito, to 'refuto'or 'dinprovo' that no one, etc. 
107 
Lucullu3 continues to treat tho cupporters of 'probabilia' and 'perapicunl 
as one group and therefore allows us to understand that his linjuiatio counter.. 
ttrýýwnent, though linked to his immediately preceding remarks about Philo'a 
position ('ex hoc illud iia usu ueniro aolet... '), concerns the doctrino"of 
probability in genoral. 
That the question should be raised whether the Academic Forcoivco what 
he states was inevitable, since it is the common assumption of both layman 
ana philosopher that Fe statement exprccses a judgement that is either true or 
false. 1 That assumption was certainly mace by the Stoic3.2 who according to 
SextiLs classed impressions as true if true affirmative statements could be 
made about them, e. g., at the present moment, 'it is day' A. 1M. VII, 244). It 
might therefore be supposed that if an, Acadcmic makes a positive assertion, 
he does co because he perceives its truth. But positive ansertiona of this 
kind can hardly be expected of the Academic, who holds that nothing can be 
perceived and whose statements oxprces what he judges to be probable. Nor 
is it entirely correct to suggest that the Academic would not agree that in 
making positive assertions we would be assigning a dafinito mark of truth to 
whatever is assorted. This would be true or do&ratio atatecmentn, but his own 
statements are not dopmmtio. Hence Cicero exhorts Lucullus to confine his 
statements about nature's artistry to what appears and avoid being positive 
('doni. que tiideantur sane, no adfirn rtur mode', 136; ef. 105,146). Nonethaloas, 
the Academic does make statements about the external world, and even if the 
question ('ergo iotuc quidom paroipic? ') is somcwhat unfair as it stands, it 
is a way of asking the Academic how he relates his statements with his view 
that the true and the false are qualitatively alWo, for in one respect his 
1ii. W. B. Joseph, An Tntrodtction to iogio, p. 160i W. and M. Knoalo, Tho 
nevclormFnt of Loin, p. 55 . 
2B. 
go 95; 't2, o. I, 14; D. L. VII, 651 Soxtus A. Td. VIII, 12. Doncon Hates, Stoic 
1iO i c. p. 28. - 
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statements are perceptual statements. 
1 
An arr; umcnt based on the oceptic's use of langulgo might "tako two . forma, 
He might be required to substantiate hin statement, by admitting that he 
perceive3 its truth or that of some other statement which confirms it, or 
also to admit that his statement in faluo or meaningless.? For a significant 
statement iss one which con (theoretically at least) be verified. 
3 This seems 
to bo the purport of the original question (largo intud quidcm percipio? ') 
and possibly of the contention which follows, that to nako a poxitivo 
assertion is to assign a mirk of truth to what is nicorted (e. g. it makes no 
difference wnethor one rays 'It to day' or 'That it is day is true'). But 
the way Cicero formulates the contention makes it equally applicable to the 
second form the arguront may take. A ctat,! ment or nenertion has reference to 
an object or state of affairs which in roco,; niued or assumed to exist 
independently of any statement made about it. 
4 If I make a statement, I am 
roeo, cniuing or assuming that a mark of truth (or reality) bolongn to that 
object or atato of affairs. Thin would not be possible it' the mark were 
common to both true or false, i. e. if external 'reality' had an ambiguous 
character. A sceptic who mikes any positive statement without admitting 
that he has porception ie thur4 oolf-refuted. 
Ctou,, n (pp, 64-65) arguon that the Acadomice did no.. like the Pyrrhoninta, 
ad%ocato a chango in linguiotie ua m from perceptual ctatemnnt3 
(I thero is 
a snake in the collar') to sense ntatomonta 
('thoro apponra to me to be a 
snako in taw collar'). But nho ovarlooka thn ovtdonco of the Iameu11, t1-1. 
In my vie-. r, auch a strict diutinotion falnifina thn Mrtdenic pooltion, which 
Sa midway Vetween that of the de tiat (who mtkon Wreeptu: tl statements) 
and t: h-t of tho t7rnccn. ist (who mikes uenze at~ýtvrýý:, tn). Acoowit, muht be 
taknni ýx the special nt. turt, of xrobab1o st it. nrontu, which relate both to 
the eubjective aide of experience and to the external world. 
2Cf. Scxtua P. H. II, 1 ff. A similar typo of dilrrrvn msy have been uzcd cCainst 
the 'nthil porno percipi' principle by the Stoic ! 4nctpator (co ap. 153 above). 
31t does not of course follow that a form of warcr that is neither true nor 
false must be meaninClese. But a 'etatomont' in the rcquire'l to is 'an 
indicative centonco uttorcd for the purpoco of arcertirt: r omethinc' (W, rued 
td. Knealo, 'The ) vnloi nent of' Lo ola, p. 50). 
4Cf. 
Seneca a,. 117,13, where n clear distinction in drawn between the meaning 
of a. sentence or affirmation, and the object which the affirmation iu about. 
Matra, Stoic Lcjj., p. 12. 
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It is olcar that theca urgumcnto depend partly on the nature of 
otatcmento as auch and partly on the attitude of the person making thcm. 
It is in hic attitudo to hin own statements an well as tho3o of other that 
the sceptic differs from the dogmatist. 'hnus Carneadea, if we are to believe 
Clitomachua, made assertionn which he did rot himaolt bulievo, merely for 
the sake of argument (78). In general, the 'moo patriua Acadcmiaa', that 
2 
of arguing against the views of others without putting forward ono'n ow", 
must stem from the wish to avoid poaitivo ctatemant. The ductrino of 
iitOXf) 
implies that no statement mvy be put forward as true but only an probablo. 
It does not, of courao, follow that a probable statement may not be 
true or false; but to say that x is probable usually rea. no that its 
truth or falsity has not yet been . iufinite1y citabliehed. Au Cicero points 
out in 99 ff., most practical judgumonts are of this kind, including 
prod. ictiona about the future. On the other hand, if thorn are no ciroum- 
stanceu in which it would be poosiblo to dotermina whether a given ntatemont 
is true or false, this would seem to create a problem. Accordir1 to bucullus, 
wo cannot accept a criterion which offer* leco than complete cortainty; 
thorn must be a dictinctivo mark of truth 
('corta atquo propria nota') by 
i, hich in the ln. ct recort we can dotercino it. According to the Academic, 
there is no such mark, 
3 
and wo have to be natiHiied with varying dearcen of 
probability. 
W. and M. Knea7, o. Thy Pev opirnt of Loring p. 53: 'Connected with the not 
that a given typo of utteritnco hau it certain. functirn is the fact that an 
uxttcranco not only expresses a proposition but afro exprorcon or ovincon on 
attitude towards the propooition exprocieA. ' 
2According 
to Numoniuo (fr. 27,14, ff., Dcc 1'1 rcoc). Carnemden wan never cninlcd 
by his ovm eloquence into boliovinF what he hilmaelf said, wheroac Arcesila: z 
wan, forgetting hic general prinniplo that he could perceive nothing. In 
D. L. IV, 36 it in : utated that in conversation Arcentlas tLzed a natural way of 
talking, including do Matio cxprcccicna such an 'i nay' and "o and no will 
not assent to thin', and that his pupils imitated hin in this im in other 
thine. For Carnoadea' nluoivenes9 in orgiamont, ueo tiv_. I, 
G2; Tdum. fr. 27,28 ff. 
3103, 
N. D. I, 12; of. Fin. II, 43 (ond)= jjf. II. 7. The refusal to admit the 
exiotence of a 'certa note' would, to Luculluc, be inconeintont with the 
Academic denial that everything in ii. neortain. 
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By remarking that the Academics meet their critics not with serious 
argument but with ridicule, 
1 Lucullus contrives to suggest that they are as 
irresponsibile as the group relegated to the background iný32, and also that 
their position is equally indefensible, if only for the reason that any state- 
ment they might make in their own defence'would tend to confirm their oppon- 
ents' view. He now goes on to accuse them of frivolity ('quid eo leuius? ') 
if they determine probability by a single glance, or of wasted effort if, they 
give long and careful consideration to the matter. His main point is still 
the came as in 33, that even the most thorough estimate of probability does 
not eliminate the need for a qualitative difference between true and false 
impressions, since without it all impressions are equally untrustworthy. 
Having mentioned Carneades' first and second degrees"of probability 
in 33, Lucullus now sets up`a`contrast botween`the first and the'third, i. e. 
between the merely 'probable' and the 'probable, unhindered and tested' 
impression. 2 Carneadee had argued (Sextue A_M. VII, 184 ff. ) that one is 
satisfied with different degrees of probability in different situations. 
For example, in matters that are of no great importance or when one is 
proceed for time, one will accept the impression that is merely probable. 
To a man hurrying into a dark room a coiled-up rope may look like a snake 
(P_H. I, 227); another, pursued by enemies, 'will interpret a ditch as an 
ambush and therefore avoid it (A. MM. VII, 186). It In to this-sort of hurried 
judgement that Lucullus refers in his stricture on accepting the impression 
which appears probable 'primo quasi aspeetu'. But why object on these 
grounds? Surely even a Stoic philosopher might be pressed for time, or 
accept without question a matter of everyday experience, as Sphaerus did 
when he took the pomegranate. 
3 The implication must be that the criterion 
1Perhaps 
a reference to their treatment of Antipater (cf. 28). 
2Cicero's 
phrases 'ex circumspectione aliqua at accurata consideratione' and 'cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit' are clearly intended to 
suggest an impression that is not merely 'probable and unhindered' but also 'tested' ( 6LeewÖCU L VT or iteptw6cuptvtl I Sextus A. M. VII, 181-2). 3D. 
L. VII, 177, of. Athen. VIII, 354e (ELF 3,624-625). 
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is applied indiscriminately and in circumstances that do not warrant it. 
But Lucullus is no better pleased with the carefully considered and tested 
impression. The first reason given, that if there Is no difference between 
impressions they are all equally untrustworthy, may mean as before (33) that 
without a qualitative difference between true and false no impression can 
even be probable, but it also seems to convey that Carneades' method of 
confirming one impression by the evidence of pthera is (in Luoullus' view) 
totally useless, since in respect of credibility they are all alike and even 
if they confirm one another they will fail to carry conviction. The second 
reason is that, since even wnon all possible chocking has been done, an 
improsssion may appear true and still be false, thin makes nonsenoö of the 
Academic claim that they have moved a groat part of the way towards the truth. 
They are in fact as far away from it as ever, and this In bound to undermine 
their confidence in their own criterion. The words unod, 'fidec', 'confidero', 
eu3gest the Greek %ta*TLrt. %ctOcOOaL , and emphasise the subjective nature 
of the Academic criterion ( %teavdv ). 
That the Academics. wore familiar with this type of criticism is shown 
by Sextus (A. M. VII, 174-5) who, in the courco of explainin3 the Carnoadoan 
theory, admits that a probable impression can be false. But the rare occurr- 
ence of the impression which 'imitates' the truth should not, he says, make us 
distrust the kind which as a genoral rule reports truly, for in both judgement 
and action the standard is the genoral rule. This Aristotelian standpoint 
(e. g. F_. N. 1112b) marks the probability theory as in origin designed to. meet the 
practical needs of everiday life rather thrn the thcorbtical requirements of 
the sciences. It is thus totally opposed to the Stoic view which attempts to 
import scientific exactness into sense-experience. LLtcullus makes no concession 
to the fact (and indeed'does not liven mention it) that the fully tested yet 
false impression is thoroughly exceptional. For him, if the possibility of 
falsity exists at all, the criterion is invalidated, whether it is the 'cata- 
leptio' or the 'probable' impression (of. Sextun A. M. VII, 438). 
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Lueullus thus refutes th3 Academic claim that they coupe an near as 
possible to the truth with the cane argument that the Academics had used 
against the cataleptic impression, namely that, if true and false cannot 
be distinguished, any impression may appear true and yet actually be falpe. 
All the proper tests might have been carried out, but in the absence of a 
known mark of truth the Academic can never tool confidence. Again, Lucullue' 
language is adapted to the subjective character of the Acadonio criterion 
('quod tandem uerum oi')i uideburtur attingere? '), though the argument ituolf 
depends on the fully objective nature of truth. 
Tho key word here is 'fides' ( T. ttvtL4; ), which, as wo have seen (27), 
is associated by the Stoics with perception and knowledge. 
' According to 
Sexttu (A. M. vII, 401), the primary division of impressions for both Stoics and 
Academics was into trustworthy ( %Lmrat ) and untrustworthy ( iintoroa 
but the Stoics identified thb former with 'cataleptic', the Academics with 
'probable' impressions (%O avat ). 
2 Thus for Luoullua it would be 
impossibly to represent an impression as trustworthy, or inspiring trust, if 
it could conceivably be falte. The criticism is particularly damacinc to 
the -nL davbv in view of its conceptual relation with %La%6 anal 
%totLr. . The Academic, on the other hand, is prepared 
to adciit that a 
'persuasive' improaaion can be false, alt:. eugh in gunerel it Is the beat and 
indeed the only guide to truth. 
I'`inully, the probable imprcanion in represented by Lueullua AD a 
'Hirn' or 'I. roof' of the thing itself, which the Academic claims to follow 
in spite of the possit; lity that the 'thi.. a signifi+1' may be false or non- 
oxiatcnt. The attribution of this view to the Academics themsolvea, as an 
3 
For the . 2toie definition of 'fides'/ Ttcrtc 9 uee abovo, p. 140 n. 1. 2 
7, L o'te) C and -tLO«vdC can bo virtually synonymi (of. Soxtu3 A. M. VII 242, 
where the primary Stoic divtoion In given as %Lt'u. vc; t / &7ttOnvot 
ý. 
Ct. Ar1nt. 11, het. 135,61) 29. AccordinC to ºgxtu3 P. 11.1,229-230, %ctdevOctit 
1130 var1o(c moßn1n, ": 3, and while the 1'yi'rhnint 'Oeiiavea' without committing 
himself, the fo] 1owt+ri of Cnrnaadoa and CAºi tomachua hnt oa strong leaning; 
towards, what io ;. ý, auvbv 
31 
am t 1'ciný, 'eat heu quids m... aiinum' to roter to a particular imprenaio! º, 
indiuttt(A by pothtint to the thing in quoution. but there in an ambiguity 
17"re; u ne ro. l93-194. 
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absurd way of talking, may bo a rhotorical fiction. According to the Stoics' 
a sign ( 011ict ov ) i3 somothing which rovoaln somothing oleo not directly 
porceptible, oithor by formor ob2orvnd aA: ociation with it or bocau3o it can 
bo inferred from it. The in foaturee in proof (&n öctýte. 
2 
and proof 
itself is a kind of sign, since both exhibit the . 'no form, 'if thin, then 
thia'. 3 Tho idea of the 'aicn' has a certain analoCy to the mark of truth 
('inaigno ucri', 36) by which the cataleptic impro Sion reveals not only 
itself but also the rntterial object. 
4 If the probable impression is similarly 
the sign or proof of the material object, it would room illogical to a Stoic 
to accept the sign no revealing the object and at the came time to aaoort 
that the object ('quod aignificatur') can be false or non-exiotont. more 
seoma, however, no reason to ouppoco that the Acadomics would havo thought 
of the relation botwoen improccion and object in to=n of sign and what in 
cignifiod by it, 
5 
or that the Stoics normally did co. 
6 
For the Stoics, it 
would tend to obaeuro the difforenco botwccn direct az, d indirect Forception. 
If they attributed the view to the Acadoaica, it wac perhaps from a belief 
that the Acadcmic theory did in fact do just this. 
On their side, the Acadomic3 would undoubtedly hzvo attacked the 
doipnatic concoption of sign, which roquiroa that tho cign is nococzarily 
indicative of truth (Coxtu3 ! 1ý`1. VIII, 249) and that proof ncceucarily reculta 
15PXtus A: t%VIY, 1143 ff. 1'+nteß, "tc%tn tor-Lo, p. 13. 
2äoxtuc 
A. ii. TI, 104; n. 1t. VIII, 245i 252. 
3Coxtun 
A. 1I. V1II, 2 j6; 7,11(. II, 96. 
4 Sandbach in Problem,:, P. M. 
5Cf. 111: 'p^rcipiordi ni tum nullusa habo=: a'. 
6ý1n 
imprenßion would differ fror an ordinary cirn in it* cuppocod rosemblcrnco 
to tho cxtorral. object. A ni. railn. r relation might be hold to exist botwoon 
thn maaninf-, of a utatomcnt an, i tho corrooponding reality. But, an., in, there 
is nothing to indicate tit-it tho Stoffaa extended their theory of ciciu to 
cover the ro! ationohin betwoen impression and object. tut toe Zoxtuo A. M. VII, 
3659 367, who unoa a-g1teLot7vOat and ot1EtctwoLiC of tho relation between 
ºuubJontivo oxp,: ricnce, and external object. 
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in a true conclusion (P; 11. II. 143). 
1 Lucullua, who hau undo his stand on 
proof quite clear in 279 would naturally object to the Academic view, 
according to which the conclusion of a logical proof might be false or 
delusive. The present argument provides him with an opportunity to show by 
implication how the Academic denial of a mark of truth would affect other 
areas of cognition where reliable evidence io nocoeaary. 
2 At the same time, 
in pausing from the one to the other, he may be deliberately confusing the 
theory of sign and prof with that of a mark of truth (cf. 34). On the 
analogy of tho latter, the probable imprec3ion In taken to reveal the object 
directly, but without providing a guarantee that what in revealed in not 
non-existent or false. On the analogy of the former, perception becomes a 
form of infc: cnco from impreaoion to extornal object, and if the impresoion 
is merely probable the inference may always be false. There'aay thus be 
an wnbif, uity botween the strict meaning of 'o1inu ', 'argumentum' and 'id 
quod a1 ificatur' and the ordinary aeaninI of evidence on which action or 
judgvmont in baned. 3 
The final remark of Lucu11ua is quite in keeping with hie general. 
doematio pocition and confidence that truth is on hic aide. By the usa of 
a forensic image, that truth will defend herself without his advocacy, he 
Fuggeata, ac proviously, that Academic acupticicm is defoated by experience 
itself (of. 17,34). TI-a unupoken inference is that the Academia, who denies 
that he makes evoxything uncertain, will not be able to prove his case. 
1Part 
of Sextus' attack on proof may E; o back to Carneadee (A 1d, VIII, 34o ff. ). 
See C. J. de Vogel, Greek Fhiloao 1iv, 11191114. : oxtuo (1'. 11. I1,1ß7; A. M. 'itII, 
473 ff. ) admi to that hi,: arguments againot proof are oril, probabi s. Thia 
riiy imply that the sceptic would accopt 'proof' if based on the probable. 
2Cf. Plato Vhaldo 92d, whore äicrrnien pointe out they daagmro of 'proofs' 
that refit merely ou probabilitieu, in geometry or any other subject. SGs 
G. N. R. Lloyd, I'olrrit rind Anal , p. 394. 
3ioid (1). 222 n. 6 and 7) sutmToatn (711jc1, ov tj 'tCxµfJpLov as the Grook 
equivalent oC " i7num auf ar; rumentinua' and int. erpreto 'id quod sirnificabatur' 
( vtb anl. rvelr6v in : oxtu; ) in the s"njo of the object which gives 
rino to tho ia: precaion. 
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Anoent and itn ia: par. tanne 
37-38 (1.45,26 - p. 46,12) hin natis connitia ... adaentitur otatim. 
Summa .I will now say a few words about a cent and approval (which 
the Crooks call Gvyxat&etotO, not that it in not a largo subject, but 
the foundations have already been laid. For in explaining the power of 
the senses, I made it clear that many thinge are gra pcd and perceived, 
which cannot happen without aneent. In the next place, since it In 
activity which chiefly difforentiatea the animate from the inanimate (for 
an inactive animal cannot oven be imagined), either the aniral must be 
deprived of sensation or the powar of voluntary a.: 3ent must ba restored 
to us. ßut1thoce whom they with neither to hrrwo sensation nor to aaaent 
are boing robbod, an it were, of the mind itself for like a scale under 
the pressure of weights, the mind muht yield to what is evident, and just 
as an animal rast pursue what is nuitnd to its nature (what the Crooks 
call o txctov ), so the mind cannot fail to approve what in evident. ' 
And yet, if the position I have been c wing is true, any talk about 
assent is superfluous, for he who perceives anything; aaeanta at once. 
According to the Stoic account given in Sextuo, 
2 
an act of perception 
has two atagoc or aspects. Tho first is th, purely pcaaivo reception of an 
imprescion, which is involuntary in that the way we Pro affected does not 
depond on us but on what is rcpreaented in the inprcnoion. The cecond is 
the act of assent, which is voluntary cnd correnpondu to a judiemont on the 
part of the mind by which the impression is acceptcd au true. In principle# 
the act of perception wouldg without a^ecnt. be inc' p1cte and virtually not 
take place. 3 'Grasp' (xa'CüAtýýy ) is connequontly defined an a. aent to a 
cataleptic impression, i and tho effective in of the ocnoce in hold to 
lkoadi, 
ig 'at, with Reid; Planberg rautoron the origiral M53 reading 'et'. 
Cf. Lcusnann-Hofmann-äzant, r, 1Iteininche Crnmnntik II, 1). 494- 
21_. 
VIII9397; cf. Fat-43 (Chryaippua); Ar. I, 40 and II9145 (Zeno). 
In practice, it would he lmpontiblo to divide any not of perception into 
two distinct stages, but a cituation could be imagined in which, fron sago 
ouch cause na inattention or shocks the mind ctight fail to complete an net 
of perception. A neliborate roi'unal to complete it might also be poasiblo 
in certain cases. 
4Soxtua 
A. t4. VII, 151; VIII9397 etc. Sandbach, I'rob)em4 p. 13$ finds Zeno'g 
manual simile misleading, atnce it nwTg; eatr. that anent and i, np are two 
uurcessive vita no (145, cf. 1,41). But in a Donau they are, ain. o xc. -rQt1YL4 
in the recult of the net of anannt. 
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involve aaaent. 
I Lucullua takes it for granted, thoreforo, that having shown 
(a3 he claims) that many things can bo perceived, he ban already laid tile,., 
fcundation3 of the doctrino of asacnt. 
2 
The Academic sceptics before Philo, repudiated assent as a corollary., of 
their position that nothing can be perceived. Accepting the Stoic view that 
the wine man will assent to nothing that is false or unknown, they accepted 
the consequonces for, themselves that the wise. man will assent to nothing 
(67-68). The ordinary person might, of course, assent and hold an opinion 
(66), and thoro see= to have been some question whether Carneadea thought 
that the wise man might also do so (59,67,7a).: But the general Academia 
view, as Cicero represents it, is that the wise man will totally auapand 
aaoent, and that action and judgements of probability do, not involvo ase, ent. 
The Academics are able to by-pass assent and avoid the-consequences 
which the Stoics said would follow because the latter confined the moaning 
of assent to a particular type of judgement, nanoly cno which icplioa, the 
positive acceptance of somothing as true. :n assenting to an improasion, we 
either take for granted or pocitivoly affirm that it dooa actually correspond 
to the reality behind it. This exclusive interoat in perception and in the- 
type of judgement which ratifies it prevented the Stoics (and Lucullue here) 
from presaini., the point that any judgement, especially a judgement of prob- 
ability. could be taken as an act of aaocnt and thus an refutinr; &xox, h .3 
11Oß 'diount anim Stoici census ipson adsennuu case'. Cl. Aet. IV, 10,2 (: +3' 11,72); Stob. Ecl. I, p. 349,23 (""U 11974)- 
2 Although in his previous arment iueullun has mentioned ansont only once (at the end of 2 ), it in obviously as2umed throughout, especially in 25 (ceps p. 139 above). The phrase 'cure uim quae coast in soneibue explicabamus' 
echoes similar phrases in 30 ('quite nie esset in sonetbun') and 20, ('quanta 
uts sit in ceneibu3'). Lucullus is probat.: y rofcrring to the argument in 
19 ff. (see p. 159 n. 4 above). 
3Clener. 
t (Strom. II p. 498/-MII' 11,992) in probably w: on in representing anopinion 
or JudComent as an act of accent. Elsewhere (II p. 923/ VF 11,121, 
he arunos agrinnt the Pyrthonioto that any ancumption would be a breach of 
-nOxfj , but the argumont roots on the belief that . hat in ancurod in tacit- 17 taken to be true. 
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For the Stoic wishes his opponent to admit that he assents in order that he 
should admit that he perceives. Even if the Academic were to admit that he 
assents to a probable impression, this would, on the Stoic view, constitute, 
no more than a weak or falte act of assent. 
I A Stoic would not expect him, 
to give his assent to what seems to him merely probable. 
2 
So long as the Stoics themselves did not allow the wise man to assent' 
to what is merely probable, there was no need for the Academics to admit that 
they did so. To the oojection that action is impossible without assent, they 
replied that they followed probability. Cicero always treats assent and 
following probability as alternatives, 
3 
and there is no indication in his 
argument that Lucullus took any other view. We must therefore reject the- 
opinion of Reid, which has been widoly, acccpte-1, that the Academics made a' 
distinction between '& solute' and 'qualified' assent, and that they proposed 
to withhold the'one kind of assent in theory but give the other kind in 
practice (cf. Introduction p. 14). This view rests basically on a misinter- 
pretation of 104 (for which sea n. 3 below) and on 146, where relying on a 
SVF III, 172. Cf. Fin. III, 18z 'a falsa autem adsensione magic nos alicnatoe 
eace quarr a ceteris rebus, quas eint contra naturaa, arbitrantur. ' 
2The 
Stoic definition of the %LFav6 v given in D. L. VII, 75 (Sy 119201) as 
'a proposition attractizg us to assent' does not really tell us whether in 
judging something to be probable wo are assenting (weakly). The same is 
tru"'oof the definiticn of the Cvaorov as 'a propositicn that has more 
char6es of *being true' (D. L. V1I, 76/S1'F 11,201). artHoujzh here we have the 
evidence of Sphaorus' : lain that he hud given his a.. 'sent to the proposition 
that 'it is reasonable (ca oyo v) that these are pomegranatec' (D. L. VII. 
177; Athen. VlII, 354e / SVF I, 624-5). But trcecilas also intended the 
F Oyo v to refer to im action that ciaoly accords with reason. It is 
likely that both Arcecilas and Carneadra to)k advantage of the equivocal 
nature of these words to introduce criteria which, ": aile providi'q motivation 
for action, made it possible for them to claim that they were not exemieing 
assent. 
31n 
104, where Cicero is explaining Clitocachus' views, the two forma of 
gnoXh are (1) the we man's refusal to assent to enything, and (2) : Ua 
refusal to give an anr*. er for the purpose of approval or disapproval, so 
that he neither denies nor affirms anything. The wise can withholds assent 
in both cases, but with regard to the second he follows probability and 
replies'yea or no accordingly. Although the passarge is not entirely clear. 
it cannot be inferred from it that under 1,2) the wise man given a 'qualified' 
assent (Reid p. 300 n. 1), especially in vi-w of 'dum sine adaensu' below. 
I98 
corrupt text Reid supposeo Catulun to be saying that he approves of universal 
Ino xf] while agreeing with his father"(and, according to his father, with 
Carneadec) that the wise man will ascent and opine, provided that he, realiaoo 
at the same time that nothing can be perceived. The only rcanonable inter- 
pretation of this passage is that the principle that nothing can be perceived 
is no longer hold to juotify 1%. oXf( ,1 and that assent in to be given on the 
basin of a probable judgement. But this assent will be simply assent, It 
will not be 'qualified' assent. According to 3toio ideas it will be 'weak' 
ascent because of the possibility that whist is assented to might be false. 
But ascent does not become 'qualified' simply because there is a-provico 
attached to it. Cicero makes this clear in 66, whore he denies that the wise 
man will ever as3cnt, but admits that he himself often dooa so, in epitu of 
his conviction that nothing can be perceived. The two nonaea of asaont-cre 
obviously the same. To hold that nothing can be perceived is not the aamo, 
thorefo; o, a3 to withhold naoent, though ý1 noXfj may or oven should be the 
consoquonco of it (cf. 59). - 
Luoullua does not differentiate botwo2n the two werde 'adcencio' and 
'adprobatio', but offern both an the Latin equivalent of OUyXQTUC(7I(; . 
In what follows, either word, or the eorrec; ondinj; verb, in uled to express 
assent. In I, 41 Cicero joins 'accoptu: n' to 'approbatt& , whether as a 
synonym or ne a ropeti+ion of 'quasi acoepta nonsibuo' in IP40 In not 
entirely clear. 
3 If asoent is given, recognition and classification of the 
object can bu assumed jr. the act of assent, but it is perhaps a woakncaa of 
the theory that an analysis of perception which divides it into n pasci. e and 
an active component, the latter boing identified with assent, leaven no way 
1Ibin Involves changinc 'eon: probanc' to 'non prob, ina' or 'improbanc' (Duo 
Introduction p. 57 n. 3). 
2When 
Cicero needs a word without thin implication he normally uses 'probaro', 
o. g. 78 'quod a Carneade dicitur probatum'. 
3ßeid, 
p. 152 n. 1, argueu that 'acceptum' in 1,41 is used in a different nonao 
from 'quasi accopta senoibuz' in 40 and virtually cc a eynony c of 'aprroba- 
tum'. 
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in which the mind can acknowledge the impression and react to it if aunont 
is withhold. It is therefore possible that in It40-41 Cicero in u. 3inq 'quasi 
accepts senoibu3' and 'acceptun' in an attempt to distinguish various degrees 
of acceptance in a perceptual act. But 'ausent' ( auyxcitr4CecLC ) in a 
technical term referring to a single and specific mental act, i. e. acceptance 
that the impression is true (see p. 109 n. 1 above). 
Luoullus goes on to repeat the charge mado earlier in 30 (sea pp. 167- 
160 above), and argues that his opponents by rofuaing assent are eliminating 
the difference between the living and the non-living ('animal', 'inanimum'). 
This differenco he sees as one of aotivity, 
I 
which deponde on sensation and, 
at least in the higher creaturca, 
2 
on voluntary ameent. The Acadeiio is thus 
presented with the uncompromicing dilemma that either aanent must be rostorod3 
or the living croaturo be deprived of nenne, for without anoent man would 
loco not only the power of action but also the effective uno of his ounces, 
and no be unable to fulfil hic basic function: an a living being. Ho would, 
in effect, be robbed of his 'xnimuct', and Lucullun keeps before us the dual 
pioturo of the hiamzn 'animuo', yielding to clear imprescians, and the living 
thizng ('animal') pursuing what in cuttod to its natura. In this analogy, 
only the assent given to irproouionn in illustrated, but Lucullun Coen an to 
argue that all mental and moral activity - in a word, all action - follows 
frort it. 
Cr. Antiochus' view that all living thing-, including mat, are naturally 
inclined to conutant activity (Fin. V155 rf. 
5, 
and that min'a moral oxcellenco 
is bcu. ~ýd up , pith thin natural 
activity (hid- 53)- 
2 The phrase 'in rostra potentate' ohowa that L"ucullus in thinking of aaaent 
primarily in hu: ýir? n terms. It was in foot Stoic doctrine that all living 
creaturen hive thc power of ascent (SVF 71,991; Long, E. M. p. 173). 
Alexander of A. Niirt dicias ciiutinguiahcc ba%wccn raticnuºl and irrational ascent, 
attributing t: , laLtor kic, d to the Stoics (^V'F II, 900,981,983). 
3Ao 
au, cstod in the Introduction (n. 39 above), the argument hero is 
anachronistic in that 1"hilo had already 'motored' assent, thoitrh not in 
the nenne or acrcpting carºº: 'a expnricnae an indubitably true. In thin 
rocpac t, Luoulira' sr rtwnt is o"11 vary raluvaut. 
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In these sections Lucullus hats not himself the task of proving; that 
to assent to nothing in to deny the proper and natural functions of the mind 
and at the came time that it is p3ycholo4Jcally impossible. Thin might 
rtrna facie seem inconsistent with his original description of ascent as 'in 
our power' ('oa quao est in nostra roteutato aita... adcannio', 37). 
1 For if 
it in in our power to assent it should also be in our power not to ascent, 
but for Lucullus this does not corm to follow. The conception of freedom 
that is implied here and in Cicero's account of Chrysippus' theories in the 
no rato (4]. ff. ) is unusual in that the problem is seen as arising with the 
perceptual antecedents of action rather than with action Wolf. raoically 
the contention in that, although n.. nont cannot takr place without the 
impression, it is not necessitated by it. 
2 On the other hand, wo are not 
free to give or refuse assent an we plcano, irrespective of the natura of 
the impression. Assent in 'in our rower' because it is our own not and 
depends on ourselves and our nature, whereas the impression comes from the 
external objf; ct ('extrin:. couw', Fat. 42). Thif» somewhat unsatisfactory 
dichotomy soEms to be the sole basis for maintaining that anraent in 
voluntary. 
It can be used na an argm-nent for or L gMnnt dotorninirm that wo are 
not free to act against our nature . It in for thic reason that wo are not 
tree to refuse assent to clear impressions. The mind yicldc to theoo 
impressions because it is constituted by natura tu do Po, in tlio name way 
that it accepts a nece scary truth or ropudintan at obvious falethood. The 
problem arisen partly because of tMe caujul link with external objcota, and 
Partly because Lucullus' im, 1Co of the descending ncclo cug; auta a form of 
compulsion rather than a mental initiative. 
1Cf. 1,40 'quarr cane uult in nobiu pouitam of uoluntarian' (Zeno). Fnt. 43 
'cod adnen»io nootra crit in potentate' (Chrynippuu). 
2Cf. 
Arir3toc1o'a definition of 'hypothotical' necons7ity (t'hy8. l99b 34 ff. ). 
Chnysippua (t. ý. ) dictinruiches 'principzl and prrfeat' from 'auxiliary and 
proximate' caucC3, the effect of external ohjr. ct: s on the Will kein of the 
1attor kind. U. L. J. Furley'a expls+nation or Lmrotiua' reference to 'nn 
extornal force' endan enitit. freedom (Luor. II, 709) its 'cumpulr, ion oxerotned 
by oxtcrnal ob, joctc thrown the medl n of renn re, ý; eptlon' (wýti, ý tuflr in 
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The view that the cataleptic icipronoion in virtually irroointiblo is 
attributed by Sextun to the later Stoics A. PI. VII, 257), and I cueioatad in 
the Introduction (p. 25) that Antioehua shared their view and that it wan the 
generally accepted Stoic doctrine after Carnoadou. Ito purpoco seems to have 
been to roaceort the independent validity of the cataleptic iopreaaion as a 
criterion in the lieht of the Academic critioioma art Carnoadoan demand for 
co:: curronce. In virtue of its clear and atrikira character, the cataleptic 
impression will win assent, 'provided there in no obstacle'. This addition 
to the definition of the criterion (A. M. YII, 253) aho: ro the Carnoadean connect- 
ion, but also creates a presumption that it wan not the intention of those 
Stoics to deny freewill. ' It would indeed be strange and ironioal if only the 
cataleptic impression (with certain exceptions) ware to 'compol' assent, and 
freedom were exercised in all other cao*s. Again it in the metaphor used 
('all but drags us by the hair to accent') that ooomc inccnsiatont with 
freedom, althcugh one may add that Chryaippus' oxa, loo, the spinning top 
and the cylindical drum rolling downhill, are not much more roasouring. But 
if it io borne in mind that, for tho Stoic, frocwill roan froedom to follow 
ono'a naturo, not freedom to go against it, tho problan bocomoo long aotito. 
2 
Tho imago of the turn of the ccalc, which is bore ado vary cxplioit, 
nu,; g; octs the Crock word 607A which is occa.: ionslly uaod in tho courcoa 
for the 'inclination' of the mind in boliof or totion. 
3 In Plutlrch Ativ Cm . 
1In Fat-40 Ctcoro explaino tho position of Chrya1ppuo no midway botwoon the 
older philornphora who bolievad that ncsant waz froo and thono who held that 
it was determined by necessity ('u, otfiei of necoiaitato dicebant'). He 
nowhere mentions that there were otnor Stoics who tork the lrittor virw. It 
is unlikely that he would have overlooked so oiCnif1cant n chtiv º In the Stoic 
viewpoint. Sandbach (Frnb1Pm'% p"14) states that Z, illor'c explanation of the 
word 'cataleptic' as ' pippin ' the porc1; ient has now boon ahandonod, and that 
the ancient authorities always represent 'fracp' au an activity in which thu 
percipient is the ahnt. But cod 1av1yn, Vor fen nn Pnrrfý*, t n p. )q. 
2Cf. Aristotle's distinction between 'natural' and 'enforced' novemont, " 
movemont contrary to the rzturo of the thinr; (1wýs. 215a 1 rf. ). 
3 vF' 1I, 900, p. 2C0,25i Ilum3nius, fr. 27,31 (Doc I'1cýcQu). 
6 
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11 D, it in applied to impuThe. Wending the ccepticr+ against critics who 
used the Stoic argument from 6Xparta , Plutarch declares that, in npito of 
all their efforts, impulao was unwilling to become accent or to accept 
perception as 'turning the scale' (ovo c 6o% jC 6pxty b Fwro ' 01Y 
araOfaLv 
1), but plainly led to action without need of scent. A little 
later (11222C) he deecribea the impulse roused by the impression as an 
'inclination' (6o-xfj, veUc ) that takes place in the i yc iovtvßv 
P. De LaCy2 has suggested on the evidence of th3 Lue-ullua (37-n, 62) that it 
was Antiochui who borrowed from the Stoics the arg, ont which Plutarch in 
attacking. There is obviously co=on #Trcund between that argument and 
Lucullus' lino of thought in the proomnt pasoageg tho chiof difference being 
that for Luculluc the falling scale roprotontn the aJsent givon to improscionn 
in porception, 
3 
whcrean for Plutarch'o opponents it !o impulco which recnivca 
ita inclination from porcaption. For Plutarch himio1f thin inclination, or 
impulße, follows dircotly upon tho ixn; rccaion. In bu.; h atin that, fox, hia 
opponents, 6ci1 is something which follows perception, Plutarch pray indeed 
be micrepreeentina his cource, since it would bo. one rnd the ueaa act of 
assent which confirms perception and directs impulzo tovarda its object. 
But whether or not Antioch-us (or the Stoica) used 6unc in thin way, Cicero 
has chosen tiß confine the imo90 to perception, while retaining the connection 
with impulse in the form of an analogy. Thiu chrn, ý'o, if change it in, is a 
cignifi. cant one, for it brings out the point that ascent in rational beings 
can luve a wider context than rero action, but that even no it in part of a 
behaviour pattern that is Cormon to all living thirg-s. 
1 
npbnfºcr v (r'ohlonz). 
2611' 77 (1956) p. 74. 
3A 
further link with Lucullus' argument can perhaps b3 aeon in 1122P fl., 
where Plutarch, still defending 17OXf1 , contiona nn objection from the 
oppooition that it in iopounible not to acnent to whit is evident, and that 
it in more unreaconablo neither to affirm nor deny nccopted beliufc than to 
deny them. Though in the context thin appears to be an Epicurean argument, 
it nugaaato that c -AuXh an a otato of mental eucpcnuion between affirm- 
ation and denial was thought to be unnatural, and the iir. aga of the falling 
scale might have been uned to oppose it. 
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Tho mind which yielda to 'pornpicua' is clearly the hur. an mind. 
' In 
what follows, the link between 'animus' and 'animal' is again exploited. 
The principle that the living thing cannot fail to pursue what is adapted 
to its nature does not exclude man, but the analopr in effective only if it 
i3 interpreted in very general and bauic terms. The doctrine of o NeEwacc 
starts from the assumption that nature created every animal to be well- 
disposed to Itself and seek what contributes to its cafety and well-boing. 
2 
The wide acceptance of this theory would make it plz, aaiblo to aupp03O that, 
since pursuit of the oixeto v is a primary natural impulse, the animal to 
which such an object in presented must respond to it, and cannot do otherwise. 
Luoullus appears to be maintaining that the mind in approving 'obieetam rem 
perspicuam' in similarly following nature, and cannot do otherwise. The 
support which his argument derives from thin analogy is somewhat ölender. 
If perception and therefore assent are necessary preconditions of impulee3 
and action, he is acuuming in the analogy one of the points at ioouo. 
4 And 
even if the grestion of impulse, like assent, being necessitated yet from 
can be loft on one aide, there still remains the problem of deciding what 
accords. with nature, about which there was no general agreement (Fin-V, 17). 
For this the ambiguity of the concept of nature was largely responsible. 
The Academics themselves would probably not have disputed that action a: --at 
be motivated by what is otxcl ov .5 But they could have argued that the 
mind is also following its own nature in refusing ascent, since there are 
no self-evident imprcasione in the sense vrdorstood by the Stoics. 
1Altht., 
igh 'pernpicuz' uuggoato primarily nenne-oxperl. onco, it need not be 
confinod to thin; cf. Llpiotetua 11,26,7, whore in 3pito of a coxrupt text it 
appears that the scale imr43o is boing applied to a conclusion of reason. 
2D. L. VII, U5; rin. IlI, 16; V, 24 cto. For a detailed d:: cueoion of the theory 
see S. C. Pcmoroke'u chapter in rroblucg, p. 114 ff, t: ltiochu3 attributed itu 
origin to the Academic lbtcro (F'1n. lV, 45). It wan aluo accepted, at leant 
for the purpoco of arf; amont, by Carnoadeu (b'Sn. V, 17). 
31! 
enon olxt; twciur. Jr. uaid to dopor: d on perception. Cf. E 1,1971 11#724- 
4 hie to I rtioulorly un i: perr^option/knowladgo bolon u to the cltU23 f': T& 
oL tu (nf. 26; fl n. 1II, 17-18; V, 48), or depend: cn the ounibility of 
roooanicing what in aTxcluv (º'ru}hlonn, pp. 113 ff., 130 ff. ). 
5 CI. Fin-V, 17 Cr, (CFtrncaden); coo p. 207 below (Arocuilao). 
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Lucullun goes on to assert (cf. his opening remlrks in 37) that if 
his previous arguments about perception are valid, 
I there in no point in 
talking at all about perception as if it warn a separate incuos 'qui enim 
quid percipit adeentitur etatisn. '2 It does not, howaver, follow from this 
that 1 7, o Xfi i© a psychological impoocibility, or that, it assent is given, 
the fact of perception is thereby proved. For even it people do not as a 
rule refrain from accepting what appears to them to be true, what in taken 
to be true is not noccocarily co, and it in poaezible to paes other forma of 
cognitive judgement than thcie involving ascent, and to base action upon 
them. 
The conseguonce3 of withholding menont 
38-39 (p. 46,12-24) zed haco otiam oequuntur ... tollit o uita. 
Summary. It also follow93 that without assent there can be neither 
memory nor concepts nor art. Above all, granted that there is freewill, 
there will ba none in him who assents to nothing. (39) What then will 
happen to virtno? It in ridiculous tha-1. vice should be voluntary and 
rest on asocnt, but not virtue, the strength and steadfaatnean of which 
are wholly derived from what it has ausented to and approved. In any 
case, improcsicn and acocnt must precede action, no that ho who taken 
away either taken all activity out of life. 
This diagnosis of tho consequences of coeptioism has a familiar look 
(cf. 21-25). There is a differonco, rowovar, and it lien in th3 deduction 
of tho aamo conolu3ton3, not from the tho3ia of &rapuaIaCta , but frc. +. the 
1'si illa du quibu3 disputatun oat tiara aunt' must cefor to Luculluo' own 
treatment of Antioohu3' case. There w. n, hoMever, an a. rgunent umod ngainßt the 
Pyrnccnian sceptic, that he ascumeo in diucucßion the truth of hiu statements 
(cf. Soxtus P. ti.? I, 1 ff.; D. L. IX, 102; Clement StroVr. VItI, 5/"Q II, 121). If 
Lucullus were implying that each aide takr, his caoa to be true, it would give 
a different plant to 'qui enim quid percil. 1t ... ' 
2Luculluo 
moans, not that a3cent succeeds perception, but that 'it follows 
without argument' that accent in given, an couothinsr built-in and integral to 
perception. There in thus no need to oee, with Void (p. 224 n. 6), a difficulty 
in the cu gc.: tion that assent immediately fbllowo I! crccption. Once conothing 
is recoguiaed as true, assent would i_pno facto have teen given. 
3'sequuntur' 
here roferc to the concoquences of pern: incnt & roxij (cf. Adv. Co1. 
11201) 9%, vzat, ... -cc: 1 u). lioid, p. 224 n. %, wr'ongly taken it in the camp ucnoo 
an 'sequitur' in 30, an a reference to the order of treatment in the co: u.. 
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doctrino of' L7oXf '. Lucullus' atate: nant'at the, beginning-'of 37, f that -nin'o 
assent ii a p. irt of pcrcoption the foundations of hic. arl; u: act havo alroady 
been laid, äpplicu'equally to tho proßont section. 
Tho conclu3ion that concopts, memory and art aro impossiblo without a 
aecuro base in perception wa3 reached in 22, and since without assent there 
is no porception, it can be taken for granted that the ccnclusion, F if not the 
argumcnt as such, applies equally to assent. In addition, thc progression 
from sensation to knowledge describod in 30 shows cloarly'tha dependence 'of 
memory, concepts and art upon assent, implied in tho attention of the mind r 
which enables it to retain and classify improaaions and build up'through 
msmory a cysten of concepto, leading evantually to knowledge and moral wisdom. 
Tho possibility of rotaining images not consciously accented to do©o not 
affoct this az-gur: ont, since without assent they could have no direction or 
motivltion. 
1 Lucullus sees his opponont, who rofueoo to comploto the act of 
porcoption, as one for whoa oxporionco would bo a more flux of impressions 
and im. -. ges, unrolatod to objoots or to ono anothor, und rightly conoludoä. 
that noithor art nor'concoptn would be po. oiblo on such'u banio. 
2 
Lacutluo' next point, that without accont thoro is nothing in our power, 
is stated briefly and with little explanation. It would oC course follow thtt 
if all irnpulgs and action dopend upon aanont, frocdom as it is ordinarily 
undorntood, an involving a choico botwoon alternative courses o: action, woulc! 
be an irrelegant 13Suo for ono who aaoonts to nothiiij. And if action l..: 
impocaible, . irtuout; notion is alco impossible. 
But the consequonco that 
without ancont thcro is no activity nt all is roafffmad at tho end of the 
sootion and dooa not soem to be the promics of this particular argument. In 
oayiN that froodom will not exist for on"i who practisoa 
l71oxtl 
, Lucullus 
coven to taue that it in throuýdh the act of ras'3ont, and throuCh this alone, 
that froadom is oxorcised, from which it follows that appotition and action 
Mcmcrioo mutt also bo abiding rnd stable improacionc (cf. Cnr . i035AD). 
. Cr. Cl rynippun' criticism of Clnanthoa' Inttrprntution of 7eno'u definition of 
an inprc: taoion an i nwo tc 
tv * 1) X1äl (P-130 n. 1 Above). 
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aro aloo in our powor`(cf. Fat. 40). The samo Is presumably true of the moral 
judgement, by which appetition is directed to what is suited to our nature 
at the rational"levol. The steadfastness of the wise an is the consequence 
of the indubitable truth of the propositions he has assented to (23), so that 
even if in one sense he cannot act otherwise, he nevertheless ants freely;, 
and as the result of his own nature. Clearly, if assent is to be permanently 
withheld, virtuous action of this kind will no longer be possible. 
Lucullus finds it paradoxical that. men's vicer., which depend on assent 
to a'falee'or incorrect judgement, will otill be voluntary, but that tho wine 
an by refusing to assent should make himself and everyone else incapable of 
virtue. The implication that the ordinary person, who assents, would not be 
a sceptic is of course duo to the fact that the dispute in about the wise 
man. But in arguing in this way, Lucullus appears to be begging the question. 
For the fact that the morally vicious and the ordinary person both assent 
does not establish the possibility of perception. The Academic can also 
dispute Lueullan' conclusion by arguing that freedom does not necessarily 
depend on ascent since there are other forms of cognitive judgemont or atti- 
tudes to oxperienco, such as judgements of probability. 
' It was, moreover, 
the Academic view that impulse and action can be moved directly by the 
impression, which may imply that actions are determined solely by extorA. al 
factors, but we can assume that thto implication wottid not have been accepted 
(pp. 207-8). Still, it ras to be allowed that the Academic position does not 
make virtue in the Stoic sense possible, '.: nee the 'firmitas' and'eonstantia' 
of the wine ß. 1n must, on the Stoic view, derive from firm and strong ontont, 
and this is what is basically meant by virtue being 'in our power'. 
The paradox that vice but not virtue would be voluntary reveroes the 
Socratic view that 'no one eins willingly'. That mo:,. 1 responsibility implies 
freedom is widoly acoopted, 
2and it was also held that the fast that wo assign 
But Lucullue' contention that freedom dioappearc with uzccnt In not answered 
by Cicero. Carneaden' defence of freewill in the N Fnto (31 ff. ) concorna 
a different prolcm, that of antecedent cauaeo. 
2Cf. 
Arint. 1. N. 1113b 6 ff.; J. D. Mabbott, An Introduction to Ethics, pp. 109 ff. 
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praiao or blame to actions prosuppooca that it wau in the agent's power to- 
act otherwise. How far thin is over strictly the case is a matter of dabato 
and need not affect the present Inoue* The Stoics did not suppose the moral 
agent free to act against his natural and wo may suppose that Ilntiochua, 
though he disagreed with the Stoics on come other ethical questions, would 
not have disagreed with them on this one. In asking, therefore, 't'here is 
virtue, if nothing rests with ourcalves? ' Lucullua In thinking, as before, 
of assent and its consequences for action, not of absolute fr: edom of choice 
between alternatives modes of conduct. 
Lucullus concludes his objections to &%coxh with a brief ro-statement 
of the argument from inaction. Although impulse in not here specifically 
mentioned an following accent, Cicoro clarifies the position when, answorinß 
the argument in 108, he sots out the Stoic view that sensations are followed 
by impulso and consequently by action. bocauco they are thomsolvos acts of 
accent. The argument from inaction was, wo are told, the one most often 
used by Chrysippus and Antipater againct the 'lies and empty postulates' of 
those who claimed that, when an appropriate impression occurred, they wore 
moved by impulao immediately without yiali: ing or aoaenttng to tho improcaion 
(Plut. Sto. nep. 1057A/f F 1II, 177). The came argument is roterrod to by 
Plutarch (Ad.. Col. 1122A-D) an the ultimate woapcn broufiht out like a Gorgon'e 
head for uoo against the Academicu by their oppcnents. 
2 
The claim that an appropriate improcnion is sufficient to rouse impulse 
and action without ascent proawnably goon back to Aroenilas. 
3 Plutarch in 
his defonce :. f lxoXfj in Adv. Col. 1122C-r explains that in withholding 
ascent tho Academic does not avoid the iopulao which is directed 'naturally' 
15ee bong, 'Froedom and Determininm in the Stoic, Thoory of Ilumrºn Motion', in 
Pro blemr, ch. VIII, especially pp. 175 and M. 
2Thin 
comparison aptly ouggestu the Stoic belief that sceptioitm 'patrifieo' 
itu adheronts (of. Epiotetun 1,5,1-3). Cf. 62 'suhlrta enim aiaencione omncm at 
motum enimorrm ct actionom rerum suatulorunt'. Cf. ýtury. Jý. ý. II, 5,1? s for the 
dog atist'n use of the argucent from inaction, oee Iteid, p. 300 n. g. The 
r'piouroan3 also used it (rin. I, 64; p. 101 n. 4 above). 
3Zeller, ^tý{cn, Er. icurelga nnd :, erntici, p. '43 n. 2. 
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towards the irnprosaiots; he avoids only the false opinion involved in anuent, 
which contributes nothing ucoful to the payehologic: al process. It in, 
however, by no means obvious that come form of cognitive or value judgement 
is completely unnecessary prior to action. The very fact that impulse is 
roused means that wo recognine what is represented in the impression and 
respond to this, not merely to the impression. Dut whether assent as defined 
by the Stoics must be part of this response in arguable. 
1 The Stoic in 
prc. ented from exploring any other possibility by his exclusive interest in 
the firm and strong convictions of the wib3 man, which could only arise from 
ascent as the Stoics understood it. Iienoo they could not argue that some 
form of belief, if not assent, must underlie action and no betray an element 
of dogmatism. But this may also be taken as a strong point in their position, 
since it allowed them not to move from their definition of perception or 
water down their definition of wisdom. 
The Academic case and methodological nrproach 
40-42 (P-46v25 - p. 48,3) nano ea uideamu3 ... non posse comprendi. 
Sum. (40) Lot us now take a look at the arguments usually advanced 
on the other aide. But first you my learn the basic of their whole 
system. They start by putting together what wo might call a general 
theory of iinpreusiono, defining their nature and kinds, including the, 
character of that which can be pcrcoivod and (; rasped, word for word2 as 
du the Stoiec. ihiy then cot out the two, propoe:. tiona which comprise 
this whole iccuo. First, in the case of impreasicnn that are ouch that 
other iiroronsions could be exactly aimilrr, ro thzt thorn io no difference 
botwecn thorn, it ib impozniblo that sums should be perceived and others 
not. Secondly, this applies not only if they +. ro actually i4unticnl In 
cvery respect, but also if they cannot be diatincuiehod apart. Having 
laid these down, they stete thetr whole case in tno forty of a single 
1Wa. tcon (stoic Th(, oly, jf nowlyd: no p. 69) rec. rku that tho Academics we o, in 
Chryuippün' view, roz ctting that thorn in ouch a thin,, ni ncnont by . ntion. 
In spying thnt senantioni ('aonuu3') are not3 of aßaont, the Stoics oeonº also 
to have boon implying that porcoption, it : hey uu, dcratood it, in inherent in 
the uuo of the semen (100; : '>V II, 72-74). It in doubtful if they were 
playinº; on t ho ambiguity of ütoa>loLr. , ainco they did not identify 
sonzation with porcuption. 
2For 
thiir meanin,, of 'totidem curbia', cf. ß. 32A= Ftn. II, 1GO. Reid wrongly 
tranalatoo 'at an rat length' (p. 226 n. 1). 
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proof,, an follown., Of impressions, coma are true, others false; and 
what is false cani, ot be perceived. Dut every true impression in mich 
that a false impreasion can be exactly like it; and if impressions are 
such that there is no difference between them, it cannot be the case 
that. somo of them can and others cannot be perceived. 
1 No impression 
therefore can be perceived. 
' (41) Two of thcao promisees they think 
they can take for granted, for no one contests the=, : rely that false 
impressions cannot be perceived, and secondly, that of improesiona 
between which there is no difforenco, it-in impossible that some should 
be perceived and others not. The other two they defend with lengthy and 
diverse arguments, namoly that some impressions are true and others 
false, and secondly, that any impression derived from a real objeot in 
such that it could be do: ivad from a false one. (42) These two themes 
they amplify with considerable care and diligence, dividing them into 
broad sections, first soncationa, then what is derived from sensations 
and ordinary experience, which they wish to darken; finally they cc%mo to 
the impossibility of perception oven by means of reason and inference. 
These general topics are further subdivided, each being treated as you 
saw in yosterd. ay'a conversation in the case of sensations, with the aim 
of showing in the smallest detail that true impressions co-oxint with 
false ones, there bind no difference botwcon them, and that therefore 
they cannot be perceived. 
Although Academic eceptioicm in elccuhere refcrrod to an a 'ratio' by 
both Cicero : +. nd Lueullus (7,16,29), its uae hero, like that of 'are' (m a 
system of knowledge), aceas to be ironical, Especially since in 29 LucullU3 
had exprecced doubt whether a sceptic could be said to have a 'nententia'. 
2 
He emphasis , with obvious acorn, the orderly and l ical manner in w}+Ich 
the Academic: present their case for the impoaoibility of porception, which 
3 
deems typical of their uothodolo rin geroral. In 43 he explicitly attaokz 
1PlaaberG 
exolud03 this contenco fron the invorted corrno, thoroby doQtroyin, 
both the form and tinc ce. gency of the arßuin-nt. I follow Raid and Rackh n in 
retaining; it as part of the 'uniua arg unonti concluUio'. 
2A. 
Naoaa (: 'naptiolem, p. 5) objectc to tho application of the term 'ayatcni' 
to Pyrrhonicm, but Eooma to imply that he would not object to itr, uao if 
applied to I. Lademic coeptioiaui. 
3AlthouCh 
Carnoaden himnclf wrote nothing, Sextua' Account of hire arrntmento 
on the critcrion reflect a conapicuoucly clot and ordorly arrmg-omont (A, 
ýM. vII, 152 ff., 166 ff. ). In r'in. V, 16, thuro in a reference to hin 
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their use of logical processes such as proof, definition and division as 
inconsistent with their scepticism. In this aeeticn (40) the implication 
is rather that a good deal of time and effort has been wasted in support of 
a position which is clearly untenable. 
Though Lucullus, in his usual dogmatic manner, professes to be giving 
his listeners a chance to 'got to know' th6 Academic capo, he is somewhat 
vacue on the proliminariea, the definition and classification of improssiona, 
except in saying that the nature of what can be perceived is dofinod by the 
Academics in the same terms an by the Stoics ('totidcm uorbio quot Stoioi'). 
We may assume that among these. preliminaries would have boon the Academic 
definition of an impression na such, and a classification and description 
of the main types of impression, including the cataleptic. 
1 The Acadomiec 
certainly seem to have adopted the main aasumptiona of the Stoic theory of 
perception, including their various divisions and definitions of improaniono. 
2 
And it appears that Luoullu3 intends it to be a roproach that the Academics 
should have worked out a case for scepticism within the framework of the 
Stoic theory of perception. 
3 
complete classification of opinions about the ethical end, which included 
not only opinions actually hold but also those that ware ponaibla. 
1Cf. Arcosilas' allege! discussion with Zernö (77) and. Carnoades' analysis of 
the naturo'of an impre^aion and thg conditions it tust satisfy to be true (Sextun A. M. VII, 159 ff. ). It ic thus very likely Ost 'totiden uorbis quot 
Stoici' refers to the whole sentence (fror. 'eorumque at uim of gincra 
definiunt') and not only to the latter part of it. ' 
2Carneades' 
definition of the impression (Sextun /. M. VII, 162) in very 
similar to that of the Stoics (Act. IV, 12,1/SV}` II, 54; AX. VII, 22F' ff. ). 
Sextua rivea 'trustworthy' and 'untruatwoxthy' as a basic diviui..: i of 
impressions accepted by both Stoics and Acedemies (A. 13. VII, 401). 't'heir 
subdivisions of the probable are fairly similar (A`t.. YII, 174 and 243-244). 
The most con3picuouc djffcronc' is that, whereas thu . ^. toica further divided 
the true into cataleptic and non-cataleptic (ibid. 247), Carno. dcn is std 
in 99 to have divided impressions into (1) those which are porcoptiblo and 
thoso which are not (i. e. cataleptic and non-cataleptic), end (2) the 
probable and improbable. 
3Tho 
Academics do not, however, seem to h"tvo displayed any interest in the 
Stoic explanation of the physical process of perception. 
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According to Lucullus, the Acado; nica next lay down two propositions, 
the first thc. t, when noma impreacions (a1, n2, a3) exactly rocemblo others 
(b1, b2, b3), it is impossible that one of these groupo should be perceived 
but not the other. This is stated as a general principle, but must concern, 
in the context of the dispute between the Academics and the Stoics, the 
irdistinguichability of true and false, whatever be the source of the false 
impression (i. e. a more delusion or an object mistaken for arother ono). 
1 
The second ; roposition is that the first applies whether there is actually 
no difference between the '..: o groups or whether none can be detected by an 
ob3envor. 
2 A case in point would ba the series of shapes presented by two 
coins of the same danom1naLion, or the similar appearances of different 
individual members of the muse class, eggs, boon, or identical twins 
(R3-6). 
For oven if no two eggs, or two boos, look exactly alike, the difference 
cannot always be dotocted. And if no difference between impressions can be 
dotoctod, it is impossible that some should lead to Forcoption, but not others. 
The force of this argument in core clearly aeon if wo think of it in 
terms of the cataleptic impr©aaion. The proposition atatos that of, cay, 
two exactly similar improaaions, either both moat be cataleptic or neither. 
17hiu aooma +o be obviously true. According to the Stoic definition, thtve 
could not be identical cataleptic improaoiono frc,, u two different objocto or 
Koiircon. If there wo: a to be identical impreeiLona, they would have to coma 
from the oai" object. Othorwico, such impro3siona could not be catalontio 
on the viow that to pcrceivo n ana not only to (; map both thp imprecaion and 
the object thatgivoa rise to it buc also to grnnp what is oxiatent or real 
( z$ v7tü. pXov ). 
3 1ºnd in the case of Impreeniono that might be generically 
Maid, howover, (p. 226 n. 3) confinau itn moaninG only to tim conru ior. of 
objootu. 
2Sinco tho rcfcrcrco in to ic: proccic:: o not objccto, the accond proposition 
n'iy nocm ir.. 1ovant. But coo p. 213 bolow. 
31-'or tho Lira I. moaning, sorg D. L. Vi1,46 and Sandbach, Prnh1own rp. 13-14. For 
tho cocond canirý;, coo äaxtýiý S1,4& v ore 1. , Load 
o Jo oxplaillod ua 
that which cxcitoo a catalnptic itnprocuion. '"ho c: ttaloptic irpru: iaion in 
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different but qualitatively identical, one would be unable to know their 
respective sources or know whether any of them has the relationship with 
the real that is required for perception. It follows that exactly similar 
impressions could be cataleptic if they came from the came object, but non- 
cataleptic if they came from different sources. The first proposition in 
consequently stated is a form which su goats that the improusions in question 
ccmo from different ecurces ('quas its uidoantur ut otiam alia eodom modo 
uidori poscint'). Its importance is obvious in that it is used as a fourth 
premiss in the Academic argument that follows. 
In representing this somewhat complicated argument as a domonatrativo 
proof ('argumenti conclusio'), 
1 Lucullus in in part preparing the ground for 
his criticism in 44 that since a proof muut have proulaaes that are knotim to 
be true, the Academic is being most inconsistent in deducing from porceived 
facts that nothing can be perceived. In his reply Cicero does not commit 
himself to the phrase 'ar; vmonti eonaluaio', but speaks of four 'heads' or 
main points which raako up the proof that nothing can be poraoivod ('quattuor 
aunt capita quao conoludant nihil nano quod nooci porcipi comprchondi posait+, 
33); the four are given in a slightly different fnrm, the order of the last 
two boing mveraed, but the arguwont is oc ontially the cacao. In view of 
its conolu3ion, the dcadomics are not likely to have represented it an a 
proof in the conso unnorntood by the Stoics, but au a deductive arE=ont 
rooting on a probable basis. 
2 On the of or )find, the 1". cadoraio4 my have- boon 
also described as the that of reality (D. L. ibid. ). This nnrLnirg of po'oeption 
is quite in line with the belief generally hold that the real in the correct 
and logitimato object of perception. It miy also be rotod that the two 
meanings m. 1y not be so different if 'CO v7%6-OXOV in interpreted an a)u t is the 
case. 
1Defined in 26 as 'ratio quas ex rebus porcoptin ad id quod non purcipiobatur 
adducit. ' Cf. pp. 145-146 above. Ior the definition as given in yoxtua, noo 
P"146 nil- 2 Cf- Sextua ; 11. II, 187; A-11. VIII, 473. `ho argtunant is not cyllo; iutic in 
form, i. e. it dcrc not dcduco the cnnnequ*nt frees the hypothetical major 
prominc and the antecedent (if A, then Di but Al therefore B); cf.: oxtue 
P. 11. VIII, 149. It in not dononctrative, in that the precineoe are not matters 
of direct perception. For the Academic attitude to proof, cf. pp. 193-4 above. 
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tempted to give their argument the form of a logical proof in order to argue 
on their opponents' own grounds. The premtoaea are tartly granted and 
partly assumed to be valid, and the eoncluaion logically follows. The Stoics 
would of course not have agroed with the third proposition or the Academlo 
arguments to establish it. But then they themselves had argued (Sextun A. M. 
VIII, 367) that proof cannot be required of everything and that certain things 
mußt be accepted as postulates. 
In its context, therefore, the fourth premiua does yield the conclusion 
that no impression can be cataleptic, and on its truth depends the relevance 
of the third premiss, that a false impression can exactly resemble a true one. 
Hence the fourth proposition and its corollary, that there is no difference 
between impressions not only if there is no intrinsic difference but also if 
there is no apparent differeneo, were said at the beginning to contain or 
embrace the whole mattor at issue ('quasi nontinoan: omnom hano quaectionem', 
40). This may scem oddly at variance with Luculluc' later statement that the 
fourth proposition, like the second, that the false cannot be perceived, wan 
contested by no one. j Lt the same could not perhapa be said of the corollary, 
the main immediate purpose of which is to ensure that the third and fourth 
premises can be taken together. If this corollary eight seem irrelevant as 
a further explanation of the fourth propocition alone, it is not co in the 
light of both the third end fourth propositions. For by explaining 'nihil 
interesne' in terms of the absence either of an intrinsic or of an apparent 
difference, the Academic allows it to be understood that what matters to his 
case is not the fact that there may not be any intrinnio difforence botwoen 
the true and the false, but only that there may be no discernible difference 
(52, Oft, 90). Ho in thus able to meet the Stoic argument that, since n" two 
individuals are alike, there must in fact Do some difference, however small, 
between the improgsions of thorn. Whether or not it makes sense to dictin, ^u sh 
between real and apparent difference in tW coco of impressione, by doing no 
the Academic guards against the asaumpticn that the nature of its sourco in 
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S 
nccosBarily reflected in the impror7 on. In leaving tho ponoibility of there 
being no intrinsic difference between true and false, or between irdividua]o 
(cf. 05), an open question, he ulao avoids a dotmatic claim and co forestalls 
the criticism that his position in as objectionable an the Stoic view, which 
he is. opponine, that thorn is a discernible difference between the true and 
the false. 
Given the two meanings of perception referred to above (to @ranp both 
the impression and the object, and also to grasp what is existent or real), 
it`is easy to understand why the false cannot be perceived. Since a false 
impression is not roprosontative of ita source, 
' it is not perceptible in 
one of the senses defined. Secondly, the false, being also the unreal or 
non-existent, cannot be perceived. 
2 The reasons why the 'false cannot be, 
perceived thus not only serve to explain why improsslona botwoen which there 
is'no difference cannot be perceived but also throw light on the relevance 
of the third premiss. For if the true can be qualitatively cimilar'to 
the false, no impression, even if true, can be perceived since doubt is 
automatically thrown on the capacity of any impression to roprosent its 
source nccuratoly,, and it likewise bocomaa impossible to loiow if any impress- 
ion proceeds from what is real or exiutent. 
3 The second premiss (the false 
cannot be perceived) could, even without the fourth, support the infaronco 
from the third that nothing can be perceived. The relevance of the fourth 
proposition and the importance attached to it uuct therefore rest on its 
corollary whteh seeks to explain what the Academics mosnt by there beii no 
difference between impressions. 
Lucuilua states and Cicero confirms (83) that the second and fourth' 
propositions were not disputed by anyone, 
' 
and that the controversy revolved 
1Saxtuo A. H. VII, 163; 249 etc. 
2D. L. VII, 46. For the equation of i'nlor with what in not real or exiatc: nt, 
uoo 3oxtuo A. M. VIII, 10, and p. 129 ebove. 
30n 
thin view of perception, it is 1rponniblu to pcrc«ivo without knowitg 
it. Contrast the view out out by 11.11.1"riao, 1, ýorno tp fc, p. 23, nocordina to 
which it in poonib1e to have perception without being aware of it. 
4Tho 
one could not havo boon grmitcd without tho otter if to p'rtiolva had 
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round the first and third. Since the first was granted by the Stoioo, 1 who 
were their principal opponents, it is not easy to underotand why tho Academics 
should have gone to so much trouble to defend it, unless they were also 
maintaining their position against the f'picureans, who (as Cicero points out 
in 83) did not grant it. If Lueullus in to be believed, the proposition that 
there are both true and false impressions was as elaborately defended by the 
Academics as the claim of anapaA) aýEa. Its'rolovanco to their case is, 
however, ýevident at every turn, especially since the very principle of 
&7tap aas aF, ta rests upon it. 'Since it is obviously difficult for a sceptic 
to maintain a valid distinction between true and false impreosiona, 
2 it was 
no doubt important for the Academies to establish their position on this 
point. 
3 There may, however, be some exaggeration in Lucullus' statement, in 
view of his intended attack on the ground of inconsistency between the first 
and third propositions (44)- 
I In claiming that unless all impressions are coneidored true, all must 
be considered untrustworthy, 
4 Epicurus was trying to fortify the dotiot! s 
position against scepticism. L'er. co, on Oo EpicureAn view the Academic 
rraument would be valid once the first proposition is granted. And since 
more or less the same meaning for all the disputants. In 83 Cicero mentions 
only the Sto: cs and the Epicureans, but oven the Foripatotice would probably 
not have disagreed. For Epicurus' equation of trug with what exists (b%dpXov) 
and his explanation of false as that which is not in fact an it is said'to 
be, see Sextun A. M. VIII, 9 (Uo. 244). That the false cannot be perceived 
also underlies his controversial view that all impressions are true. 
1The Peripatotics too maintained the same view. Sextus A. M. VII, 369; V111005- 
2 Soxtus p. ti. II, 77; 92. In principle, the: afore, a ccoptie would be expected 
to attack and not defend such a view., The Acadcmica, on the other hand, worn 
only using it to eatablish their cane. 
'In 11_ D. Ii70 it is stated that A'cosilas argued that all conso -improsoions- 
were false, against Zono who hold that only come worn : alte. Feasibly this 
is a careless misrepresentation of the Acudemio arCumont (expressly attributed 
to Arcosilas in Sextun A. P1. VI1,154) that there are no true impressions such 
that they could not be false. 
479; 1011 i . I, 70; x. n. 23 and 24. 
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their position wan indirectly affccted, we may anuume that they would have 
had sufficient reason to dispute the first proposition. But they could not 
have maintained that by upholding the first proposition the Academics were 
paving the way for scepticism, which would have meant endorsing a concluoion 
which the Academics were themselves seeking to establish. They might have 
attacked the Academic division of impressions into 'trustworthy' and 'ui- 
trustworthy', though such an attack would have been irrelevant to the ; resent 
areument, since, for t: io Academic, the trustworthiness of an impression lion 
not in its truth but in its probability. 2: ovortholeoo, the concept of 
probability. rests ultimately on the belief that the ordinary distinction 
between true and false has moaning and validity. k'hothor they were entirely 
consistent in maintaining this distinction, particularly in view of their 
claim of &7capa>, a attar, seems to have been a matter of concern not only to 
their opponents (44) but also to the Academics themselves, or at any rate 
to Philo (111). 
That tha Acadcmicc, on their aide, attacked thy; Epicurean contention 
that all icpreaaiono aro true may bo implied in Cicero's oritioicm of, that 
view (79.. t30P 101) and his arguments against the canoe* which affect not only 
the Stoics but alto the Epicureans. In 101 Cicero maintains that Epicurus' 
view that if the scnsce wore detected in a ninglo lie, no neaeo should aver 
bo boliovod, coupled vtth the Stoic admisuion that thoro woro falao 
Impressions, was anouhhi to cant doubt on the validity of nonoo-oxporicnoo. 
The Epicurob, i answer wculd probably have cccn that it in the combination of 
the Stoic and Academic. views that leads tJ so'pticisn. Bitt since the 
Academics could not arguo their caao within the framework of the Epicurean 
epistemology - which may explain why the battle was coutly between them and 
the Stoics - it is unlikely that d, ioprwvirg thu Epicurean view of the truth 
of all sense-impronstons wau their main concern. On the other hand, it in 
hard to ceo with what other motive they r. auld have laboriously defended the 
first and third proponitionu if the Stoics (ranted theca the first one. 
217 
Thus in representing tho, Academics as upending much time and otfort on , 
proving the first as well an the third proposition, Lucullus m: iy be over- 
simplifying their purpose and approach. !c may be doing this deliberately, -x 
since he will later argue that these two propositions are inconsistent (44). 
As Cicero confirms in 0jß the main dispute between the Academics and 
the Stoics centred on the third promiss, which contains the Academic principle 
of &, iupa»Tat; ta, or indistinguishability of true and false impressions, and 
thus states the exact opposite to the Stoic definition of the cataleptic 
impression and constitutes a direct challenge to it. The Academic proposition 
is formulated in three different wayut (1) 'every true impression is such 
that a false one can be found exactly like it' (40)= (2) 'every impression 
which comes from the real is ouch that it could co. -* from the false' (41); 
(3) 'coupled with all true impressions are false improo sionu which do not 
differ at all from true ones' (42). In 03 the formulation is similar to 
(3)s 'there is no true imprension arising from sense to which there is not 
joined arothor which due not differ from it at all and which cannot be 
perceived. ' : roar this selection it can be noon that the uiwplest formula 
is 'there is no true impression which could not be false' (i. e. (2) above= 
cf. Soxtus A. i. VII, i5o). 
Since thin Academic proposition directly contradicts the last clause 
in the Stoic definition, the Academics quit have claimed to derive it from u, 
consideration of all the ponsible caue, i of deception that are , gwrdod a, -ainst 
by the Stoic definition, including casou of deluaion. 
I The principle of 
(inapaaTar. Ea can be nooumed tr have the name t: a ning in all theca ca co, 
though there way be different explanations for each type of dncoption. In a 
capo where one confuses two cloooly eimilAr objects (54 ff., 84 ff. ), one 
may be deceived into taking on improeaion coming frcni an object (X) which is 
prooont to have come' from X1 not pru3ent. The improcaion in thoroforu fulao 
1Iackham, 
howovor, oxp1. ini the ar cnt entirely from the point of view 
of cacao of mistaken identity. 
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and it in being confused with a true one. 
1 Similarly, the illusion of, eay, 
a bent oar which in faloo, in qualitatively similar tc the true imago of a 
bent oar (19,79 ff., Sextun AM. VII, 413 rr. ). A deluaion is likewico a case 
whore a false impression to confused with a true one (48,00 fr., Soxtu3"A. M. 
VIi, 402 ff. ). On the baois of such con3ideration3, it is infarred that the 
true and the false are qualitatively indiatin£uiahable, so that one could at 
any given time be confusing the one with the other. 
2 Luoullus will criticioe 
thin move later (49 fr. ). 
Judging from the various formulations of tho principle, ono is inolined 
to think that the Academics are arguing that every true impression has a 
false counterpart, or that there are fairs or cet» of exactly matching 
improssiona, one of which is true and the other faloo. 
3 This interpretation 
would seem to derive support from the fact that all the forma of deception 
mentioned above are reducible to the baoio explanation that one in taking 
what is not 'there' to be 'thore'. 
4 The two exactly matching impronnionu 
(i. e. the true and the false) could not of courno be experienced oimultanoouc- 
ly, but the falao impression can be thought of cu either an actual or a 
possible oxperience. Against this intorprotation it could be argued that, 
when one is deceived, one does not in fact experience both the true and the 
false irpresciono of the oaino object. In the caue of a doluaion, for inotance, 
tho 'true' is not neeeb,, arily a different icproacion with a similar content, 
1For thin oxi: innation, one p. 292 below. 
2qß, (35; Sextun A. M. VI7', l54,164. 
3Cf. Soxtuu A, r4. VII, 164: 'Since there is no true impression auch that it could 
not bt false, but for ovary npparently true impracr. ion in found to oxixt a 
falue ono exactly oimilar .... '. A. j. VII, 252: tt. o Stoke addcd tho laut,,, 
olau: io to the dettnitic. of the cataleptic imprccaion 'bncauao the Acadd"co 
did riot, like tho Ctoi.:., think it impocaiblo that an exactly cirrilar rut 
false improsr; ion could bo found. ' 
41'hin 
crnaidcration deterrairca the phr hing not only of the Ctoic definition 
of the cataleptin impression, but also of ! ho Ac. acme proposition, an in 41 1 
'onur utnum quoit it a unro tale ern#º riwn]w ctioM n (aloe (&?. iý µiß v7 Lr)XOvtoc) 
poaatt onao. ' Lncauso of Cats, dolucion boconoa perhaps the vºont ir. portant 
form of deception considered in the dtu Auto. 
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but can be (and sometimes has to be) the came impression thought of as if it 
were true. That the Academics were aware of this iu shown by the fact that 
they considered any true impression capable of turning out to be false. But 
if this wore all that they claimed, there would be little point in, speaking, 
of two qualitatively similar impressions, or in drawing fine distinctions 
between different degreou of resemblance, as in the noritea argument (49). 
1, o must therefore aasumo that the Ac domion scant what they said when they 
spoke of any true impresion having a false counterpart (whether actual or 
possible), and that the possibility of 0fl7 given impressions, howcvor probable, 
being false and not true is a deduction from this principle. 
Sometimes the true acid the false are spoken of ce actually linked or 
placed aide by side ('adiuncta', 42; 'adi+oaitu& , 03; cf. Soxtus A. 11. VZI, 430 
7tapaxetaraL ). The indiatinguichability of true and falue as elements in 
the samo experience is illustrated by Sextua' oxa plo of tieraelee having a 
true impression of hii bow and arrows but a false improesion of his children 
as those of Eurystheua (A M. VII, 407). It iR difficult, however, to, coo how 
two impressions with a similar contort court be linked to cthor in this way. 
Such an explanation would be more appropriate to rational impresione dealing 
with certain qualitative and quantitative concopto, vhich mvy 
be difficult 
to demarcate from their opposites (e. g. ftt, and many, poor and rich). 
' In 
auch cases the true and the false can be acid to lie in close proximity. 
2 
But even then, the use of expressions like 'adiurota' or 'adpositu=' may not 
be too appro; riato, since the aimilur imprvsaiona are not experienced aimul- 
tacnooualy, though they '. Lay be broucht together by the mind for the purp^uo 
of corpariaon. 
90 ff.; saxtua A,. ti. VII. 414 ft- 
2 Soxtua(Ari. M. VIIt4l7)uaca the verb 'Rn, naxctcOat of 4ucccaaive imprcaoio: ta 
in tho nnritcit where tho diffarcr. cc butwoon true and Palau in clnimcd to to 
no mall au to be ' india tinguic1utbla' (421). 
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The Academic claim that there is no true impression which could not"bo 
false may be mat, in the, firet instance, by a simple denial: there is such an 
impression, rid it Is the cataleptic impression. In order to establish that 
an impression is not cataleptic, it In necessary to chow that there could be 
another impression exactly like it coming from a different object or acknow- 
ledged to be false. In the case of similar objects which could give rice to 
confusion, a direct comparison between exactly matching impressions may be 
possible, but thin cannot bo co In the cane of dolubivo. impreaoiono. _ 
fence 
it may be difficult to accept that ovary true iwpreeoion has a false counter- 
part, 
2 
or that even if thin were the carne, they could not be differentiated,,,, 
in normal situations. It may be noted, however, that. the simplest , formula. ., 
(i. e. there is no true impression which could not be false) does not lit the., 
scheme of the Academic ; root, which requires that th^re should be pairs or 
cots of exactly matahinS inpresciona, oee of which cannot be perceived without 
the other. 
In 03 Cicero confines -the principle of ý-napa»ac. Jia to sonso; - 
impreacione ('nullum case uioum uerum A seneu profeotum oui non o. dpoottuan sit 
uioum aliud quoll ab co nihil intornit quodquu peroipi non ponsit'). 
3 In 41, 
however., Luculluv indicates that tho Academics argued their case on tho basis 
of an elaborate c1aaoification of uxpcrienoo, including reason and infer-once 
as voll an oonoo and improooions derived from it. ;:, implying that his 
oppon'nto were obueased with division for its own nu3ce, 4he omits to mention 
(as at the buginntng of his oxpocition in 40) that th. ty were operating within 
ýCf. twumcniua rr. )7,33 jr. '(D Planen), who gives the oxniiplo of the wnx 
and tho ro"t1 ogg, the foann'ºr repr. eventing what is Falco. 
2Ono 
wc"uld doubt the p^Hnibility of miintaining it in the case of rational- 
improa3ion3. For Antiochua' own early attempt to do co, coo 71. 
3Cf. 
99 'ttrque of eenaiEian probanda r, ulta aunt, toneatur modo illud, non 
inecco it' iio quicqu tale qualo non otia faluum nihil ab co differens 
Ouse ro3 3i t' . 
4Aivinion 
wan much practiced in Plato'u Academy, to the point of proviting 
mz"trxtul for the comic roº: ta (W. and ; l. Xne: ilu, urn 1)nvMaoCrent or 1A th, 
p. 10). The AovJf mic-j afteir Mato continntcd to con.: tdor it all important 
lei ic: U ciothod, but thcru in no roaucm to think that it wai carried to 
ext ü,, ýca. Cr, R. E. Witt, AUiInn , r. 36. 
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a scheme initiated by the Stoics thcmaolves. Sinne the Stoics distinguished 
between xaýbýlrýyrLi; through the senses and by reason, 
' the Academics felt it 
necessary to show that we can be deceived not only by the senses (79 ff. ) but 
also by reason (91 ft. ), and that cixapalla&ta In a feature' of rational as 
well as sensory experience. It is not, however, very clear by what types of 
argument they established this, other than the sorites (92 tt. ) and various 
logical puzzles such as the Liar (95 ff. ). 
It is uncertain %o what area of experience Lucullus is referring by 
'ea quae ducuntur a sensibun et ab omni eonsuetudine' (42). One possibility 
is that he has in mind impressions derived by analogical inference from those 
received directly through the senses. 
2 On the other hand, he may be intending 
to refer to general experience an such, and no to impressions based on 'consue- 
tudo' rather than further derived from it. If so, the main divisions would 
be the came as those attributed by Cicero to Chrysippus, who'disoorioerted his 
fellow Stoics by searching out all the arguments 'contra census et perepieu- 
itatem contraque consuetudinem contraque rationem' (C7). 
3 An a category 
intermediate between the data of sense and the strict processes of reason, 
'consuetudo'/ouvifl eia represents the accepted beliefs and assumptions of 
ordinary life, which the Academic sceptic is alleged to undermine ('quarr 
obscurari uolunt', 42)"4 This charge, which is the only explicit criticism 
in tal. s somewhat gener l and biassed account, echoen such previous objections 
1D. L. VII, 52. Diogenes gives the oxietenab of the gods and their providence 
as an example of xcL r& ryt Creached throug.: logical proof. 
2Sextus 
A. 14. VIII, 50 ff; XI, 250 ff.; see p. 164 above. 
3Cf. 75: 'quaa multa ille contra sensual quarr multa contra omnia quas in 
oonsuetudino probantur. ' Chrysippus seearg to have used the title xwr& 't 
ouv-nWo{ for a general attack on perception (P1ut. Sto. Ren. 1036C/SVF II, 10), 
which he answered in c' ther work ýjxtp r? cAuvT ctatD. L. YII4, i98) 
Introduction pp. 23-24. 
4Epict. I, 27,15 ff. Plutarch, Comm-Not-1059B, notes the Stoic accusation that 
Aroesilas began the attack on ouvýoe to In Cicero's view (07), as in 
Plutarch's (rto. Roý. 103GD, Corr...? o t. 1o59D), Chrysippua himself would be liable to such a ch. rgo. Plutarch turns the argument against the Epicureans 
an well (Adv. Col. 1123A, D). 
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as that the Academics are robbing us of daylight (30) or overthrowing the 
whole of life from ito foundations (31) or even robbing us of our eyesight 
(33). Like Chrysippuw, who appears to have looked into every area of 
experience for examplo3 of error, the Academics are here represented as 
attempting to establish the principle of &nap aas aCia separately in all 
the various sectiono. Their method of minute subdivision was, wo are told, 
illustrated in Cicero's discourse on the previous day against the validity 
of the senses (cf. 79; Introduction P. 63). The saun divisions of the section 
on 'sensus' can be conjectured from Lueulluo' treatment of the subject and 
from Ciccro'a reply in 79 ff., whore, after a brief introduction on the 
limitation3 of eyesight, he deals successively with canes of illu3ion, 
mistaken identity and delusion. 
A formula of tho prinoiplo of clxapa»a&Ca which implied a duplication 
of exactly cirilar improsoions would not be suitable if applied to rational 
impreosion3. In the case of such impressions, 'a uero' and 'a falso' mean 
'from what is the cczo' and 'from what is not the caau' rather than from a 
real or non-real object, and refer to the aase proposition as it is judged 
true or falce. This does not mean that the thought of the proposition as 
true and the thought of it an false are two different though qualitatively 
similar i. mpr. aaiona. The false imprcunion in qualitatively similar to the 
true only if it wan in faut taken to be true, but is now judged to be false 
cn the basis of a later or homo other opinion. There are also cases where 
it is impossiible to decide whether a proposition is true or (also, or wnere 
the tru3 and the falue lie in close proxiiaity, e. g. '50 is few' fray be true 
while '51 is fowl may be false. The latter two impreacions cannot be said 
to be oxaotly similar in content. There is thus no real duplication of 
exactly similar impressions, and the principlo of indiatit uichability 
between true and false does not coca to require it, except for the purpose 
of the Acaditmio proof, as it in hers formulated. 
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Thy 1cMiv. nl inconst. ctvr, ctcin of t. ho- Arndcmie rcaitinn 
43-44 (A"4a94 - p. 49, (i) hanc ego 3ubtilitatrm ... cuporius conuinoitur. 
Sumnirv. (43) Such exactness is most worthy of philosophy but extremely 
alien to the cace of thore who argue in this manner. For definitions; 
. divisions and language using ouch ombelliahrcnta, alco fine, and subtle 
differentiation on grounds of likeness and unlikeness are characteristic 
of men who believe that what they maintain is true and incorrigible# not 
of those who declare that it is no more true than false. How would they 
react if asked whothar a definition of theirs can be applied to anything 
other than the thing defined? If they say it can, what reason would they 
rive for the truth of the definition? But if they deny it, they must admit 
that, since that true definition carrot be applied to the falsop what in 
unfolded by their definition can be perceived, and this is not at all their 
intention. Every part of their argumcnt can be attacked in the samo way. 
(44) For if they cla. 4m that they have a clear insight into the subjects 
they discuss and are not impeded by any common character of imrroscions, 
they will have to admit that they can grasp them. But if they deny that 
true and false can be differentiated, how will they be able to advance 
further? For a proof cannot be concluded unless you believe %that is aßaummod 
in the premiasos to be such that nothing false can be of a similar nature. 
What could therefore be more inconsistent than an argument that relies on 
things grasped and perceived to infer that nothing can be perceived? And 
when accurate speech profossoo to reveal what is not clear and to make use 
of the senses and what is evident in or+4or to do so more easily, what kind 
of lenguego is that of people who claim that everything seems rather than 
is? They are, hoarover, especially at fault when they advanco those two 
most incompatible propositions as if they were consistent, first, that 
come impressions are false, which implies that some are traö, and then 
that them is no diffaronce between true and false impressions. But you 
made the first asaumntion as though ther" were a aifforonco; the later 
statement is therefore incompatiblo with the earlier. 
i 
Kooping tho claim of &nupaa»ct tu and indeod thu moat controvoraini 
proponition for critical troatrcnt lator (47 ff. ), Luculluo attacko tho &ncral 
1 Thore perms to bn ro Junti. ficntion for Iulrkramlti tronnlation of 'pr, Iuß' 
and 'poott riua' aua 'r,. ijor' and 'minor' pre-ioa. 
*Corrigendum* For 'which implies that ... ' road 'owing to which they assert 
that ... '. 'Deolarant' can here mean either 
'assert' or 'imply', but I am 
taking it in the first sense because the Academics do in fact admit that 
there are true impressions. Luoullus would otherwise be misrepresenting 
their position or advancing a totally irrelevant argument. 
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character of the Academic argument, which he finds to be conipicuously 
incompatible with cceptici:: m. The faults in the Academic position are 
found to Ile, an is perhap3 to be oxpeoted, in the inconsistency between 
the strict methodological procedure and technical lange. o used by the 
Academics and their claim of unap aas a (a , and its professed consequence 
thst their own stateme"its are no more true thin false ('qui clament nihilo 
magis uera illa osue quam falsa', 43). The Academic use of logical inference 
is also criticised. ', "be final argument of Lucullus also concerns the other 
controversial proposition in the Academic argument, namely that there are 
true as well as false impressions. 
The phrase ov µ1AAo v, which 'nihilo magia' translates, may have been 
more popular as a sceptical formula among fyrrhoniste than among Academics. 
1 
For apart from this passage, there are only two significant references to its 
use by Academics, 
2 
compared to numerous mentions of it in Fyrrhonean texts. 
3 
The claim of6%ap a» acta , which did not entail the denial of the law of 
contradiction on the part of the Academics, could not have committed them to 
using the formula in the place of either a double affirmative ('this in Loth 
true and false') or a double negation ('thin is neither true nor (also'). 
Moroover, their general position, which repadiatoa even a single dogmatic 
statement, would not have allowed them to use it as an assertion, and they 
would undoubtedly have boon aware that the phraue could be calf-rafuting. 
4 
For a gorrernl discussicn, see Do May Ov ifl. »oy and tho Antecedonts of 
Ancient Scepticism', Ibroný,, in 3 (1958)P 
'PP- 
59-71. 
2Ni: 
nanius, fr. 27,36 (Dc, Places); IIipgolytua, R., f. I, 23,3" 
3E. 
ß. D. L. IX, 75-6,01-2; Soxtua P-11. I, 1U7-191; A. M. VIII, 320; IX, 50; X, 4Q; 
Y. I, 147; Co:. liua X1,5,4. In acme of tho oxamalca 2iatel by Do Lacy ov,;; raaov 
rooms to be uaod in a difforont eonuo (o. c;. 'ono man is no more a ctanrlsird 
than another' does rot illuatrrºto the oceptio formula, whereas 'a man in no 
more a etandard than not' would have done co; 1M11. VII, 320). Similarly none 
of the oxamplon oit'd from Cicero'n works as attesting the Academic ueo of ov 
iD. »ov in rortrictod contexts in in army way rn]ovant. 
4b'or 
cell-rofuting arC^, iAontn, ace Arint.? rt. 1012b 14 ff.; p. 153 of thin' 
l. n; rmentury. 
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The claim of, 6. %apaaaa. E 3a could itself be no more true than false. We 
can therefore, tako it that if the phrase was used its purport was, as for 
the Pyrrhoniot, to convey indecision as to the actual reality behind the 
impression, or as to the absolute truth or falsity of the impression; it is, 
a confession of ignorance which justifies the withholding of assent. 
Lucullu3, however, appears to be, taking the phrase tobe assertive, of 
, the possibility of contrary predication and therefore as expressing a double 
affirmative ('this is both true and false'), as is implied, for instance, by 
his argument about definition. He therefore assumes throughout his argument 
the truth of the general philosophical belief that things are naturally 
differentiated from one another, just as there is a difference betweeen true 
and false, adifference which the Academic perceives and is implied in every 
aspect of hip reasoning, but which he yet denies. With Plato and Aristotle, 
Lucullus, appears to believe that the possibility of assigning contrary 
predicates to the same-subject destroys the identity of things, meaningful 
language and, above all, knowledge. 
2 If things are no more true than false, 
such lcgical, procedures, as definition, division, demonstration can no longer 
take place. The sceptic might, of course, be only too glad of these conse- 
quences of o6 pass ov , it he wishes to undermine these logical procedures 
and the precise meanings attached to them by the dogmatist. 
3 Lueullus does, 
not go deeper into the implications of Ob $L. » ov and does not, for instance, 
examine, like Arictotl,;, 
4 the consequences for aoticn, for his criticisms 
1For the Pyrrhonian u3o of the formula, live Sextun P. H. I914; 188-191. That 
the phrase exprosoea Is-. decision as to the truth or taloity of an impree! ion 
can bo gatherod from Nuroniue (fr. 27,35-7). The Waage in Hip"lytu3 (Ref. 
1,23,3) suggoate a scop; ical reluctance to pane judgemont on the nature of 
physical objects (firo is no moro fire than anything else) and a readiness 
to be content with decoribing the appearance only. 
2Plat. Theaet. 152d; _ . 523o ff.; Crat. 439d-440a; Arriot. Mot. 1061b 34 ff. 3Soo Sextus' attack on sign P_N. IT, 104 ff. ), proof (134 ff. ), definition' (205 ff. ), division (213 ff. 
). 
4Mot. 1008b 14 ff., 1063a 20 ft. Another eritioicm not made here in that the probable implies a commitment to the true ". athor than to the false and is, 
thorofore incompatible with the claim of o6 R1tLAa O v. Cf. Numeniua, l. o., 
unleaa instead of the cecond µZ1), )ov we road g6vov with Uoenor. Raid's 
'ý ov µL »ov '[b CL7ctCt. vov ¶toü %tI! avoß (p. 245 n. 24) cannot be right. 
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are determined by the main logical Loaturoc of the Acadomic, argurcnt: in'40-42. 
-If ov gT1. a'Xov has these implications, this claches with the Academic use 
of the logical procedures mentioned in 40 to q2, all of which assume perception 
of the true, and are aeknowlodEed to be the right philosophical method in the 
search for truth. 
' Lucullus is not prompted to question the reliability of*, 
these methods or oven to ask whether they are the only possible ones. But 
ho calls in question the consistency of the Abadomie in using them. 'What he 
does not consider is that, since those were the methods of their opponents, 
the Academics were using they in a polemical context and for an argumentative 
purpose. He also wrongly takes it for granted that true perception in a'- 
necessary condition without which these procedures are impossible. 
Since definitions are the ultimate end of the search for knowledge 
2 
and 
it is around them that philosophical discussions rovolvo, 
3 
and since the other 
logical procedures are more or loss aids to the process of definition, he'' 
4 
devotes a whole argument to'definition alone. Logically a 'definiona' is 
relatcd"to a fixed 'dofiniendum', since it 13 axioiatic that the definition 
must include the differontiating Froporty ('proprium', 16&o v) of the thing 
defined. 5 It cannot, therefore, be applied to anything other than the 4-, 
'dofiniondum'. Lucullun accordingly faces the Academic with a dilemnas what 
wculd the anawor be if he were asked whether a particular definition can apply 
1ýý5s 32; rin. 1,22; II, 3 ft., 30; IV, 0-10. 
221; 1,32. 
3join. It4; II, 3 ff.; Omantor 1161 p. 106 of 2hia Commnntary; ß. E. Witt, Albiman 
p. 30. 
4Tho definition will Involve divioion ( di. aipc oiC), i. e. the dioeeotion 
of a genus into its various apocion ('divinio') or o. a thin; Into ite parts ('pr%rtitio' ), and thin will doper4i on porroption of nioiln. rition and 
differences. See Ton. 26 ff., where the view: oxproaced are believed to be 
those of Antiochu3 (Witt, p. 38,; Dillon, pp. 103-4). Despite thin dietinotion 
totwoen 'diva©to' and 'pirtitio' made in the Thnion, Lucullu3 hero uses 
'partitio' (43) of the definition of 'genera' (40). 
52 
co T, ß, 29; r'nrt. Qrat. 411 D. L. VII. 60 (SVF II, 226); extutt i.,. 11. II, 209,212. 
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to somothing other than the thing defined? If he answers that it can, he 
will not be able to claim that it is a true definition. But if he says that 
it cannot, he must admit that, since a 'true' definition cannot be applied 
toa 'false' object, 
lthe thing defined can be perceived. It is thus presumed 
that what is defined is an individual (cf. 21), though the individual can be 
defined only an a member of its species, which is defined at the same time. 
2 
Lucullue does not of course mean that the definition cannot be traneforred to 
another member of the same species= only if it were to extend to a member of 
a different rpecies would it be faulty (of. 50). Bet if the definition were 
no more true than false, it would no more apply to the thing defined than to 
anything else. Clearly not even the Academic could accept this consequence. 
3 
The dilemma presented to the Academic offers him an absurd alternative 
on the one hand, and one that would contradict his position on the other. If 
the Academic turns to the second alternative and denies that his definition 
can be applied to what is 'false', his claim that nothing can be perceived 
will be faulted, since if the definition is true it follows that the 
'definicndum' is perceived. Lucullue here makes an important but incorreot 
aaaumption, namoly that a true definition necoscarily elucidates the nature, 
of an existing thing. But to offer a definition of something is not the same 
as to assert its existence. 
4 If the Academics accepted, for instance, the 
1'Falsum' 
. rb µs 
b: wdpXov , but here may suggest more strongly the 
idea of 'something other than'. Cf. Aristotle ?ot. 1024b 26-8, where it 
is said that definition is false if applied either to the non-existent 
or to something other than the thing defined. 
2Sextus A. M. XI, 8-9. Sixtus goes or. (10 ft. ) to ststo the same of division. 
3Althouch Luoullun uses thin argument acý: ýinat the Academic definition, 
it would clearly apply to uny predicate in the came way. Cr. Aristotle's 
argument against the followers of Protagorta, that 'f the principle of 
contradiction is denied, any predicate coo". d be applied to any subject 
(Y"01.1007b 23 ff. ), 
4Ariat. rost. An. 72a 20-21. The Stoic definition being formulated as a 
conditional cf. 21) did not have thin implications Long, H. Fh. p. 141. 
It is also debatable whothor definition* can have a truth values coo 
R. Robinson, Dhf____, ntý, p. 5. 
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Stoic definition of the cataleptic improeoion, this did not commit thorn to 
charing the Stoic belief that a cataleptic impressiun existed or could be 
'perceived'. ' For the most part, the definitions posited by the Academic 
are argumentative and taken from his opponents themsolvos. 
Lucullus believes the came line of attack can be employed againat-othar 
aspects of the Academia argumont as outlined in 40 and 41.1 Therefore, he 
agiin presents the opponents with a dilomma, this time reversing the ordor` 
of tho hypothosec. If they say that they 'clearly see through' the subjects 
under diccuacion, without beine; hindered by the cow, on appearance of true' 
and false impros3ionc, thi. e will amount to an admission that they can `gr,. 3p " 
them. But if they still maintain that true Improcsions cannot be distinguished 
from false, Lhe result of their logical analysis will be worthless, for they 
will not be able to draw any conclusion from their premiscos. 
No new issue in raised by'thin second dilemma, which recalls the 
ar not in 28-29 and 35 as to whether the Sceptic known or perceives hin own 
statements. 'Several variants of the dilemma as uaod against the Academics 
occur in Sextue, 
2 
with the came basic pattern that either the sceptic is 
making barn and unproven assertions or true and proven ones. Here Lucullu3 
developn the erne objection as before, that since the Academic rofusce 
to rej rd his own atatemant3 ao unambiguously true or feine, ho cannot 
correctly mako uns of tho logical proconaoa on which he rolioo to support 
He may intend hic criticism to be applicable to the logical procedures 
other than definition which he has not treated individually an well as to 
the prominnon of the A, --ademic 'proof'. 
2P. T. rl, 13o, 1x35-lß',; . V1'1,337,440; 'Ir147O fr., 463 ff. See p. 153 abovo. In 55 it is ar it 1 that ni thar we hivo or have not a notion of truth anti 
falsity. In IngrAl, the uf-o nr the dilemma iss connected with th., bolir. that th. 
ncoptirnl pouition in Dn1t-r^futi+, g. For the validity of th3 diloc a u, l an 
argument, ooo 1i. 1'.: f. Jo: eih$ An rrtrn__! ntlon to T ric, P-361. 
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his position. In the cane of the first alternative offered, Lucullus is 
'dilucide porspicere' either in the nense of or as implying 'comprehando. rol, 
just as in 34 he had argued that 'perspicuum' implies 'pcrcoptuwn'. Just as 
nothing can be called 'perspicuously' white if what in black could seem to 
be white, so the Academic cannot support a claim to see his views clearly 
if opposites (in this case true and false) can present a common appearance. 
It might be thought that Lucullu, in hero confusing % clear understanding of 
the meaning of a statement with a perception of its truth. And the diccuscion 
of 'porspicuitas' in the next section suggests that he is using; 'porapicoro' to 
mean insight into what is the case, which would be impeded if what is not the 
case could present the same appearance. 
t But for an Academic who does not 
identify 'clear' with 'cataleptic', 'dilucido percpicore' and 'comprehondoro' 
are not synonymous. 
The promicooc of a proof must be perceived or thoy would not lead to 
a truo conclusion. It in not, of course, true that a conclusion cannot be 
drawn from merely probable promisees, though thin would not amount to 
demonstrative proof in the strict sense.? Lucullue profera, however, to 
regard the Acadenio proof as a demonstrative nrgvmont that is invalidated 
if the promiesee fail to reveal the eonolunion, which they cannot do if they 
aro not thomoolvos known to be true (Sextun I'. 11. II, 1431 noo p. 193 above). 
Cf. 33, 'ut onim ilia voulic modo a=occuntur, oic roliqua uicio, sod 
proprin uori, non conununi uori ot falsi nota'. 
2Tho 
distinction botwo;. n 'doronatriAtivo' and 'dialectical' rroof is rondo 
at the bngin,: lnr of Ariatotla'a Tortea (100a 27-30). Uinlpetical nr wnont 
usoo probable prominnoc ( 'tü EvOoFu), whoroan doNonatrativu or ociontifia 
proof uwon promtcwoo thrit arc true and imr. ^cdiato. Thin in br-cically the 
oamo suo thv Stoic conception of domonstrativo proof (cf. the definition of &7,60¬ t , uu in 26, p. 146 of thin Comrrantcry). Litcullun refrains from criticising 
tho Acadcinic rroof on the ccoro that doubtful rMnl: ixen render thu conclunion 
doubtful, ninco that knuld b-ý- to accept the Acadomic'n position that hin 
propo:,! ttonu are u. oruly pror.,; blo. 
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The apparently strict logical form in which the argument in presented would 
seem to justify Lucullur in treating it in this way. Be accordingly roturnq 
to the first alternative as the only acceptable one if thought is to proceed, 
and points out that, if a valid proof must have premisces that are perceived 
and grasped, 
1 it would be most inconsistent to draw from premissos of this 
nature the conclusion that nothing can be perceived. Hence, even if the 
argument were valid, its validity would disprove the conclusion. As Lucullus 
nays, 'quid potent roperiri quod ipsum eibi repugnot magic? ' The effective- 
neon of this paradox is unquestionable, and indicates the point at which 
the Academic may appear most vulnerable, namely the logical status of his 
own propo3itions. 
2 
Tho belief that language describes reality may have led Antiochuß to 
the view that words are the marks ('notao') of things and that their otymo- 
logical meanings can servo an guides in inquiry and logical demonatration. 
3 
Lucullus' criticism of his opponents' use of 'oratio' is similarly based on 
the view that exaot or ccientifie languago is related to thingo as they are, 
not merely as they appear to be. The implied contrast with ordinary spcoch4 
and the purpose for which auch language in said to be uacd, the revealing 
of tho non-evident by means of immediate sane-exporienoc, cuegest that horn 
too he is uai. ng proof or demonstration as a model (of. 26). 
' The außecstion 
R. E. 1Witt (Albinus, p. 34) compares Moment's view (_trom. VIII, 7) with the 
position of Antiochua on this point. 
2The 
cooptic could, of couroo, argue that his prcaicece : oerely appear (uf. 
Sextu3 A. M. ViII, 363). A mors relevant criticism cig+ht have boon that the 
conclusion of the Aaad'mio argument in no more true than false. 
31,32; 'in-V, 74. Cf. the Epicurean view that the primary meAninge of words 
aro important in inquiry (Bailey, Grdok Atomista, pp. 24© ff., 267 ft. ). 
4Cf, tho contrast between ordinary language and the need for accuracy when 
inquirinj into the nature of thinL-n in Setif= A. M. VIII, 128-129 and Fin. IlI, 4. 
The Epicutreflno were accuced both of repudiating what was acknowledged to be 
the right philosophical mothod and of using ordinary and non-technical 
Language (I, 5). 
5'Oratio' 
wan ucod in a similar acne* in 17, 'orationem nullam putabant 
inluatr. iorer: ipca cuidentia reporiri ponco', whore it in clearly a translation 
of )6 yoc . Cf. 1,32, where dialcotic is da£tncd as 'oratio rationo conolusa'. A1ao Soxtu3 A. M. VI II, 77: proof (? 1%66c tr", ti ,) in npooch () OyoC) . 
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is that the Academics are misusing language by putting their proofs in 
logical form if they do not intend them to apply to reality. 
1 Although 
Lucullus is hors confining his remarks to loratio accurata', the Stoio view 
of language in Coneral as descriptive of reality`would certainly support them. 
For instance, Seneca In ''a wall-known passage (ßa+. 117,13) explains that-when 
he Rees Cato walking, what he sees is a material object; `when ho says 'Cato 
is walking', he is making an assertion about a material object. 
2 If the 
Academic maintains that, since both the impression rund tho statement maybe 
false, the inference can only b3 to what 'coo=', the answer might be that 
neither ordinary non scientific lanqurgo'takes account of the difference, in 
the sense that what appears is equivalent to what is. 
3 It im, however, by no 
means curtain that the Academic would subscribe to the view that 'everything 
seoma rather than' iol ('qui omnia non tam eoco qua% uideri uolunt', 44) wbioh 
is rather the language of. tho Pyrrhonict. 
4 Lucullua was perhaps on aafur 
ground when he crLn: ed in 35 that a statement which is asserted is normally 
a3sertod au truo, and tray be taken to imply perception. 
1Cf. Long, L1_121. p. 122t 'The oscontial point In that in Stoicism, as In Plato, 
dialcotic is a science which hie tho real nature of things as its field of 
study'. Also p. 123s 'Worda, things, and the rolationu which hold botwoon 
them - that in a rutoholl is the subject of Stoic dialectic. ' In 91 Cicero 
argues that, in formulating principles of logic, roa: on Is lcyina down rules 
for itcolf and its own oporat. tono, not distinguishing 'truth' and 'falaohood' 
as ouch. 
2LonC, 
£. p. 136. t1atoa, Stnfa Toile, p. 12. 
3Dut in another conae, Lucullua would equate, %hat appouro with what la, 
unreal (51). 
4D. L. IX, 104-105. Soo p. 103 n. 1 hbo, ýr. Though Cicero ruoo=onda the use of 
'uidori' in 07 ('uidcantur sane, no ndfi. rraentur modo') and in 105, ho does 
cc on the Tround that oxporionec juntifio3 only stztement3 of probability. 
By irDlication ticullu3 is hero Lttributir:, . enoo a tatemonto only to tho , Academic and therefore coo: ne to be wing iý this opposite extreme from ; toulr; i'o 
view that the Academic a kea only perceptual statements. 
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Lucullua concludes thin part of his argument by accusing his opponents 
of failing to seep the ii%con3istency between their statement that there are 
false impressions and their claim that thuru is no difference between the 
true and the false. In Lucullua' view there cannot be false impressions 
uAloss there are true discernible impressions, whereas the Acade: aica assort 
the existence of true impressions only as a necessary corollary of the 
existence of false Ines ('quoll cum uolunt declarant quaedan once uora', 44). 
A position which assumed that all impressions were false would generally 
have been regarded as soff-=ofuting (Sextue A. M. VII, 39ß ff.; LLi. i 9141 Gee 
p. 153 n. 2). It can, moreover, be argued that it in no more possible for 
all oxporience to be false or delusive than it is possible for all the 
coins in a country to be false (Ryle, nilemmin, p. 94 ff. ). If there in to 
be false experience, there must be veridical experience. LuCullua claims 
that the Academies first seem to rocognico this distinction, then contradict 
themselves by maintaining that there in no difference between the true and 
the false. 1 
The Academics do not, of course, aa'ort that there in no difference 
between fnlco and true impressions. They do, however, maintain that thero 
may be no dirforenco of intrinsic quality, or at any rate no discernible 
difference. For Lucullua, it is pointleao to say that there are true and 
false impreasiona unlcan there can be a discernible differonco, for he is 
cooking to eqtabliah not morely that there are true tmpreaciona, but that 
there are trio imprcaoionc which nothing fnlao could pozsibly rcnemble. 
The Acadcmio, on the other hand, in ºceekinsr to avoid thin conolunion. The 
belief that there are true ae voll an falao impreaviona in thus common to 
both positions but docu not in itiolf fav:. ºr one raoie than the other. It 
was, however, important for the Iºcadcmio not cnly bocrºune his doctrine of 
1Cf. the artumont in 33, PP: 178-80 ofrthis Commentary. 
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probability depended on thin assumption but also becnsno the only way to 
fault the Stoic definition wan to make the opposite claim of &%apo. » o ia, 
and this could not have made dense without the assumption that there aze 
true as well as false impressions (Long, f. h. p. 95 n. 1). 
Lucullus' charge that the Academics are primarily concerned to assert 
the existence of false impressions seems to be basod on the conacquenco of 
the Academic argument, by which true imprecaions are placed on the level of 
the false in that none can be perceived. Since the Stoic too han a tendency 
to class the non-cataleptic with the fake, he niturally Bees thin an a 
disregard for the ocoential nature of truo inpreaaiona. it in never claimed, 
moreover,, that all false imprecoions are indistintjuichable from true onus. 
One might feel, therefore, that there wan a certain bias in favour of the 
false Snpreamion inherent in the refusal of the Academic to allow that any 
truo impression can be perceived. 
The same argument is put in a slightly difforent form in 111, 
whore it in specifically attributed to Antirchus in his debate with Philo. 
Tf tha Academic allow3, that there are falec impreaaiona, then he must 
surely notice a difference between true and false, 
1 but he inconoistontly 
goes on to deny tho difference. Antiochun seams to have realised that 
attacking the Academic on the ground of h! c recognition that there are 
false impressions rather than on that of his admicsion that there are 
trug ao well as faloo impre'aiono might be more effective. So Ayer 
(The Yroble+r of Knoale! i , p. 30)t after pointing out that Rylo'e argument 
would not be fatal to ! ho more modorate ce ptical pr. iition that thcro uro 
both truo and faiBO oxpcriencea but that we cannot differentiate botwoon " 
them with abuolute certainty, notes that ounh a position could itoalf be 
faced with a aimilur chJoction, for dccoption can only be diccorned if 
wo can compcro canon of non-deception. But, as he goon on to argue, a 
rocotnitton of folno experience in no way Intaila that the exporiencco wo 
1Thia in tho axaot oppoiito to tho arLumont of Ypiourua that, if cons 
improaaionu are hold to bo falno, one can novor be burn that any ero true. 
cr. 79,1011 Noxtuc A. H. Viii, 64. 
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take to bo trustworthy are indubitably true. It would similarly be poosiblo 
for the Acadeaic to`arguo that hic recognition that there are falso impressions, 
though it entails that there are true impreaaions, dooo not entail that we 
can know for certain which aro false and which are true. It does not 
therefore entail that true improioion3 can be perceived. or that they are 
qualitatively distinguishable from false ones. 
According to Cicero, Antiochus claimod that Philo found thin charge 
of inconsintcncy particularly upootting. Cicoro'n reply to the effect that 
the Acadomics do not deny Use existence of true icpressions and do in fact 
notice a difference between true and false, though not with the certainty 
required for perception, doss not entirely dispose of the problom. 
1 But if 
this was Philo's own answer, wo might conclude that Antiochuß' criticism had 
played a decisive part in influencing Philo'e now views and his modified 
theory of perception. The answer Is not, however, relevant to Luculluo' 
ntatement of the criticism in 44, co that either Fhtlo pieundorotood both 
the Academic position and the import of his opponents' critioi®h, or it was, 
Antiochus 'rho related the objection to Ph lo'o now viowo and inferred that 
Philo mutt have found that objection moot upsetting. 
t`_ 1. arneag tZrnntnnr rnrcfrt1On 
45-46 (p. 49,9 - P"50,2) sod progrodiamur longiu3 ... facore conotitui. 
S""mmzr=. (45) Lot us go further and impartially, but exhaustively, oxamino 
their th+orieo. First, wo maintain that what wo h. 1vo called 'oloara-7cn' 
is uurfi.. iont in itsolf to reveal things as they are. But !n order to 
keep a firmer and steadier grip on wh-.. is pore-O: cuous, there is further 
noocl of uuothod and attontivoneca, lost we be diverted by sophisms from 
what la clear in itcolf. For Epicuruo, who %: iahod to colvo the problem of 
per^uptoO. errors and made it the taah of the wino an to separate opinion 
1Ruidtr. 
cornrn nt (p. 231 n. 16) 'that the Aradomic donio3 apparent, not eaauntial, 
dtflereicc: a is aimilarly basidu the point. 
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from the clarity of sense-perception, nchiovod`nothine'for he failed 
to got rid of errors duo to opinion. (46) Since two difficulties beset 
what is clear and evident, wo must have ready the same number of solutions. 
Firstly, people do not pay sufficient attention to thing that are clear 
to notice the amount of light surrounding theml secondly, coma people 
are deceived by fallacious quostioningo and, unable to find a solution, 
defect from the truth. Wo ought therefore to have ready answers, as 
stated above, to safeguard clearness and to repel these sophistic rttacke. 
Thin will be my next point. 
The wc; º is now being prepared for an attack on the third proposition 
in 40, which states the Academic claim of nxapa. » o. to . In 51 Luculluo 
will appoal again to clarity as the only criterion of veridical Impressions. 
But first, he will set out the arguments used by the Academics in support of 
their claim (47-48) and expose their fallacious nature (49-50), thus removing, 
with the help of 'ara'and 'diligentia', one of the obstacles In the way of 
clarity. Mo character of 'porapiouitas' wan first introduced in 17, when 
the Latin wore. wan given, with 'ouidontia', as a translation of & vtip yctm .1 
One view thorn stated was that arguments should not be brought in defence of 
clarity on the ground that nothing was clzaror than clarity iteolf, and 
if the Academic could not accept thin, it was unlikely that ho would be 
perauadcd by anything else (p. 104 above). Another viowp howovert was that 
if clarity wan attacked, arguments might be brought to defend it, to avoid 
deception ('n'i qui fallorentur', end of 17). It is this second position 
that in now Laken by Lusulluo. 
The ad: ico of Lucullu3 concerns first the problem of grasping what is 
evident and thoroforo aeaurrao that there is ouch a thing an clarity which 
(; uzrtintuon porcaption. In the last ronort the mark of truth or clearnon©, 
1Trn 
mcnning of I-v&pycLti (Icuidantia', 'porapicuitaa') h.: a already boon 
dincuu^ed (pp. 107-100 of thief Co: rrrc+r. tury). 
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(ausuning that theoo are more or lean equivalent)' con5tituten tho final 
" bulwark against scepticism. Though we are not told precisely what clearness 
is or to what it applies, 
2 Lucullus contrives to give the improseion, that 
it is an objective and absolute quality that guarantees perception. But 
the attempt to make it independent of other factors cannot be said to be 
consistent. While the claim that clearness is sufficient in itself to reveal 
existing objects as they are seems to suggest that perception does. not need 
any aid other than clearness, 
3 it does not tell us what contributes to bring 
about this clearness. On the one hand, it appears to be something 'given', 
to which the act of attention on the part of the mind has nothing to eo.: trib- 
ute, and which, like xar0T1 tC , admits of no degrees (cf. 51). Either 
something is clear or it is not. Thus Lueullus assumes that self-ovidenos is 
already 'there' prior to the act of attentions 'aduoreatur enim primum quod 
parum dofigunt animos at intendant in ea quao porepicua aunt ut quanta luco 
ea circumfuoa eint posoint agnoseero'. Hero it Is not-a question of olarifi- 
catir" by the act of judgement but of recognition. Yet Antiochus had argued 
(Soxtua A. M. VII, 162) that perception is the result of the interaction between 
our perceptual faculties and the objects of perception, and in 51, Lueullus 
will deny that delusive experiences are over clear, as though not only, the 
absence of truth but also the abnormal state of the mind had something 
1It is never Lxplicity stated whether cloarneea is to be identified with the 
'nota' or mask of truth. In 1,41, 'uisis on omnibus adiungobat fidem sod 
iia . olum q%Dto propriam quandam haberent deelarationem carum rerum quae 
uidtrentur', there soo a to be a fusion o: the characteristic mark of truth 
with clearneozi the use of the objective bonitive with 'deelaratio' nhowu 
that it is not merely a translation of l v6. A YC M, an Reid bettevon (p. 193 
n. 13). 
2Clearnecs is said to belong to impressions (e. g. 51) or to things (e. g. 18, 
34). In thin context it seems to apply p! marily to 3on3o-oxporienco, wut it 
would also have been uacd of propositions the truth of which is immediately 
evident or oven of the conolusiono of proof, despite the technical distinction 
between the immediately uvident ( npGbtlWov ) and non-ovident ( üLün), ov ). 
3Cf. Soxtus A. M. VII, 3G4: the self-evident in what is perceived in itcalf and 
needo no other thing to cutablioh it. Soxtua disputes this (365 ff. ) and 
argues that, cinco nothing in perceptible per na, everything is r, on-evident. 
No thereby cranes the distinction between the inmcdiately evident and the 
non-evident. 
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to do with tho lack of clarity. Secondly, the coarch for tho right 
percoptual conditiono, (au doocribod in 19) cooma to duCCoat the depondonco 
of clarity on other factoru. Our passage can, itoolf bo aaid to imply, a 
crude association of clearnoas-with light, acd therefore a dependence on 
an extornal factor. 
This dependence ca other factors may have boon rocoCniood by 
Antiochue if (as su. gestod above, pp. 25 and 201) he hold the view of the 
cataloptic impression which Soxtus (j . VIT, 253 ff. ) attributes to the 
'more recent' Stoics, The proviso that the cataleptic im;. rossion forces 
assent 'provided there is no obstacle' seems to include both objective and 
subjective factors (A. M. VII, 254-250i of. 424). The only-obstacle to grasp 
of the evident which is explicitly mentioned by Lucullus in the present 
passage is lack of attention on the part of the percipient. There is, 
however, common ground in the emphasis placed in 19 and in Soxtus (A. M. VII, 
253) on the need to examine the situation closely and to cook for the right 
conditions of perception, and particularly in the fact that any abnormality of 
the mental state is considered as a hindrance to perception both by Luc'.. tlus 
(53) and by the 'younger' Stoics (Sextun A. M. VII, 424). It should, moreover, 
bo pointed out that the proviso about obotoclen, rather than boing a"conceeaion 
that woakonn the position of the dogmtict. 
' 
ctrongthon3 it by taking account, 
on the one hand, of the Academical own insistence on 'concurrence' and, on 
the other hand, of their reliance on porcortual orrora occurring in what 
:, ou1'+ be ;, -onera11y coneidorod to be abnorr_1 conditions, thus eafeguarding 
the doctrine of the cataleptic improasion againat the Academic ar«ucont that 
the falne can display the same charaetorietica and bring about the same sort 
17'hia in tho view of Couiaain (UAv, d'hint., irn tIn In phlInnopht" 3 (1929), 
p, 271) and Long (fi. Tim, p, 129). 11i3t L ýtý1c 1'hilnýtnr=hyr PP"144-145) thinku 
it 'unncooonary' cJnco it is alroady iipliod in tho original doctrine of tho 
cataloptic' irprouniou. 
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of reaction as the true. 
1 The now proviso now mako3 it possible to argue 
not only that the false can never possess the same qualities as 'the true 
but also that any possible confusion is duo to aspects of the porcoptual 
situation other than the Intrinsic nature of the isap. ossiona in question. 
It could, in reply, be argued that, apart from the objc-. tion that there is 
no such thing as an ovidont objoct that is porcuptiblo it e (Soxtus A. M. 
VII, 365-360), thorn is novor an absonco of obstacles to parccption of what 
is evident (Ibid., 425). 
2 
In'34 Lucullua rejecto'i a distinction between 'porapiouum' and 
'perceptum' on the ground that if the former word wore correctly applied 
to anything thorn could be no poa®iblo ground for doubting ito truth. Hare 
too clarity in defined as a character which, once it is rocogniaod, guarantees 
the truth of the Impression. It in therefore impoeaiblo that any false 
improcoion ohould be clear (51). The doctrine of the later 3toica, which 
allowo for tho ponaibility of a cataleptic improeaica not being aasented'to 
if the percipient has roacon to doubt its truth, dooo not toll un whether- 
or not ouch an improasion would be ro; ardad an 'clear'. But it would 
obviously be Impossible for oven a 'clear' impression to be accented to if 
a falsio one : ould exist cxaotl;, like it. It in therefore nocoaaary for 
Luoullua. to dioprovo the llcadomia arguxonts that a (aloe impreasionrtoan 
(According to P. Couiasin 1ec ai . 
), the proviso ai: a at refuting the 
dostruotivo i: apoot of te Ateuv6v while preno: ling w%atowsr positive 
clement there is in it. He holds that the cooond criterio:. of 'arnoadoa 
(i. eo the ir; nroasion that is both probable and uneontradicted) rolioa on 
the fact that the impression admits acme trust, tho'iph the Acadomica 
regard all improrraions ns basically untrustworthy. 
2Lucullu3 himself unos a aiuilar argument against the probablo in 591 of. 
36 and 100-9. 
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exactly resemble a truo one. It in thoso argumonto which Luculluo' 
represents as traps an. i snares dooignod to distract the mind from evident 
truths, 
Lucullus is also concerned with the problem of how to keep a firm 
hold on our apprehension of what in evident. But it is not clear if he 
means that tho people who are tricked into abandoning clarity aro converted 
to scepticism or simply give up particular po; itiona ('doacicr"ant a uoritate', 
46). Mu do: cnco of clarity may, howovor, be designed to cover both cased. 
It is perhaps in opposition to the Academic claim that uncertainty is to 
bo found in the nature of thin93 (32) that Lucullus traces the cauaos or 
difficulty in cognition not so much to external faotors as to the wea}nocs 
of the percipient, to hie lack of attention and hic inability to resist 
fallaciou3 rea, 3onir .' According to 
Calon, 2 it is not always easy on the 
spur of the moment to distinguish botwoon truo and falsop oapocially in 
the case of the 'so-called cophiemn', which are fal o arrumonts specially 
dosigned with nalicioun intent to rocomble true ones, no that tt. d falnity ; 
in hard to dotout for thono who are not well-trainod in argument. Although 
tho Academic: do not oncapo consuro for their uce of ouch 'praootigiao' 
(cf. 49), thAne are not as euch noon as a direct and serious throat to 
1Siailarly Aristotle (` t. 1012a 17 ff.; of. 1009a 16 ff. ) tracts one of the 
cc: uooa for adcpting thoorioo that deny the lawn of contradiction and excluded 
middle to inability to withatand oriotic aruonta. 11. E. Witt Aihinnn, p. 38) 
drrwo attcnt! on to the view oxpronced by Clement, S; "4,,; m. VIIt, 7, that th, ro 
rtro two main c. tu3oa of noopticiam, 'the ticklonooo of the hwalaan mind' and 
'the arp; iront diccrop. 1ncy which oxiotu in thingu'. i: e may be roadinR too 
rauch into the prnaont prjcace when ý:, addr, (quoting .. 6), t 'Such in the 
View taken by lantiochuu'. 
2cln 
rnitlt per 4 in di ? ^, . mr(Ltýn 
3 (E , _vv 
I!, 272). 
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clarity . The blame must rather lie with the lack of ability or experience 
of the ordinary porson to resist such arguments and by implication to 
insecure apprehensions. Similarly Chrysippus (quoted in Plutarch 5to. 1? r . 
1036D-E / SVP 11,270) warns nG-ainat"too free a use of opposite arguments, 
so that people may not be misled into abandoning their Yercepttons= ninco 
they do not poy attention to the solutions, they can easily be divcrtod from 
the facts of experience by the Magarian intortogations, and by other more 
numerous and more forceful quostioninpe. The reliance on 'arc' (in the 
senso of method1 rather tha" a system of knowledge) is in lino with Zono's 
advice that dialectic be resorted to to refute oophicros. 
2 The sort of safeguard 
dialectic offers against deception is described in DioConec Laortius (VII, 
46-4a)=3 it enables the wise man to distinguish between the true and the 
false, the plausible and, the anbiCuouo, and without it he cannot methodically 
onafo in any interro story nr&ument. Incorrigibility applies not only to 
particular items of knowlodgo but also to the disposition to which acts of 
knowing conform. Since a disposition of this kind in 'immovably by arcumant' 
and in necessarily found in the wino mun, 
4 Lueullua'profoonod purpose 'ut 
manoamus in poropicuis firmius of constantiua' clearly does not apply to 
him. I; oreovor, only outside the context of wisdom cin there be degrees 
of 'firmit: c- and 'conatantia' (aspects of virtue that arc most opposed to 
error, doubt and ecapt: eicm); 
5 
so that Lucullus' advice must for this reason 
as well be etmod at those who are atrivin to be wino and not at those who 
have alrca(Lr attained wisdom. '(ho use of 'arc' and 'diliintla' in further 
IDafincd 
as 9 tC 6Oo1otrl'ttxfj, 'tov'clß'Ct OL' 8600 xa1 ILCC66ov %otoUo4 Tt 
(Zono, WP 1,72), or tCtC 6670 7lu, v'C¢ hvCov o (Cleanthoa, SVF I, 490). Cf. 
Quintil. 11,17,41, 'jr.: a ciuo, ut Cloanthoa uoluit, arc out potoutna uia, id 
o3t ordiro, ucfic1cn4 ... '. 
2P1ut. "tc. jrj. 10341ý' (GVF 1,50). Coo r. il. II, 229. 
3Cf. Yin. LIt, 72; Pritt. 152-153 w}: ero it iu doocribcd as 'artom omnium artium 
Laximun'. 
4A. L. Vii, 47 xnd 14 (^Vý` 1,613 vnd 411)- 
5C&'. 
cup. 23,39, %5,66 cn4 1,42. 
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ju3tified by the hi&hly methodical approach of the Academies themsolve©, 
which Luculluo had earlier found incon3iotcnt with their ocopticicm. 
In principle, no one, least of all the wise man, can be diverted 
from what is acir-evident. This, however, sharply contrasts with the 
implication in Epicurus' position that error is still possible however 
clear impreuuiono may bo. The view that all impressions are true and that 
error is wholly due to judgement or opinion ('opinio', abCa )1 entails 
that clarity is not, evon for that wine man, a uuffioient ca: eguard against 
deception and that he too can be 'driven off' fr-. M what Is clear, a 
connequence which is inconceivable for Antiochus and the Stoics. Apart 
from the eontroveroie. l rejection of the general belief that impreooionß 
are either truo or faleo, the attribution of truth or faloity to lop: nio' 
may not in itself be unusual2 since it would have boon generally accepted 
that judgcmonto can be either true or false. The Epicurean caueat that 
one should not pane judgement on what in still a»aitins confirmation or 
contradiction by the evidence of the nenica does also teem to mako the 
clarity of oxporicnco the ultimate criterion. And despite the recoCnition 
that there in a natural tendency of thv mind to form opinions ,3 the wine man 
is presumably infallible in his judgement since he can 'coparato' opinion 
from the clarity of cenoo. 
a 
1Soxtua A. T1.. 'II, 210--211. Sao Un. 247-24A, particularly Tortullien D" An-17: 
'Ep: curei conntantiuu parcm omnibun atquo porpotuara dofcndunt uoritatem, 
ved ulia .: ia; non enim ccn . um mentiri, nod opinicnem. ' 
2Unlc+an, in view of the : stoic contempt for opinion, one were objecting to 
the uco of the Corm (ors. ('opiuto') to cover ol°ther judgment or the 
3udginj faculty. The vu;; ation that 'opinio' in vary likely to load to 
'error' also pluc i3 the r: pieureano in a vary üwl light in view of the 
Stoic equation of 'opinio' with 'error'. 
3ZL. TC4t. 51 ! ii . i: ey, Crook 
Atomtht", pp"254-255" 
4Plutarch, Adv. Co11.1117' (Un. 222), quotes a cuy1n3 of Tpicurua, that only 
the wies man nvsvcr chat u his opinions. For an example of error duo to 
opinion, coo Cextua Ali. V11r, 63 (r? o. 253), where Epicurus in quoted an 
cayiru; that 't l . a: +a who r.: dintain that; some i pre. aiiona are true and others 
falro are mic)ed owing to their ýr, ý: i+ility to e'parate opinion frojn the 
clarity of the : s{moon (? o7, r& 't) ppi; . ýOvczO, ^nt ýu' CLV ', Gzuv Ui {v('pyr, toG ). Ne ales rives UroriL< a' belief that the Purian were solid 
bodies an an e>:., iplo of af ; ltw vp. l nion. 
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But despite the ipicurnan attempt to colvo th-i problem of orrorg hic 
eyctcm undermines the cloarnoso of oxporience. in two ways. If'nll impreacione 
are true, the evidence of come as ouch becomes controversial and no is 
opinion since it is based on sense (of. Soxtus fl. VIII, 65). This, however, 
is not exactly Lucullus' point. What he ceems to be objecting to is the 
aesumption that th,, responsibility for deception ließ with opinion and 
therefore with the percipient o:. '. y, and not with the impression. The mind 
has no other faculty that can celaot batwoon improaaiona or grasp their 
evidence with cortaint; '; and if it can, docpito the' evidonco of ooneo, 
pans a fulso judgement, auch evidenco looeo its validity as a oufficient 
guarantoo again3t docoption. 
1 Whereas for Lucullua, an improonion is 
Dither clear or not clear and clarity n` is the ultimate objective 
criterion of truth, the aouumptiona of E'picurua rob the evidence of condo, 
2 
which denpito ovorything he wants to be the ultimzto critorion, of ito 
unconditional validity and loavon tho ro8ponnibility for attaining truth 
to the essentially unverifiable judjtmont of the mind. 
Anadhmin nrp"umnntn In rsurrnrt of 
67--nCrt27r%rta 
1. Dl. v n 1v cn't»aci imrrenifon? 
47 (p. 50,2-15) oxponun igitur ... nihil nit omnino. 
nimm ry. I shall follow their own mothod of Go'-Ling out each typo of 
arGunont coparatoly. They firnt try to show that many non-oxintont 
thinraa may appoar real Wined the mind can be movod by what is not 
existent no by what in exictcu".. Since you admit, they argue, that 
none impronnionu rro sent by god (e. g. in dro: to and through other 
mz'ntic aüancinz, f^r they ray that the Stoics whom they are oppoöina 
accept therm), r+vw can the Cod render false imprcnaiotio convincing 
and yet not bo able to bring about false improonione which renomblo 
1Plutarch ibiri., 1121!; (U& 52); ^ctxtua ibid. 
2 ?, G, v^rwv XCLI PrItO LoC ?I /vß. pyeth (Sextun A; M. VII, 216). 
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true once very cloOoly, or if he can do this also, why not those which 
are hardly diatinguichablo from true onna, and finally, why not those 
which do not differ at all from true onoo? 
Since the crux of the wholo clco for Academic scoptioicm lion in the 
claim contained in the third proposition in 40, naaoly that for every true 
impression there can be a (also one exactly like it, Lucullus cots out to 
criticise the Academic use of various typos of perceptual error to ostablish 
it. In spite of his professed intontion-to deal systematically with the 
classes of argumont used by the Academics, a treatment of canes of 
illusionI ar. well as of errors conrcotod with rational impressions will 
be conspicuously absent. 
2 Of the ctsoo of perceptual error he coneidora, 
only two are really important, and thaao are cnaoo of doluaion (48# 51 ff. ) 
and cases of mistaken ilontity (54 ff. ). The proxont ono dealing with the 
possibility of our mistaking divinely caused improesiono for existentially 
truo onaa, is a variant of the argument from dolueion, and involvon use 
of tho aoriton (cf. 49). Ito onl; " obvious rolovance lien in the cimilarity 
of the reasoning to that underlying tho arguiont about dolunion3 proper In 
48, and this will givo cufficiont justification to Lucullus to objoot in 
49-50 to this Bonoral typo of Academic argumont. In anaworing this argument 
in 49 Lucullus ropoata it in a aliChtly difforont form. A comparison of 
tho two pasaagoo will alto chow that what the Academic is trying to oatablich 
is not the god's abili+y to bring about convincinC impronnlona3 but that 
tho improaaiono ho brings nbc-: t, which are falao in the conao of boing 
exiotviitiai y doluaivu, can bo indintinguiahabin from truo cnoa. The 
11t is inauff. iciont to bruzh auidc the problem (19) on the Ground that, 
unlike I pact rur., he admits that thorn are fnlr. o na . +o11 to true improntlona (of. 79 ff. ). it is poaaiblo that Lucullua believes that uinco an i11u:, ion 
' is niSain a quentton of wcoinr; what is not 'there', criticism of the Academic 
ar,, ttanto about cases of delusion r_nd mistaken identity will apply to their 
ar;; umont about ctcon of illusion as uoll. 
7In 49 ho doon howovor attnclc th': mrtten, which tho Acadcnica oalployod 
to fH. ult rltior,. -xl, conition (92 ff. ). 
31;: 
uk6irun'a tr. i i: t. ttion In X17 in in thin reopeet lnccrroct and micleadinq. 
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progroaaion in 49 in in five atagoas (1) false but probable or, convincing, 
(2) very clone to the truth, (3) with difficulty diatinguiahed from tho 
truth, (4) not distinpuishod fron tho truth, and (5) no difforont from 
tho truth. In 47 the fourth stage In omitted. I 
It was a basic contention of the Academics that existentially real `a 
and existentially delusive imprccaions can affect the mind in a similar' 
manner. 
1 And the argument about the god2 is only one way of c, towing the 
possibility ut such confusion. Whether it proven anapallm ; ia as 
a general principle is debatable, since delusive iml: zoosionsn of this kind' 
are confined to a certain typo of experience. It can also be argued, to 
Lucullus implies in 50, that the deity would have no motive for such 
deception, even if he had the power, no that the responsibility for error 
lies only with the percipient. In principle, the stoic deity cannot do 
wrong, 
3 
and '. falso' throughout the argument merely moans 'existentially 
delusive', not that the daity in out to deceive. Similarly Plutarch 
(°to. Phs. 1057A ff. / 'SVF 111,177) states that, according to Chryeippus, 
god and the cage induce false impressions in us, requiring of us not ascent, `'- 
but only impulse and action, but wo axe led through weakness to assent to 
such improsstons. 
4 To assent hero means to accept the improesion an 
actually comiua from a real physical object, no that it is only if we' 
assent that we are doc ivod, and this is not part of the divine purpoco. 
This, of coarbe, does not moan that the improcsione are not true in the 
1'Cum 
animi inanitor moueantur oodew modo robus iia auae nullae eint ut 
iin quad cint'(47). Cf. Soxtuz A. Ai. YJI, 402 (reporting Carnoadoc)ty'tvowrc. t 
Y&p <ai, &r. ý ý01 ünapxüv'Iwv gcLvTaatai k ili 6n tpx6viwv. Sea alto 40. 
2Thoro 
iu only one god in Stoiciom but ho +^anifonta him3olf in a multiplicity 
of forma and activitioc under various nauo3. Ponce the Stoics aloo opoko 
of 'tho Gods' (o. g. II. D. 1I, 3). 
3Sen. En. 95,4( (Sw 11,1117). If he co=unicatos with ua it is because of 
hic love and providential care for men (Uiv. I, 02). For the Stoic belief in 
divination, occ 107; alco SV-' 11,1107 ff. 
41'lutarch 
re rd3 thin an an inconniatcncy, ainco Chryuippun attacked the 
J: cpdcmics for ouitntaininZ that impulno and uc°; icn wore ponniblo without 
ausoi t. 
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sen:: o that they are actual moc0ago3 from the 4oity. 
1 but the Stoics ponaihly 
preferred to speak of ouch impressions an 'porcuacivo' (Plutarch 0-0.105713 / 
jP III91? 7), which they-htivo to be if they are to result in'notion. ° It' 
in also possible that the Stolen maintained that the doity would not interfere 
with ordinary improaaions or. cauco the improsalone he condo in aleop to be' 
indistinguiahablo from existentially true onoa, so that Lueullus may be 
including both those points in his refutation in, 50 ('quia'onim tibi dodorit 
auf omnia dour Fasse auf its facturum ossn ci poaait? '). But'tho Acadowio 
in not'claiming that the rod might interfere with ordinary impreaaiono and 
it in more likely that Lucullua' reply in 50 instill concerned only with 
irnproasions cent by the god during sleep, although by implication there iu 
a nenne in which there would be so, no Interference with ordinary improccions 
if the conclusion of the Academic argument wore truo. 
2 But in the context 
of the proCrearion not out in 47 and 49 the dotty has nothing to dp with 
normal impressions anti the Academic is not sucgoating any Cartouia: n conflict ° 
batwoun the uxintonco of the external world and the poccibility that we may 
be suffering fron an illu3inn brought about by an arch-deceiver. The argum'ant 
might be follcvcd to its logical oorcluaion to establish the no assumption an 
that made by Tcsce. rten, and wo are certainly rer: indod of tint philcaopr. r, 'but 
the concept of deception on the part of a higher power in totally foro: gn 
to Stoic philor; ophy and in probably irrelevant here. 
4 secondly, the Academic 
1taý. III, J3. 
- 
2Cf. P: id p. 04 n. 2, vita however aocme to be ccnfuning the Academic argument 
with twat of Poucar ton. 
5Examples 
o! ' cvch d, ueption in particular crtaen arc, -however, common in both 
Greek and Lutir. literature, e. g. the cloud rovemblinfi I9crn which deceived 
Ixion; the f ,,! --o Helen (tosichorus; Plato, ! _; 1. 
ä06t ' 1ýliripidoo' 1'sl mit = the 
ccuntorfait Anroas which deceived Turnus (Virg. Arn. X, 636 ff. ). Tho delusions 
of twidnoaa are r no thought of an hoavon-tont, e. g. Ajax and Itrtraolea. 
`+i'lutarch, hownvar, raiana the quoation in hit. polemic l. n. ), and no does. 
Luculluo in hire toply. 
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is not trying in thin particular urj; umont to contend that than whole span 
of our perceptual oxporioncoa night bo doluaivo, ý'.,. 
According to Cicero, ono ostabliched inatanco of indistinguichability 
would undermine the voracity of any impression (84). - 
But as was said. above, 
the argument about the deity, since it in confined to a particular area of 
oxperienco, >i. e. the inspired dream, 
I does not necessarily have this affect. 
It can, howevor, be said to have force if it merely soaks to invalidate the 
Stoic definition of the cataleptic impro: oion. For this purpose it is 
sufficient to prove that a dolusive impression can exactly resemble an 
existentially true one, and in drawing this inference from the common belief 
in inspired dreams the Academic is only presenting the Stoic with the logical 
eoncequoncea of one of hin own theological aceumptionc. The arg uront'in 
both 47 and 49 in formulated an a aeries of quontiona, each of which moves 
a step nearer the doeirod conclusion. It can be looked at from the point 
of view of the god'c power and necordly from the point of view of probability, 
and it in from the latter that it derives all its force. If the Academic 
were merely trying to draw on his opponent to admit the ability of the god 
to bring about improaaicns that are indiatingrzichablo from true onec,, hin 
argument would be pointless. Vor is ho tying to argue that the trod would, 
for whatever roaeon, wich to exert his poor to bring about ouch improooionc. 
Lucullua will take the argument to have this moaning (50) since in thin 
form it is e'aier to refute. slut the arg,. "nt in not really about the 
god'a ability to do cortain things or whri. motives he might have for doing 
thorn. The Acn, do, rio is simply racking us to think of the divine itorvo Lion 
It in difficult to ace how the other ox=plea of divine revelation 
mentioned it, 47, by m, inns of oracle's, auiapicon and ontraila, can be "Nieel 
in the Irmo vay as dream: ), or that they have any relevance to the noriten 
arg font. hence they ere omitted in 49, when Luoullue ropoatu the argument. 
P-47 
as producing a result for which the god in not. responsible and no apneial 
motivo need be acsi nod. And`from the point of view of probability, 'tho 
conclusion in already contained in the first adxicnion. If an impression 
is existentially false and in yet convincing, or oven resembles the true, 
i 
there in no reason why su'h an impression should not be qualitatively 
indincorniblo from an exictontially true nno. 
2'. 8n1f-orljrin. itod imrroniiinnrt 
48 (p. 50,16-25) doinc! o cum trans mot: ootur ... intoatinum of oblatum. 
Summnrv. Next, if the mind can bo moved by itcolf an is proved by the 
thingo that we picture in our imagination or that ccmotimoa appoar to 
madmen and droamarn, it is plausible that-tho mind can be no moved 
that not only it may not diffurontiato true improaoiona from false 
onoa, but also that there in no difference botwai n them, just an if 
people were to tromblo or turn white either of thr, ir own accord through 
come inner mental movement or through come frightening external-cauco 
without there boing any diccorniblo or actual qualitative difference 
betr; con the two typos of oxpt-rionco. 
Improraions in tnic second clans cosy bo considorod faltto for tho ea, mo 
reason as impressions caused by-the dotty, namaly that in their case too 
th3r3 is no external reality that corraapor43 to them. But there is a 
contract established between the two classes in no fAr ac "in the presont- 
cace the impressions are solely and purely fiotiono of the imagination" 
('cum mons moucatur ip3a per uuco'), wheror: in the previous aection'the 
racponoibility for tho occurrence of the improaaiona does not lie solely 
with i'3 min-. 
Tho contra3t hntwcon oxtorrvi1 cauueo of improanions and iiitornal onon 
in also to b, + fourd in Sextun A. rt. YII9241)2: an imä, zosaicn is . oithur. oz 
This ambtgvouo mcrnin of 'probabilia' in tho firct promis3 holpa to' 
faciiitato the trrnnitton from 'convlnc inm, aj' to 'indictingutah. ibility'. 
2 Cf. Arictotl. o To Tnru rrrn, 4GOb 20 ft. 
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external objects or of our own internal affections] in the latter cane it 
in a zero 'cnpty attraction' to an imnCinary object (cf. 245). Wo have, 
of course, to differentiate between the self-induced flight of fancy or 
ant of pictorial imagination and the mental oporaticna by which our stock 
of concepts, based ultimately on oxpcrienco, is further enlarged and extended, 
1 
although the prosent passage does not explicitly distinguish them. It was 
also reeogniand that impressions occurring either in dreams cr in madness 
could ultim:. tely be traced to previous eonoo-exporienceo (Sextus A. M. VIII, 57); 
but whit is important for t; e Academic argument is that at the time they 
occur they are falco in co far no the objeot3 represented are not in fact 
precont, or my even not exist at any time (e. g. a winged man). Any such 
appearance is therefore concidorcd to be a more semblance in the mind 
( (pti. v-taoµa ) or an 'empty attraction' (öLäxcvoý jaxvopb ). 
2 
Of the four cases dealt with by Lucullua in hie reply (51-54), namely 
Imagination, droama, intoxication and madnoc , intoxication is not horo 
mentioned. Since it deco not feature prominently in Cicoro'o atatemont of 
the Academic argument in 60-90, it is poe. iblo that, bocau'o in the case of 
intoxication the improccions are not truly coif-originated, they did not, foaturo 
larSeiy in +he Anademic attempt to establish the claim of kapaa» eta, 
It is also rot clearly edited whether the argument seoka to octablich the 
indictinguishability of true and Falco improsuions in normal psycho-physical 
atateo, thot,; h wo are no doubt meant to accept thic implication. At tha 
boginning o- tho previous uoution wo were explicit],, told that minds can bo 
docoptivoly moved ('inanitor mouoartur') 1-y tho nor. -axiatont in the came 
way an by real objccta. fora we are told that the mind can be moved in 
1 Sao P-164 of thin Corurentnty. 
2D. L. VIIr50 (v` 11,55); Aot. P1rtc. IV, 12,4 (MME II, 54); cf. 5oxtuo A. M. VII, 241, 
245,427. In h. M. VII1054 Ooxtua cn11 euch imrroaclonD xevonmOTIlm-Ca xat 
l. Vý7lý, ýOý1C'Cß 'ti, 1: bt(LVgt(tr. " 
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in such a way that not only it cannot discern if the impressions are true 
or false, but aloo that there is in fact no differonce between them. It is 
clear that the nature of the affection in not specified (i. ee whether it., 
in 'inaniter' or not) becauae. the argument seeks to establish that we can 
really be at a loan as to the truth or falsity of the imprcnoion3.1 Wo are 
therefore deliberately left in the dark as to the sort ofpsycho-physical 
state in which the mind may be moved 'ut non modo non intornoncat uera ills 
uisa eint an falca ced ut in its nihil intermit omnino'. For the Academic 
is sceptical by virtuo of the fact that he thinks that the veracity of even 
normal experience is doubtful. 
2 
This does not mean that all our exper; lnccs 
are necessarily delu3ive. 
3 Some of them may be true without our knowing 
it. In this respect, the Academic reacmbles Ayor'a moro moderato ocept104 
in that hie ccepticisn is opposed to the type that 'in no undiscriminating 
in its acopo' that it expoaea itself to the easy refutation that illusory 
1This 
would in fact not often be the case, since the dreamer and the mad= 
are virtually convinced of the truth of their impressions. On the other 
hand, this is the point of the argument, i. e. the delusive and the veridical 
can be confused with one another. 
2Reid (p. 235 n. 12) must be mistaken in thinking that 'ilia' refers to the 
'uiaa' mentioned at the end of 47. The word need only refer back as far as 
'sic etiam mentem mouert' and includes im; reanions ocourring during both 
abnormal and normal states. 
3Ao bofore. (47), the Academic (as ropresented by Cicero) does not take his 
argument to its logical conclusion. Although the cu4goation that we may be 
dreaming when we think wo are awake had been made in earlier Greek philosophy 
(Plat. Thenet. 150b -o), the Academic do: n not conclude from the argument 
abo"*t dolusiona that our waking experiences or oven that all life may be a 
dro"n; he does not also claim that there .s no difference between m dnocu and 
sanity. Lucullua will, however, accuse h. n in 54 of disregarding the 
distinction between sanity and insanity, and Evictotua (I, 5 6) that bot', oen 
dreaming and being awake. According to F'olybiua (XII, 26c 25, the Academics 
were so resourceful in producing plausible arguientn that they wondered, 
among other things, whether, while diccoursina in the Academy, they wore not 
in fact dreaming. 
4Tho Problem of Ynotrledpn, pp. 37-38. 
4 
''4 
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makes sense only if ccntrastod with veridical. The moderation of the 
Academic in Also shown in the fact that, th3ugh he entertains the possibility 
that there might not be any intrinsic difference between true and false, he 
leaves the question an open one. 
But if we apply 
the conclusion 'ueri simile, cat sic etiam montem moueri 
ut non modo non intornoccat uera ills uisa lint anne falsa sad ut in its 
nihtl intorsit omnino' to normal psycho-physical states, we have to ark 
ourselves, as Lucullu3 does in 53, whether it is a plausible inference, from 
the promico that the mind is capable of colt-originated movement. Wo might 
agree that in sleep or during madness or some other abnormal state a percon 
might mistakes his (aloe experiences for true ones (88-90). It might be 
inferred from this, an Cicero does, that true-and faire impressions are 
qualitatively and generically indistinguishable during auch abnormal states, 
though wo cannot assort it, for it cannot be proved either that voridioal 
and delusive, impressions are exactly alike or that they are not exactly 
alike,. Lucullus is therefore free to insist (52) that there in a difference 
even in abnormll states though his aubtlo avoidance of the Inoue that 
whatever difference thorn is may not be discernible will be one of the 
woakneasna of his counter-arewent. But +! +o argument of the Aeadcmie door not 
include a proof that in normal psycho-phycical states veridical and dolunivo 
impr3aaiona are indistinguishable or intrinsically alike, and therefore will 
alwayu be pto, uod with the objection that :: o trios to establish his case 
uy c.: ýpealir, to what h ppona in abnormal a'atea and therefore to what is 
ix-rolovant to nor ail atatos (53). 
1 We can, for example, imagine things when 
In a norm. il utate, but to eonfumo an imaginary object with a true one would 
in itself bn a oi6ni of 1brorraality. The cralogy with 'tremor' and 'pallor' 
iT2io 
only citß&i (68) of a porcon in a normal state and yet bolieving 
"i tho truth of it djiuoivu expcrionoo io th. t of aomoono who even on waking 
up continu')a to boliov. in th., truth of what were in fast dream oxporiencon. 
Lut can euch u porwon be said to bn in m normal frazao of mind? 
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an produced by the mind itcelf and an caused by come terrifying object is 
not convincing. It is of course pocciblo that in the cane of auch 
exporicnces there in a qualitative similarity between the emotion caused 
internally and that caused externally, but it does not follow, that one would 
be unable to verify the source of the experience. This' does not wean to, nay 
that mistakes are not possible even during normal oxporionco, but the 
Academic does not seek to establish his case-from this angle and it is 
always possible to argue that all the conditions for poroeptiun have not 
been fulfilled if deception occurs. 
The most serious difficulty underly+ng tho Stoic perceptual theory 
is that we can be acquainted with reality only through impreueiona, and 
this raises the question whether a valid criterion exists whereby wo can 
measure the efficacy of an imago to make-us acquainted with its source 
(Sextun A_M. VII9427). A sceptic can argue that if there io a single instance 
of an existentially delusive imprecuion being taker. for a true. one the whole 
of experience becomes doubtful. And it io clearly the intention of the 
Academic to argue thus. But what he perhaps fails to realise (and what 
Lucullus himself will not point out) is tnat, since in Stoicism thorn is a 
strict causal rolation between a true impression and its source (Soxtur A. M. 
VII, 426)2 an4 false stands for what is not 'there' or what is not the case, 
the Academic must, if he wishes to regard ealf-originated aantal improaaiona 
as not only indiatinguiehable but perhaps no different from true once, 
ronounco the Stoic perceptual theory, with its dichotomy botwuen true and 
false, and be prepared to allow that all c: porionoo =ay be fulse, thus, canting 
doubt on the oxicterce of an external world1 an "oil an our knowledgo of it. 
In 00-90 Cicero arguea that it in irrelevant if on waking or on-rocov- 
wring a souLa framo of mind wo judo the proviou3 oxpcrienco to bc. faloo, 
1And 
ultimately on his own existence and that of other mindo. 
2For 
the phyaicul procaaa underlying perception, see Samburuky, Thysl. ca of 
th(, Stotaa, p. 22 ff. 1ec%uuc tine Stoic theory of perception in cocontially 
cawml, it offeru very little score for ocoi't; iniam. 
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einco when they occurred the impressions wore taken to be true. From thin 
it in inferred that a false impression may be qualitatively similar to a 
true one. It may seem rather odd that Cicero should exclude from his 
consideration the reactions of people in normal states, and should pretend 
that he is not questioning the distinction people would make between normal 
and abnormal experiences. A sceptic might be expected to consider it parti- 
cularly relevant to his case, not that people in abnormal states should take 
their false experiences to be true, but that people in normal states ahculd 
take what may be false to be true. But the objective of the Academic in to 
invalidate the Stoic criterion with its r. aaumption that a false impres^ion 
cannot bs qualitatively identical to a true one* He is thus compelled to 
focus attention on the nature of false impressions and their possible 
resemblance to true ones, and not vice versa, by this very proviso in the 
Stoic definition. It is also perhaps easier to try to establish the possible 
qualitative similarity of false impressions to trug ones during abnormal 
states than the possible similarity of true impressions to false ones during 
normal states. D'it because the Academic argument relies on the judgement 
of the normal parson to establish that impressions occurring in abnormal 
states are false, and on the judgement of the person experiencing them to 
establish that they are indistinguishable from true, it could in reply be 
argued that it in impnesible to compare the impressions of, for instance, 
a cleoping und a waking person, and that the judgement of the same subject 
when itwako would lo the only valid teut of indistinguishability. There 
appoara no way of definitely deeid!. ng this quastio: a. And if it is argued 
that tho Stoic criterion applies to normal nitu: 6tton3, the Academic argument 
neither invalidatus it nor establishes the untrustworthiness of normal 
perceptions. 
' It remains to be seen how Lucullus deals with the problem. 
1Indirectly, 
of course, h! s does question the distinction and invalidate 
nor, rr. l t xpcrienan an well (cf. 54). 
2It 
n-y be arj-usd that the Academic argument is not even plausible ('ucri 
aimtlo') if applied to the 'normal' context. 
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Coneslusions why Innnot the true nnd'thn fn1tn pot Mirror? 
4ß'cont. (p. 50,25-31) pootremo sinulla ... distinotio. appsroat. 
Surmz . Finally, if there are no, convincing Improssionc which-are 
falco, it is a different matter. But if there are, why not also thobo, 
which are not easily distinguishable from true ones? 
1 Why not such that 
they do not differ at all? especially as you yourselves assort that the 
wise man withholds assent when in a state of madness because no difference 
between impressions is apparent to him. 
The argument at this point does not introduce a third category of 
delucivo impressions although 'postromo' might appear to zuggoat this, but is 
simply a concluding recapitulation, supported by a reference to the practice 
of tho wise man. The gradation of five stages used in the nnr itnn, in 49, and 
of"four otage5 in 47, has hero been further shortened to three by the conspi- 
cuous omission of the second stage (why not also those which approximate an 
closely as possible to the truth? ) as it appears in 47 and 49. The reason 
for the omission cannot bo that this Otago does not carry tho implication 
of indiutinguiohability, since the last but one promies still implies the 
possibility of a differentiation. The final stago is, on the other hand, so 
devieod that any ouggoetion of distir uiohability in rulod out. 
If it were the case that one never viotakoo false impressions for true 
ones, the inevitable inference must be that true and false impressions are 
in all caooo recognisable for what they are; the Stoic position would not 
have been questioned nor would thero be a ciao for scepticism. But if ono 
can bo convinced of the truth of certain impressions though they are false, 
the caco for indictinguichability stands. From the convincingnoso of some 
false improaciona can be deduced the possibility of there being false 
Ii. 
o. eivcn that the falso can be 'probabilia', why cannot thorn be falce 
impreauiono which are not oaoily dietineuiohable from trug, once? Again, an 
in 47, Iackham'o tr. alation falsifies Lucullua' version of the Acadonio 
arCumcnt, which io not to outabliuh tho cc: º, incintncaa of impreociono, but 
thoir indiutinguiohability. Ikoideo, it d4, oo not have to be urgucd that 
improoeionn presenting thu hij, "hoot deCrco of indintinjuichabilty must be 
convincinij, if the false but minimally similar can be co. 
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improsoions that are indietinguiahable from true oneo, and from this it 
follow3 that any impreaaion taken for trueizay be false. 
I The, argument 
is again presented in cuch a way that the conclusion is logically contained 
in the first premiss. As we were told proviously (40), the suggestion that 
there is no difference ('nihil intorsit') covers both the possible absence 
of an intrinsic difference and the inability to discern such difference. 
There are two points to note in the argument. While we are Liven the 
impression cf an advance from a lancer degree of qualitative similarity to 
tho highost degree of siciile. rity, probability itself is not graded and made 
variable with qualitative similarity. Thiu is bocauvo it in easior, to draw 
the conclusion that false impressions can present the highest-degree of 
similarity once it is granted that 'probable' colncidos with the leaner. 
The second point is that the gradation is not-from the qualitatively dissimilar 
to the qualitatively similar. For false (i. e. dolusivo)-impressions-to be 
convincing, thoy must in somo way r©comblo true ones. Again tho'fact*that 
'probabilia' can also moan 'like the truth' in important to the transition 
from the first premiaa to the next one. : hui the first, premioa alroady- 
contain3 to a limited extent the assumption of absence of difforonce'ýreached 
in the final conclusion. The same is true of the intermediate' statement 
('cur non et tam, quao non facile internoacantur? ' ), so that from th, i Eirat step to 
the last, it is alwayn a question of similarity, never of dissimilarity. The 
conclusion ells serves to reinforce the point that is* difference may be 
diccorn. ble . nd that this may imply absence of an 
intrinsic di. "forenoe 
rather than failure on the part of the oul-joct to LtatirIuiah it., 
In neakin to arguo for the poanibility of thoro, boing (also iraproooions 
w, itch ara I wt: Atii iih:, Lble fro: a truo onuL, th9 Acndfmic may appear to be 
trying to eicablioh &xupaXAal; ia only In oomo caaoo. but ultimately, 
thy.: intention is to eatablich it Aa a universal principle. 
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Taken ao it iop tho argum, nt looko plAuaible. But we aro not told 
(porhapo intertionally) to what state of oxporlenco it applies. If, au it 
appears, the first prcmios applies to abnormal situations and yet the 
conclu3ion concerns normal experience as well, the chief weaknoce of the 
arguront will be that a concluaion baced on exporionce acknowledged to be 
abnormal and false is then applied to the whole range of normal oxperience, 
as if no difforence between the two kinds existed. It is in ! 'act part of 
the arguxcent that no difference may be diacornible. But if this 1i the 
caso, we havo perhaps no ri4ht to aaaumo in the first place that abnormal 
experience is talge. Even ttio a1lcCcd Stoic admission that the vice man 
withholds assent while in a state of 'furor' beoauno no differonoo botwoon 
impressions is apparent to him dooa not eotablich abaonco of a difference, 
and therefore the fallibility of the wise ran, evon under abnormal conditions. 
If the Stoics did mike the admission in the form reported, it may appear 
that they werd playing into the hands of their oppcnf'nto. Put eins the 
Academics binod their claim principally on the fact that no die U nction 
appears to the poroipient during hie abno: aal state (40,52,80,90), it 
in doubtful if the Stoio3 a. ado tho adnioaion oxaotly in tho form atatod. 
1 
Lucullua hii i f, when replying to tho argument in 53, dooll not confirm 
th, ) reason g!. ven in 40 ('quia nulla in uiaia diatinotio apparoat'), but 
maintains that, just cß at other times when proper perceptual conditions 
are 1acking, tho wise m: tn, when dorarged, withholds ascent lost he chould 
approvo fn1r.. for true ('no adprobot Laloa pro worin'). Ii the Stoioo did 
xoally make the admtaaion ao reported, it eau porhana because they accepted 
that under certaiu oonditiwºo a diotinction between true and false was not, 
oaay to mako rather tar bocauso thoy bolt vod that no diotinotion wan 
diocorniblo nt all. Altnrnativoly, wo tay auauro that the Stoics explained 
I'1'tio 
aclmisliInn is quoted in SVF (I1I, 551). 
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the action of the wise-man in the-sane way as Lueulluc does in 53l'or merely 
admitted that impressions occurring during a'state of madness are not 
cataleptic (Sexaa A. M. VII, 247), but that this was interpreted by the 
Academics as amounting to an admission that the false can be indistinguishable 
from the true. The appeal to the experience of the wise man in particular 
was important for the Academic becau33 it served to confirm his claim of 
b. icap MX7c. Efa on the evidence of the only compotent judge and to undermine 
the supposed vantage point of the sage. . If the Accacmlo could not, 'in the 
case of the wise man, rely on the inference that assent during madness 
implies indistinguishability, he was still dotormined to find a way of 
supporting his case by pointing to the fact that the wise man withholds 
assent when in a state of frenzy. On tho other hand, it is quite possible 
that it was the Stoics who in the first place brought forward the argument 
about the wise man to counteract the Academic reliance on the accent of the 
percipient in abnormal situations. Frenzy ('furor') was the natural choice 
of an abnormal state required for the argument, since, according to the 
Stoics, the wino man does not become intoxicated, and they could hardly have 
argued convincingly. about his behaviour in. dreams. 
The Stoic claim that the wise an will withhold assent under ouch 
conditions may appear somewhat plradoxicalg since wisdom and normal mortal 
powora cannot euroly be operationri during an attach: of mzdneon. We must 
proaumo that it was rococnicod that 'furor', which here translatoe µc7, ay jta1 
2 (a physical illness which oven the wino . in would be liable to contract), 
1Not Ilavia (ao Reid, p. 231 n. 2, see= to think) which cannot affect the 
Wioo man (D. L. VII, 116) since it refers to a psychological disturbance duo to 
an oxcoao of paacion or to the moral and opiatomic doticicnoy of the fool. 
Sao Tuzc. III, ll; Cicero there notes that 'furor' ca: a also be ucod in the sense 
of . ccrioua psychological disturbance. For the oc. "irronce of non-cataleptic 
and doluaivo impressions during 'molancholy', ace Sextun A. Af. VII, 247; Aotiua 
P1nc. lV, 12,5 (, VF' 11,54)- 
2Tu. 
c. IIl, ll1 of, D. L. VII, 1lO, who adds that he may also Buffer from dr_irium 
1. fjp, no. C ). : fiat, Stoic F'hilonc+rhy, p. 16 ff. 
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could vary inintcn3ity co that cvon if. the illncoo could, bo, reaponoiblo 
for thn loac of virtur, as Chrycippua hold, 
I it wau rcnorally poo©iblo fur 
the Stoico to maintain that the wino man can, when in a state of fronzy, 
retain hic normal. mental powers to the extent that he would not assent to 
what in false, 
2 
which would entail loan of hie otatuz an a wino'man. 
Cleanthee him3elf had not allowed that virtue can be lost because of thn 
firmness of the wise man's porceptiona. 
3 If this implies, an it seema to 
do, that the wise man can distinguish the true and the false even during 
his illneos, then this view would be different from the one expressed in 
the present passage, unless restraint fro, a all acts of assent ('ab omni 
adsonsu') does not exolt. de the possibility of distinguishing true and falso 
at some stages of the state of frenzy. 
4 
Antiochvo' ro, 1y the Academia unen fallacious araumentn 
49-50 (p. 50,32 - p. 51,29) ad has ornon ulnionea ... quod fiori qui'potcat? 
Snrm ry. (49) Antiochun spent a whole day arguing against those 'empty' 
impressions. I will, however, state only the rain points. First, -they 
must be rebuked for using a moat deceitful typo o: questioning, which 
is least approved in philosophy, nanely that involving amtill and gradual 
additions or subtractions, and known an the noritoa because they bring 
about a heap by adding one E;: ain. A dofeotivo and deceitful typo of 
arbwtont: For you climb thus: 'If an impression put before the sleeper 
by god can be convinoing, why can it not also be very much like the truth? 
Next, why not baroly dintinguiahublu? Then, not oven diatinguiehablo? 
Finally, such that there is no difference between the two? ' If I admit 
1 D. L. VYI. 12'1 (SVF iII, 217)i another cause to intoxi^ttion (cf. D. L. VII, 11a). 
For the controvorcy on whether virt""o can 'ao lcat, 'so JVP III, 230-9" 
2Accordinr, 
to Sextra A. MM. VII, 247, pooplo during frenzy and molo. ncholy orton 
do not mal: a any affirmation about their uxporiemceo or unaont to thorn. 
3 44b. Gsr, {lctý vvý xct-Ccta 1411 Le. r D. L. VII, 127. 
4Cf. 52, whcro it in argvcd tliat people can, at the initial anJ final etas* 
of nzcthc;, c, kncw that the impreuniono appoaring to then are faloo. But 
sicaont in not mentioned thcro, nor in tho argument about the wine man. 
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this atop by step, the error in mine; if you arrive there of your own 
accord, it is yours. (50) For who will have concaded that the god 
in cwnipotont, orthat, if ho wore, he would act as you say? On what 
ground do you assume that if one thing is like another, they will be 
distinguishable only with difficulty, then that they cannot, be 
distinguished, and finally that they arc identical? It, for examplo, 
wolves are like dogs, you will finally say that they are the came. 
There are indeed similarities between some thing-i which are honourable 
or good or artistic and their contraries; 'then why do we hesitate to, 
assort that there is no difference between them? Do even ! ncompatibloe 
escapo us? Nothing can be transferred . rom its class into another. If 
improsaiors'of different kinds did not differ, came would be found both 
in their own class and in a class to h;. ich they d: d not belong whit: 
is impossible. 
Lucullus' reply to the Academic arguments involving exiÄtontielly 
dolu31vo impreaniona ('utaionea inanes', which aeema to Include a playful 
reforonco to tho areuionts them olves)i is conducted on a very carefully 
structured basis. Earlier wo worn. told that taro' end 'diligontia' wero 
needed to defend what is clear in itself against deceitful argumento baood, 
or. faulty and contentious reaooning (45-46). It in this obstacle to clarity 
which Luculluo now tries to romove, as wan his intention (46), by criticising 
the no raten ;: the . tcadomica 
(49) and their use of unjustified aaaausptiona (50). 
Ilia next r. ovc (51-54) will be to reinstate clarity as an intrinsic property 
of veridical imprcaaionA. We need not take Lucullt: a eorioualy when he says 
that Antioch-4a spent a whole day on thin single topLo (coo 11-12). 
2 Cicero 
is evidently conscious of the diaadvantagoo of long '+xpoaitioni whore the 
dromatio aottin, runs the risk of d! aappo 'ins oomp'ately. Luoullue' remark 
is therefore a more dramatic device to stream th" importance and amount of 
'So Numanius (fr. 25,34 and 41t Dos Places) troato rcaailaa' arguments as 
illusory ( axLo, papta 0 p&OiiM-M 
); olccwhoro (rr. 27,37-30) he uso3 bvc tptLm 
of those of Carneadoo. Cf. N. ]1. fII, 95 whore the Epicuroan Vclloiun romarka 
that oven dreads are not as unsubstantial as a Stoic diucourco about the Coda. 
2According to Reid (p. 236 n. 4)9 this topic 'tilled' one book or section of t ho original work from which Cicero is hero copying. Ilia rem; %rk that Coxtus 
often quotc3 Antiochuo when dincuaning 'thin and similar subjects' is 
urcubctantiittod. 
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time and effort opont by both partioo on thin ioouo and aloe to juatify 
hin curoory aid cumna y treatment of the topic. 
The sor, itee basically concerns the problem of dernarcating.. thelimita 
of quantitative and qualitative terms and the argument could take on various 
forms according to the concept that was being examined. 
I Since the difficulty 
it rained coincided very closely with the epistemological problem the 
Academics were concerned with, they, and in particular Carneade8,2. had freely 
used it or arguments of a similar atructuro to establish the close proxin. ity 
be cataleptic and non-cataleptic impressions, with the inforonco that 
nothing can be known in the absolute sensd (92 ff. j Soxtuo A. r1. VII, 416 : t).. 
To the question,, for instance, whether 9-is few, one might fool at a loin 
or answer affirmatively but wrongly, while 'ß is few' might have been a corroot 
anower. 
3 One might find the same difficulty in delimiting 'diuas'-from 
'paupor', 'clarus' from ! obacurus', and no on (92). The o* ton thoroforo 
reveals the poosibility of orrora of judgumont which dialectic, the art 
of distinguishing the true from the falne, is incapable of solv'ng (91), und 
that not only sonso-impressions-but also rational impressions (sec p. 210 abovo) 
may bo indintinguishable. Since the ortginll Rorer seems to have boon 
connoctod with the number series, it is charaotoriatio of this typo of. 
argument that it moves forward in a series-of gradual steps or stagos,, 
('aliquid minutatim of gradatim additur nut domitur'), No that the term can 
1For this argument, attributed to the Magarian Eubulidcu (1). L. iI, 108), coo 
ioid p. 236, n. 10 and p. 237 n. 251 It. and H. )noale, 7L, # P, ivn o n. nt Or T=in, 
P"114. In origin it seams to have been rlnply a 2c: ical puzzlo, ba. ad on 
the tact that although one grain d" n not mike a hs, p, a heap is eventually 
made by the addition of one grain ('uno additorQ. 'ano', 49). 'hat the purpose 
va: of this and other Ziogarian paradoxes, it is hard to cay, but as the Knoaloe 
(1.0. ) rcn, zrk, 'it is incrodiblo that Eubulidee produced them in an entirely 
pointloao way'. Th'y no :o that argumonta rich as the E: oap or the Bald Man 
'reveal the . sasential vaCuonono of come of our co mou axprosaiona'. Cf. Iloraco jL'"II, 45-49, with Wilkins' noto ud loc. 
2'Loa 
soritou do Carndado', P. Conissin, , 1941, pp"43-r51. For. Cnrneado3' 
u:: o of this typo of aruwont aiainst the oxiutence of gods, coo yextus A. N. 
IX, 139 ft., 102 ff.; L. n. III, 43 ff. 
3Cao 
ftloo D. L. VII, 82. 
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cover the lino of questioning illustrated in those scotion3, by which 
the Academics sought to entablich that delusive impressions can be 
indistinguishable from true ones. There is thus a certain regomblanco 
to the typo of chain-argument which was later given the came name ('it 
A is B and B is C and C is D, then A is D', nee Joseph, An Tntrotu tton 
to Logic, p"354 ff. i Zeller, Stoten. Yninulrnnn nn1 S(, nntlcR, p. 120). 
1 
By attacking the use of the snritan-type argument and -scribing it 
as faulty ("titiosum') and most fallacious ('captioaicaimo genoro 
interrogaticnis'), Luoullus appoara to be voicing the general antagonism 
of the contemporary philosophical schools ('quod genus minima in philooophia 
probari aolet'), and in particular of the Stoics who apont much timo and 
effort dealing with fallacies (S_YP II pp. 89-94) and who believed that a 
good training in dialectic could help one to coo through them (Soxtus P. if. II, 
229 ff.; D. L. VII, 46-48).. Although hints were previously given that the 
Academic is a deceiver ('ne qui fallerentur', 17) who makes use of fallacious 
arguments (45-46), it is now that the accusation In first brouE:. t into the, 
open. The harshness of the criticism is typical of the Stoics (Plut. Cemm. 
L 011-1059A)# but the charge of deception is also to to found olsewhoro. 
2 
The Mogarian origin of moat of those fallacies or Isophicmal in not commented 
on. Despite the tact that opponents had triad to point out the influence 
of that school on Academic oceptieiam, 
3 Lucullua fails, Loth hors and oarlior 
(13-15), to draw any comparison with their orintic ti. hich the Stoics believed 
1Although the chain-arCurnont, which Is virtually a .. rics of cyllogiema 
with the ccnaluaione cuppreoacd, wa.. known to Arintutlo (An. Pr. I, dya# with 
Roast note ad loc. ), and further dovolopod by th.. Stoics t eo Zollore 10. ), 
tho name 'cor"., an' wan not regularly applied to it boforo the nixtconth 
contury (Joseph ley. ). 
2ttuionius, f i.. 27.33 and 41-47 (Don Places). Cf. rolybiua XII, 26o, whoro 
the cchool in said to have bocomo notoriouu for Its lova of paradoxon. 
3300 the verooo of Arioto and Timon about Arcoailt. 3 in Sextus P_. 11. I, 234, 
1). L. IV, 33 and Num niuo fr. 25,15 ff. (Deo Placon). 
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waa also aimed at diverting othcru from their porcaptiona (Plutarch äto. Rep. 
1036 / ^VP 11,270 and 271). 
1 Howovor, as uowal, a moral noto is introduced 
into the criticism. 'Sophinma' are by definition (aloe arcumento (toxtuz P. 11. 
II, 229), and so Lucullua ancumca that the purpoao of the Roritca and similar 
ar amcnto in to divert men from the truth by deception and trickory. 
2 
But unless a respondent is tricked into accepting a false asoumption 
or the argument doce not proceed on the bioio o: an agreed anuwerý it could 
be argued that there in nothing fallacious in the method of proceeding by 
otagcs (93 st. ). Ito purposo is not racroly to trap tho advcroary (which 
Cicero udmito, 94) but to put him in the "ata position of uncertainty as 
the Academic claims to '. )a in himaelf. 
3 Lucullwi ia, however, not prepared 
to make any auch distinctions and in uncompromising in diacrediting the 
use of argwnenta of this naturo. Wo may infor from yhio that in genoral 
the uoritoo wan rogarded an an effootivo weapon, but that it was aluo looked 
upon with auepioion. The same conoluaion can be drawn from Chryaippuu' 
advice that, ; hen being qucationed, the roupondont should halt and withhold 
went well btifor© the critical point in the argument, in order to avoid 
falling into no: no abaurdity. 
4 Thua Lucullue follows this advico5 and 
I a%Vaeated earlier (p. 90 n. 4) that the rcacon for this may have boon that 
Areooilno dissociated himself from the Me ariana, an from the Pyrrhoniote. 
In 75 Cicero repudiates any link between Academic nceptioinm and tto arian 
dialectic. He alto no Lou how that school had caused trouble to the Stoics 
with their 'aophiamata°. 
2Uce 
of what in falco, like accent to the false, in a mor^.: ai^ 
('uitit. &'). 
Jience the ßr-iten in 'uitios u. n' aloe in a coral ennoe 
(cf. 93) The failure 
to do tact scrhiyr can have r.. oral and practical cornaeauonccn 
(of. 5oxtuu P. I1. 
11,229; D. L. V1I, 40). 
3Tho 
genoral airy of the tso, which is admittedly to perplex and confuse 
tho opponent, ohould alno be clearly diutinguiohod from ito purpcco in the 
prencnt argument, where it is virtutlly t%i equivalent of a proof. 
493; aoxtua r. t1. II, 253; A. M. VIi, 416. .; piototu; 3 
(II, 18,18) rofera to the 
ar ont an o 'tinvx66Y, (, jv `. Chryaippun v;. n apparently co troubled by thin 
norhicim that Perujus (&nt. 6,79-C0) humorously caya: 'dopungo ubi aictams 
/ 
inuantu: i, Chryuippa, tut finitor Rcerut. ' 
5üoxtu (L-11. II, 247 ff. ) aloe rorortu the view of 'the dialocticiano' that 
n loophir-m' or an ur u1acnt with . "nlno promiecon nhoulti not be o. eoentod to. 
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indicates that he has not granted to the Academics each cuccoosive atop 
after the firnt needed. to roach the conclusion (400huc ci peruenoria. me 
tibi primum quidque concodonte, meum uitium fuoritj sin ipso tua sponto 
processerie, tuum'. It id., furthermore, obvious that Lucullus is not only 
discrediting the general nature of the Academic arguments concerning 
existentially delusive impressions, but is also making an indirect attack 
on the Academic use of the noritR, to undermine dialectic and reason (91 ff. ). 
lie does not in fact make a separate case against the Academic argwnont on 
this, issuo, althouih the claim of &Itupaa). c. Oa is applicable to rational 
impressions as well. ho does not therefore peek to understand that the 
problem posed by the eorti might be a valid one. too colution, ie thus 
offered, 
1 
and indeed Cicero states that the Stoics regarded problems of 
this mature ac 'inexplicabilia'. 
2 
The Academic arguront is found to be faulty-on two grounds; (1) the 
a3aumption3 about the Grad are unjustified and 
(2) total identity cannot be 
inforrod from aimilarity. It is not clear whether 'quip onim tibi dodorit 
auf omnia deum posse out its facturum oces, at poaait? ' was the anewor Given 
by the Stoics or whether it originated with Antiochua. The general Stoio, 
position die. not allow the parlier Crook dualism between the divine and 
some higher powor, and to be in line with the Stoic beliof,: doubts ought 
not to have boon raiwid about the omnipotenco of tho duity. 
3 But since this 
question was a subject of continuous controversy 
(f. iny 1y. Ti. ZI, 27) and may 
1 Acccrdinß to Watson (e tc 'fin^'. = oi' ftnvlnd,, r+,,, _, 
p. 70), the Stoic 
reply to the anritnn would be that +a statement 
liko 'That in big' in not 
of the caxc typo as 'Thin in hay need'. But ho o: rora no evidence for this. 
295; D. J.. VII, 02. Cf. the codl. oval 'incolubilia' (w. and M. Knoale on, eit, 
p. 227). 
3N; n. III, 92t 'uoa onim ipai dicero colotin nthil aaeo quod dour officoro non poosit, at quidom ein' laboro ullo'. Cf. Atv_. II, 06. 
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not have been a octtled ono even in Stoiciom, 
1 it is pocoible that the 
Stoics would not have refrained from the reply reported by Lucullue, since 
it is one that is suggested by the context and is so formulated an to 
parry the Academic move. If doubts are raised ao to god's power, -there'' 
is a better chance of faulting the Academic argument, vrhoreas the chances 
would be halved if it were merely granted that god can do everything but 
would refrain from certain things. Lucullus also raises the question of 
the divine wcjtive. The suggestion seems to be that if god did produce 
impressions that were indistinguishable from existentially true ones, it 
could only be (like Descartes' Demon) with intention to deceive, and it 
would be inconsistent with the divine nature. As wo have coon (p. 24 4 of this 
Commentary), the impressions sent by the god, though convincing, are false 
in the sense that they do not arise from external physical objects and we 
are not required to assent to them. Wherefore, if god ware to render the 
impressions he sends indiotinguishablo from exister. +ially true oneC, they 
would be assented to and he would be responsible for the deceit. The 
question is never raised whether such impressions would be considorod true 
(Goo P. 244-5 above) as Lucullus is particularly concerned 
to defend normal 
veridical or; ericnce; the peculiar nature of improssiona'sent by the deity 
and criteria by which they may be recognised are therefore wisely ignored. 
A discussion of thin subject would have introduced unnecessary complications, 
for not only would Lucullus have found himsolf defending existentially : also 
impressions as wall, but he would also have found it impossible to make any 
justifiable inforonce from this typt of o-porience to normal veridical 
1Seneca 1ý. . I, Prof. 16-17; 1: ß. 95,47 
(gVP 7t, 1117). Thorn is ono notablo 
fragcv, nt j 11.1183) according to which Chrycippua hold the view that 
thero are certain limitations to godIn power as well as to his knowledgo, 
but it has boon thought to be unreliable. Sea M. Dragona-Monachou, ThA 
thin Amur ntn for the LvIntoncn and Prnvidpnnn of thn Godn, 1976, Athone, 
p. 32. One of the Stoics' explanation of evil au an accidental roault of 
Cod's work also implies that hin power in limited. Plutarch ! to. t . 1051B .T I1,1170). 
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experience.; It seems that for the purposes of the argumont, all such 
impressions must be classed as false, and in 51 Lucullu3 will attack, 'unreal' 
impressions ('inania uisa') on the ground that they lack clarity. He makes 
it clear in that soction'that the impressions he has in mind are those-that 
are-imagined or occur in sleep or-during intoxication or madness, or any, 
of this nature ('eiusdem mods'). It-is unlikely, that he in there including 
the impressions, sent by-the deity. It is perhaps in order to avoid the-issue 
of criteria !n the case of such impressions that the argument about the deity 
(47), is used to criticise the fallacious naturo, of the Academic-roasoning 
(49-50), while the argument from delusion proper (48) is reserved for-the 
purpose of reinstating clarity as an intrinsic property of normal veridical 
impressions. In principle, Lucullus' criticism here should apply to both 
ooctions 47-48, but one gets the impression that the argument about-the 
deity is at the centre of, his reply in 49-50" 
If a criticism has, to be made it is that Lucullus fails to take account 
of the fact that the Acadomio is, as usual (P. Couisain, o. o. p. 57), forcing 
a logical conclusion out of, a premise granted by the opponents themselvos, 
and that tho argument is not abouta theological point. If-falco impressions 
can be oonvlrning, ýwhy cannot thore 
be total absence of a dietinoticn betwoon 
auch impresttnna and true onus? The question of e)d's power or motive is 
irrelevant. Ile also dries not point out that the 'convincingnoas' of the 
impressions rant by the deity may lie in the fact that they are correctly, 
interpreted r-nd not oxolueively in the fact that they are m: atwten for 
oxistentially true ones. In intorproting the first promise sololy in this 
latter conce, the Academic may be distorting the Stoic point of view allogodly 
granted in t)' first premiss, which Hood n: t have the same implications 
for ordinary oxporierco as in the argument in 40 whore 'convincing' moans 
cololy t talceti. for what is exiHtontiully trug'. 
265 = 
Substituting 'similar' for 'convincing', Lucullua next. auggoate 
that the Academic is confusing similarity with identity. In general, the 
argument is that things in different claooeo may be alike,. but this does, 
not imply thero ie no difference between them; if there were no difference, 
a thing could be both in its own class and in a class other than its own, 
which is irapoesible. 
1ý Thus opposites like good and bad, honourablo and 
2 It follows dishonourable may in certain cases be alike but not identical, 
that true an. false impressions may eometimos be similar but cannot be, 
identical so that a differo:, co between the two is always in principle 
diccerniblo. The Academic was represented in 47-48 as trying to argue that 
at least come of the false impressions in question might have the character 
indicated at each stage of the argument. But his intention being 
ultimately to establish that every true impression is indistinguishable from 
a false one, Lucullus is justified in gonoralicing his counter-ar&, ument. The 
Academic would, of course, not say that wolves and dogs are identical, though 
he might agree that some dogs may be difficult or impossible to distinguish 
from wolves. 
' But if the true and the (also were iLdiatinguishable, there 
is a tense in which all objects would loco their determinate character. 
Thus the counter-argument simply assumes what the noriten was used by 
the Academic: to disprove, that the difforonce betwoon classes and kinds,, 
or even between the mcaninga of terms, in an absolute one. It also anaumea 
that generic difference cannot be maintained without qualitative differance. 
This differci. ce must be both intriccio and apparent. In auoti:: i 40 'nihil 
1 Cf. tho argument about definition in 431 also 8ý. 
2Lucullua 
again makes the aooumption that there iu an ab2oluto difforenco 
between what in morally right and what is morally wrong. Cf. 321 L=-I944-45- 
Also typical of the dogmatist in the view that wo have the ability to 
percoivo those distinction and not confuse what are 'repuenantia'. 22,911 
1,191YI-' 11,135. 
3For 
reforoncea to the traditional resemblance between wolvoa and doge, 
soo Roid p. 238. 
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Interesse' was explained for the purpose of the Academic proof asImean ing 
either actual or dioccrnible difference. It iv therefore po ible that 
the Academic did carry his argent in both 47 and 40 to the otage wher3 
he argued for the posaibility'of there being no actual difference. On the 
other hand, it is significant that in both 47 and 48 the conclu3ion that 
there is no difference is not preceded by the inference that the impreesicns 
in question cannot'be distinguished apart as in 49 when Lucullun repeats the 
argument. In other wcrds, 'nihil interess: a' may be intended to have the 
same ambiguity as in 40, and it is Lucullus who may have got rid of'the 
ambiguity in 49, because of which he ignoroa the meaning the Acadomio"atttchae 
to 'nihil interesse' and represents him as actually arguing for total 
identity. Hr also interprets the Academic arCumert an though the same'two 
impressions assumed to be similar at the beginning are finally taken to be 
identical, which is clearly not the case since at each stage it is a question 
of a different qualitative variant of a faloo impression, though he cannot 
be said to be unjustified in doing so if, in every case, a true impression 
is indistinguishable from a felso one. 
But whether implied or openly stated, the Academic contention that 
the true and the false might be identical can, Lucullus believed, be met 
with the Stoic view that no two individual, are alike, 
i 
which Locke called 
the '; rincipiu.. % indiuiduationio', 
2 
and which aasumec, like Leibniz' principle 
of the identity of indiecernibloo, 
3 that : Inder examination a difference is'' 
always discernible beto: oen two particulars. Though more relevant to the,. 
argument in 54, this Stoic view also applies to the argument abort olasaoo, 
aince it would certainly follow from it thzt no impression could bo placed 
154v '6v 50,05. Lone, Jrohlomn, p. 44 ft., PP"75-76; iiicka, Stole and ricurPnnt, p. 57; Viricux-Ithymond, 1-"+ ? ortnue' nt 1ýiýnintýrrn1c«1ý ýinýs titoiciAnn, 
P-135. 
2 An Rnsny Cnncnrnin Vu' in Urn1orgtnrdinr, ft II, ch. 27. 
3Sce 
S=burcky, Drove n or the Etctcot pp. 47-40. 
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in more than one class. But being itself questionable (85), it does not, 
decisively refute the Academic view that there is either no discernible or no 
actual difference between the true and the false. The Academic might in 
fact be-tempted to classify the same impression twice, as both true and 
false, on the ground'that it was uncertain to which of the two classes-it "`` 
belonged. Lucullus would perhaps have made a more convincing case that the 
Academic is confusing classes of impressions by pointing out, -as he does in 
539 that if a false impression is accepted as probable, it means that not 
all conditions for correct perception have been fulfilled, no that not only 
the premias but also the conclusion of the eorite argument in both 47 and 
48 are inapplicable to the situation in which cataleptic impressions are 
possible. It may also be noted that by using the analogy with objects and 
proceeding from individuals to classes, Lucullus avoids the risk of begging 
the question by re-asserting the difference between true and false. At the 
same time, he is able to state the maximum confusion rasulting from the 
Academic argument in his conviction that_it implies the possibility of 
mistakes between objects of different olabaea (of. 34). 
True imnranston9 -An bA And nra difforpntfat. 4 from th4 falan 
51-53 (P"51,29 - P"53,1) omnium deindo inanium ... oustinent auf numquam. 
Snmm1r, º. (51) There is therefore only one way of warding off all empty 
inprossions, whether imagined or occurring during sleep, intoxication 
or madno:. a. They all lack clarity, to which wa wust at all coats oltng. 
Who, on-recollectins himself from a flight of fanny, doea not. soe. tho 
difforonce botween clear and empty irap'eoaionu? Similarly with dreams. 
Do you think that attar walking In hie. garden.. with his_noighbour, Serviua 
Calba, Ennius said, 'I Boomed to myself to be walking with Calba'? But 
he reported a dream thus: 'The poet Iioroer ooemocti to be standing beside 
me'. And so did Epicharmuas 'I seemed to be dreaming that I was dead'. 
When wo wake we disregard such improsaiona and do not confuse them with 
ordinary experience (52). But you will argue that dream expcrioncea at 
the time thoy occur are qualitatively similar to waking ones. Firstly, 
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there is a differa:: co, but lot us not delay on. that, "for our viow is 
that our normal sensory and mental powers are inpaired during sleep. 
Even intoxicated persons do not act in the same positive way as 
the sobers they hesitate, sometimes check themselves, assent more 
weakly to impressions, and, having slept off the effects, realise how 
trifling their experiences were. Similarly, people at the initial stage 
of, or recovering from, madness are aware of their state and comment on 
the unreality of their experiences, like Alcmaeons 'But my mind in no 
way agrees with what my eyes see'. (53) But the wise man, you contend, 
withholds assent when in a state of madness to avoid accepting false 
for true. 1 So he often does when some heaviness or slowness affect his 
censes or when the impressions are not clear or lack of time prevents 
him from ascertaining the situation. Thin argument, however, that the 
wise man sometimes withholds assent works entirely against you. For if 
impressions did not differ, ho would withhold assent always or never. 
Setting out on hia second criticism of the Academic argument from 
delusion, again with a play on 'inanium uieorum' and therefore referring 
to both the delusive impressions and to the Academic argument itsolf, Luoullue 
doplovs all four examples of abnormal psycho-physical states in the argument 
on a very neat schematic basis. The cases of imaginary and dream exper5encoo 
are usod to illustrate the fact that people do recognise a qualitative 
distinction between these and ordinary experience on returning to their 
normal states of consciousness. The cases of intoxication and madness are, 
on the other hand, used for a two-fold function, nam: ly (1) that during the 
abnormal state one does not have notmal powers of cognition and (2) that 
? 3ople can oven during the abnormal state notice a difference between 
veridical and delusive. The withholding of assent by the wiao moat rounie 
off his argument that there is a discernible diffo_enco between true and 
1I interpret 'oustinot ao' as understandinZ 'ab omni adaonnu' (40) and 
" 
no adprobot falca pro uoria no final. The alternative in to take the 
clauco as doponding direotl on 'ouatinet so' ('restrains himself from 
aanentinC to talon as trº: o'), as Rackham ooema to do. But thin porhapa 
falsifiee the Argument, cinco it implies that the wino man would in fcot be 
diatinguiching true and false. 'Guatinero' dooa not normally take 'no' and the subjunctive to complete its meaning. 
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false, just as in 40 the same point had been used to complete the Academic 
argument. The whole passage can thus be divided into four eeparato, statementat 
(i) all delusive experiences lack clarity; (ii) people in a normal otato " 
discern a qualitative and generic difference between their veridical'and 
non-veridical experiences; (iii) when in an abnormal psyeh'o-physical state 
people do not have normal sensory and mental powers but even then it is 
possible for them to make distitiotions between the true and the false, ard (iv) 
the Academic argument about the wise man can be reversed against themselves. 
(i) All deluc+ive : ', irronstonn lAek elnrity (51) 
After preparing the way in 45-46 for his reliance on 'porspicuitaa" 
with the view that ouch clarity is in itself sufficient to reveal objects as 
they are, and after removing the 'obstaoleo' or fallacious argumonto lying 
in the way of clarity in 49-50, Lucullu3 now proposes absence of ouch" 
'perspicuitas' as the only cure means of defence aCainct delusive impressions, 
a view which places An'. 1ochus beyond doubt in the ranks of thoco Stoic 
champions of clearness (Plut. Cemm. No1.1083 C). One is reminded of Deccarteo' 
view that we cannot go wrong if we assent only to what Is clear and'distinct, 
1 
but the present view ie"alco one that is proposed in direct opposition to 
the Academic contention that existentially unreal impressions are just au 
clear and distinct ( ývapyc tG) an true ones (Sextus A M. VII, 403). 
The weakness of ouch a view is undoubtedly betrayed in the inability 
of Lucullus to, oay whit this clearness is. If by clearnoso. ho means a , - 
character of impresoic:. a experienced in what one might take to. be normal 
and favourable condition, it could be argued that 'clarity in not a sufficient 
guarantee that one +e perceiving things as they really are'. 
2 It could be 
said, as the Academics did, that delusive improosicnu may be just as cletr 
Rolle Popktne, itintorv of SeAntic1rm from Franmtm to T), +ncnnrtoo, pp. 101 
and 194" 
2%. A. Long, li, Fh, p. 23, criticioing tho Epicuroan viow that all cloar 
improasions are reliable. 
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as veridical one:. Thy thirsty man feole the came pleaauro in taking a drink 
during a dre,: m as during the waking otato. IIeraeles, in his madnoao, kills 
his own children, mistaking them for hio-enemy's. 
I Even if it is wrong to 
infer that delusive impressions may be no lone striking and evident than 
true oneo from the fact that one can observe the came reactions to them as- 
those of people in normal situations, it Helms equally wrong to deny that 
th1i are clear at all. 
2 The equation of 'clear' with 'existentially real'3 
would be more convincing'if all existentially real improooions were clear 
in the required sense, but this does not seem to be the case. Such an 
equation can indeed be said to be circulars an impresuion is clear boeauce- 
it has an existential referent and an impression has an existential referent 
because it is clear. 
But Luculluo' argument cannot be rejeoted just for the roacon that he 
understands clearness to be a quality that chows us thinC3, an they really aro 
(45) and that delusivo improsoiono cannot poriseas. Although he door not toll 
un on what precise basis rooognition takoo place (thus avoidinG the error of 
an infinite regreaa if clearness were to be referred to some other quality 
which would have to be recognised first), he is not totally unjustified in 
holding that dolusivo ivprossiona cannot Lave this character and is not 
compelled to accept thn inference that bocauco they produce the same reactions, 
they are just as clear as veridical onoaf for there might be reasons- -other 
than 
1Sevtus A. 1". VII, 403-407; Ayor, 'r' Prob1i or Knou? ndnA, p. gOs 'It in 
because an experience of this sort 1. o. Kneboth aoeing thi dag ar) in like 
tho experience of seeing a real object that hallucinations are p.. oiblie . 
2In fact, it is perhaps easier to infer that the falce are equally atrikinq 
and evident than to ersun th. t they are not so. 
3Soo the contrast boti"pcn 'porspicua' and '1nania' 
(51)j of. 'lnuia' (52). 
Tho argument indirectly affoctn Epicurus' confusion of the dolunivo with the 
o:: iatcntially true. The doctrine that every impression is true, including the 
experiences of dreamers and madmen (D. L. X, 32), would nnttnrally commit him to 
the view that even delusive oxporionceo can be dust as k vapyct e, na normal 
ones (Sextun A. M. VIII, 63 ff. ). Cf. t D. III, 95. 
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clearness why ouch delusive`impressiora are accepted by people in`abnormal 
psycho-physioil stateu, If normal and abnormal experiences cannot bo compared, 
so that neither the Academic claim nor that of Lucullua can be supported by 
incontrovertible proofs, the one claim cannot be rojeoted in favour of the 
other, for both can be said to be equally plausible. Lucullua' position would 
have been con. iiderably weaker if he had conceded that clearness is a quality 
common to both true and false impressions, the only`di£ferencz being that 
veridical ir:; raasiona are clearer. 
1 The Academic view that the false caii be 
as clear as the -true could : ell have influenced Antfochus to advance the exact" 
opposite to this view and to avoid the comparison altoE; ether by maintaining 
that there cannot be degroed of clearness, thus pro-empting the use of the 
concept to distinguish the cataleptic impression2 and turning it into an 
absolute quality displayed solely by veridical impressions. 
(ii) 2'enp1A d1ffernntimtf th ntr normi fron thntr nhnor-nil nxrnr1. ncnn (51) 
'Indeed, it io a common acoumption of mankind that dreaaa In fact boar 
little relation to reality' (Slote, )nMzrn And ScArtirtRm, p. 90j. Life io. 
like a coin with two sides, normal ntate3 and abnoraal otatee, and, an"ä rule, 
people do differentiate botweon them and describe them difforontly. Tho 
examploa chosen by Lucullus to illustrate this point both contain the verb 
'uideorl and are ouch that the content of the dream in each case is clearly 
1Yet 
see riv. II, 126 Sv^ II, 62)s 'praenartim cum Chrynippue, tccdoiaicoa 
rofcllon3, parmulto clariora of cortiora oaso dicat, quere "igilantibus 
uidoantur, quam quao somniantibua'. If 'clariora' tranala*-2a Lvupytavcpu,, 
Chrycippu©' view that there are degrees of elearnern would perhaps have 
contradicted the implication in t1 £nnecal Etoic ponition that there am 
no degrees of vcvr iji tr. (119,128# Soxtu8 A. tMf. YII, 422-423). Cicero does, 
however, attribute to Luculluc the view that dol-"dive impressions are feebler 
('imbecilliora') than true ones (ßß, referring tv 52). 
2Cf. Sandbach, Prob l pp. 19 and 32. Or". s finds the equation of what in true 
and knowable with what is clear ( orb ca'p C) no early an Xonophanga (DK 341 
Soxtu3 A. MM. VII, 49-50)" The identity in ascumed by 5oxtue arguing a ainat the 
view that the self-evident in perceived of itself (ti. ti. VII, 365) and also when 
contending (368) that, to know the truth, there must be something self-evident, 
but that, since everything is ton-evident, nothing in knowable. 
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at odds with reality, no that their delusive nature would easily beýrecognised. 
Since Homer was dead, 2nniua, on waking up, could naturally not put hin dream 
experience on:: the same level as.. hio waking exporiencos. Again, since Epicharmun 
was still alive, his dream that he was dead could not have been taken seriously 
by: him., A similar point is mado by Aristotle (Vtt. 1010d 2 ft. ) in'roplying' 
to'persons who affect to doubt (among other examples) whether the=truth is'as° 
it'appears to be to those who are asleep or tb those who are awakes no ono, *' 
he says, who dreams that he is in Athena when in fact he ia'in Africa sots 
. off for the Odeon. rormall, people 
do not believe that their droam experiences 
are true and their-waking experiences are always given priority, and this 
because it is axiomatic that one sees nothing or has no perception whatever 
in oleep (d l nnorm. 458b 7-85 34 ff. ), or th%t. ono hiu fa1Qe perception in 
dreams or other states of the kind (P1at. Thenet. 157e ff. ). 
1Tho 
same applied to 
thoso waking Staten in which the mind croatoa fictitious imagne, which (ao 
was, Implied in 48) may closely rosomble the truth or even be India tinguiahable , 
from it. On coming to himsolf, such it parson i=odiatoly becom. a awaro'of 
the difforonoe between reality and il1uoi#n ('sentit quid intersit inter . 
perspicua of inania', 51). 
The Academic rotort that what he is intoreoted in in the faut that at 
the time the delusive oxperioncoa occur they may bo qualitatively 
indistinguishable fror. true ones (52, ßd, 90) reveals that, as far as he in 
concorncd, ttiic argu: acnt of Lucullus is totally lrrelovant. But since Luculluo 
prefero to : fond tho truth of_nora, al expo riencoe betoro ccsait.: r to the Academic 
retort (52). he la obviou3ly award that a defence cf the truth of normal 
1 This viow also undorlios the Bonoral disapproval of the Epicurean dootrino 
that the oxyorioncos of drown ra and mldmýn are truo. But it was also a 
aomnon anoioat boliof that tho truo soll becomes acquainted with roality 
during droama (Div. 1,63; flohdc, F'. ttychi, p. 7), which Lucullu3 completely 
ignored hero for the pucpoee of the argumont. 
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experiences in not no irrelevant as Cicoro would want us to believe. For 
although the Academic denies that he is questioning the beliefs anyone might 
have during the, normal state concerning his abnormal exporlences, this reasoning 
door, as we have said before, erode the distinction between normal and abnormal 
experiences. If it did not have this effect, he would not have claimed that 
nothing can be known on the ground that the true and the false are qualitatively 
indistinguishable. Dut it is not enough simply to aosort. that delusive and 
veridical im; ressions are not exactly alike because of our beliefs concerning 
them or because of the fact that we describe them differently. Our beliefs 
are not necessarily justified. 
I As for the argument from language, it Is true 
that 'uideri' was usually resorted to in Latin literature,, and porhaps in 
everyday life, to describe dreams and viaiono, and that, like tt. o English 
'seem' and 'appear' or the Creek patvco0at, it can be used to indicato 
that one's experience in . apparent 
only as opposed to true in the conga of 
corresponding to external reality. 
2 but distinoticno in linguistio, usagu, while 
they might preouppoae a basic difteranco. botwoon the two levels of oxporienoe 
on the Antiochean assumption (cog p. 230 ul'ove) that language portrays reality, 
3 
1See Ayor, Foundationn or_Fm»trical Nnow1eipr, A"7. 
2Soxtus P. A. T, 20; Plut. Adv Cn1.1120D. It can also convey doubt and uncertainty 
(87,105; Plut., ibid., 112111 , and perhaps Lucullu3 in thinking of this meaning 
as wall. Ennius could not havo said 'uicua cum mihi cum Calba ambularo' not 
only because he knew if was not a droam, but also baeauco he had no doubt 
about it. Cf. Aycr, Th_i oha#, n or Y. nýw1rd ý", p. 101e "It would be considered 
odd for me to say I It aoema to mo that 1 now see a cigarette case' if I had 
in fact no doubt that I did coo one". Lucullue' argent is perhaps also an 
indirect way of telling the Acadomie that his ctrca4 on the appearance would 
commit people to describing their n'rmal . r. perionco: as though they were dream. 
3It 
cannot be said that thorn was and in a well-''+voloped vocabulary to dooeribo 
abnormal experiences. Compare Austin, r'n^fº and VOni bilir., p. 42* 'And we 
might add here that descriptions of droums, for exsr,; ple, can't be taken to 
have exuctly : ho came farm and implication as the ca. -m words would have, if 
used in the üeacription of ordinary waking experioncea. In fact, it is just 
because wo all know that dreams are throughout unlike waking oxperioncos that 
we can safely uco ordinary oxproasionn in the narration of them; the peculiarity 
of the dream context in buffiaiently well-known for nobody to be micled by the 
fact that we speak in ordinary terms'. Ajain, p. 49, 'It in true, to repeat, 
that dreams are narrated in the same terms as waking oxporiencoct these terms, 
after all, are the beat terms we have; but, it would be wildly wrong to conelud0 
from this that what is narrated in the two arges is exactly alike'. 
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do not nococoarily demarcate our waking exporioncoo as being true from our 
non-waking exroriencoo an boing (aloe. 
If Lucullus is claiming moro than more boliof that our experiencoo , 
occurring during the abnormal state are untrue, and if he is arguing,. as, ho 
appears tobe, that on returning to the normal atato°of consciouonosa, ono, a 
'percoives' ('sentit') the difference between the two categories of experience, 
then his argument ovidently lies open to the. objection that V-2 truth and 
falsity of oxperiencos occurring during abnormal psycho-physical atates cannot 
be verified and therofore cannot be assortod. 
1 It in, houovor, only rcaconablo 
to aesumo that veridical and delusive experiences cannot be exactly alikoýand 
that there must be a discernible difference between them. Austin, objcuting to 
the modern 'argument from illusion', which seeks to establish the doctrine of 
'cenao-data' also by way of the came argument that delusive and. veridical expe- 
riences are qualitatively and gonorically indistinguishable, points out (San' 
nnd____sennibilin, p. 48) that, for instance, a dream of boing procontod to tho 
Pope cannot seriously be described an being qualitatively indistinguishable 
from actually being presented to the Pope, or that &aoing stars when onn In 
hit on the head cannot be qualitatively indistinguishable from cooing stare, 
when one loo! --: 3 at the sky (p. 49)" But it has to be allowed that the degree of 
probability attachod to euch an assumption in considerably diminichod in a 
representational theory of perception. Even then, it could have been argued 
by Lucullus that, while it cannot be proved that people are justified in 
taking their . raking experiences to be in general veridical and their dream 
experiences to be always delusive, the op; cnuntol that a dream experieneo 
and a waking oxperionco may be qualitatively alike cannot be proved either, 
but that eor+;? xativoly his ovrn view in moxw natural and more reasonablo. 
2 
1Soxtus P. H. I, 113; N. A'. a1colm, nrrvninr0 p. 110. 
2If there are true as voll as false lmproculuna, it in vorn reasonable to think 
that all experiences are not of a uniform chlractor, xnd that nature has coon 
to it that the true and the falca can be ditforontiattd correctly. Luculluc' 
vio'r is also not 'inq»iry-limiting'. Zoo :; l'itt' (e, r t. p. 65 f:. ) for thin 
concept. 
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It could also be argued that abnormal dream experiences, for in3tanco, 
procuppose normal waking exporiences, 
' 
and that though the two otatos may 
overlap, 2 and there in no absolute guarantee that one in not at the moment 
dreaming, 3 the reasonableness of the belief that the two typos of experiences 
can inýgeneral be distinguished far outweighs that atterding the belief that 
they are ouch that one could not say which is false and which in true. 
(iii) A difforonce con bo nnt1r 4 ov4n durtn? the nh orvrl?, ntntn (52) 
The arfýumont at this stage would, in Cicero's view, be more relevant 
since it seeks to controvert the Academic contention that what supports his 
case is the appearance of the Impressions at the time thoy occur, i. oo during 
the abnormal state. 
4 In the case of dreaming, Lucullus avoids arguing on the 
Academic's own ground in order perhaps not to claim that the dreamer can 
be aware of the falsity of his experiences or oven that he aaacnts weakly to 
them. Therefore, after a"briof denial of the Academic contention that the 
appearance of the dream and the waking reality can 1%t the same, he immediately 
proceeds to his next point, that in sleep our powers of sensation and judgement 
are greatly dimirished. 
5 Lo could not, of course, be cxpoctod to draw the 
inference that, oven if the dreamer is. unable to distinguish his dream from 
caking export nce, this does not necessarily establish that thorc is no 
difference bt. tweon them, since this would have given support to the opponents' 
main point that the false at least appear indistinguishable from the true. 
Cf. Soxtus At14. VII, 392,395" False coins presuppose true eine, deception 
pronupposos nnn-deception. Soo Rylo, nt -nn, ch.?; Austin, 'Sonne nn( 
'o n, ý,. 
th ilin, p. 11 ft. 
2 88. See Austin. pp. 45-4G. 
3` 
ntlt. 156b ft. 1 Moore, Fh11n, orhirnl Pnrorng p. 149i alto Ruacall, Pitman 
Lm a', 'r p. 1,369, 
4iat 
onim dam uidontur eadom eat in aornia arooioa coram quo uigilantoo 
uidomua'. Cf. CO and 90. 
5It 
wan the Ponoral view that sleep involves n clackoning of o. ctivity on the 
part of our normal faoulticu. For tho Dtoica, noo D. L. VII, 150 r3 II, 766)9 
Aet. V, 24,14 ("yr IIo767), niv. II, 112 ("V1ý I, 130)1 for thi llicuraana, 'Portull. 
» An. 43 (uu. 335); of. Ariatotlo, iv, 1, ')4b 1 ft. 
21G 
For this same reason, he merely staton tho'opposito ('interact') to the 
Academic claiw ('nihil interest') and maintains the same ambiguity botwoon 
there being an intrinsic difference and there boing a discernible difference. 
Had he tried to argue that there is a discernible difference if only the 
dreamer were able to notice it, he might have found hic, olt supporting the 
opponents' viow. 
Lucullus, therefore, very skilfully shifts attention frua the appearance 
of the dream experience to the state of the dreamer. The case of the 
'uinulenti' mused to back up his argument that our perceptual powers are 
impaired during the abnormal state, his point being that, it intoxication 
can affect our consory and dental powers, this is-surely the more so in the 
case of''sloop. He does not forgot to note the point mentioned in 51, that 'on 
returning to the normal state, people fully roalico the unsubstantial nature 
of their former impressions. But what is important in thin argument about` 
the 'uinulonti' is that he deduces from their hecitant behaviour a kind of 
realisation of their condition; they assent more weakly ('imbooillius') to 
what they söe, and do not perform aetionc 'aide= adprobationo qua cobrii'S 
they can also check themselves, and horo it in probably implied that accent 
is not alwayo given to the false. Lueullua is also following the Academic's 
example of Ltforring the character of the experience from the actions banod 
upon it, but coming to the opposite conolusion, namely that assent in either- 
not exereisea or it is not given in the aame way to the Falco as to the tzuo. 
l 
In either cuao the aim is to moot the Acadomio contention that there in at 
least no apparent distinction and tt atºif'. the rose: nsibility for action 
from the nature of the impression to the abnormality of the condition. And if 
it is posr, i: ilo for a Vernon to be aware of the abnormality of his condition 
1Cf. 90, where Cicero states the Academic contention that in respect of 
the mind's ascent there is no difforenco between true and false impressions ('inter uisa uera at falea ad animi adaensionam nihil intcroano ). 
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and of the falaity of hin oxporiances, ho will,,. control hio reaotiona. 
1 
,., 
The argument concerninö mzdnesc hzn the came purpoca, but hero Luoullus 
take3 into conoideration only the boginning and and of tho attack, when . .ý 
the subject i3, ablo to como extent to realise the dolusive. naturo of. hio 
experience. His state at this stage thus rusuithlos-tho aontal condition; 
of the intoxicated person except th. it (to judge from the words of Alemaoon)T 
the false impressions are not assented to. The possibility of conflict, 
between 'heart' andý'eyes' shows. that, even in these oonditiono, the, - 
difference betwecn true and false-can be discerned. It may lastly be noted 
that Lucullus--is here replying to that parr of. the Academic argument th. ºt 
does not yet concern the wise man. 
2 
1 
The. mo3t etrikinß aspoot of thie reply is that Lucullue it very nvasivo 
on the question of the qualitative appearance of impreooiono during thooo 
otagen of the abnormal state when ono'e normal powora are totally affected. 
In'the case of dreams, for instance, he does say that thorn is a difforonco, , 
but wo are not told if the difference is discernible or not. S: ailarly with 
intoxication and madnosa. Even if it is the case th%t at certain, ctagoo of 
tho abnormal state one can see through the falsity of the axperienco, this, 
do3o not really answer the Acadnmio contention that, as far as the"appoarance 
1Sloto (TAAnnn "I'd ScRn11tt" , p. 99 ff. 
) infers from this phenomenon what 
he calla the ! 'rinciple of Tllunion and Evidence. 'An astronomer who roalioee 
that he has been drinking heavily or hao juot taken an hallucinogen and in 
looking thro+, Ch his telescope teems to use n star in a place where none has 
proviously been known to oxiat, will be more hositant in thinking that he 
has made a dicenvory'. Similarly, Aristotle arguca (d lnvemn. 461h 130 ff. ) 
that if a porsonwcro awars that a f'ngor -. ao boiri ; : oaood telow hin eye or 
that he w, " aleuping, - arty dolusivo ; »ppaar,, noo would sot carry the oamo 
conviction as if he wort unaware, 
2Though the wino rran will take wino, the gonaral vihw was that he will not 
brut drunk (ý.: 1. YII, 11© / pVr III, 644). D-. inkonaaa can induco delirium S. V]. Il 7, p. 109,5 / 11I, 643) and even bring about a loco of virtue (coo 
p. 257 above). The vita ran aloe cannot cuffor from 'incania'. Soo '1` o. 
III911, where Cicero notes that Alc, con! e otato would be reforrod to an 
'furor' in Latin. 
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of the impressions in question is concerned, there might not be any difference 
between false and true, even though it may controvert the conclusion that the 
mind assents as strongly to false impressions as to true. - If the intoxicated 
person assents, even if weakly, could it not be because there is a certain 
similarity between true and delusive? Again oven it (as we are told) the 
mind of Alcmaeon does not agree with the sight of his eyes, could it not be 
contended that the false vision as ouch has the came qualitative appearance no 
a true one? It would, of course, have boon nonsense to argue that in ouch 
conditions one can'infallibly distinguish true from false, but the more 
possibility of recognising the falsity of impressions, and this only at certain 
stages of the abnonnal state, 
I does not really refute the Academic arguwont. 
It might perhaps have boon better to admit, 'like Austin, 
2 that it in possible 
for the true and the false to be qualitatively indistinguichablo, 
3 but that 
thin does not apply to normal situations or to every possible situation. 
Alternatively, Lucullus could have recognised that neither he nor the Academic 
can support their respective claims. 
Secondly, not all cases of abnormal .: xporionoca can be dealt with in b 
the samo ways : hat applies, for instance, to the state of intoxication will 
not nocoosar! ly apply to the case, say, of dreams. In this respect there is 
a certain fallacy in Lucullus' careful selection of examples to illustrate 
particular points. The experience of the dreamer would usually be considered 
to be totally delusive, that of the madman or intoxicated person only prrtially 
co14 the imr:. csiono to which the intoxicated person given womi: ascent are 
1Cf. Aristotle, (in Tn- minn, 460b 13 ft. 
2Sornn 
and nennfbtlin p. 52. 
3Particularly if the content of impreoaiona occurrint to dram ra and madmon 
is gunoratl dotort inod by the m%toria1 prnvidod by aonuo exporionco (Coxtuv 
A. 7LVIII, 57), or if dreaaia are morely the poraiatonco of waking oxpurioncea 
de In'nnn. 460b 1 ff. ). Cf. 1? nn`. 676oc 'Iu not droning just thin, namely to 
mistake rusemb1anco for identity'? 
4E. 
ß. Oroatoa miatakina Eloctrt for a fury, and ! for*olon having; a truo 
impression of his bow and arrows but a falao icprcn; ion of his children (3extun A. M. VII, 244-245 and 406). 
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possibly true, thorn to which, tho dreamer auconto almost certainly (also. 
In all those cacao, normal critical powers may either be impaired or`auoponded 
(as in the case of day-dreaming), but again, it is by no moans the caoo-that 
action (if any) is always hesitant. A person who In dreaming cannot be said 
tobe aware that his experiences are false, nor is it the case that all droama 
are=mado light of by the dreamer on waking, as Cicero is able to argue from 
the example of Iliona believing that her son had really spoke: to her-(©O). 
Lucullu3 is no doubt right to recogniso that tho bohaviour of a roroon 
in an abnormal state is to La accounted for not only in terms of the nature of 
his experience but also in terms of the abnormality of his-condition. But 
this does. not1disprove the thesis of indiotinguichability, although it does 
perhaps render it unnocoacary. To understand why Luoullus'does not Book 
support from the argument that a person in an abnormal state can distinguish 
the-true from tho false, -but seems content only to maintain that it is 
poosiblo for ouch a person to roccsniso the falsity of his oxporionce, it 
is important to boar in mind that the Academia roprosonted by Cicero appears 
intent to are (ß8-90), not that our 'noLmall experiences maybe falsop but 
that our false experioncos are taken to bo true. Furhape it is easier to 
invalidate r.: r al experionco by arCuin3 in this way. But the Acadomio 
argument its of takes account of the fact that the Stoic criterion primarily 
guards against a false impression beine taken for a truo one, and in turn 
influences L"cullus' reply. Lucullua may also balieIo, that one single 
oxamplo of distinguishability is ouffioiont for his purpose, jxit an Cicoro 
maintains (84-85) that doubt is cart on t`: a whole cf oxperionce on tho basis 
of one oin3lo capo of indistinCuichability. 
(iv) Th_arr, ýrý"t "1'n t "hr. wjrn m", n i11 rovrrnihin 
(53 
Lucullus now esoo to bo aonuing that ho hi alroady ostobliahed that 
the true and the fake are not only intrinsically difforont, but alto 
qualitatively diotinguioluiblo. He thoroforc toolo h1moolf to be in Doaition 
to refer tuiak to the Academia unu of thu Stoic admiuuion that in a atnto of 
2ßo, 
madness the wise mzn xithholda accent because no difference is apparent to 
him (48). Th, point Is particularly relevant bocauao co far the reply of 
Luculluo has concerned only. ordinary people who might be considered to be 
Moro prone to be affected by abnormal perceptual con-litiona, so that it, is 
more likely that their powers of judgement would be impaired to the extent 
that they would assent to the false than that the wise man would lapse into 
folly. Since the wise man would not in prinoiplo assent to vat is false, 
theeAcademiua could not use their usual argument that accent to the fa)eo 
during the abnormal state Implies qualitative indiutinguichability. So, in 
the cane of the wise man, tho withholding of assent rather than accent assumes 
relevance. Similarly, the case of the wise man, which in equally important 
to Lucullus, imposes the limitation on him that he cannot labour the point 
that sensory and mental powers are impaired during the abnorna l state. There 
is no question hero of the wise man cooing through the falsity of his exporienco 
at some sta. oe of his illness, for this would impl. that at zomo other stage 
he does succumb to assenting to what in false. Hence the question whether 
there can be a lapse into folly In underaLandably luft out. Thu reasons given 
for & oxfj on other oocaaiona aa., woll leave us to suppose that Lucullua 
bolievoa thrt the wise Man will remain more or loan in control of his faculties 
throughout the attack. It in impossible to say it his answer lu intended to 
take account of cases of extreme illness, and Sf so, whether he would still 
argue' that the wico man can excrcico 1-coXff . I! o alco avoids tollinr, un 
if the wino wan withholds ascent when dreaming. Th+n is a prc. *jlom which oven 
the Stoio view that the vice man d. w o not, when ale-! ping, lnpno into folly 
would not colvo. 
Tho pent that t Rox(i in not the proroCntivo of acoptica only, but 
in rosorted to in curtain ciroumJtancoc by the do. itist, in alao mentioned 
by Clcmant of Alexandria who, like I. ucullua, givaa lack of olearnenn an ono 
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of tho cauaoo. 
1 It ia, howorer, not necoaoary to aaauno with R. 1. Witt (hlhlmia, 
p. 36) that 'tho view is typically Antiochean', for it is nothing-but ai, 
elaboration of the Stoic view that the wise man dooa not opine. What, Luoullua 
is saying is that there is nothing unusual in the wasional exoroico"of 
Ino)ff by the wise man and that if the wise roan is not in n po31tion to 
ascent to his experiences in certain situations, this does not mean that he 
is not justified in doing no in normal conditions. After all, It '10 a commonly 
accepted as3amption that conditions for perception are not always fovourablo, 
and Carnoados himuolf had acknowledged this fact ar4 that lack of time, for, 
instance, might force one to be content with the lowest degree or probability'2 
The argument that assent in withhold on other occasions also in, of courco, 
relevant only if the Stoics refused to allow the Aoadcmio intorprotation of 
their claim as implying that there is no qualitative difference between true 
and , false. 
In saying that, if thorn wore no difteronce b'twoen true and faleo 
improasions, the wise man would withhold aaaent Dither always or nevor, 
Iuoullus is again arguing on the basis of ilia opponents' views, no he moos 
thou. For whereas the Stoic sage somotimoa withholds accent 'no fdprobot 
falca pro uc: is', the Academic wino aus in p3rmancntly in this position. On 
the other hand, if there were in fact no difference between irproanionot there 
would be no reason to refuse assent to any of them. The wise can could 
thoroforo take hie choice whether to roG id all as Chloe or (like the 
Epicurean) all as true. There would, noroovor, on tcullua' view, be no 
reason to regard one impression as : -, re p: jbable th:: i other, to that if ansont 
werd given to be probable, 
3 
c min it would be a *^^. ttor or all or none. An it 
ies, howovor, oince the (Stoic) vice man w; thholde ancont only in cortain 
1"_trom. VIII, 5 -2VF' 11,121, p. 37,12-14). : ho other roaaons montionod aro 
mental wuakneco and tho oquipollonco of ar utonto. 
2Soxtuu P. j. I, 227-2291 A j. VII, 103-109. 
3. to in tho modified AoPdomio position, whothor this In attributod to Carn ados 
or Philo. 
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conditions, thin would imply that a difference between improssiona io 
discernible at other times and co tell against the Academic case. 
There is little doubt that the replacement of 'quia nulls in uinio 
diatinctio apparent' (48) with 'no adprobet falca prn uorio' deliberately 
seeks to avoid the issue of indistinguishability in the Academic oonso"and 
to shift the responsibility for the wise min's action to other causes. The 
reason given*migght, of courso, be interpreted as moaning that there is no 
apparent dim. inction. But the important thing is that Luculluo does not 
'admit it, since it would h.. vo meant playing into tl: " hands of his opponentss. 
By allowing that the wise =in can, when in an abnormal state, still more or 
less retain control of his faculties by the normal exercise of Zito Xfj , 
Lucullus may be diminishing the likelihood of there being a causal relation 
between the abnormal state and assent to what is false. It would also be a 
weaknoss in his positicn"if ho were leaving us to understand that the facultica 
of the ordinary person would be more seriously impL1rod by illness than those 
of the-wise man. 
tin rninvrnne and imrlicationn_ef th- nrpu"nt from dnta n1on 
53-54 (P"53,1-16) and ex hoc gonnro ... non modiocria innania. 
Eummn . 
(53) What in evident from this clans of argument is the trifling 
n. tture of'tho views of these people, who wish to mix up everything. We 
are seeking for a criterion that is relevant to dignity, consiotonoy, 
ctoadfastnocu and wisdom and yet wo have to put up with the oxampleo of 
droaDere, madmen and drunkards. Do wo not son how out of , Inca it all, 
is? If Po, wo should not be making out at one moment that thero in a 
difference between the impreos! rno or those whc are awake, nobar and nano 
and of thoco who are In the, opposite ctate3, and at another moment that 
there is no difference, (54) Do they not even discern that they render 
ovorythin,; uncertain (to translate thu Creek 66ill a )' 
1 
which they do not 
intend? For If the case wore such that it made no difference whether 
1 hio remark did not ccme earlier, in 27 or 329 probably boeauco 'ineortal 
wac unod there in the cenee of 'what is aboolutoly uncertain', und thin in 
only ono of the moaninGe of Uijl m9 
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things appeared as they do to the read or the cano poreen, who would be 
cortain of his own sanity? To deoire to brim; this about roveala more 
than ordinary aadneua. 
The Academic emerges, in this argument in the worst possible light. 
Claiming ironically (because there is nothing clear in what is doluaivo, 51), 
that the only evident fact that comes out ('peropici potent') is the frivolity 
('leuitas') of the Academic polemic, Lucullus again contrives to cuggoat that 
the views of the Academic are just as delusive (of. 'leuia', 52) as the 
experience of people he quotoa, and put him on the come level ne the dreamorp 
the inebriated and the insane. tie adopts a strongly moral tone in his 
criticism, contrasting the judgomont that is based on dignity, consistency, 
steadfastness and wisdom with that of the examples used by the Academics to 
undermine the Stoic criterion. The list of the main facets of wisdom 
('grauitatis', 'constantiaq', 'firmitatia') which are coat opposed to error 
and doubt may perhaps be intended to match that of the examples of abnormal, 
psycho-physical states mentioned immediately aftoruards, 
1 
and rino to not 
into relief the 'leuitas' and 'inoonstant! a' (ef. 'illud attondimua in hoo 
omni gonoro quam inconatantor loquamur?! ) of the Acadomio. 
2 
Acoorc+tng to Lucu. llua, the 'louitan' of the Acadomio case in ahown not 
only by the falsity of their viowa, but porhapa also in the confusion or the 
two categories of nor.. i, slity and abnormality, of wisdom and folly. By trying 
to undermine perception, the Acadomio plaoea the who can on the a=* level 
a3 dreamers, madmen and the inabriated3 and fasle to coo that the difference 
of condition in highly relevant to she p"cblom of porcöption. ' Similarly, 
I'this is perhaps why the case of izigination has horo been dropped. But 
there in in uny case nc convenient oi»gle word to oaproca tho otato of mind 
of nuoh perbona. 
Cf. 66: 'nihil oat onim ab ea cogitationo quarr habomun do grauitato eapiontio 
orroro, leuitato, temoritatu diiunatiuu. ' Soo 29 for the 'ineenatantia' of 
the Academio. 
3Yot tho main reason au 3tcd for inoxfj had been to oxcludo tho wino ruin 
from tho class of ainnere. 66 ff., 77; :: oxtua A. f. ViI, 156-157. 
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the Academic argument that he does not deny, that people uako a clear dintinotion 
botwoen»their normal and abnormal experiences' is aeon to be incoroictert with 
his alleged claim that there ie no difference botwoen-veridical and dolucivo. 
It is obvious that-Lucullus is going beyond what the Academic himself nays, 
and inftrying to make explicit what he considers to be implicit in the Academic 
position, ho ij willing to introduce a certain degree of falsification. The 
Academic never says that there is no difference between, say, waking and 
dreaming, an:: his use of the terms 'true' and 'false' depend on his recognising 
the difference. What he doom say or imply in that aP far as the dreamer himself 
is concerned, there may be no apparent ditforencn (60). 
2 People often believe 
in the truth of their droams, in some cases oven after waking (ibid. )., 
positively Similarly, he does not/assert that there is an intrinsic difference botwoon 
the impresnion3 occurring during the abnoriaal statu and thorn occurring during 
the normal atato. All Cicero says (80) is that he does not dory what people 
believe about their abnormal experiences. Given thl. s, olonont or falnifioation 
in Lucullus' account, it is not curtain if the charco of tinccnatantia' hero 
is onttroly ju3tified. 3 A more appropriate accu3ation would have boon that 
the Academic avoids openly and explicitly drawing soma of tho conclusiona e 
Which aro im; lied in hin position. 
This Artire nrg=ont is extroao1y important beoauso it shown thtt thn 
Academic appeal to abnormal perceptual exporioncou was considered by their 
oppononto to Lo totally irrelevant. Tho quo3tion is, did these opponantA 
1See 80. Raid (p. 241 n. 23) takes t;. a rofaronco to .. v the Academic appeal to 
the 1 noXfi of the wino man, which n+' thinkn is belog interpreted by Luculluo 
as an admieeion that there Is a real difference : twean the oxporioncoo of 
the cane and thoco of the mad. This in, I bolie.,, a mistake. 
2In 08 Cicero reeogniso* the posx3ibility t tt Enniuc did not in fact dream 
the linos exactly as he wrote them, but maintain* that, if he did, ho hoard 
them in the came way no if ho was awake. 
3Thio is not to any that there might not be an inconsistency. But it is 
implied rathor than oponly stated. It could, for inatnnce, bo argued (44) that 
it in wrong for the Academic to assume first that certain types of experience 
are falco (thereby mmintaininl3 a difference between dolu: ivo and veridical) 
and then to uze this ncoumption to prove thr there is no discernible difference 
Lotwoen false and veridical. 
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really mistake 'the force of the Skeptic argument' (Stough, p. 46) or 'mica 
the point of the Academic criticism' (p. 47)? Stough, arguing like Carr:: ades 
in Soxtus (A. M. VII, 402 ff. ), contends that, since it was the cataloptio 
impression that was at issue and not senso-perceptior. in general, any false 
impression might display the same properties if the only guarantee that an 
impression is cataleptic is 'sufficient forca and clarity to compel assent' 
(P"48). What is relevant in her opinion is not the psychs-ph; sical condition 
of tha percipient, but 'that the experience be forceful enough to compel 
assent, and to this end any ease of genuine error it* sufficient'. If delusive 
impressions do generate ouch a reaction, 'the Skeptic has mzda his point, 
namely, that they are not intrinsically distinguishable from true impressions'. 
But it is wrong to son tho general Stole position, and cartainly that of 
Antiochua, as one that explains the cataloptio improooion maroly in torma of 
its capacity to co. npcl assent . Lucullun does not, moreover, have to accept 
that falc: e improoniono are as clear as thorn that a' voridical. The poycho- 
Physical condition of a percipient in surely relevant in no far an his accepting 
hic experiences as true or ascentin3 to Csem might be due to the very faut that 
ho is in an abnormal ctato and not to the qualitative appearance of impression*. 
$extua (_. Y,. 7II, 424 / ^yp 11,68) reports th* Stoic view (which would to that 
of Anticchua as well), that, for perception to take placo, it in necessary 
that five things ohould concur: the orfr u of nenne, the object of nenoo, the 
place, the r nnor and the intellect. if only one factor is abeont 
(o. r. if 
tho intellouti is in an abnornal condition), porcept±on will be imroauiblo. 
Although it cannot be poaitivoly ae"ortud that the -xFerionco of a person 
in an abnormal state in not qualitatively similar to that of a person In 
a nor al ota;. i (and lucu. 1lus perhaps rightly avoids raising the Incuo), the 
Academic fails to take account of the important requirement for perception, 
that the percipient be in a normal and healthy etato and that the context 
in which the definition of the cataleptic impression is applicable Is that 
of normal and not of abnorw. 1 exporienco. Mornovor, it In the Won man 
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who is infallible and the Academic hau not shown that the wine man, even 
if mad, would confuse delusive imprcocion3 with true ones to the extent of 
regarding them as cataleptic. Stough recognioea that the Academic drgumont 
does not render all experience doubtful. Yet she believes that the Academic 
criticism does undermine the Stoic criterion. This is quite debatable. 
It may be argued that it is a weakness in the Stoic position that the 
'abnormality' of any condition iu hard to eatablioh without reference to 
the impressions experienced. If the impressions are qualitatively 
indistinguisiable from others judged to be 'normal', there would be, at the 
time of occurrence, no way of distinpuishtng the mental state of the 
percipient. 
1 If the cataleptic impression is to provide an absolute 
g rantee of truth, it must stand or fall on its own morito and not by 
limiting the conditions in which it is supposed to occur. 
2 Duty on the 
other hand, Luoullus does not have to accept that the dictinetion between 
'normality' and 'abnormality' breaks down at the ti_* the delusive 
impressions occur, just as ho does not accept that such impressions are 
qualitatively similar to veridical ones. It is also natural to assume that 
certain conditions must be satisfied if purcoption is to take place. 
Although Lucullus has already implied his dissatisfaction with the 
Academic distinction between 'incertwn' and 'id quod percipi non ponoit' 
(32 ff. ), it in only now that he clearly indicates hin complete repudiation 
of it. Having argued earlier that the doctrine of probability, on which the 
dictinotion roato, cannot curvivo the failure to dit'ferentiatc botwoon true 
and false impressions (33-36), he now rer^ws the e1-prgo that the Academion 
1For 
the indistinguishability of 'normal' and 'e. nortal' sonne-data, nee 
H. H. Price, I'ercontion, p. 31. It w. a tonnrally assumed that perceptions 
differed accoýdinj; to the state of mind o: the perciaient (e. g. Sextue P. N. 
1,101; II, 54), but not that only 'normal' porcepticna were true (of. Ar-in-t. 
Me t. 1011a 3 ff. ). The iccuo-of normality is also raised in the context of 
the argument from illusion (79-82; Soxtu3 A. M. VII, 412-414); of. Price, 
p. 209 ff. 
2Honco the view that this 'proviso' weakens the Stein position. Soo p. 237 
above. 
237 
'make everything uncertain' #1 after'concidoring part of the Acade. mia argwncnt 
for &7. cipaAa'F to and in the licht of the crocion of the distinction botacen 
veridical and delusive experience, normal and abrorr-al ctateo of mind. The 
charge that the Academics do3iro to bring about a genoral eonfuoion also makes 
sense in relation to their failure to make these distinetiona. 
2 Tho uncertainty 
resulting from such a confusion3 would be absolute, in that not only would 
there no longer be objcots of icaediato perception, but cven inference would 
bocome imporgible. Lucullus now also apella out the cenelusion implied in 4 
the Academic position, that it what appears to the said and the cane porcon 
can be qualitativoly aliko, 
5no 
one can be euro that he in anno and not Iah 
(adding by way of a joke that the wich to produce auch a state of affairs 
would indeed be a oiGn of madnes3). Dr the came arguxcnt, wo cannot know that 
wo are now awake and not dreaninß. The answor of tho Acadomio would probably 
1If. 
Conche (Pvrrho ou 1'n rap rcnc-ar p. 04) thinks that the aeouzation in aimed 
at Philo in particular, on the ground that 'quad Haunt' in raminiaeent of 
'eo quo minima uolt' in IS. But the rutoranco is solely to 32 here. 
2Cf. 58 ('no confundam omnia'); Numonius fr. 25,66 ff., fr. 27,56 ff. 
(Don 
Places). Us are reminded of the warning 'if Fpicuruq f"' . irdt. 52) that 
acceptance of the eritcria provided by ccrao in necencary if we are not to 
confuse everything by maintaining the orroncoua. It in unlikely that the last 
clause is specially directed at sceptics. Lueretiuo, however, dots cpcak of 
the sceptic as a person who stands on hie head inotoad of hia feet 
(IV, 72). 
A variant of the charge is that the aeeptio confounds or destroys life (3]). 
3Cf. 
110: 'iiaquo non metuit nu confundoro onnia uidoatur of incerta roddoro'. 
4Sao 
pp. 169-170 of thin Commontary. 
5'Si 
enim rca ne its haboat ut nihil intorait utru sui uideatur ut incano 
an cano, cul possit cxploratum enge do aua aanitatu? ' 1o id retains thy. P= 
raiding 'haboant' and takes 'rya' (plural) to refer to external objects 
(p. 242 n. 1). It might, however, be difficult to orplain what in meant by 
'objects being such that it makes rn diff.. rrnco whether it appears 
('they 
appear', Rackham, reading 'uideant4t"') to anyone ir. the cane way an to the 
nud or to the nano'. It in preferable, therefor-, to accept Coerenz' 
correction 'habeat' and to translates 'if the croo were ouch that it made no 
difference whothor anyone had impressions resembling those of the mad or of 
the nano pei-din' (i. e. if there were no way of dictinguiching the Impressions 
of the mad ... id cane person) 
'no one could be aura of hic own aanit '. The 
are mont hero in reminiscent Of Arintotlo'a view (? 'at. 1C47b 19 ff. 
) 
that if 
contrary predication were poasiblo, the nature of thin^s would be indotornin- 
ate; of. lyrrho'c view that things in thercelvca are Indeterminate in the 
aent. o that our judgements about them can be neither true nor faloa (3touph, 
p. 10 ff. ). 
6nutarah 
uuoo a similar arrumcnt when attacking Epicurus' confusion of nornanl 
and abnormal experience (Adv. Col. 1123C ff. ). 
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bo that, although wo cannot be entirely certain, there in a high degree 
of probability that we are awake, and that the general belief that there 
is a difference between dreaming and being awake justifies us in maintaining 
the distinction. 
Car n of mintakcn identity do not purport A Z&a lý' CL YY 
54-50 (P"53,16 - p. 55,20) aimilitudinen ucro oublata uer. l at falci notw. ... 
summary. But they childishly chane after likenesses between twins or 
seals Impressed by cigret-rind . Who would deny that there are 
similarities, since they appear in no many things? If this abolishes 
knowledge, why not be satisfied with +t, particularly as we grant ! t, 
and why rather contend what nature does not allow, that each thing in 
its own class is not such as it in, and that two or more objects can 
share a common character with no difference at all? We grant that eggs, 
bees or twins resemble one another, but you want them to be not alike, 
but the name, which is impossible. (55) Then you take refuge with the 
physicists whom the Academy despises, and cite Damocritus' claim that 
there are innumcrablo worlds, some of which are not only alike but 
totally identical, and similarly with human beings. In vice of thiu, ' 
why, you argue, should not two thinC-s in our world be qualitatively 
alike? Why, if innumerable replicas of Q. Lutatiun Catulun not only 
can but do exist, formed out of the atos. s from which Demooritus dorivos 
cveryth. 'ng, may not another Catuluc be formed in thin world of aura? 
(56) 
, 
But more refined philosophers have clearly shown that each 
individual thing `. a3 a particular quality of its own. The famou3 twin 
Cervilii of old, though alike, were not identical and could certainly 
be dintlariished apart at home and by people alone to them. Have . ºa 
not come through familiarity to distinguish persona, whom we would 
have thou. --ht indiutin6uiohable, no c. toily that they did not even appear 
in the le., tot alike? (57) Cn thin point you nay chow fight, but I will 
not resist you. Indeed, I will even grant you that the wine man 
himcolf, whom this whole discussion $a about, will withhold his ascent 
if he is faced with ulmailar things which he cannot distinguish apart, 
nor will he aasont to an impreo: iion unlcin it in auch that a false one 
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could not be like it. But just as in other mlttera he has a certain 
method to dictinguinh true from false, co to those cases of similarity 
he must apply practice, and with practice you, no loss than their 
mother, can learn to distinguieh twins. In spite of the proverbial 
similarity between eggs, we hear that poultry-keepers at Delon during 
its prosperous days were able to tell which hen has laid a particular 
egg simply by looking at it. (50) And this in not detrimental to cur 
case, since, even if we cannot tell those egge apar:, it is nenn the 
more right to accept that this one is that one, 33 thoaO, there were no 
differer-te between them. For I have a rile to judge as true only such 
impressions as could not be false. From this I am not allowed to, 
diverge a finger's breaath for fear of ccnfusing everything. A lack of 
difference between them will abolish not only the knowledge but also 
the nature of the true and the false, so that it in absurd to say, as 
you sometimes do, that you doriy a difference not between the impressions 
themselves as they are imprinted on the mind, but betwcen their 
appearances or, as it were, their forms. But impressions are nectocarily 
judged by their appezrance, and will have no credibility if the mark 
of . true and false 
is abolished. 
Lucullue here makes an abrupt transition from the Academic arfiuzonta 
based on delusive experience to those bated on ca: oa of sioilarity between 
existing objects. He does not (aa he had professed he would do in 47 and 
has up to nc. %; been doing) first outline the nrg-uaentc un1 then answer thorn, 
but embarks immediately on his criticiecs. This is no doubt baoauae he Sa 
continuing the line of abusive attack begun in the previous section, but the 
result is tt. at the purpose and relevance of the Academic argument eare not 
immediately apparent. tie begins with a scornful re: trence to nie orponont'e 
childish interest in canC3 of rosoc.:, larce, but the eaaon for this interest 
in not explained, even in 55 which is entirely d-voted to a statement of 
the Acadeflio oxgument for the oxictence of 'doubles'. It in only in 57, 
whore wo are told that the wine an will refuse =sent as long as he is 
not cure that he can di:: ccrn the difforenca botwoer. the true and the false, 
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that the point of the argument begins to emerge, and with it the point of 
the Academic distinction between actual an. apparer. t difference, which 
Lucullus, here refuses to recognise (58). 
The Academic appears to-believe that the mere Feasibility of objects 
being identical would go a long way to support hic claim of ü=pQa»CEto. , 
If there could be two 3bjects exactly similar in all respects, there would 
obviously be two exactly matching ispressions, -ene of which is 'false' only 
because it is incorrectly taken to come from the other object. Thora could 
also be no cataleptic impression of either, net only becr: iee the one micht 
always be miotaken for the other., but also because it is part of the 
dofinitioh of the cataleptic impression that it reveals the object in auch a 
way that it could not have come from what is not that object. Apart from 
the argument about identical worlds, it is obvicus that there is sufficient 
similarity between some individuals in the case class to make it doubtful 
whether a cataleptic impression can be distinguished by its intrinsic 
qual1ty, and there is a fortiori no other way cf distinguishing them. It 
therefore becomes important for the Academic to show that there are exl'iting 
objects which so closely resemble one another that impressions from them 
are indistinguishable, and equally important for his cp; onent to deny that 
this is, the case. Unlike the case of del, u: ivo experience, the case of 
mistaken identity offers the Academic the advantage of two impressions that 
can be directly compared and may be found to catch one another in all 
"es'n. cts. This does not, of course, auto"itically explain how &%tLp Qaý c4tQ, 
is supported as a general principle. Decauaa two objects can be Lºista! xen 
for one another, it doss not necessarily mean that our senses are deceiving 
us, or that they may d'ceive us in all capes and render knowledge impos_ible. 
On this point, Lucullus leaves ua much in the dark. 
His answer may appear to be unnecessarily lengthy, though it is 
carefully organised in that each point follows naturally from the previous 
one. IIavini; argued for a difference between similarity and identity (54) 
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and mentioned the Academic argument in favour of the poooibility of idontity 
(55), Lucullua next a%tempta to undermine the Academic reliance on apparent 
indistinguishability (56). Most important of all, the wieo man is not oven 
deceived by a single case of similarity (57). The last section (58) outlinoo 
the consoquencea of the Academic argument, 
I Since tho3o sections deal 
continuously with a single issue, I have found it convenient to treat theca 
together, taking first the Academic argument from caaoo or mistaken identity 
and then Lucnllus' answer. 
(i) Th'sb Academic nrrumF^t 
To understand the Academic argument wo have to refor to Cicarole answer 
in e4-86 and to Soxtua, Ä. M. VII, 408-411. Lucullus' complaint 'oimilitudinoo... 
geminorum .. * pueriliter consectantur' and later quoution 
'quid tibi uie in 
gominis? ' make cen3o when we realise that in both piaaa4o© the capo of 
resemblance between twins is a prominent oxaQplo (the more oo in Ciceroln 
reply) used to illustrate the Academic argument. 
2 
^icoro ootn out to prove 
the validity of the third proposition in sootion 40 (fourth in 03), uam, ly 
that 'nulluni ease uiaum uorura e oenau proi`octum cui non adpoaitum sit uicum 
aliud quod ab eo nihil intorsit quodquo porcipi non pooait'. It in pouoiblo, 
argues Cicero, for someone to ba in the pruconco of one of two twins, say, 
P. Seruilius Geminua, and yet think that ho is Boeing his brother Quintus. 
3 
The utages !n this counter-argumont thus follow the nae pattern na in 
the provioua one against the Acadonic argem nt from dolua!: n 
(1.54). 
2 The oxamplc of eggs also featuro3 in gcxtuc 1 . 
). iýuMOniua (fr. 27,30-40, 
Des Places) adds the wax egg as opposed to the res. 3gg. Roid(p. 245 n. 2) 
dra. wa attention to a work on c oaxotiu by a Stoic philoaophor Herz gorae 
which is mentioned in the Ct (S %F 1,462), tut this rap havo been about 
divination by egge and not, an Reid intorprotc It, a polemic aminot the 
Academic arp^+aont about mistaken identity. Other examploo used by Cicero 
are seal-im«*scsiona (54 and C4) been (54), hairs, '; rains of corn, 
duplicate statuoc (04)" Soxtuo l. a. ) adds awikeo poking their heads out of 
a hole. Plutarch Crm mt . 1077C; F-, 
`VF 11 0112 has dovoa, bone, gratno of wheat, 
figs. 
3Thoro 
is a curious mistake in itac". Am'c translation at tho be inning of Gyp, 
which should road: 'Seoina that it is poaoibla for Publiu8 Cominus to appoar 
to you as Quintus'. 
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Similarly, tho wino =, according to Sextun A-11. YII, a10), may have an 
oxperionce of Castor and yet think he is seeing Polydeucos. This shown that 
a false impres3ion (Polydeuces being not present, the impression that In 
actually seen is considerod to be false and non-cataleptic) may be mistaken 
for a true and cataleptic ono. 
1 The true and the false muat'therefore be 
qualitatively indistiizguishablo as there is no tOtc a A. M. VIIi411) or 
'nota' (84) to distinguish them apart. Wo Must now auk how this particular 
type of perceptual error helps to establish &%ap aaA a&ta as a universal 
principle. If I confuse two similar, or oven identical objects, it does not 
follow that I can confuse two dissimilar objects. But in opposition tu the 
Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression which stipulates that it cannot 
come %b µißv u. pxo vTot , it is the general Academic view that it is always 
possible that something not present should be taken as present 
(e. g. that an 
illusion or delusion should be taken as veridical), and this is also the 
point which this particular Academic argument aims at establishing. Ilona* 
although this particular type of error would first and foremost be explained 
an a case of confusing two existing objects or oven of taking what is other 
than the case to be the case, the argument is conducted on the assumption 
that one of the two objects is absent, and an though the deception hog in 
taking what is not $there'2 to be 'there' as in the previous argument from 
delusion. This is because the possibility of contusing two exactly similar 
objects which are both present would not carry the same implication since 
it Mould be immediately rocognisod that ^uch Impressions could not be 
cataleptic. It would also have boon argued that the possibilit, r of pnteoptual 
error is extremely unlikely in such a case, and that a guarantee against our 
confusing objects preient is provided by the Stoic view that each objent is 
1Alternatively, it could be said that a true impraaaion (that of Castor) io 
being taken for a false ona, but Soxtua dooc not nay no. 
20n 
a ropresontational thoory of poreeption, this is the most important modo 
of falsity. Cf. p. 111 abovo, wharo Riot's viow of + rn 1T1 k&pxov coC In 
also diccusood. 
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unique, while the definition of the cataleptic impression only eocondsriljr 
guards against ouch a typo of deception. Hence, to Invalidate the 3tuio 
criterion and to support his claim of 4i7Lap aas aCEa as a universal principle, 
it was important for the Academic to conduct his ar,; ument on the assumption 
that one of the two objects is absent. Cicero thorofcro arcuoo (84) that if 
there has ever been one such case of fallacious resemblance (i. e. of 
indistinguishability), doubt has been cast on the validity of the criterion 
by which an impression is judged to be true in such a way that it could not 
possibly be false. No impression could thus carry a guarantee that the 
person you saw was the person you took him to be. 
i 
It is obvious that there was a close connection between the Stoic 
definition of the cataleptic improsaion and the doctrine that no two 
individuals are exactly alike, 
2 
no that by quo3tioning the one, doubt could 
be cast upon the other. - By asserting the unique character of each particular 
thing, the doctrine ensures that the objects of porjoption cannot in principle 
be confused with one another. It thus assumed considerable importance in the 
face of Academic ar, umentc, particularly that about mistaken identity, to 
establish that the true and the false arc indistinguishable. To establish 
his case by way of the resemblance between objects, it was sufficient for 
the Academi%. s to argue that two objects could appear indistinguishablo. To 
deny or assort the Stoic principle of individuation was therefore irrelevant 
(04). But if their opponents raised the matter, it wao necessary for The 
Acadorlics to question it, particularly it, au °Cice. a maintains, ' they baliuvod 
1CP. 85: 'qu. ndo igttur poto3t tibi P. Conirus quintuc uldori, quid habos 
explorati cur non posit tibi Cotta uidori qui non sit, gnoniaa aliquid 
uidotur ossm quod non oat? ' 
2Soo 
p. 266 of tihic Commentary. Also Sanoca ''r. 113,15-16.7'ho doctrino 
statos that evory articular thins is a qualitative individuation or Tattor 
SVi' 1,378 and 3955. I, 0nL', N. M. p. 161. 
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that the principle is not a convincing one. Tho: o An furthor ovidonce in 
Plutarch of their dispute with the Stoics on this issue. 
I That there in 
no reason to think that they questioned it in a context other than thex 
epistemological one, or that thoir interest extended to the ictaphycical 
implications of asserting or denying it. We miy ouppose that, just as the 
Stoics sought to make the Academic case for ü ap a\) . Ztu. less plauaibla by 
asserting tho truth of thoir. owr principle, so the . endemics aimed to support 
their caso by attacking it. 
Being consictont ccepticoo, howovor, tho Acadamico nuat ouroly have 
acknowledgod that any assertion of identity applicebla to oxtorr. %l objoot3 
would be purply, conjectural. They cannot have unsorted that objooto which 
appoar. to, be indistinguishable are qualitr. tivoly identical in actual fact, 
the only difference being purely numerical, 
2 Sinco, Acadooic ocoptioism 
lacked a metaphysical theory of its own 11com which could bo plaunibly 
inferred the oppooito of the Stoic p: insipin, they zoom to have tried, quite 
naturally, to rest their claim on the assertion of others. The atomic theory 
of Dooocrituj and his doctrine of innumerable3 and possibly identical worlds4 
1Cnmm. Not. 1077C (y 11,112) where the Stoiea are mentionod " gwtrolling with t AAcadersics both orally and in writing, und crying out that tho latter 
coz una all thir 3 with their 'indictinCuichable likeneasea'(ci+tRüv'tn. nýtiYpc . 
OVYX60uot ¶ Ltg a: 'capua) t c) by Loroinga oir. 41o qual. tication on two eubatanooo. 
Plutarch Cons on to oriticiso the Stoic theory of z: zturo (1077E ff. ). Da tanny' ('00 µi»cv and the Antoaodonto of Ancient Scaptioi. ". #'hccnonin 3,195O, p"IG 1 
ßU Osts that the Academtca may Mvo attacked the Stoics on the acoro of incon-. 
aiatoroy botwoon. their theory of mixture and their principlo of individ%tation. 
2Plutarch (Ctrm. Not. 1G77C / ,,,, )vF 11,112), defending tho Actdenicc, ourXeota a 
morn r, ) 3aibliitys'therc is no one who dooa not nupp. Aee and think that on the 
acntr., ry it would be barpriuing if in the whole of tine there h: ve not been 
two doves or two been or two Araine of wheat or the 11rovorbial two figa 
irdintinguichablo from on' another'. Cf. 55. Rist (1 , 
tja r,: p. 47) wrongly 
nvppot. oe that the Acac-sºaica did hold the view that two objoctm cri ro identical 
otI: or than : -. aerically, and ro to the Academic position an weak. 
3111ppolyt. not. 1,13,2, (nX 6OA 40). According, to thin paoaa , L. ouoirpus too held tho co a. m: Wow. See also A. L. IX, j1 4%. 67A 1). CC. the viuw of A: otrodor j 
oi' Wiou (Aot. I, 5,4/1X 70A 6)t 'it is absurd that thcrv should be one oinnlo 
04r of corn on a largo plain or th:: t thero ohot ld be only one world in tho 
3-1411to'. The attribul, i. nn of the r: uno Joctrino tu oth+tr i'rucoo,. rttica In 
without fotmintion. : goo Kirk an(1 fRavon, 'flits Ornarrrrºtir 11111nrtor)vvrrs, p. 412. 
4Cf, 125 'alion dianiriil" al, alioa uiuu mods runt1oa oaaa', Guthrio, Iilý, nry 
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would have provided a good bacia for the Academic argument. Compared to 
Epicuruo, who too had held a doctrine of innumerable worlds some of which 
are like our world, 
1 but who had also been hostile to the sceptical Academy, 
Democritus was a more respectable philosopher whose plows could, despite 
Lucullua' suggestion that the Academics were taking uholtor with philosophers 
whom they despised, 2 reasonably be quoted in support of Academic oceptieism. 
3 
The apparent lack of. differentiation between twins and coma r.: mboro of 
the came spc-ies could thus be carried a step further by postulating the 
existence, both in other wcrlda and in our own, of narcona and objects 
not merely similar but in all respects identical to those we encounter in 
daily experience. It is doubtful, however, whether atomism would really 
justify ouch an inference. Lucrotiua (II, 347 rr. 
), while holding that 
atoms might be, identical in shape and sizo, strongly asserts the opposite 
principle as operative in the world of naturat 'quorum unun quiduio gonoratim 
aumero perge, / inuenies tarnen inter so differra fi-=it. 
/ roc rationo alia 
proles cognoscere matrem / nee cater polnot prolom'. The existence of . 
of Creek Philosophy II p. 406 n. 2, ouggest3 that the ascription to Zet: ocritun of a theory of identical worlds may be duo to a miounderat:. %dinC, and that 
what Democritus may have said wau that some worlds were of the same kind (or species) as ours, not necessarily identical. Sanbure)y, ! ^; ices '5f the 
Stoics, p. 47, considers it a 'plausible inference' frcm the stoma theory 
that two bodies would be 'completely equal provided they were composed of 
atoms equal in kind ans arrango o t'. No pcrrap3 put: it too strongly when 
he cons on to say, 'ibis vice was also shared by oppcnentc of the atonio 
doctrine ouch as the Feripatetico' (confused here with the Jcadomics), 'who 
maintained th9 possibilI. ty of the absolute indiccor. ibilit; " of two diftoront 
bodies'. 
I E-M-2dj t. 45. 
2Cf. 
Lucullus' attack on the precedent ardent :a 13 fr. :: oid (p. 243 n. 15) 
currents that the 'phycici' were mocked for thoi. do atism, but the treatmant 
of the 1'resocraticc in the Luc u (13 ff., 72 ff. ) does not bear thin out. 
The reference could perhaps be to slightirg rcarka about earlier thilooophoro 
In Plato, e. g. Soph. 242o 0 ff., and the 'battle of the co and the Giants' 
in 246b 4. 
3As in 14,329 73; 1944" 
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'doubles' would bo purely a matter of chance, and it ueems hard to base any 
Cogont argument upon it. 
(ii. ) Immil2»g' counter-prom*nt 
Although, as we have open, the quootion of actual identity betwoon 
objects or impressions was considered more or leas irr levant to &nupu) )cri is 
(40,85), the Academics did nevertheloaa nttRCk the Stoic principle that no 
two objects are identical. Lucullus' ansuar, theroforo, is for the moot 
part a dofcs, cc of that doctrino, which he bolievae holds Good even if many 
aimilaritios exist between existing things. The Aesdomio argument in taken 
as a statement', of fact, not acroly of possibility, and one which in confusing 
similarity with identity propounds a view that goes against tuature. Natura, 
it is argued, will not allow that, within its class, a thine should not be 
itself or that there should be any common character without individual differ- 
ence. 
' The sharing of characteristics is, to be sure, a feature of naturo 
co that two or morn objoctn can present close cimiJptritioo. Dut this dodo 
not can that thoy do not also differ in virtue of tho uniquo individuating 
Property of eA. ch. Lucullu3, howovor, dooe not elaborate on the procico natura 
of those oimilaritico2 nor dooo ho toll us what it iu that individu. itoo an 
object. Ac;, ording to the Stoics, existing thin« are dit: crontiatcd by 
their 'individual qullity' (Lt 7o0v), i. e. that particular blond of 
qualitioa and the combination of its various parts that given an objoot a 
''I'hrs 
negatives in title nentanco ('cur id potiu. i contanditic ... nulle ro difr, rons communite'+') aro hard to diccntangla. f. 'ickhnsa&u not* and tranalaticn 
chow that ho has hi: x. -Olf fallon in'-4 the trap agaiunt which ho yarns othoro. 
Goo also 1 oid'o noto, p. 242 n. O. ý; ommunitaa' doom not traralato apa»a (o. (i ui(i, packham), but Xo i vb tI (cf. Plato 9"hß. 200d G-9), 
21ro 
mniy have in mind co=on gvalitioa. Or the difficulty of understanding 
what the 'oom, 3on giuxlity' Is in Stoioicc, Goo Riet in i'rnh rrýný p. 45 ft. , 
I 
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peculiarity of its own. 
1 In arguing that two objects cannot be oubutitutod 
ono for the other ('hoc illud esso', 58). Luculluc seems to be assuming that 
more numerical difference or purely positional properties are not onouo~h to 
individuate an object. In making a full statement about a certain objoot 
one would have to state its spatio-temporal disposition an wall as its 
relations with other individual objects. But the real individuating property 
lies in the intrinsic and overall qualitative make-up of an object. Hence, 
of the four Stoic cat, gorieo, a statement of the second (7. ot6 v) would 
already individuate it, because it would necessarily include a reference to 
the individuating quality ( Wwr. noto v) of that object. 
It is thus easy to understand why the Academic arguments pose a throat 
to the Stoic principle and that absolute qualitative indistinguishability 
would mean that two objects could possess the acme individuating proporsy, 
which according to the Stoics would be a contradiction. 
2 But if the Academic 
argument is hold to make perception impossible on the ground that the true 
cannot be distinguished from the false, a similar objection can be raised 
against the Stoic principle. For by making it necessary that an object and 
consequently its impression should present its own discernible uniqueness 
in order to be knowable, the Stoics make accurate perception more difficult 
and perhaps impossible. 3 The criticism c^uld also be raised Mainot them that 
they arbitrarily assiuilato the uniqueness of the object with that of its 
impression,:. *id that on their own prinoip] the impression and the object 
4 
ought to be troatod as two individual things. It In incufficient that the 
Loner 111 h. pp. 161-162; obleýn p. 76; Edolctoinr Tho 1? rnina of Stn icra, 
D. 22 ff.; Hicks, Stoic and F%ni_ curcýznr pD"56-57$ Could, 7no Hh1 orijv of 
chry 'i t»rußr P"59. 
21.0. it would be equivalent to caving 'hoc illud eoaot (50)" In objecting to this, Luoulluo may also be pointing out that a statement of identity botwoon 
two different objects would contradict the logical principle that individual 
cub3tance is not a predicable. 
3cr. 
Do Lacy, ice. p. 66. 
4Cf. Soxtua A. M. VII, 3t, a ft. 
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Stoic view chou]d bo dogmatically oupportod because the Stoics are Moro 
refined philocophoro than the ntoointe. I If Lucullua, on the other hand, 
believes that the validity of their principle is either self-evident`or has 
been clearly domonotratod ('dilucido docatur', 56), he would be claimirg more 
than is allowed by hie cage, for whatever the Stoics a... y have claircod, their 
view, like that of their opponents, can cnly remain an unverifiable hypothosin. 
The inference from the Domocritean doctrine could be said to be supported not 
only by that doctrine but also by the Stoic belief in an endless cycle of 
destruction and rebirth and' its corollary that ovoay now world in identical 
( ci7, apw? jaxoror to the last detail, with the previous one. 
2 It is 
explicitly stated that this would apply to individuating proportion, though 
there might be some alight variation In non-easontinl 'accidents' (L,. vr ii, 
624). Since thoao worlds cannot, however, co-exist, and therefore cannot 
load to error in this world, it was perhaps easier for the Academics to base 
their argument on a doctrine of oimultanoous irnm, rnble vorldn. 
Lucullue' second weapon of attack is relatively morn to the point, hia 
is his contention-that although roeotblancoa exist, and two objects can appear 
indistinguishable, they can be known apart, in principle if not alwayn in 
practice since they are not the camo. Rowuver alike, for instance, two twine 
may appear to be, experience shows that what is indistir iiohablo at first 
become diatinguiehabl± with familiarity and habit ('oonsuntudo'). This might 
appear to b" an admiuo en that atrangthcna rather 'h'n weAkona the Acanomio 
case, as Lucullue is well aware (57, bee. ). Fnr i: it is admitted that two 
objects can appear indietin6uishablo, this will email that confusion between 
them in possible and the Academic will have mad, his point. At the vary 
leant, this isplioc that impressions can `.. o qualitatively indiatinCuiahabl. e, ` 
"polittoribuo', 56. 
2` 11,623 rr. 
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oven to the wine ran (57). Tho empirical obaorvat! on that two objccta can 
appear similar seems hero to compel Iuculluc to concodu what ho has boon 
evading no for, i. e. the question of indistinguishability. flut his belief 
that there is always a discernible property immediately annuls tho ecneoesion. 
Ile also avoids playing into the hands of his opponents by assuming that oinco 
the similarity is known and the possibility of orrer rocognisod, such 
impressions will not in any case be taken an cataleptic. Honco the wino man 
will Githhold assent until he in cure that*ho can dtotincuioh between t«o 
similar things (57); for the ordinary person it is not necessary to be able 
to distinguish between, for instance, two eggs, or to assent correctly to a 
proposition involving the particular identification of one of them. Thum 
Lucullus' solution involves roooeniuing (1) that indistinguishability dodo 
not depend on the nature of the object but in relative to the percipient, and'{ 
(2) that where the possibility of error deists, the impression must be' 
rogardod as non-cataloptic " 
Lucu116 doom not, ao in the argument about dolusiono, cattle the matter 
once and foi all by refusing to allow that ouch oxporionco is 'oloar' (51). 
But hic position requires him to maintain that only improccion3 in which tho 
individual difference is infallibly ruveelod can be cataleptic. And this is 
a considorablo concoction to the Academic argument. For if the wino awn 
withholds ascent until he in sure that conditions for a correct jud occnt are 
catiofiod, the Acadoci c may aak, how can !: o over be sure of this? And though 
ono may guard against orror where the possibility it raoogniood, how c. a ore 
guard. a ainq: it in tacos whore the possibility in not oven known to uxiot? 
I'urthermoro, in limiting perception to canoe where individual, difforonceo 
can bo diatleguished, Lueulluo rooms to be roquirirs more than in his previous 
argumont, whore 'clarity' was enough to chow us things as they arc (45). 
Whoroas boforo, the ordinary person who was awake, sober and in his right 
mind could be said to have veridicAl cxperionco, thin now becomes the 
prc. rogativo of the oxpart. But even with the help of 'arm' acid 'contuotudo', 
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there will always remain cases in which the individuality of thingu is" 
hidden from us. In looking at nature, can we not have a 'clear' impron'äion 
without being able to distinguish two blades of grass? It is never made 
clear to us whether perception requires the ability to distinguish objects 
at the level of ordinary experience, or in a noro exact and scientific sense. 
1 
Lücullus perhaps implias the former urhon, sftor reporting the skill of the 
De"ian poultry-keepers (S7), 
2 he says that for us it is sufficient not to 
distinguish eggs, but without accenting t: the proposition that one egg is 
the came as another. 
As In the earlier arCumont (53), Luoullua admits that the wise min hsm3oll" 
will sometimes meet with unfavourable perceptual conditions and so will with- 
hold assent. But whereas before, an'abnormil state of mind was one of the 
factors responsible for his uncertainty, the fault now in duo to unfamiliarity 
with the likenesses which ho encounters. Lucullun assures us that, juat as in 
other cases the vice man his 'a certain art' whereby he diatinCuichon true 
from ralso, 3 so here he will apply experience (luaus'). The Implication it 
that, since the wise man has a way of dealing with the difficulty, the 
Academic ar ont about indistinguishable impro: sions has only a limited 
ýIn Soxtus /t. ri. VII, 250-252, the cataleptic Impracsion is said to reproduce 
its object tiexv Ly% , i. o, showing all the individual datailo 
( tö t(%ta-ca ), 
liko carvers Sinichin6 their work or coals imprintirg their likeness on wax. 
Ho who has a cataleptic impression thus diccerno Tz; %vt, xwe. the individual 
differonce of the object. This conception too= somewhat at variance with 
the view ths& the ordinary person can hav+ a cataleptio impression. 
LCf. 06; Pliny h', -Ti-X, 155. Although the poultry-keepers could dictinipioh 
which hen has laid a particular erb, wo are not told whethsir the; coul'i 
distinguish each cj laid by that particular hen. 
3Althou, h Lucullus is probably roforrin; to dialectic as the art of 
dictinguiching true and false, the moanin(; of 'arc' could include method in 
Eoneral and art in th, t sense of a particular art or expertise. In 20 i: 4 31 
wo wore told that arte like music or rainn. ing Increase the efficiency of the 
ben. -os (an argumont countered by Cicero in 06, where he dccc not seem to bo 
distinguishing between the two Doaninge of 'are' jsst mentioned). The 
admission that the wise myn, like the rest of us, will need experience an 
well an art helps to make him a more credible figure. 
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validity and does not apply at all to tho cataloptio impreonion. Ienno 
Lucullus' argument otc'd3 or falls with tho wise man's ability to distinguish 
a cataleptic froca a non-cataloptio izpro3sion. 
Thero are two anecdotes that show that the infallibility of the wine 
man wau a matter of controversy; both concern a case of deception through 
recemblance,,, The stoic Ariato apparently attached conaidorable importas, oo to 
the doctrine that the wino man does not opind. Be was, ho ever, refuted by 
failing to recognine the difference when a certain Feraaou3 caused one of a 
pair of twine to deposit money with him and cent another to reclaim it (D. L. 
VII, l62/; VF I, 347). The cocond story eons,. rns the ätoio Ephaarus who, again 
in the courao of a dispute as to whether the vice man opinoo, was deceived by 
King Ptolemy Philopator into mistaking a wax ponogranate (or bird) for a real 
ono (D. L. VII, 177; Athon. VIII, 3540 / §VF 1,624-625). Then* otorioo do not, 
of courso, establish the, fallibil. ity of the wine man, for both Arloto and 
Sphaerus, could have claimed that they wore not, uioe ron. According to, Riet 
(Stoic Thilosophy, p. 142), Sphaorua Savo the wrong answer when we explainod 
that ho had aoc nted not to the proposition that those wore pomeCranatoa but 
to the proposition that it was reasonable to think that they wore pomegranatoo. 
It may be that it tolls against Lucullua that the wino an was ouch an oluoivo 
figure that the Stoice could never point to a living exempla and always cited 
men who were already dead. But this is also the strong point in his arguncnt 
cineo the fallibility of the wino man rcnaino unproven and, an a purely hypo- 
thetical iaano, is protected against the Academic arlumant Cieoro in 04 
argues that one ainCle coca of fal]..: cioua roeomblanss will make everything 
doubtful. But the thought that the wino man aig: &: tall into oven a single 
porceptuii error In, for tho Stoic, no loan fantrotic than tho ouppociitiona of 
complete indistinguiohability produced by tho Acadaatca. And oven if itiaoro 
granted that tho wieso rzn could) in oxcaptional oircunw tanoea, nr+ko a miutako, 
thin could hardly rendor all experience doubtful, since it could be olnitaod 
that the mintako arono from homo factor other than the intrinalo natura of 
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tho improsiion. 
- The main weakness of Lucullus' criticico is porhapa that ho doeo not, 
bring out clearly and criticise the line of thought by which the Academics 
universalised their principle of tl%apo »a tc. on the basis of this 
particular argumont and the examples quoted. It wo rake a mistake of identity, 
we cannot exactly be said to be experiencing what isýnot 'there', as iu'the 
case of a delusive experience. The inference drawn that in any given case wo 
may bo taking what is not 'there' to be 'there' seems quite unjustifiable. 
But the fault perhaps lies with the Stoics themselven. Although in our eyes 
the error involved is one of judgement rather than perceptual error, 
' the 
Academics were tempted to treat it as the latter owing to the Stoic viev that 
such an impression is non-cataleptio and more or less equivalent to false, 
2 
and also perhaps to their doctrine that it to possible to perceive the 
individual difference. 3 It may be noted too that this present Academia 
argument is not wholly consistent with the previous one based on ca: oo of 
delusion. The one roots on the assumption that, since objects ors only 
oxperioncoc: through Impressions, in any given cane the impression and`tho 
reality may fail to correspond. The other tatrau for granted that there is 
correnpondonco, that ein+ilaritiea in impressions arc matched by si« il:: itioc 
within groups of objects, 
4 
and that in any given case va"m y be mistaking 
one impression for another by referring it to the wrong object. Since either 
IThe, typo of error involved ocn2orn3 the identification of parcopta ar4 In 
explained in Plato's (193b ff. ) an fitting a parcept to a vrona 
memo:; ijw, b. 
2The Stoic viow t:. t the iaproasion is fnlso because tro Judgement i4 faleo 
is the exact oppoc.: to of the i'rotagorean view that bt: cauco the perception is 
true, tho judgement is also true. 
30n the Aristotelian view that the aama fora is perceived in more than ono 
individual, the Academic argu ont would lost much of its force. 
41f 
a sceptic wants to oast doubt on all improaaionu, he cannot In the first 
place make thoce aecumptione. 
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of those mistaken can occur at any time, the conclusion is drawn that 'for 
evory true i"nprossion a false one can be found exactly like it' (i. e. false 
in either one of these two senses, since it could not be false in both though 
there is a sense in which in ovary single case it will be-doubtful if there 
is an existing object present). 
Having admitted that only the wise man cr the export can be cure of 
rocognicing the individual difference, Lucullus novortholosc reasserts his 
intention to abide by the criterion and not to ascent-to any impressions- 
as true unless they could not possibly be talge. To do otherwise would be 
to destroy not only the knowledge of true and falco but also their very nature, 
and: so confuse ovorything. 
I Even if Luculluo is begging the question by taking 
for grantod that an impression exactly represents its source (Bold p. 246 n. 5), 
it is difficult not to say that the Academic argument has those implications. 
Lucullua ond3 by mentioning the Academic distinction, which he believes is 
absurd, botweon impressions themselves as actuxlly Imprinted on the mind and 
their form or appoaranco. For impressions are, he says, jndgoa by their 
appearance,, and if they carry no discernible cark Onota') of true and false, 
they will have no credibility. 
- The distinction between actual and apparent difference between 
impressions was previously made in 40, and sooma to arise from a partial 
acceptance of the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression as exactly 
reproducing its object. Luoulluu appear: to be caling that the Academies 
admitted 0.4t thiro might be a difference between the itaprintw thomeelvoa, 
2 
1Cf. gas coo alco t%o Stoic accusation to be fcw. itt in Plutarch and rotorrod 
to anrlior (p. 294 n. t ) th. 't the Ac=lonico cont., ro otiveything with their 
'indtutinfuishablo likonoasoo'. 
2Thin 
crams to be contradiotod by Soxtua J1*tj. VII, 4Att vh2 
o the Acadomica are 
cai4 to illuotratn indigtinLniii liability in roo1'oot of 'atczp and imprint' 
(x vtw xu. paxl"IPl Y . ML xwtu ¶C1 ov 
) by thv ar6wti nt from riiatakorr 
ic+. anti ty. L nxtus in, howovor, contrnnting trio with the týr,; w ont frort dolu3lon, 
whcro the comrar icon is in ronyoct c. 'alririty z:, t intcncity'. In the earlior 
part o: Lucullun' expoaition or the Lcx,, luzir3 nný nt, it haw boon ruantwa«t that 
tharu my be no diffcroncn b, twoon im pr, 7oaicnn tho iolvon, an a furch»r atop 
bcyon4 the inability to diatirCuiah those. 
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but that the 'appearance' of one could be contu ed with that of nnother. 
This raises the issue in what sense an iu? roccion cculd be said to hive an 
'appearance' that was distinct from itself. According to Raid (p. 246 n. 9), 
'species' and 'forma' ; robably refer to the Crack c 7bo c, which he translates 
as 'class' and interprets Lucullua as aoaning that, according to the Academics, 
there are apparent distinctions between individual impressions, but that the 
two 'classes$ of true and false cannot be exactly carked off from one another. 
This is, obviously wrong and conflicts with 'specie ... indicentur' bol.. w. 
Since the Latin is ol. arly intended to translate the Crook d0oC %at µopcpfj , 
the reference could be to the appearance of the impression, i. e. the look or 
shape it presents, but with the implication that such an appearance is 
something common to the two classes of true and falso. 
1 The distinction 
drawn between the intrinsic nature of the impression and its 'a; pearanee' is 
at any rate typical of the Academics. 
2 Lucullus' final remark that true and 
false impr, saions arc judged by their 'app. aranco' does in offoot question 
this distinction. It also brings out the dilcm. a facir.;, the Academic in 
relying on'w at 'appears' to pass judgerenta of probability and at the came 
time denying the existence of any diotinotien in the 'appearance' of true 
and false. It is the 'appearance' that is decisive in a. ^. y cognitive , zdgcmont, 
and for any such judgement to be worthy of trust, it raust be based on the 
recognition of the 'nota' of truth. The arguzont looks familiar (of. 33-36) 
and it is significant that Lucullus goes an (59) to argue bristly that even 
judgements of probability should require that there be a reeoCnicabla 
diffo'ence : etweon t: -,. e and false. 
1Roid, in his note on 'ar. ecio' (p. 246 n. 9), seers to : ocognico trat 'arocieO' 
can also mca. ri 'appearance'. The ao+zrco of his miatrkn :,, era to be th. tt he 
takes 'inter ipzas irapreasionea nIhil intorowze' to rotor to the 'arpnaranco' 
and 'inter speoiea of quasdam : orna.: ac. -=' to the cbjootiva r%turo of 
impreaaionn. It is the uppoaito that, I boliave, holds rood. 
2Zho 
ansuwnption that tho imprints themselves my differ is reminincant of 
Milo's view criticiced in 34 that true inprocaionn can be ota pt±d on the 
mind but that they are not cataleptic in trnt zenro they carnet to fated 
(of. 112). In 'Al Cicero Ra1ntr_ina th.. t ir; ro^aicn: t cxn be accepted m: time 
en the bania of 'apooica'. This corwa to cont. rdiet w. -At Luculluo is harn 
cuyins. 
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Tho Aendmlc nrtn1rrnt ]enfil to 0 Yfj 
59 (P. 55,20 "" P. 56,9) illud uoro porabsurdu. -a .. * uol incognitae. 
Summary. It is absurd for you to say that you follow probability if 
nothing impodo3 you. Firstly, how can you not be hindered when false 
impressions are no di(forcnt from truo, and secondly, what criterion 
of truth is there when it in co=on to both true a.. d false? Such 
considorr. tions necessarily gave rise to hno xý ' ions the ou3ronsion of 
assent, in which Arcosilas was more con:; istont it the views of some 
people about Carnoados are tree. For it nothing is pore-ptiblo to them, 
assent must be abolishod. 
I For what is no rointleos as to assent to what 
is not known? But as we were told yesterday too, Carnoades uaod to have 
recourse to the admission that the wits man would sometimes opino, 
2 i. e. 
oommit, a fault. I# on the other hana, 
3 
convinced as I am of the 
possibility of perception (about which I have been arguing too long 
already), am still more convinced that the wine aus never opines, i. e. 
novßr assents to anything false or unknown. 
Lucullue passes his final indiotmont on probability, pointing out that 
%7tapaaaaQta abolishes even the Academic criterio... This conclusion tolloYaa 
from his previous comments on the aignificarco of 'species' in cor: ition; it 
also echoes the gist of hie earlier critioicros of probability (33-36), namely 
that there is no criterion of truth if true and false impressions can praaont 
a common appearance, that probability, whatever its degrwe, suet be dato rminod 
by some evidence that is recognicod as true, and that lack of a difference 
between true and falLs doprivoo all probably judgomonto of credibility. 
But if provlously Lucullus was only trying to fore- on the Academic this fact 
Cf. 'tollendem' in 1481 'must be vithhcld' (itackl-am) in to put it mildly, 
2It is very difficult to dotormino whether 'intordum' qualifies 'dolabi' 
or 'opinaturum'. It would make come if it wore to qu%li: y hither or both 
(cf. 67). Yn 112 it q"aalities 'opinari'. %ockham similarly takes it to 
go with 'o;! naturum'. Sod p. 311 below, cap. n. 3. 
3'Porro' doom not designate'a third atop in the ar mont followirj on 
'primwn ... doindo' above, as Fold 
(p. 247 n. 21) cu ; nata. Apart from 
introducing a new point, it also cots up a contrast botwoan the pojition 
of Carnoadoo and that of Luoullus. 
306 
that he muht acknowledge the exiotenco of a mark of truth if hic own criterion 
io to bo opcrational, it is only now# aftor his curvoy of tho Acadcinic 
arguments to cutablich b-apaaac to , that he makes the final Feint that, 
if &%apQ)Aa, &ta it; accopted, there can never be any 'lack of hindrances 
to probability. And this proviso will alwayu apply in two wayo. Firstly, 
Academic -r naaaa. 1 to in terms of the appearance or impression crontra- 
dicta the alleged reliance of probability on"whAt appearn, for it leaven no 
jround for judCin; one impreoßion to be more probable than another. Secondly, - 
the appearance is the only aspect of an impression un which any tons of 
judgement can be based. If what in probntlo in dittorcnt from what In 
perceived, it is not boaauee the areas of evidence differ, in each eaio, but 
becaurzo the perceptual conditior. 3 differ; lack of any diatination in the 
'appearance' of iraproasiona will therefore conatituto a hindrance to probable 
Judgement, as to perception. 
In using tho phrase 'ai nulls ro impedismini' (59)o Luoullua ray 
bo thought to bo roforring upooifically to Carnoados' cocond variant of 
probability, 1.. c, the 'probable and unhindered improooion'1 to which Cicero 
had referred earlier (33) n3 'probabilea tuinionoa) of qw o non idpedimtur'. 
Cicero often Apcai of the probable nr&d unliindurod imprecoion2 am thou6ii it 
were the pro! 'erred critorton a3 oppoecd to the maru1y probable improxoion. 
This oomoo out oloarly in 104 whorl, reporting; Cliton ohun' oxplaation of 
the two moaninq; o of &7coxfj ', he otatca that not all improonions of thu 
kind that move use to uction are actually sacnptcut, but on3v tliot o that cro 
unimpoded. On tho othor hind, any wegrot of probat lit, 4ou1d depor. 4 ou coma 
form of ovidonoo, no that tho rhrano i1y oimply an what it says, that the 
1wextua, Fý. 7T.., 227-22O; Ar;. "III, 116 fl. 
2101,104, toy, 1OC-109. 
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probable is accepted provided there in no obetaclo to its acceptance. 
' Since 
the same provico was applied by the later Stoics to the cataleptic imp. -. anion 
(Sextus A. M. VII, 253), the proviso as Huch need not have implied anything more 
than the probable as a criterion. In genoral, the Anadomie can therefore be 
said to follow probability, prcvidod there is no hindrance, an a norm, so 
that at any level Lucullus will find a hindrancA in the absence of a 'propria 
nota' of truth. Similarly in his roply, but perhaps without Mustitication, 
Cicero will claim to have (rood probability from all its ont nglomento. 
2 In 
109 he evades the issue by .. ttributinc to the dog=at: at the argument that it 
is the belief in the impossibility of perception that will imrodo the action 
of the ran who claims to be following probability providing that nothing 
impedes him. But Lucullus is not simply arguing that lack of perception is 
an impediment to action, or that what is judged rarely probable should be 
perceived; he in arguing. that his oppononts' own doctrine of the common 
appearance of true and false impairs not only perception but also the 
judgement of the probable. The force of this argument would hr.. o boon 
recognised by those sceptics who regarded probability as inconsistent with 
17coXfj and involving a ecmnitccnt to objective fact, not toroly to appearanco. 
3 
Whtle implir! tly subscribing to the general belief that probability In 
inconsistent with scepticism, Lucullue coon the solution to the problem only 
in the rejection of ü, Kapa7)atZta , the direct cor. -equonce of which is 17koXf, 
1Cf. Orr. II, 8: 'gtid eat igitur, quoll mo impodiat oa, quas urobahilie aihi 
uideantur, cequi, quas contra, improbaro atque aft1L. uºndi nrrngantiam uitantem 
fugero tcsmeritatom, quas a cnpiort+' dicridot plur?.. um? ' 
2105 'sic igitur indueto of conatituto probabili, at co quidem oxpedito aoluto 
liboro rulla re implicato, uidos profoeto Lucull: iºcere für illud tuum 
peropicuitatie patrooinium'. 
3Soxtun V. 11. i, 226 ft.; Totiun A1h1. rnd. 212,169t 30 ft.; of. Nun. tr. 27,37 
(DID hlacoa). 
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If probability is inconsistent with A. 7 apcLU UI. to, and the uonnequenoi 
of b7Eapaa. aa to is &7cokfj , it naturally follows that the abolition of the 
probable as a criterion would lead to 17taxii . Though the Academics claim 
in the first place that following probability does not involvo aaoont (104)ß 
Lucullus here seewa to imply that a probable judgement is, like a judgement 
of perception, an act of assent. His deduction of b'roXf1 from the Academic 
pogitior. 
1 
and the need to preserve the integrity of the wine man appears to 
correspond to the attempt by the Academic himoalf to infer the necessity of 
bEOXh to safeguard wisdom from the Stoic position. Thar view Attributed to 
Carneadee, that the wise man will eomotinoa opine, in accordingly seen :s 
contrary both to Arcesilas' view and that of the Stoics. An Cicero points 
out in 66, in the matter of cafecuardinfJ wisdom by rofusinff to sanont to what 
in false or unknown, Aroasilas saw eye to eye with his oppononts. 
2 
One of the meanings of 17ttXCL1V in to refrain from any dotinito 
affirmation or denial of anything (104). S0xtu3 gives a similar axplanal'blion. 
3 
When Chryoippus advised that one should keep silent and exercioo t7oXfl in 
face of the cnriton, the attitudo of mind which he van thinking of aas again 
one of rcntraint fron both affirmation and denial. The doctrine of J%0Xh 
also lcade to a ntato of aontnl tUupenae i-hereby one neither aftirmn nor 
denieo the validity of the point at i0ouo. 
4 The attitude of the vice than in 
the presence of ncn-cataleptic inprecQionn (53) is `imilarly one that 
In tO Ciccro Bonics that '%%oXfi ncca: aurily to1lown from 47tapnaaa ,; Ca 
on the ground that the wico an pint, u1 the nano$ hold an opinion, t. 't 
he doca not pieu3 tho point. 
2Cf. Box tun n. f-. vII, 156-157. 
3 
. t, 1o= 196. 
4Ct. 1,46; Caxtu: i P. 11,1,0 ff., 31 rt.; 1961 Clam. ýtron. VIII, 5 "vj 11.121). 
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refrains from both affirmation and denial. Standire for a neutral montal 
state betwcon affirmation and denial, L nn xf) hao, therefore, a wider 
connotation than 'retontio adseneionio', in that the former covers any not 
of judgement' while the latter denotes only a roatraint from the act of 
positive accoptance, aozent beinij, as wo have seen (p. 196), an act of 
approval rather than disapproval. On the other hanl, the main, if not the 
sole justification of btoxfj , in to avoid acceptance of what is false, no 
that accent is treated as the very oppodito of &ioxfj and to withhold _onent 
becomes its primary meaning. Hence Cicero horn tranalatea i no Xf1 na 
'adsencionis rotontio', perhaps not a: oroly bocauao thin In the central issue. 
in the controversy, but bocau3o thin is the priraxry moaning both for the 
Stoic and for the Acadocic. 
2 
Lucullua hare moans by bo Xfi the permanent withholding of aaaont 
which he regards as following noo©acarily from Academic &xapaaacziawh1ch 
undermines the probabin as well an othor possible criteria of truth. 
3 This 
is a logical rather than a historical dovoloroont, though Lucullua ta. y also 
be saying tat those conaidorationu historically gave rise to the doctrine 
of perm anent 1no fj in the Academy. It is plausible to think, however, in 
view of the General Acadowio tendency to roly on sac nptiona mide by their 
opponents them olvoa, that InoXflwau first practised to a limitod nxtoet 
1So Soneca (&: 103,21) urnao*tho oxproaoion 'iudiciuw auatine', though probably 
in tho non-technical Rance of 'rotorving Ju&r, oont'. For tho ryrrhoniit, knoxtlnor ally ha. 3 thin wider rornao, ao that oven jtid c. onta of probability 
aro inconcintont with it. 
2Ct. ti_t. XI11,21,3s'to.. porqua Carnaadoo 7tpo fv cilia nt rotentionom auripa 
oiclilem tacit rýxc;; ý'i'" But hie translation can Eoaetiracn be saialeadina, an 
for oxsrplo jr. 104, Whore the p: u saeo is clarified to a conaidorablo extent 
if one undorutmnda ? -, 7.1XC LV in the nano* of 'to auapanl judgement' in the 
placo of 'a t onuua ou: stinoro'. 
3The 
quoation 'quoi iudioiu sat uori, cu, *it ccr uro tnlai? also rotarg to 
the Stoic criterion which is invalidated by the Academic oontantion th.. 'tt oven 
tits 'cataleptic' impro ion can be snatched by a folau one. Cr- 33.34, 
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among the Stoics, and it was from Stoic promicaoa that Arccailan polemically 
inferred his doctrine of catoxt) ''. ept it v r* v. 
ý 
The point of the contrast between ? rcoailas and Carnoado: is not no 
much to defend the former an to illustrate the atraita to which the Academic 
may be driven by the absurd nature of hie Fromiccoa and to chow the do cnora- 
tion into which the Acadomy had sunk as a r. =lt of ccepticicta. The contraot 
introduces the possible consequences of the Acadoaio caao for wisdom and 
Lucullus' defenco of the concept of tho wico san. Coaxtus too rognrdu Arcooilao 
as a more consistent sceptic than the other Acrdomics and an nearer to the 
Pyrrhonist. 2 But this is not because of the view in our piosal; o that Carnoadea 
had given up & io xfj, but because the doctrino of probability implies coma 
form of dogmaticm. 
3 Lucullua does not harn rontion the Clito choan viov 
that Carneades had maintained that the wine can would com, times opine coroly 
for the sake of argwzcnt (78). Tharo can bo no doubt that Carnoadoa had =do 
the admission. What is not certain in whether Csracades had advanced it for 
the Foke of argumont or had really rasant what he caidp as Thilo and M. otrodoru3 
believod (70). Yet it is not clear if Lucullua is exp roach doubt &is ;, o 
whother Carnoadoo had in fact made this otate: ont, which h -, d can attritutod 
1T. hic is the conclusion of P. Cou. iaain, 'L'origiro at 1'dvolution do 
1' 1%6X1i', 
Mr, 42 (1929) pp"373-3V7. There hzn boon : rich controvoroy as to uhothor Pyrrho 
or Arccailaa invented Cie doctrine of 17 oXh . Couipoin'c view in that J'oXfj 
is not necessary to the scepticism of Pyrrho, which -is chtracteriood by an 
" indifference to things rather 
th. in idoaaa, brochard (rp. 95 and 110) attributes 
the invontior, of the doctrine of 
l7toXh to dreosila. s on the basis of this 
u. anago and 77. I: o believes this is backed up Ly the stator nt 
in DioConon 
L3ortius (IV, 28) that Arcoailas was the first to withhold assent owing to the 
equipollence of arguments. 
2P. }?. I, 232. According to r=oniua (fr. 25,67 ff., Don Places), Arccoilan vas 
hold to be a 'acoptio' by 'fimon and othora in the aamn cons* in which they 
thomoolvoo were 'ccoptico'. 
3Soxtu3, however, door not find Arcoailao .oB. totally coraiatont on tha 
ground that he had positively condemned accent 
(233). 
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to him in the proviour day'a conversation, or uhothar ho had not%ially 
meant it. 
1 
If Lucullua is referring solely to Philo c»d Motrodoru3 (70), and 
presumably to Catulun' father (140), he would then be deliberately ignoring 
the view of Clitomachus, perhaps to avoid considering the polemical intent of 
Carneades' admission and its repercussions on the Stoic position itself. The 
admission that the wise man will occasionally ascent and opine may merely 
ha!, * been a aay of irritating the Stoics further by going the opyaooito way 
to Arces; las and telling them that their d3finition of perception loads to 
opining on tho part of the wine man and in tact undermines wisdom. 
Alternatively, Carneadoo may have boon pretending to accept the objection 
that probability implies ansent, without agreeing that assent implies 
perception. At any rate, it is certain that he could not have boon driven 
to this admission by the criticism that aaaant In nocoasary for action, 
2 
since the theory that the probable mlkeo action possible without docent (104) 
ingeniously meoto the argument from inaction. It is alto quite improbab). o 
that Carneades saw, as Thilo may have thought, that L O) fj about cvorythinC 
would no longer be nocoscary in the light of a now definition of poreop. '. ion. 
But, whethor we accept the Clito! chcan view or thcit of lhilo, ancont would 
only bo occaeional3 (presumably when the 2. ht conditions were thou ißt to 
prevail), though Ivory act of ascent would b, 2 equivalent to opinion, beoauno 
4 
'lei 
uora uuat quao do Carner. do non nulli oxiuticnant' (59). 
2 Soo, however, Icvan, Stoirn and s(-option, Zrp. 131-135. 
30n-Thilo'o 
views Carnosdeu would have ,; ivo up ko)( for good. In 
principle, therefore, Mile, could not have hold that Ca: noadca only occasion- 
ally voiced this view. If Lucullu. 3 in really ignoring the Clitor chcan 
interpretation hero, thin would perhaps be another rvanon why 'intardum' 
probably qualifies 'ol-inaturun' rather th. *n 'dolubi'. 
4Cf. 70,140. At the boginnini of 67, Cicero acema to imply thnttMaoont 
would not alwayu raoult in opinion. But them thu ar unont is boing 
dirooted at the ätvicu wino aru boing told that if uaaont is oxerciood on the 
understanding that uhat is aruzentod to to porcoivod, than, if the wino rain over 
naaonta, he will : cn otimeu opino. In 112, whoro Cicero Qxpoundtt l'hilo'n 
ponit. ton, ho m 3y bo theu!; ht to imply that one Would not tuoccaaarily be 
opinJnr; when oxrroini»c u,, aant. 
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the Academic would still hold that thero is no ouch thing as n cataleptic 
impression. Since in any caco Cicero profera the explanation of Clito "tchuo 
that Carneados had put forward ouch views only for the sake of arCumont (70), 
wo may take it that Cicero himself did not baliove that Carncndou had given 
UP ko xh or that the theory of probability required him to do no. 
i 
Although Lucullus deduces 1. o)1 from thA Bare factors which ha hntld 
to invalidate probability, he does not claim that the doctrln- of probability 
as such invo? vos the wise aan in acta of ascent and opinion, 
2 but roliec cn 
the alleged admission of Ca: -neadoa that tho wino can will accont to contrast 
the immorality of scepticicm with his own 103ition. If Arcaailao no loot than 
Zono had sought to precorvo the moz. nl and opiatemio integrity of tie wino L%-m, 
3 
Carneadea is hero presented as trying to do tho very oppooito. In order to 
contrast this integrity with the moral wcakrcca of Carneadoa' admicoion, 
Luoullus hero emphaoicoo, the negative aide of the conception of the wino man, 
which is common to Arcesilas and the Ltoica, =41y that ho can never be 
brought to aosont to what is fclco or unknown 
(i. e. whnt is not 'catsloptio') 
and thus commit a moral sin: 
4 
But apart from thin one area of agrccmont, the original Academio and 
Ltoio conceptions of the Woe an are vary dtfforont. For the Academia, 
avoidance of rashness and error is a virtue in itaolfj for tha Stoic, it in 
a corollary of the poadaoaion of knovlodgo on which the virtue of the Woe 
man dep4nds. The total exclusion of opinion, whothr.: trug or faloa, from the 
1Tho 
conneotion between ascent And lrobabIlity and id'o notion of 'qualifiod' 
aaoont were diecuesod oarlior under . octions 37-30, i. 196-190 of thin 
Co=entary. 
2Concequently, he cannot, like St. Au : otino (Ar;,. rll, i5,33 rr. ), condemn 
rrobability o,: the grouni that it load* tc, error and cubvo its morality. 
" 366 inf., 77/ üoxtus A`H"Vl 
It 156-157- 
466,63; Ac. I, 42; F in. III, 1Bt'a tilge, nuten Aisoftnnionn na, io non olio nxtoo 
coca qwu a cotoris robuu, quao hint contra r tturara, arbi; rantur. ' 
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realm of wisdom, which was typical of the Stoica, 
t thus ro®ultod in a utrictor 
conception of the infallibility of the wies yin thmm is possible for the 
Academic. And on the assumption that knowledge involves both the objects of 
knowledge and the knower, this Stoic view here provides Lucullus with another 
important guarantee against doubt and scepticism. In contrast with the Stoio 
view, the Academic : rise man has no more win-fom than the ordinary person{ 
inO4ed, if he is not allowed to hold opinions, he may have less. If Carnoados 
and Philo after him sought to redress the balanco by allowing the wico man to 
have some opinions (though the claim of Carnoa.. tos ray have boon purely arEwnon- 
tative), their intention may also have been to narrow the sap between the wise 
man and the ordinary person. 
For Lucullu3, on the other hand, the claim of corality and wiodom In 
paramount, and in view of the numerous occauiona on which ho has tried to bring 
a moral note into the diocuesion, this my also bo takon an roflocting the viow 
of Antiochua. It is porhape unfortunate for Lucullus' own caco that ho claims 
to ba even mors convinood of the fact that the wine u. an never opinao than of 
the fact that there is comothing that can be known. Thin also kross A jr.: net 
the Stoic view that thoro a: o no dogroo3 of xajC). tj* tC or of truth. The 
romark, howovor, qualifying his mention of perception 
('do quo Jam nimiuo otiao 
diu disputo') reaffirms the dogmstiot'o bt! iaf that nrgumont to oatablioh the 
poaaibility of porception is relatively pointloaa, rid also looks forward to 
tho end of hic counter-arg<uaont. 
T. »c»llun triostinnn the rntivon or,, ttln Ar n is 
6u (p-56p9 » 21) ro3tat illud quod dicunt ... dicondi uto tuiaaot? 
Summary, Thorn iu loft their claim that the purpoao of arguing on both 
aidoo of a quostion is to diccovor the truth. If I eck what they ?. -vi 
diocovorod, the : oply in that they do not ravool it. Coma noup ah-at in 
1Ac 
ording to Cicero (77,113), the viow Mott the who twin never opinora hid 
novor boon uphold a3 explicitly and strongly boforo :. cno. 
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that sacred doctrine of yours and why conceal it as though it wore 
something liacreditable? The reply in, 'Co that the liotencr may to led 
by reason and not by authority'. Is not the use of both equally cou ond- 
able? One doctrine they do not conceal in that nothing can be perceived. 
Does not authority stand in your way here? To me it seems to do co, and 
to a considerable extent. For who would have ospouaod ouch evidently 
perverse and false views, had it not bean for the eloquence and invent- 
iveness of Areesilan and, still more, of Carnoadoa? 
Lucullus, now near tho end of his arucnt, takes up two points raised 
by Cicero in the proem (7-9), namely that the aim of the Academics is to 
discover truth, and their inuiopendence of authority. Ills treatment is purely 
general, but since he has chosen to make his points in the form of a fictitious 
conversation (cf. 32), the subject of the singular 'inquit' has been thought 
to be Areesila©, on the ground that the ehargv of concealed dogmatism is most 
appropriate to that philosopher. 
1 If eon Lucullus would be conceding that 
Arcecil's was among thoso'whoco professed aim wan the diooovo y of truth, 
althoujh it is not at all certain that this motive had a legitimate place 
in the Academy of Arceailaa. 
2 There are, however, claims in Cicero that 
Arcesilas, like Carneadea, was actively cued in the search for truth. 
5 
Lucullus does not believe thin , 
(16)# but he is accepting his opponents' 
contention ac a basis for argument (whether or not this involves a ehargo of 
concealed dogmatism). This does not, however, constitute a reason for us 
o identify the aubjoot of 'inquit' with Arcaoilas only. wa 
1Soxtua P. I1. i, 254; Aua. Ae. I, 17,38t humcniu3 fr. 25,7i fl. (Doo r1ncea). 
Long, f. Ph. p. 93; Drochard, p. 114 ff-; liotln, p. 67- 
2 Soo rp"74-75 abovo, where the Acetdomie mothoda o' arpuirg on both aidoa and 
of oppocinß the views of othoni are diocuaued. 
376-77. Soo p. 75 n. 5 abqvo. For Carneadc', cf. fl r. I, q. 
4For 
the common uno of 'inquit' without cubjoot, coo Lau1nn-Ixofmtinn. antyr, 
Lnto niaohe Cr, ir mttik II, pp. 417-410. Cf. PPr33t. 2ß7s ' hucydidor, ' inquit, 'imitaznur. ' 
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The, charga of concealed°do&aatiom could bo brought nnainot other 
Academics as well, particularly in viow, of Cicnro'u claim that they have all 
along been searching for the truth. Accusations of concealment are m. 1do 
against Carneados by Numeniun who, however, oeecs to be alluding to the 
notorious difficulty of finding out Carneo4ec' real views. The roa%rk 
, attributed to Cicero 
by St. Avguatins (Ac. III02O, 4 ), that the Academics 
. 
used 
to hide their doctrine and not reveal it to any except those who had lived 
with, them up to old ago, may similarly be thought to rotor to thin fact, 
2 
Philo's innovation, oy which he attempted to bridgo the cap between the Now 
Academy and Plato, might also have expos M the school to the charge of 'secret' 
doctrines'. St. Augustine speculates (Aa. III, 17,37 ft. ) that the Academics 
had all along been keeping secret the doctrinaa of Plato in order to reveal 
them at the appropriate time, and interprets rhilo'j innovatory cove ns a 
return to Platonic dogmatiam. 
3 Lucullus can therefore be said to have had 
enough grounds to accu. o the Academics of hiding their views, oalvoially if 
they were in principle unwilling to voice them for pedagogical reacono. 
' 
Dooauao of his deuiro to bring to the fora the charge of ocnccaltvnt, 
Luoullus ignores Cicero'o claim that the:, Acadonio alto airs at and cannot 
go beyond probability, and for the a=* roaaon he doeo not difforcntiato 
between the early negative Acade: aio method of cppooing the views of other* 
and that of arguing on both aides which as char. otarictio of Arictotlo and 
ß c. 27,56 LT., 69 ft. (D03 rA. aoe_). 
2' (Academiof a) morem fuicoo occultindi cententic auaw, nee *am cuigW L Mai 
qui LIecum AA conectutem uoquv uixiucot apariro ccr. aucs: e' (tlanberg, p. 24). 
C:. 98, where it is said that Clitor.. aehue was Frith Ci noadeo 'u: que ad 
aonectutem'. 'Sententiam summ' is of course ambiti: oua. Krincho was perhaps 
right in aooi , ning 
this statement, or something like its, to the third book 
of the soco:.. t edition, which would have correspond.; to the first half of the 
I, un ullue. Reid (p. 167 n"35) thinks the rom3rk was uvie by Cicero in Pu 
second book, whore it is also placed by plaoborg. Aa intorproted by St. 
Auf-uatine, the remark could not have come from either book, 
3Iio 
oven interprets the probable in torso of racemblanco to the truth as 
concealed by Carnoadoe Qºc. 11I, 10,40). 
4Cf. PJn. II, 2 ft, concerning Arcoailan. According to T' Cr. 1,84, Chiretdaa 
followed the came custom of not revoaling hic own view=. 
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probably of the later Academy. 
I Luculluo does not seem to be eoncornod 
with historical veracity, nor does he point out explicitly the logical or 
even psychological incompatibility between the aim of tho Academic and his 
scepticism. 
2 Bit he cannot really believe that the Aoadomic3 were dogmatists 
in secret, especially since he has earlier (26-27) argued that the notion of 
'search' or 'inquiry' is meaningless unless truth is, at least in principle, 
die: ovorablo. Indirectly, therafore, he cunt be pointing out the Inconsist- 
ency between a search for truth and the Ac. domio proposition that nothing 
can be perceived. What he Is saying is that, it the Aeadoraio has boon 
searching for the truth, then lot him tell us what he has found. It his 
inability to do so in interpreted an unwillingness to reveal some secret 
dootrino, or alternatively, something diogracot 1, this im merely ironical 
and does not imply a ocrioun chargo. 
3 The criticism of Luoullus hero to-not 
really that scepticism in in practice untenable and that the Academia to in 
fact a dogmatist, but that his profoaaod motives are a more facade to conceal 
the true no,. ativo nature of the Academic philoaophy. Ile may also have In 
mind allusions to cocret doctrines in Plnto, 
4 
which the roforanoo to 
'myoteria' ( 6i 6ppilra ) may svFgoct. Thoco allualona might in faut tuºvo 
been one of tho roasono why the charco was brought c ainat Aroooilso that hio 
1In `r. V, 100 however, Vioo, Antlochun' opokeaA.. tn, d: sa di(forontiuto tho 
tnothod of Aristotle from that of Arcoaila. s. Coo pp. 4-75 above. 
2Cf. 
p. 76 abcvo. 
, ýTho suggestion 'quasi turro aliquid contentiam uoatrrm (colatie)' mny imply 
that Lucullua too is thinking of tho difficulty of finding out Co. noader' 
roal, viewn. Ono euch viow that would be 'turpo' In that the wine can opine* (59). 
E. g. Per. 378a, Ur. 1520 LT., 100b ft., . 210a ft. 
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scopticiam was meroly a front to toot hie pupils and that in ooaret he 
passed on to them the doctrines or Plato. 
1 flut it must be emphaaiaod that 
no support can bo derived from this section in the I"ucullua for supposing 
that the New Academy ever had any eaoterio dootrinoa. 
2 Although the 
, tradition that Plato held oocrot dootrinoa and the fact that theca were 
attributed, to all or moot philosophical echoole3 wicht have lent soma 
colour to Luoullus' insinuationn, his obviouäly ironical ropr-. sentation of 
the Academic as admitting that ho conceals his viow3 CO that his pupils tray 
be led by roaoon and not by authority must make any charge of this naturo 
at beat dubious and at worst malicious. 
Lueullua argues that tho one proposition which tho-Aoadcmio does not 
concoal, i. o, that nothing can be perceived, contradict* his a11eg, d 
independence of authority, since, like the root of the Academic doctrines, 
it is so obviously faloo. that it could not have boon ootabliohod except by 
authority. 'Authority' moans in this cane the percuaaivo oloquonoo of 
Arcosilan and Carnoados. 
4 The agoumption that Carnoadea poooocrod 'oopia. 
rorum' and 'dicendi uie' to an oven groatur extent than Aroonilao in no 
doubt based on the fact that under him the Nov Academy roachad the peals 
of its dove? opmont. 
5 
1Sextu3 P. 11.1,234. Thin charCo may also be basted on an arbitrary 
intcrprotation of Ariito'a versa ('Plato in front, ryrrho behind, Diodoruo 
in the middle'), which, like'tho veraoe of 'ticon, could only have been 
meant to rotor to tho various influences on Arcaailia (cf. D. L. IV, 33; 
Vumoni1,3 fr. 25,15 ff., Don Placca). Uran i4umaniua (fr. 25,75 rf. ) rejects 
tho a1loCation that he wan afraid of the attacks w. 41o on philonophero by 
? 3ion and the followers of Thoodoru^ of Atnoa, and L. concealed his views 
in order to avoid trouble. 
2Goo DrochArl, p. 116. 
3Roid, 
p. 248 1.2. 
4The 
rhetorical c-nd arm=entfttivo skill of both Is well docu ented$ For 
Arceoilun, coo 16; Do Or. 1119671 D. L. IV, 37,43 sind 44; Numeniuis tr. 25,27 fr. (toe Flacon). For arncadoe, 'in. III, 4l; L=. 11I, 0; Do Or. 111,161; 
D, L. IV, 62-63; 1w niua fr.? 7,7 ff. or the +ri w oat, cf. Loxtua A. j. VII, 326. 
5Lucu1luu ju'i +cmcnt is cupportod by llumcntuc, tr. 27r7 ff. (i i'1t oo ). 
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The answer which Lucullus gives in pacoing to the Acadomio avnroion to 
authority, namely that a combination of roaaon and authority may be bettor 
than either alone, 
' fits in well with Antiochua' support for the Old Acadomio 
tradition, which did not, hoiovor, involve blind adhorenco to that tradition 
or to Stoicism. Although Cicero mzintaina in 137 that Lucullue lo bound to 
follow the doctrines of Antiochus and defend them an he would the walla of 
Roma, this is perhaps not a fair otatoment oftho do matiat'o attitude to 
authority. 2 The Academics themselves aoom to have made oxtenaivo use of 
precedont (13 ff. ) and even Cicero does aomatiiaoa claim to be following 
authority. 3 He would, however, have no doubt nerood that roaaon and authority 
are the boat guidon whon they point the came way, but that, of the two, reaaon 
should lead, not follow. 
4 
ThA rprörntien 
61-62 (p, 56,22 - p. 57,16)ha00 Antiochus .. * minu. atut auotoritnn. 
Summary. (61) Those wore more or loan the views Antiochun put forward 
at Alexandria, and long afterwards with even more om; xaaia when we wore 
in Syria shortly before his death. 1%ving ootatliahod my ca. se, I shall 
not hositate to give you a warning as a brood friend - ho was talking of 
me - and my junior by covoral yoarae will you, 
doapito your own praioo 
of philosophy and its influence on fortonaiuß, follow a oyntot that 
oonfu os the true and the (aloe, and deprives us of judgement, ovary act 
of approval, 
5 
and the ccnooa? The Cimmariana, though deprived of sunlight, 
0 
1Cf. Au3. Ao. 1II, 20, Q31 'nulli autem dubium act gcmir+o pond,. x, Mio impolli ad 
diocondum au.. toritatia atquo rationia'. The context In which "`. iio judconont 
cccura tempi.., ono to think that yt. Au. Cuntino Moir infiuonccd, if not by thin 
paaaaeo, at least by what corroapotded to it in the rocend edition, 
21n 11. n. III, 10, the Stoic Dalbua cla1CW to doopioe authority and follow reason. 
. t. 
=, 36, he would ±.. ofor to Co vronc with Plato ('orraro 3Cf. ff. In Zsi 
cum I'latono') and buliovo in irortality though it cannot be proved. 
4Seo 
pp. 46 fr., 74. Cf. Conoca I''± . 45,4: 'cultum maagnorum uirorua iudioio credo, 
aliquid of moo uhidico. ' 
52tcading ' on ni' with Flaoborg. 
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at least had firoo to provide them with eomo illumination; but the people 
you follow have shrouded everything in such dnrkneso that they have left 
us not even one single spark of light. Adherence to their system would 
leave us in chains and total immobility. (G2) For by abolishing assent, 
they have abolished all thought and oction, which lo not only wrong, but 
also impossible. You should be the last person to zmbraco such a theory. 
Aftor revealir. C things that were rout deeply hidden and atatirg on oath 
that you had found them out (a claim I could have mrdo myself aftor loarn- 
inC of theca from you), will you now affitä that nothing c-n be graapod, 
porcoived and known? Take the Croatoat care that you do not detract from - 
that mor* glorious deed. Thun ended hie speech. 
Luculluo ords with a rominder that ho is transmittinC from momory the 
argumerta of Antiochus. For tho aako of vorisimilitudo, ho admits tho account 
is only an approxiiration ('foro') of what he hoard at A1ou. ndrii, but to givo 
it groator authenticity, he adds that Antiochua uso4 to oxproca the uns views 
oven moru strongly1 yearca later, whon ho wns with Luoulluo in Syria (of. 4 and 
10, 'eadem do re saopius'). 
2 This would have tha ofloot of ehortonina by almoot 
a third tho interval botwoon tho dramatic dato and the tiwo wheii Lucullua heard 
Antiochuu, thereby compensating for any d: aattio deficiency tha incident at 
Alexandria might havo if uccd alono. 
Cicoro's philosophical dialoguoo ofton end, Ilk* an opidototfo . poach, 
with acmo form of exhortation. 
3 Ifenco Luoullua' au. ain6-up contains a atronß 
hortatory olcmant which also conforms with what was porhApa an important Roman 
1'Adßounrai tiun' would Karo a pojorativn conno from Cicero'" yoint or viawl 
0o would ho the ch ractoriatio 'confir=ta' on Luou:, 1uo' part. 
2Ono 
cannot, howovor, bn cortnin thA in 1) Luculluz is thinking of the period 
uhnn both ho and Anttochun uoro in Syria. In anti, carol it is only now that 
Cicero oxplibitly p. itc this foot to drarv4tio uao. 
13E, og. tho argument in 'yin. II onda with n j.: rconal appoal to tho Epiouroan Torquutua to abandon }hedonism; T ºno. IV coroludon with an exhortation to 
phi1o ophy; tho Acctctcmio Cotta is at the and of tt. rr urgd by the Stoic 
Balbua to adopt his own thoological viowo. 
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tradition, r1amely that those advanced in nce chould paou on orally tho benefit 
of their experience to their juniors. 
I Tho cuing. -up and the porconal warning 
are very ckilfully fu-sod together co as to bring out the supposed incompatibi. 
litt' between the actions of the author and the philosophy he upholds, 
Refutation on E rounds of inconsietoncy between the views of the opponent 
and hic own actions co"tld have been a woll-roco=endcd rhetorical prrtetlco, 
2 
and since this has boon all along one of Luoullua chief moa. no of counter- 
argument, it eacma aui+able that he should now coma to tho conflict, if any, 
between the scepticism supported by Cicero and ovents in nia life, which auggout 
convictions one would not expect of a sceptic. It is also obvious that Cicero 
is using the peroration to anticipate any quoition of inconeistoncy hatween 
his beliefs and his political actions that rlGht arias, now that ho in for tho 
first time openly supporting the ocoptioiam of the Now Aoadony (con Introduction 
P"52 ff. ). Thero will be those who will show undue curioaity about his own 
opinions on certain problem (N. n. I, 10). Atho. re will coo an incompatibility 
botwaan his scepticism and hic habit of putting forward hie views on rainy 
issues Off. II, 27). As noted in the Introduction (pp. 5; -55), thort will appear 
to be glaring inconsiotonoioa between Cicoro'a new eurport for : coptioiaw and 
the conspicuous dogmatic featuroo in his r:: ilouophicol, wor'c., what, r curlier 
or later than the ^-, n41#nlrn, a: well as hit conduct in practical nitu. ltiona. 
But it in clear that C'Waro himuolf did not ace any inaonaiatoncy uithar with 
regard to hir intellectual activities or his political action', which l. uoulluu' 
mention of his praico of philosophy and bi. coj, "nitivo claim aoncorning the 
'Luoullus, 
who wac quaootor in 88, must hivo bocn at loant ton ycarsE oldor 
than Cicoro. 
2Cf. Ariat. S=h. l h. 174b 19-23. 
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Catilinarian con-. piracy1 recpectivoly deal with. An far as his actions 
relating to his evoryd. y and Frofcenional life are concerned, Cicero probably 
thou6ht that they had always conformed to his General anti-do atio x 
disposition as well as to his moderate form of scepticism (cf. Introduction, 
p. 54). Alternatively, ha could be defended on the Grotuid that he cannot be 
expected to hrve been a sceptic in his public and professional aotivitiuo. 
2 
It is, however, less easy to exculpate Cicero'on the charge of incompatibility 
botween his nraiso of philosophy in the Itortonnium and 1eonvornion'3 of the 
chief antagonist who gave We nano to the dialogue, and his support for 
Academic scepticism. For it was both the traditional and the currant view 
that philojophy was the love of wisdom and dealt with the search for truth 
in the absolute sense while on the Academic view the wino man does not possess 
any knowledge. Cicero's insistence that the Academic in a 'searcher' is ono 
way of bridging the gap between the idea of philosophy an concerned with 
truth and knowlcdgo and the Academic denial that anything can be known. nut 
this is a dilomma which he never really solves 
(of. Introduction p. 49). In 
the prosent dialogue, Cicero gives no explicit answer to either of the two 
points raised by Lucullus. 
1ff key worm here io 'comporiaao' which Cicero had tpWontly uood in the 
Senate to inw'icate that he had knowlodCo of the conspiracy, In Att. I, 14,5 
we are told that Clodiuz quoted the word in his accunation of Cicorot 'co 
tantu.: n "cornparirsoe" oirnia, orimin: tbatur. ' The implication would to that Cicero 
hnd ouppro:. cca evidence. Cf. ' Itowo'n note ad loc. 
(p. 74) and F . V, 5,2= Raid 
p. 250 n. 6. i 63 Catulun interproto Luoullua' wsrniatfi 
('uido quacao... '. 621 
aj a rof`rcnco to the much-drotWed tribunate of which Cior, ro r;. auld 
(prophet- 
ically) beware. 
2For the vie; that corm thooric. i cc-. not b: carried to daily lifo, coo flacatt, 
1ao , tini sm, 1: p. 146-147. fiu.. acniua (fr. 26,9 ff., nos fleece) tells at humorous 
+ale about I.. xvydoo illu:; tratinb" the adze point. 
3Coo Introduction (p. 59) on thin. 
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Another important method used by Lucullu3 to refute Academic oceptici©m 
has boon to highlight its ccnsequcnceo and chow its untenability in practice. 
Ile does the same hero but not all the main points previously raised are 
recapitulated. By concentrating mostly on the effects of scepticism on the 
percipient, he appears to be giving priority to the argument (of. 31,37-39) 
that such a philosophy would overturn human life and in in psychological 
terms an impossibility. Just as St. Auguatitle was motivated to rcfuto 
Academic scovticisn because of roligious conviotiona, Luoullus has no tai 
given us the impression that the ethical argument wan the most important for 
Antiochua. The only obvious reason why t: Aia argument Is not brought in hor©l 
is that it would not carry such conclusive weight as the view that ecoptioiam 
is a negation of the percipient as a living being and results in an oradio- 
ation of all intrinsic distinctions in nature. Thera is also the point that 
the objection that scepticism undermines the nature of both the knower and 
the known would in itself imply all the other conacquences which Lucullus 
fails to mention in thin conclusion. 
Although tho woakoat point of the Anadomio capo could be conaidored 
to be tho claim of &%apaaao. Jta , Lucullua here ceema to be aoaigning more 
importance to his argunonto about aaacnt, as though those atill had total 
relevance at the tiro of the dramatic data of the dialogue and co though 
the withholding of aunt would not only have entailed in theory but aloo 
produced in vraetico the undo irablo conoaqueneoo hero not out. But oven if 
thece arnw.. Rnto had still been relevant, only the activity of the wino man, 
who practiaea total I noXfl , wool"" have noon aftca: ad by them. Similarly 
the nd hrminem arbr=: nt alloLring inconeiatoncy butwccn Cioaro'a theory and 
his practice would apply only to a man who claimed to be wiao. Luoullua 
speaks ac if any who crabraco the Academic philosophy rink bringing on 
thrumselvee t'nd their follow men the fate he doaeribaa. 
1Apart 
the ccºr ont 'non mode recta ... ricri non poaoot' (62), if thin Is interprot.. d in at aura). sense. 
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Lucullus Lilco gives prominence in hie conclusion to the metaphor of 
light and dar? rnenn (so-: - p. 144 n. 4 above). The charge that the Academics 
plunge us into total darknessI is vividly supported by the allusion to 
Homer's Cimmerian3 (Od. XI, 14 ff. ). The assumption that even the Ci=crian3 
had the light of fires to see by in pure guns-work on the part of Luoullua. 
But this thourht, together with the imago of being chained down with not oven 
a single spark of light, may be taken to august a situation worse than that 
conceived in Plato's analoty of the Cave (E=- 514a ff. ), whore the priocnere 
could at least see the shadows of reality. 
1 Cf. 16,26,30,33,42; N. n. I, 6. Tho accusation ia, partly a rotort to 
the Acadomio's own claim that everything is 'obacura' (7,321 I, 44). 
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